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"Robert Bellah (1927-2013) was a hugely-influential twentieth-century American social scientist. During an intellectual career that spanned six decades, his work became central in many fields: the sociology of Japanese religion, the relationships between sociology and the humanities, the relationship between American religion and politics, the cultures of modern individualism, and evolution and society. His seminal 1967 essay "Civil Religion in America" created a huge debate across disciplines which continues to this day; his co-authored book Habits of the Heart (1985) was a bestseller (it sold close to 500,000 copies) and became the object of sustained public discussion about the temptations and dangers of radical individualism. His last magnum opus, an interpretation of 15,000 years of human history many years in the making entitled Religion in Human Evolution and published by HUP when Bellah was 84, was a capstone to an extraordinary scholarly and intellectual career. It has been reprinted numerous times and continues to sell. In this book Matteo Bortolini recounts not just the arc of this extraordinary scholarly career, but also an eventful and tempestuous life, including a youthful student affiliation with the Communist Party USA and a resulting McCarthy era exile to Canada, crushing personal tragedies (with the death of two of his four daughters in the 1970s), and, at the age of 50, a coming out as a gay man, which did not however sever his close ties with his wife of many decades, Melanie Hyman Bellah. The author has worked on this book for thirteen years, and during this time has conducted research at university archives around the world, including archives at Harvard, Columbia, Chicago, Berkeley, and McGill. Bortolini also interviewed some three dozen of Bellah's colleagues, former students, friends and relatives, including his two daughters, who have given this project their full support (without attempting to influence it in any way). They have also given the author full access to Bellah's personal papers. (Bellah's wife of many years predeceased him.) It is also noteworthy that when the obits appeared after Bellah's death, Bortolini was quoted in them as Bellah's biographer. So he is already widely recognized as the guy from whom we can expect a definitive biography of this man"--

Quotes from Josep Colomer:Constitutional Polarization. A Critical Review of the U.S. Political SystemRoutledge, 2023.  CLICK to purchaseA collection of 6 posts. 1 - Why a Federation? The aim of the Convention in Philadelphia was not to experiment with democracy in a large territory, but to create a "stronger", "firmer" government able to defend the new independent states from the British and other foreign troops still over the continent. The priority was to create a standing army, to pay the debt for the War for Independence, and to introduce the subsequent federal taxes. The basic institutions were the states-appointed Senate and the mighty President with war powers.Some delegates warned that in the new and independent United States, people would not accept, again, taxation without representation. That's why the House of Representatives was embodied as the democratic component of the government. Then, the delegates responded to its perils by designing a series of "filters" and "checks" to prevent the House from prevailing over the other components. The separation of powers and their institutional checks were a cap, intended to tame and temper democracy. NOT A DEMOCRACYMadison warned against "the amazing violence and turbulence of the democratic spirit," and stated, "democratic communities may be unsteady, and be led to action by the impulse of the moment." Later, in the campaign to ratify the Constitution in New York, he would hold that, in the past, democracies "have ever been found spectacles of turbulence and contention … and as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths."Alexander Hamilton would allege that "the zeal for the rights of the people has been a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government." In his view, democracies are manipulated by people who "commence as demagogues and end being tyrants."Gouverneur Morris was an influential delegate from Pennsylvania who is credited as the main redactor of the final text of the Constitution. He also cautioned against "the turbulence, the precipitation, changeableness, and excess" of democratic assemblies.Other delegates in the Convention referred to "the fury" and "the folly" of democracy. One confessed, "It's the anarchy, or rather worse than anarchy of a pure democracy, which I fear." Another simply stated, "democracy, the worst of all political evils." DIVINE HANDAbout the divine hand guiding the constituents, see, for example:     "America felt that the hand of providence was on the young republic … There can be little question that the hand of providence has been on a nation which finds a Washington, a Lincoln or a Roosevelt when it needs him," Seymour M. Lipset, American Exceptionalism, W. W. Norton, 1997, pp. 13–14.    "I can't wait to go to Heaven and meet the Framers and tell them the work that you did in putting together our Constitution is a work of genius. Thank you. It was divinely inspired," Mike Pence, Vice-President of the United States in December 2020. Reported by Gregory Jacob, Counselor of the Vice-President, to the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the United States Capitol, June 16, 2022. 2- An elected MonarchyMONTESQUIEUIn the imaginary Constitution of England described by Montesquieu, the powers of the three institutions were so challenged and limited by mutual checks that the most likely result would be governmental paralysis. He held that in order to prevent abuses, "Power should stop ["arrête" in French] power"; brake, not just "check" as it was sloppily translated. In Montesquieu's words, with these rules, "these three powers should naturally form a state of repose or inaction." In the perhaps unlikely or infrequent case that public affairs required some action, he conceded that the three powers should be "forced to move, but still in concert." Madison would only ambiguously paraphrase, "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."   There was a problem: Montesquieu had misunderstood how the British system actually worked. What he described was closer to an old-fashioned, outdated model that, in the best of cases, could be identified with a transitory, provisional past period in England's history. It did not correspond with the political system in motion when he visited London, and even less with practices contemporary to the Framers gathered in Philadelphia several decades later. By following Montesquieu's obsolete account, the authors of the US Constitution misunderstood the source.MONARCHYThe monarchical proposal was most explicitly presented by Alexander Hamilton. He did not attend most of the Convention sessions, but on June 18, he showed up, took the floor, and delivered a prepared speech for more than five hours, no break for lunch, that left the delegates flabbergasted. Hamilton proposed a president that would be chosen by electors and serve for life. Such an "elective Monarch" would appoint the state governors and could veto state laws. At the federal level, the president would also be the arbiter for expected regular conflict between the Senate also appointed for life and the popular House: "This check is a Monarch," he suggested, "capable of resisting the popular current." The president, with absolute veto over congressional legislation, would be "a salutary check upon the legislative body." According to Ron Chernow, his biographer, Hamilton had written in his personal notes for his Convention speech that the president would not only be appointed for life but also "ought to be hereditary and to have so much power that it will not be his interest to risk much to acquire more." Yet, probably sensing the audience's reluctance to his already delivered proposals, he skipped that part.    Adams, who would become the US' first vice president and the second president, was suspected of having monarchist leanings. He would propose calling George Washington "His Majesty the President," thought hereditary rule inevitable, and, after Washington's childless tenure prevented it, he would be the first to make his son run for president.3-The Founders' Portraits in WashingtonWhat one can see and guess about these characters by looking at eight portraits,  the first five by Gilbert Stuart and the next two by John Trumbull at the National Gallery of Art, and the eighth by Joseph Siffred Duplessis at the National Portrait Gallery.             4- How the System Actually Works CHECKS AND GRIEVANCESAlexander Hamilton clearly lay on the side of scant congressional legislation. He said, "The injury that may possibly be done by defecting a few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantages of preventing a number of bad ones." It was like fasting for the sake of not being poisoned; the result is anemia, not good political health.In practice, there are checks but no balances. The existing blockingmechanisms in the US constitutional system do not produce balances in favor of a few good laws. They are largely unbalanced in favor of the Presidency and its powers, which is aggravated by the biases of the presidential elections.The US constitutional plan, instead of relying upon positive institutionalincentives, such as the expectation of sharing power in the Cabinet, countedon politicians' virtuous behavior. Yet, absent our better angels' motivations, the system of negative checks becomes a machine for sustained conflict. PRESIDENTIALISMThe greatest increase in presidential power has derived from wars. From General George Washington, leader of the Revolutionary War for Independence, through Theodore Roosevelt, a high-level combatant in the Spanish-American War in the Caribbean, eleven of the first twenty-five presidents were war men. Whether as generals, national heroes, or upper-echelon military officers, Andrew Jackson, William Harrison, Zachary Taylor, Franklin Pierce, Ulysses Grant, Rutherford Hayes, James Garfield, Benjamin Harrison, and William McKinley fought in the wars against the British, the Indians, the Mexicans, or, in the Civil War, other Americans, and their military feats helped them to be elected.Alexander Hamilton had already identified the management of foreign affairs as the main way to expand executive powers: "It is of the nature of war to increase the executive, at the expense of the legislative authority." Discussing rates of presidents, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. observed that war "made it easier for a president to achieve greatness.            5- No Parties, But PolarizationNO PARTIESThe Framers were confident about the future of the republic because they miscalculated that in a great, expanding, and diverse Union with multiple institutional checks, it would be unlikely that nationwide parties could be created. They expected that the best individuals with "enlightened views and virtuous sentiments" would lead the new politics against "the pestilential influence of party animosities" and "the pestilential breath of faction," as scorned by both James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, respectively. Currently, the two major political parties in the US encompass a range of policy proposals and ideological orientations comparable to the typical European system with multiple parties: There are liberals and socialists within the Democratic Party, and conservatives and populists within the Republican Party, with the minor Greens and Libertarians flanking each side. However, the political competition is polarized by two parties or candidates because of the electoral system and the election of the president.POLITICAL, NO SOCIAL POLARIZATION The polarization of parties and candidates is more politically consequential than the polarization of voters. Generally, parties can lead and carry voters in their direction, either to closeness or to distance from each other, but to a limited extent. That is because it is less difficult to coordinate and mobilize a few thousand politicians than millions of voters. If parties and political leaders move to radicalize their positions and provoke polarization, voters may follow and become more polarized in their preferences, but usually less than the politicians and parties come to be. If, conversely, parties moderate and converge in their positions, voters may also moderate themselves but less than the partisan politicians do.FEAR AND NATIONAL FERVOR During the Cold War, many citizens developed a sense of unity, love of patriotic values, and pride in the American way of life. They trusted the rulers, who appeared as their protectors and providers of security. Challenging the government in the middle of a war would have been regarded as treason. In parallel, the ruling officials were able to keep many state secrets, their policy performances were not seriously evaluated, they enjoyed discrete privacy from the media, and gained support and devotion from the public.After the Cold War, without the threat of a nuclear war, the public lost their fear. There was a new openness to indiscretion and transgression. The new political atmosphere became the opposite of the previous period: a general mistrust of government, close scrutiny of corrupt practices, leaks of confidential plans and messages, frequent scandals about politicians' business or private affairs, and loud calls for more transparency and accountability. After the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the "peace dividend" that appeared to be a potential source of domestic progress led instead to domestic mayhem. With just a little exaggeration, one could say that, over the years, the international Cold War was replaced with a domestic cold war.          6- Towards the 2024 ElectionPRIMARIESThe primaries mechanism is a substitute for the formation of multiple parties. To build a majority, in Europe and other democracies, a coalition of multiple parties must be formed after the election; in the US, a coalition of multiple factions within a party must be formed before the election. In European parliamentary systems with multiple parties, the mess comes after the election; sometimes, the formation of a coalition in parliament for the choice of a prime minister takes months. In the US, the mess is before the election; the process of simplifying the pluralistic setting to only two major presidential candidates starts more than a year before Election Day. These alternative experiences both confirm that, in the absence of a traditional monarch, simplifying a complex society to one single executive leader is always a challenging endeavor.The main drawback of the system of partisan primaries is that it may not produce a majority in support for the winning candidate but it can result in the nomination of an extreme or unqualified demagogue who would be rejected by a majority of voters.The turnout in the presidential primaries has increased to nearly 50% of the party voters in the general election since the 2010s. However, the number of primary candidates within each party has also increased, up to double digits in recent seasons, which reduced the support for the winner. In 2016, Donald Trump was voted in the primaries by only 22% of his voters in the general election; Hillary Clinton, by 26% of her votes in the general election; and in 2020, Joe Biden by only 23%.SPLITTING CANDIDATESIf popular participation increases, partisanship becomes more compact, and the potential political pluralism of the country is not well articulated by the party system, third and further candidates reappear. They indirectly made a winner by splitting partisan support in at least four of the first eight presidential elections after the Cold War. The independent Ross Perot split Republican voters twice, in 1992 and 1996, and twice produced a Democratic winner with a minority of popular votes. The other way around, the Green Party's Ralph Nader split Democratic voters in 2000 and produced a Republican winner with a minority of popular votes. Also, the Greens and other candidacies absorbed potential Democratic voters in 2016 and helped make a Republican candidate the winner with a minority of popular votes.CAN TRUMP RETURN?There are also precedents of traitors who persisted in politics, ran for office, were elected, and provoked further turmoil. At least two former presidents joined the Confederacy during the Civil War. Former Whig President John Tyler, who had replaced William Harrison at his death one month after entering office, was first elected to and chaired the Virginia Secession Convention, and during the Civil War, he was elected first to the Provisional Confederation Congress and then to the Confederate House of Representatives. Former Democratic President Franklin Pierce collaborated closely with Confederacy President Jefferson Davis. Also, former President Andrew Johnson was elected senator on an anti-Reconstruction platform.Collection:1- Why a Federation2- An Elected Monarchy3- Psychological Portraits of the Founders and Framers4– How the System Actually Works5- No Parties, But Polarization6- Towards the 2024 Election

Calls for President Joe Biden to take direct military action against Iran are ratcheting up following this weekend's drone attack in Jordan that killed three U.S. service members and wounded over 30 others. Biden has said that "it was carried out by radical Iran-backed militant groups operating in Syria and Iraq" and vowed "to hold all those responsible to account at a time and in a manner our choosing." Tehran has denied involvement in the attacks. This is the latest major escalation in the Middle East since Hamas's incursion into Israel on October 7, and Tel Aviv's retaliatory war on Gaza. The Biden administration has maintained that it does not want a war with Tehran and that it continues to seek paths to de-escalation in the region — but following the first known deaths of U.S. personnel since the war in Gaza started, members of Congress are pushing for a swift response. "The United States can and must respond to this brazen attack," said Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.), in a post on X. "This attack on U.S. and coalition troops in Jordan — our steadfast regional partner — is an escalation, and cannot go unanswered. I support President Biden in a deliberate and proportionate response," added Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.), the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.Some Republican hawks, many of whom are long-time advocates of regime change who have been calling for an aggressive response against Tehran since October 7, went a step further, calling for a direct confrontation with Iran. "The only thing the Iranian regime understands is force. Until they pay a price with their infrastructure and their personnel, the attacks on U.S. troops will continue," Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), wrote in a long thread on X. "Hit Iran now. Hit them hard." "The only answer to these attacks must be devastating military retaliation against Iran's terrorist forces, both in Iran and across the Middle East," added Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) "Anything less will confirm Joe Biden as a coward unworthy of being commander in chief."Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), the ranking member on the Senate Armed Services committee, said that Washington must strike "directly against Iranian targets and its leadership."But not all members, including Republicans, want to lurch headlong into war. And not all of them think the president has the unilateral authority to do so. The administration was already conducting strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen without seeking congressional approval, drawing harsh criticism from a bipartisan host of senators and House members. Some of those lawmakers renewed their calls over the weekend, insisting it is Congress's responsibility to declare war."There is no 'Iran is bad' exception to the Constitution," Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) wrote on X. "If we're going to war, Congress must declare it."Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.), agreed, writing on X that "[b]ombing Iran would require an Act of Congress according to the Constitution.""Is there anyone you don't want to bomb?," he later added, in response to Lindsey Graham's X thread. Observers of the GOP say that this is evidence of a growing divide within the party on questions of foreign policy. "War with Iran is a red line. Any who advocate for it have the mark of a failed, American old guard," Curt Mills, executive director of the American Conservative, tells RS. "On the Republican side, the choice is stark and obvious: a total rerun of the failures of the Bush years— pitted against a new party that is actually reckoning with that disaster and offering a foreign policy tailored to the interests of Americans."On the other side of the aisle, several Congressional Democrats are warning against further escalation. "To the chicken hawks calling for war with Iran, you're playing into the enemy's hands—and I'd like to see you send your sons and daughters to fight," Rep. Seth Moulton (D-Mass.), an Iraq War veteran, told Reuters. "We must have an effective, strategic response on our terms and our timeline.""We can't allow the deaths of U.S. service members to go unanswered – but we also can't give in to the war hawks who look for any reason to go to war with Iran. Direct confrontation with Iran will certainly lead to the deaths of more U.S. service members and could easily expand into a regional conflict," added Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.). "I urge President Biden to proceed thoughtfully and carefully with a strategic, proportional response that avoids unnecessary escalation. We also must continue to pursue a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas – not only to bring all the hostages home safely and get humanitarian aid into Gaza, but also to end the war that's emboldening Iran."How exactly Biden will respond remains unclear. Axios reported on Monday that top U.S. officials were discussing "significant military response," though Axios and a number of other major media outlets say that the administration is still keen to limit the potential of a wider war.High level talks are reportedly continuing over a potential ceasefire proposal in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages. "We're hopeful about progress, but … we should not expect any imminent developments," said the national security council spokesperson, John Kirby, said at the White House press briefing on Friday. The Axios report from Monday noted that some Biden administration officials acknowledge that a ceasefire is a crucial piece of reducing regional tensions.Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.) continues to insist that a cessation of hostilities in Gaza is the only way to prevent that regional conflagration from happening, writing on X that her "calls for ceasefire have always been about saving lives - in Gaza, Israel, and the region, and preventing a larger conflict. My heart goes out to the US service members who have lost their lives, and their loved ones. This must end."

Die rechtspopulistische Partei Perussuomalaiset (PS) (dt.: Finnen-Partei), auch bekannt als die Finnen (die kursive Schreibweise weist auf die Partei hin, in Abgrenzung zu finnischen Bürger:innen), weist einige Besonderheiten im Gegensatz zu anderen europäischen rechtspopulistischen Parteien auf, die sich teils aus Besonderheiten von Finnland ergeben.Zum Beispiel spielt das Thema Migration – obwohl die Finnen dieses Thema durchaus bedienen – in Finnland eine eher untergeordnete Rolle (vgl. Wilde-Krell & Adorf 2022, S. 288 f.). Auch zeigt sich in der Regierungsbeteiligung die Besonderheit, dass die Finnen nicht erst die nötige Reputation dafür aufbauen mussten, im Gegensatz zu einigen anderen rechtspopulistischen Parteien.Dieser Umstand ist in der Tatsache begründet, dass die Finnen eine Nachfolgerpartei der Suomen maaseudun puolue (SMP) darstellt, welche als populistische Partei bereits Regierungserfahrung sammeln konnte (vgl. Wilde-Krell & Adorf 2022, S. 279). Die Finnen besitzen also eine lange Parteiengeschichte, welche auch dazu führt, dass die Partei nach Cas Muddes Kategorisierung in "extreme right" und "radical right" von Lahti und Palonen als "radical right" Partei gesehen wird, wobei "extreme right" Parteien als demokratiefeindlich gelten, während die "radical right" Parteien im Rahmen der Demokratie operieren (vgl. Lahti & Palonen 2023, S. 128).Eine weitere Besonderheit der Finnen wird nachfolgend in den Fokus genommen: ihre Russland-kritische Haltung. Viele rechtspopulistische Parteien in Europa fallen immer wieder durch ihre Nähe zu Russland bzw. Putin auf. Eine Nähe, die selbst nach dem russischen Überfall auf die Ukraine und dem daraus resultierenden Krieg häufig bestehen bleibt.So beispielsweise die deutsche AfD, die diese Nähe aufrechterhält (vgl. Ntv 2023). Zwar ist die AfD auch in dieser Hinsicht gespalten und parteiintern gibt es genauso Stimmen gegen diese Russlandnähe, es ist jedoch auffällig, dass wichtige Parteimitglieder wie der Vorsitzende Tino Chrupalla immer wieder mit einer Pro-Russland Haltung auffallen.Zudem zeichnet sich ein ähnliches Bild ab wie bei anderen Streitfragen der AfD: die Gemäßigteren, die die radikalen Meinungen anderer Parteimitglieder ablehnen, sind diejenigen, die die Partei verlassen (vgl. Schmidt 2022). Die AfD stellt hierbei nur ein Beispiel dar für eine europäische rechtspopulistische Partei, die – vereinfacht auf die beiden Konfliktparteien aus dem Kalten Krieg bezogen – einen USA-kritischen und Russland-freundlichen Ton anschlägt.Die USA, sinnbildlich für den liberalen Westen mit seinen vermeintlich linken Ideologien, welche durch die Rechtspopulisten abgelehnt werden (LGBTQI+ Bewegung, Klimaproteste, etc.), Russland bzw. Putin sinnbildlich für Autorität, Stärke, Nationalismus. Entgegen diesem Bild stehen die finnischen Rechtspopulisten der PS.Hierbei ist erwähnenswert, dass Finnland nicht frei von Populisten mit Nähe zu Russland ist. Die finnische Partei Liike Nyt ist stark geprägt von wirtschaftlichen Eliten mit Nähe zu russischen Oligarchen, welche jedoch seit Beginn des Krieges abgestritten wird (vgl. Lahti & Palonen 2023, S. 129).Die Finnen hingegen waren nie pro-russisch eingestellt, wofür es vielseitige Erklärungsansätze gibt. Einerseits kann hierbei das historische Erbe erwähnt werden. Lahti und Palonen sehen die Möglichkeit einer starken Solidarisierung mit der Ukraine auf Basis der finnischen Geschichte. Finnland wehrte im Winterkrieg 1939-1940 mit vergleichsweise geringer militärischer Stärke das militärisch starke Russland ab.Russland ist somit in der finnischen Geschichte ein Kriegsgegner gewesen, zudem stellt sich möglicherweise für manche finnische Bürger:innen die Situation in der Ukraine ähnlich dar: die militärisch unterlegene Ukraine, welche von Russland angegriffen wird und bisher erfolgreich Widerstand leistet.Ein weiterer wichtiger Faktor stellt der bis 2021 Vorsitzende der Partei, Jussi Halla-aho, dar. Halla-aho kann keineswegs als gemäßigter Konservativer bezeichnet werden, viel Kritik begleitet seine politische Biografie sowie seine ideologischen Positionen, immerhin wurde Halla-aho bereits wegen Volksverhetzung verurteilt und fällt immer wieder mit extremistischen Aussagen gegen Bevölkerungsgruppen, beispielsweise muslimische Bürger:innen, auf. Auch gilt er nicht als EU-freundlich, immerhin forderte er den "Fixit", also den Austritt Finnlands aus der EU (vgl. Wolff 2017).Ein Punkt in Halla-ahos Biografie beleuchtet allerdings, weshalb er dennoch pro-ukrainisch eingestellt ist: Halla-aho studierte Slawistik und setzte sich im Rahmen des Studiums schon früh mit der Geschichte slawischer Länder auseinander, so auch mit der Geschichte der Ukraine nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion. Es scheint logisch, dass Halla-aho eine große Gefahr in der Ausbreitung der russischen Grenzen für das eigene, an Russland grenzende Land sieht. Als überzeugter Nationalist ist es daher kaum verwunderlich, dass er für finnische Interessen einen Eingriff zugunsten der Ukraine als nötig betrachtet, wofür er sich auch mehrfach stark gemacht hat (vgl. Lahti & Palonen 2023, S. 131 f.). Dass die pro-ukrainische Haltung der Finnen nicht nur ein politisches Manöver darstellt, um Stimmen zu generieren, sondern auf Überzeugung basiert, zeigt auch der Wechsel der Fraktion im EU-Parlament. Während die Finnen – Vertreten durch zwei Abgeordnete – vor dem Krieg in der Ukraine der rechtspopulistisch bis -extremistischen Fraktion Identität und Demokratie (ID) angehörten, welche viele weitere rechtspopulistische bis -extremistische Parteien unter sich vereint wie z.B. Rassemblement National, Lega, Alternative für Deutschland, Vlaams Belang uvm., schloss sie sich als Reaktion auf den Krieg der Fraktion Europäische Konservative und Reformer (EKR) an (vgl. Camut 2023).Die EKR vereint ebenfalls einige rechtspopulistische Akteure unter sich, wie z.B. Vox oder die Alternative für Deutschland, bevor sie in die ID-Fraktion eintrat. Die Finnen kommentierten, sie hätten sich einer Gruppe angeschlossen, "whose member parties are united by the uncompromising defense of Western civilization and the European security policy architecture" (Camut 2023). Ihre anti-russische Haltung zum Schutze Europas bzw. Finnlands sahen sie folglich in der vorigen Fraktion nicht mehr für möglich.Eine weitere schwerwiegende Entscheidung und Veränderung in der Haltung der Finnen war der Eintritt Finnlands in die NATO. Während die finnische Bevölkerung, die ein Selbstverständnis von Neutralität in Bezug auf den Kalten Krieg hatte und bis heute hat, nach der Annexion der Krim durch Russland nach wie vor gegen einen NATO-Beitritt war, änderte der russische Angriff auf die Ukraine 2022 diese Haltung. 2014 nach der Annexion der Krim stimmten nur 26% für einen Beitritt Finnlands zur NATO. Im März 2022 waren es 48%, die dafür stimmten, im Juni 2022 waren es 79% (vgl. Lathi & Palonen 2023, S. 129). Infolge dieser Veränderung kam es 2023 zum Beitritt in das NATO-Bündnis (vgl. ZDFheute 2023), wobei auch die Finnen hinter diesem Beitritt stehen. Die Haltung der Finnen unterscheidet sich also in Bezug auf Russland von anderen europäischen rechtspopulistischen Parteien. In Umfragen ist kein maßgeblicher Unterschied merkbar, seit die Finnen sich auf die Seite der Ukraine gestellt haben, was vermuten lässt, dass dieser Faktor keinen allzu großen Stellenwert in der Wählerschaft hat oder die bisherige Wählerschaft diesen Standpunkt teilt.Dennoch ist diese Besonderheit einer europäischen rechtspopulistischen Partei nicht unbedeutend, insbesondere mit Blick auf mögliche Entwicklungen. Die Entscheidung zum NATO-Beitritt könnte Spannungen einerseits zwischen den Finnen und anderen rechten Randparteien, andererseits aber auch zwischen verschiedenen Lagern innerhalb der Partei auslösen. Mit der Frage beispielsweise nach der Neutralität Finnlands, die mit dem NATO-Beitritt nicht mehr vorhanden ist, könnte vor allem von NATO-kritischen Parteien der Versuch unternommen werden, Wähler:innen zu mobilisieren oder von den Finnen abzuwerben.Auch die Tatsache, dass die Finnen nicht mehr aktiv die "Fixit"-Kampagne verfolgen – wobei unklar ist, ob die Kampagne wieder aktiviert wird – könnte einerseits das Feld für andere rechtspopulistische Parteien öffnen, andererseits aber auch die Finnen für eine breitere Wählerschaft öffnen (vgl. Lathi & Palonen 2023, S. 134 f.). Ob und - wenn ja - wie sich die Partei und die Zustimmung im Volk verändern wird aufgrund dieser Entwicklungen, bleibt abzuwarten. Mit der Unterstützung der Ukraine, der Ablehnung von Russland und der Zustimmung zum NATO-Beitritt haben die Finnen in den letzten zwei Jahren jedoch auf jeden Fall besondere Positionen eingenommen, verglichen mit anderen europäischen rechtspopulistischen Parteien. Quellen:Camut, Nicolas (2023): Far-right Finns Party moves to ECR group in EU Parliament. In: POLITICO, 05. 04.2023. Online verfügbar unter https://www.politico.eu/article/far-right-finns-party-ecr-european-conservatives-and-reformists-group-parliament/ ,zuletzt geprüft am 14.01.2024.Lahti, Yannick/Palonen, Emilia (2023): The impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on right-wing populism in Finland; in: Ivaldi, Gilles/Zankina, Emilia (Hrsg.) (2023): The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-wing Populism in Europe. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Brussels.Ntv (2023): Bensmann zur AfD und Russland: "Die machen das aus Überzeugung". In: n-tv NACHRICHTEN, 10.01.2023. Online verfügbar unter https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Die-machen-das-aus-Uberzeugung-article24434349.html , zuletzt geprüft am 14.01.2024.Schmidt, Martin (2022): Ukraine-Krieg: Wie hält es die AfD mit Russland? In: tagesschau.de, 30.03.2022. Online verfügbar unter https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/afd-russland-115.html , zuletzt geprüft am 14.01.2024.Wilde-Krell, Anna-Lena/Adorf, Philipp (2022): Die Finnen - Auf dem Weg zum konventionellen Rechtspopulismus?; in: Decker, Frank (Hrsg.) (2022): Aufstand der Außenseiter. Die Herausforderung der europäischen Politik durch den neuen Populismus, Nomos.Wolff, Reinhard (2017): Ein neuer Chef bei den Wahren Finnen: "Der größte Rassist des Landes". Online verfügbar unter https://taz.de/Ein-neuer-Chef-bei-den-Wahren-Finnen/!5416271/ ,zuletzt geprüft am 14.01.2024.ZDFheute (2023): Finnland ist Nato-Mitglied - was das bedeutet. In: ZDFheute, 04.04.2023. Online verfügbar unter https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/nato-beitritt-finnland-bedeutung-ukraine-krieg-russland-100.html , zuletzt geprüft am 14.01.2024.

Актуальность и цели. В 2016 г. Россия отметит 25 лет своей новой истории, связанной с выходом из СССР и распадом последнего. Несмотря на четвертьвековую ретроспективу данного процесса, сегодня все чаще разворачиваются дискуссии о сроках завершения данной трансформации, отражения ее сущностного проявления в реальных практиках российского общества, а также о причинах сложностей модернизационного развития российского государства на современном этапе. По нашему мнению, изучение вышеуказанных аспектов невозможно без глубокого анализа эволюции советского менталитета в русле зависимости успеха экономических преобразований от социального восприятия реформы собственности (приватизации) 1990-х гг. и связанных с ним поведенческих реакций населения. Целью данной работы выступает изучение уровня восприятия российским социумом содержания и установок радикальных социально-экономических преобразований начала 1990-х гг. в сфере трансформации отношений собственности. Материалы и методы. Реализация научных задач строится на основе социально-репрезентативных исследований, результатах полевых опросов, отраженных в материалах периодической печати как центрального, так и местного происхождения. Отдельным блоком источников выступает комплекс архивных документов фондов Государственного архива Российской Федерации, Российского государственного архива новейшей истории и Государственного архива Пензенской области. Методологию проведения работы составляют базисные принципы научного познания (историзм и объективность) и специально-исторические методы исследования: историко-системный, статистический, проблемно-хронологический. С целью получения более эффективного результата комплексного анализа социальной рефлексии приватизационных процессов раскрытие ее внутренних связей строилось на основе междисциплинарного категориального и методологического аппарата, необходимость использования которого вытекает не только из тематики работы, но и из признаков проблематизации исторического знания. Результаты. В статье оценивается возможность эволюции социетальных практик советского человека в условиях социально-культурной трансформации, меняющейся институциональной среды и объективного воздействия рыночных стимулов на модернизацию гражданского общества новой России. Конкретно-исторический анализ переходности и уровня преемственности российского социума в работе основывается не только на общероссийских исследованиях и измерениях общественного мнения, но и на локальном уровне Пензенской области, являющейся по всем параметрам стабильно-типичным регионом с усредненными ценностными архетипами. Выводы. Перестройка массового сознания советского социума под воздействием рыночных институтов, введенных в рамках радикальных преобразований 1990-х гг., безусловно, поляризировала общественные устои социалистического уклада и имущественно-собственнические настроения. Вместе с тем темпы такой перестройки менталитета были крайне медленными, что тормозило ожидаемое реформаторами развитие механизмов саморегуляции рынка и естественное образование гражданского общества новой России. Умеренные ожидания от перехода к рынку сменились общественным разочарованием, утерей доверия к власти и партии (КПСС) со стороны населения. Кроме того, население стало прибегать к консервативной тактике внутреннего сопротивления и «безмолвствия», что было прямым следствием ранее господствующих настроений социального иждивенчества и государственного партийного патернализма. Анализ причин данных тенденций позволил заключить, что трансформация отношений собственности в России показала высокую устойчивость советского менталитета к восприятию рыночных институтов. ; Background. In 2016 Russia will celebrate 25th anniversary of its new history, associated with the release from the USSR and disintegration of the latter. Despite a quarter-century retrospective of this process, the society quite often debates about the time frame of completion of this transformation, the reflection of its essential existence in the real practices of the Russian society, as well as the reasons for difficulties of the modernization of the Russian state development at the modern stage. In our opinion, the study of the above-mentioned aspects is impossible without a deep analysis of the evolution of "Soviet mentality" in the context of dependence of the success of economic transformation on the social perception of the ownership reform (privatization) of 1990s and the related behavioral reactions of the population. The aim of this work is the study of the level of perception by the Russian society of the contents and installations of the radical socio-economic transformation of the early 1990s in the field of property relations transformation. Materials and methods. The research objectives were implemented on the basis of the socially-representative studies, the results of field surveys, reflected in the periodical press of both central and local origins. Individual unit sources is a complex of archival document collections of the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History and the State Archive of Penza Region. The methodology of the work included basic principles of scientific knowledge historicism and objectivity, and special historical methods of research: historical and systematic, statistical, problem-chronological. For the purpose of obtaining more efficient results of the complex analysis of the social reflection of the privatization process, the disclosure of its internal relations was based on the interdisciplinary categorical and methodological apparatus, the need for which is substantiated not only by the subject of the work, but also by signs of problematization of historical knowledge. Results. The article traces the evolutionary nature of social practices of Soviet people in terms of the socio-cultural transformation, changing the institutional environment and objective impact of market incentives for modernization of the civil society in new Russia. A concrete historical analysis of transitivity and continuity of the Russian society in the work is based not only on the nation-wide research and measurement of public opinion, but also on local-level researches Penza region, which by all parameters is a consistently-typical region with average value archetypes. Conclusions. The restructuring of the mass consciousness of the Soviet society under the influence of market institutions introduced with a framework of radical reforms of 1990s, without a doubt, polarized social foundations of the socialist system in the direction of property-proprietary sentiment. However, the pace of adjustment of mentality was very slow, which hindered the development of mechanisms of self-regulation of the market and the natural formation of civil society of new Russia, expected by the reformers. Reasonable expectations of transition to a market economy was replaced by disappointment, loss of confidence in the government and the party (CPSU) by the population. In addition, the population began to resort to conservative tactics of internal resistance and "silence" that was a direct consequence of the previously predominant tendencies of social parasitism and state party paternalism. As a result, the analysis of the causes of these trends allows to conclude that the transformation of ownership relations in Russia confirmed high resistance of the Soviet mentality to perception of market institutions.

One
reason the nearly-now-concluded 2024 First Extraordinary Session of the
Louisiana Legislature failed was Republican Gov. Jeff Landry and the
GOP-supermajority in each legislative chamber scored an own goal in
congressional reapportionment that, instead of ending litigation, only will
increase it with them in a weaker position.

The main reason for the session Landry stated as congressional
reapportionment, in response to a Middle District of Louisiana court case
where, at present, the presiding judge said that unless the state acted to
change its current distribution of one-out-of-six majority-minority districts,
in a state where the population is about a third identifying as black, a trial
on the merits of the existing map would occur and likely end with the judge voiding
it and imposing her own plan. That configuration likely would have followed
closely the preferred plan of the special interest plaintiffs which would have
created districts more in violation of traditional principles of reapportionment
than any from the past 30 years which almost certainly would see GOP Rep. Julia Letlow ousted in favor of a
black Democrat.

Landry and his two main water carriers for his
plan SB 8,
its author Republican state Sen. Glen
Womack and House and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Beau Beaullieu,
surrendered to this viewpoint of judicial inevitability. Braying over and over
that it would be better to pick their own poison, SB 8 capitulated to the two
M/M scheme but instead reconfigured districts to put Republican Rep. Garret Graves at risk, who is
on the outs with Landry by working behind the scenes to put up an opponent
against him in last year's election and with other members of the state's GOP
congressional delegation because he worked against the eventual process that
brought on a Louisiana Speaker of the House.

They and the GOP majorities that passed SB 8 didn't
need to do any of this: with at
least two contestable avenues that could have had higher courts overturn the
extant ruling – that the basis of that decision was ripe for reversal because
of the Kavanaugh
concurrence, which the state actually is employing to defend itself in a similar
suit concerning the state's legislative districts, and because of circuit court
disagreements, one of which came from the Fifth Circuit's handling of the case
about the use of a private
right of action. Indeed, there wasn't even an imperative under law, despite
the assertions of Landry, Womack, and Beaullieu as well as legislative Democrats
and the plaintiffs, to create two M/M districts, as not only does Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act instruct that it does not require the proportion of M/M seats to
match roughly the racial distribution of the population, but also as no court
in the country has ruled that a plan that didn't create roughly equal
proportions had to do that, with the operative language from a panel
of Alabama-based circuit and district judges used to date as the judicial
guidepost for cases like Louisiana's reading "any remedial plan will need
to include two districts in which Black[sic] voters either comprise a
voting-age majority or something quite close to it" (emphasis added).

But they did it. This leaves the ball in the court
of the plaintiffs, who can decide to accept the plan and dismiss the case, or
if they don't then the court likely steams ahead by bringing into effect by
fiat their desired plan anyway and neuters the entire effort by the majority of
Republicans.

However, if the plaintiffs do accept, then the
2024 boundaries become that plan, and the GOP gives away a seat to Democrats,
even if contested by a private party, for the same reason the current
boundaries otherwise would have stayed in place if left unchanged: the
judiciary is reluctant to alter electoral boundaries through litigation too close
to an election. Basically, by this action Landry et al. gave away a
congressional seat for Democrats in 2024, as opposed to if they had they passed
a plan with a single M/M district and another opportunity district – one that
has a plurality-minority population distribution which is the "something quite close
to it" – or with two opportunity districts, as HB 14 by
Republican state Rep. Mike Echols
offered. In that instance, Republicans could have had a shot at winning one or
both districts.

Of course, the plaintiffs would have turned that
one down. But that then would have led to the state challenging the subsequent imposed
map, and on the basis of the Kavanaugh concurrence and no private right of
action where the former stands a decent chance of prevailing, that would have
overturned the plaintiffs' victory. And this likely would have happened in
2025, keeping the additional Republican district. Yet Landry and most of the
members of the GOP legislative party stubbornly asserted that the district
court's ruling was sacrosanct, set in stone, and had to be followed.

And, not only did the GOP throw away this
possibility of an eventual ruling on the merits preserving the current map, the
SB 8 map created itself likely is unconstitutional. That was drilled home in testimony
to members of H&GA by Paul Hurd, the lawyer who actually was involved
in early 1990s legal actions that ended up twice invalidating Louisiana plans where
race unconstitutionally played too large of a role in mapping. He estimated
that the new M/M district was about 90 percent similar to the one struck down,
and similarly infirm.

Expect if the plaintiffs accept the new map for a challenge
to it to come on the same basis – don't be surprised if allies of Graves are
involved – and succeed, although it likely would mean a 2024 cycle under SB 8.  If by then another challenge from somewhere else
springs successfully the Kavanaugh concurrence, that would invite the GOP
Legislature to remap again back to a single M/M – although this possibility itself
is a little uncertain because of the evolving jurisprudence around the concept
of "retrogression,"
or drawing fewer M/M districts than existed before and whether that is
constitutionally permissible.

Keep in mind, however, that the state has
handcuffed itself in restoring a single M/M map because of the result of the
session, and in fact put itself in the absurd position of a GOP governor,
attorney general, and Legislature defending a map putting their party at a
disadvantage. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs have a decision to make: take a two M/M
map even if not their preferred and much like one previously declared
unconstitutional for at least one cycle but hope it survives, or turn it down
to suffer a one M/M map in 2024 but roll the dice that the Kavanaugh concurrence
doesn't flip the previous decision and they get their preferred two M/M map in
2026.

In summary, absent a desire to ensure Graves rather
than Letlow was put at risk even as either being put at risk was far from
certain under the current plan or HB 14, there was no good reason for the GOP
governor and legislative majorities to give away a congressional district to Democrats
as early as 2024. Forcing a court's two M/M plan imposition in fact would have increased
the chances that map would be overturned eventually, compared to forging ahead
with a constitutionally-questionable volunteered two M/M plan that may get
rejected anyway.

Unless the plot all along was to offer up an infirmed
plan ripe for ruin as a way to buy time to the jurisprudential landscape to
shift, but that gives away 2024 and is riskier than outright resistance. If so,
it was a reckless brinksmanship with a result at present that should discourage
conservatives' hopes for propagation of their agenda in Louisiana that they
thought was a slam dunk to come into fruition over the next four years.

Oggetto della tesi è un ventennio cruciale della storia contemporanea turca, compreso tra il colpo di Stato militare realizzato dalla giunta del generale Kenan Evren il 12 settembre 1980 e la prima vittoria del Partito della Giustizia e dello Sviluppo (AKP) di Recep Tayyip Erdoğan alle elezioni generali del 3 novembre 2002. L'obiettivo è spiegare le premesse, le motivazioni e le dinamiche storico-politiche sia domestiche sia internazionali che, nel corso di tale ventennio, hanno condotto al progressivo declino dell'establishment kemalista e all'affermazione di uno specifico ramo del movimento islamico sulla scena politica, economica e culturale turca. Una simile analisi consentirà di formulare anche delle linee di interpretazione per le vicende attuali, che appaiono strettamente legate a quanto accaduto tra il 1980 e il 2002. La ricostruzione storica dei principali avvenimenti verificatisi nel ventennio si basa sullo studio di fonti primarie e secondarie in massima parte in lingua turca. Tra le prime, è prevalente la documentazione ufficiale (dibattiti parlamentari, programmi di governo, rapporti di commissioni d'inchiesta, documenti di partito, atti processuali, discorsi di personalità politiche, etc.) disponibile negli archivi digitali delle istituzioni turche. Per quanto riguarda le fonti secondarie, si privilegia la storiografia turca più recente e non ancora tradotta in altre lingue. Allo scopo di favorire una comprensione più completa delle dinamiche in esame, accanto alla contestualizzazione storica si offre una riflessione critica su alcuni aspetti significativi di natura maggiormente teorica, riguardanti in particolare l'ideologia kemalista, lo sviluppo dell'islam politico, il rapporto tra religione e secolarismo nel Paese. L'Introduzione chiarisce gli interrogativi e le ipotesi della ricerca, argomentandone tra l'altro la rilevanza rispetto ai recenti fatti di cronaca e alla situazione politica corrente; vengono inoltre presentati lo stato dell'arte, le fonti di riferimento e l'approccio teorico. Nel Capitolo I viene ricostruito il clima antecedente al 1980, discutendo innanzitutto alcune contraddizioni intrinseche dei principi kemalisti e il ruolo dell'Esercito nella vita politica. Successivamente ci si sofferma sul colpo di Stato del 1960, sul memorandum militare del 1971 e sulla crisi economico-politica che ha interessato il Paese negli anni Settanta. Il Capitolo II è dedicato alla trattazione del colpo di Stato del 1980, delle sue cause, delle sue conseguenze e dei provvedimenti imposti dalla giunta militare al potere fino al 1983. In seguito, vengono descritte la trasformazione neoliberale e la graduale liberalizzazione promosse durante il governo decennale di Turgut Özal, leader della Nuova destra turca. Nel Capitolo III viene affrontata l'ascesa dell'islam politico e della borghesia conservatrice in Turchia, riservando un approfondimento al movimento della Visione Nazionale e alla comunità religiosa di Fethullah Gülen. Si ripercorre quindi l'affermazione del Partito islamico del Benessere, fino alla formazione del governo di coalizione affidato a Necmettin Erbakan. Il Capitolo IV si apre con il golpe post-moderno che ha abbattuto il governo di Erbakan e represso il movimento islamico; questo ha quindi intrapreso una fase di rinnovamento, culminata nella fondazione dell'AKP sotto la leadership di Erdoğan (del quale viene fornita una sintetica biografia). La tesi si conclude con la descrizione dello scenario politico risultato dalle elezioni del 2002. In conclusione, verranno offerte delle risposte agli interrogativi di ricerca alla luce di alcune ricorrenze storiche e dei paradigmi politici fondamentali emersi dallo studio del ventennio. In particolare, si propone una lettura non dicotomica del rapporto tra kemalismo e islam politico, che risulta caratterizzato da interazione ed influenza reciproca piuttosto che da conflitto e opposizione. Tale rapporto può essere meglio compreso nella cornice della sostanziale continuità dell'autoritarismo nei regimi politici turchi post-1980. Come prospettiva di ricerca futura, verrà suggerito uno studio dell'era dell'AKP in un'ottica di comparazione e di continuità storica con il ventennio cruciale. ; THE DECLINE OF KEMALISM AND A NEW FACE OF POLITICAL ISLAM. TWENTY CRUCIAL YEARS IN TURKEY'S HISTORY: 1980-2002. The present dissertation focuses on twenty crucial years of contemporary Turkey's history, between the 12th September 1980 military coup d'état staged by General Kenan Evren's junta and the first victory of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 3rd November 2002 general elections. It aims to explain the background, motivations, historical and political dynamics (both domestic and international) underlying the gradual decline of the Kemalist establishment and the rise of a specific branch of the Islamic movement on the political, economic and cultural stage of Turkey during those twenty years. Such an analysis makes it also possible to draw some guidelines to understand the current circumstances, being these closely linked to what happened between 1980 and 2002. The historical reconstruction of the main events occurred during the crucial twenty years relies on primary and secondary sources that are mostly in Turkish language. Among the first, official documentation prevails (parliamentary debates, governments programs, reports by parliamentary committees of enquiry, party manifestos, procedural documents, statements made by Turkish authorities, etc.); such documentation is largely available in the digital archives of Turkish institutions. As regards the secondary sources, more recent and still untranslated Turkish historiography is preferred. Along with the historical context, a critical comment is given on some significant aspects, which are more theoretical and mainly concern the Kemalist ideology, the development of political Islam, the relationship between religion and secularism in Turkey. This should provide a deeper understanding of the research objects. The Introduction explains the research questions and hypotheses, arguing their relevance with reference to the recent events and ongoing political issues of the country. The literature review, sources and theoretical approach are presented too. The Chapter I describes the situation before 1980. First, it discusses some contradictions inherent in the Kemalist principles and the role of the Army in Turkish politics. Then, it looks in more detail at the 1960 coup, the 1971 military memorandum, the economic and political crisis afflicting the country throughout the 1970s. The Chapter II analyses the 1980 coup, its roots, its consequences, and the measures implemented by the military junta in power until 1983. Subsequently, it traces the history of the neoliberal transformation and the gradual liberalization promoted by Turgut Özal, the leader of Turkish New Right who ruled for ten years. The Chapter III deals with the upsurge of political Islam and conservative bourgeoisie in Turkey, with a focus on the National Outlook movement and the religious community of Fethullah Gülen. It also illustrates the rise of the Islamic Welfare Party, until the creation of a coalition government led by Necmettin Erbakan. The Chapter IV begins with the post-modern coup that overthrew Erbakan's government and repressed the Islamic movement; consequently, the latter entered a phase of regeneration culminating in the establishment of AKP under the leadership of Erdoğan (whose short biography is also included). The dissertation ends with a description of the political landscape resulting from the 2002 elections. In conclusion, answers to the research questions are provided under the light of some recurring historical patterns and fundamental political paradigms, which emerged from the crucial twenty years. In particular, it is argued that the relationship between Kemalism and political Islam is characterized by interaction and reciprocal influence, rather than conflict and dichotomous opposition. Such a relationship can be better understood in the framework of the substantial continuity of authoritarianism in the post-1980 political regimes in Turkey. As a perspective for future research, it is suggested to study the AKP era in terms of comparison and historical continuity with the crucial twenty years.

Welfare states provide services and cash benefits. Concerning the latter, main programmes (expenditure levels/number of dependents) are retirement and unemployment benefits. Individual benefit levels mostly depend on prior earnings/contributions. Benefit levels and distributions affect relative poverty/income inequality, as well as other factors (labour supply, tax/contribution burdens, etc.). Several approaches explaining welfare state development co-exist, oftenly citizens' preferences link societal/economic developments and welfare policies (ch. 2). This work shows which factors affect citizens' preferences for levels and distributions of cash benefits, and how these preferences are turned into policies. Programmes are shortly depicted in ch. 3. Current and projected financing problems inherent to PAYG pension schemes are discussed, as well as three main goals unattainable simultaneously. For unemployment benefits, causes and the changing nature of (post-industrial) unemployment are shown. Benefits affect labour supply and wage-setting. Ch. 4 shows ideal-typical entitlement principles and 30 European countries' programmes. One aspect are theories of path dependence, partially being based on effects from policies on attitudes and vice versa, in the latter case causing institutional inertia due to attitude stability. Related to this, regime-specific reactions to crisis symptoms affect income inequality/relative poverty, fiscal burdens, and employment and unemployment rates, all of which affect citizens' attitudes (shown in ch. 7.1). Ch. 5 shows attitudes' relevance. Differences on the micro/regional/inter-country level necessarily leave citizens dissatisfied. The question if survey items in ESS4 concerning government responsibility are understood as concerning basic responsibility, or if answers reflect preferences for higher or lower benefits, is raised in ch. 6. Policies and macroeconomic factors determine attitudes (ch. 7.1). For some macro effects, links on the micro level can be shown in ch. 7.2. This chapter shows that views about justice, dependants as well as about policies' effects are relevant. These factors are affected by self-interest in a narrow sense, but far more relevant for citizens´ attitudes. Estimates of high standards of living of pensioners/unemployed reduce support for gov. responsibility. These estimates are unrelated to pension levels, but they are affected by long-term unemployment benefits. This also explains why support for unemployment benefits is unaffected by short-term benefit levels, whereas long-term benefit level has strongest negative effects on support for government responsibility. According to most figures, higher benefits for higher earners are supported primarily where benefits are positively earnings-related. With generous benefits for the long-term unemployed, welfare policies strongly reducing relative poverty are self-destructing. Country and region mean values are shown in ch. 8. Country values are strongly correlated to results from the 1990s, so that aggregated attitudes are stable. Support for government responsibility for the old is on the strong positive side, to a lesser degree this also applies to the unemployed. Intra-EU differences are small in both cases. Citizens prefer higher benefits for higher earners. This applies more to pensions than to unemployment benefits. Differences between countries are strong. Further, some countries display strong regional differences. Lastly, it can be seen that CEE citizens vastly differ in their preferences for gov responsibility. In Western Europe, party supporters' attitudes differ as expected from regime theory (ch.9). In Southern Europe this is only partially the case, in CEE not. Part of the explanation is that differences between party supporters are smaller in CEE. This is partially caused by welfare outlays being lower there (this pattern holds within non-CEE countries). Aggregated and partially distorted due to electoral rules and coalition making, voting decisions determine cabinet compositions. Ch. 10 shows how cabinet strength of three different ideologies in different time periods since 1945 affects policies. Within countries, cabinet predominance of certain ideologies is very stable between periods 1945-1974, 1975-1990 and 1991-2008, so that it cannot be ascertained which period is relevant for today's policies. Therefore, path dependence of programmes after initial set-up cannot be shown, but this stability may reflect path dependence mechanisms. Primarily for Western Europe it can be shown that economically left parties spend more, Christian democratic/religious parties slightly less and liberal/secular conservative parties markedly less on welfare. Christian democratic/religious parties introduce earnings-related benefits (and contributions), whereas both other party groups are more in favour of equal benefits (on different levels). In Western Europe, citizens' attitudes matter for policies. ; Wohlfahrtsstaaten bieten Dienstleistungen und Barleistungen an. Unter jenen nehmen Renten und Zahlungen an Erwerbslose in Bezug auf die Gesamtausgabenhöhe sowie die Anzahl betroffener Personen eine hervorgehobene Stellung ein. In den meisten europäischen Ländern hängen Leistungen vom vorherigen Einkommen (und den Sozialbeiträgen) ab. Die einzige Ausnahme hier sind Zahlungen an Langzeiterwerbslose. Sowohl Höhe als auch Verteilung der Barleistungen beeinflussen relative Armut und Einkommensungleichheit, als auch andere Faktoren wie Arbeitskräfteangebot und Steuer- und Abgabenbelastung. Die meisten Erklärungen wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Entwicklung beruhen auf Annahmen, welche die Einstellungen der Bürger als Bindeglied zwischen gesellschaftlichen und ökonomischen Entwicklungen und wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Politik benötigen (Kapitel 2). In dieser Arbeit wird gezeigt, welche Faktoren auf der Makro- und die Mikroebene die Einstellungen der Bürger zur Höhe und Verteilung von Barleistungen beeinflussen, und wie diese Einstellungen über den demokratischen Prozess Politikinhalte beeinflussen. In Kapitel 3 werden wohlfahrtsstaatliche Entwicklungen kurz dargestellt. In Bezug auf Renten werden gegenwärtige und zukünftige Finanzierungsprobleme umlagefinanzierter Systeme gezeigt sowie drei Lösungen, die nicht gleichzeitig erreicht werden können. Zudem werden Gründe für Arbeitslosigkeit und der Wandel der Arbeitslosigkeit in postindustriellen Gesellschaften dargestellt. Höhe und Verteilung von Renten als auch Arbeitslosengeld beeinflussen das Arbeitskräfteangebot sowie Lohnhöhen. Die idealtypischen Verteilungsprinzipien von Wohlfahrtsstaaten und die Programme 30 europäischer Länder in Bezug auf Höhe und Einkommensabhängigkeit werden in Kapitel 4 dargestellt. Einerseits, weil Makrokennziffern die Komplexität von Programmen nur teilweise erfassen können. Zum anderen wird davon ausgegangen, dass Entwicklungen in jüngerer Vergangenheit und sie begleitende Diskurse die Einstellungen der Bürger beeinflussen. Ein Aspekt dieser Entwicklungen sind Theorien der Pfadabhängigkeit. Teilweise gründen sie auf der Annahme, dass wohlfahrtstaatliche Politik die Einstellungen der Bürger beeinflusst, bzw. dass im umgekehrten Fall die Stabilität und politische Relevanz der Einstellungen institutionellen Wandel blockiert. Damit zusammenhängend beeinflussen regimespezifische Krisenreaktionen Einkommensungleichheit bzw. relative Armut, fiskalische Belastungen sowie Erwerbs- und Erwerbslosenquoten, die wiederum die Einstellungen der Bürger beeinflussen (Kapitel 7.1). Kapital 5 zeigt die Relevanz dieser Einstellungen für die Politikgestaltung und politische Unterstützung. Einstellungsunterschiede auf der Individualebene sowie regionalen Ebene führen notwendigerweise zu Unzufriedenheit; dies trifft im Falle europäischer Wohlfahrtspolitik auch auf Unterschiede zwischen Ländern zu. Der empirische Teil beginnt in Kapitel 6, in dem die Frage aufgeworfen wird, ob Fragen nach der Staatsverantwortung als Fragen grundsätzlicher Zuständigkeit oder als Fragen nach präferierten Leistungserhöhungen- oder Senkungen verstanden werden. Kapitel 7.1 zeigt, welche Makrofaktoren die Einstellungen der Bevölkerung beeinflussen. Dazu gehören wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik und, teilweise davon beeinflusst, makroökonomische Faktoren. Für manche der Makrofaktoren kann die Verbindung auf der Mikroebene in Kapitel 7.2 gezeigt werden. Hier wird gezeigt, dass Vorstellungen über gerechte Einkommensverteilungen, abhängige Gruppen sowie Auswirkungen wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Politik relevante Mikrofaktoren sind. Sie werden zwar von Eigeninteresse beeinflusst, sind aber einstellungsrelevanter. Darüber hinaus wird die Einflussstärke und somit Interessengegensätze unterschiedlicher Gruppen nicht in erwarteter Richtung von regimespezifischen Politikinhalten beeinflusst. Für Effekte von wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Politik auf Einstellungen kann gesagt werden: Die Einschätzung, Rentner seien finanziell gut situiert, führt zwar zu Ablehnung von Staatsverantwortung für diese Gruppe, wird ihrerseits aber nicht von der Rentenhöhe beeinflusst (dementsprechend hängen Rentenhöhe und Unterstützung für hohe Renten positiv zusammen). Ebenso führen hohe Einschätzungen des Lebensstandards von Arbeitlosen zur Ablehnung von Staatsverantwortung, aber diese Einschätzungen resultieren aus der Höhe von Langzeitarbeitslosengeld. Dies erklärt auch, warum die Unterstützung von Arbeitslosengeld durch die Höhe von Kurzzeitarbeitslosengeld nicht beeinflusst wird, wohingegen die Höhe des Langzeitarbeitslosengeldes starke negative Effekte auf diese Unterstützung hat. Die meisten Zahlen zeigen, dass die Bürger einkommensabhängige Renten in Ländern befürworten, wo diese einkommensabhängig sind, was noch mehr auf Arbeitslosengeld zutrifft. Mit hohen Leistungen an Langzeitarbeitslose sind gerade diejenigen Politikinhalte selbstzerstörend, die mit am stärksten die relative Armut verringern. Kapitel 8 zeigt Länder- und Regionenmittelwerte. Erstere korrelieren stark mit Ergebnissen aus den 1990ern, d.h. auf Aggregatebene sind die Einstellungen stabil. Staatsverantwortung für Alte wird stark unterstützt, für Arbeitslose etwas weniger. Unterschiede zwischen EU-Ländern sind gering. Die Bürger präferieren höhere Leistungen an Rentner mit höheren vorherigen Einkommen. Dies trifft auch für Arbeitslose zu, jedoch liegt hier der Ländermittelwert näher an der Einkommensneutralität. In Bezug auf die Einkommensabhängigkeit sind die Unterschiede zwischen den Ländern groß; in manchen Ländern wird positive Einkommensabhängigkeit stark unterstützt, andere liegen leicht auf der negativen Seite. Europäische Wohlfahrtspolitik würde nicht in Bezug auf die Höhe, jedoch in Bezug auf die Verteilung der Auszahlungen (und Beiträge) die Bürger mancher Länder unzufrieden stellen. Zudem gibt es in manchen Ländern starke regionale Unterschiede, so dass Staatenregierungen notwendigerweise in manchen Regionen Unzufriedenheit schüren müssen. Zuletzt kann gesehen werden, dass trotz gemeinsamer Geschichte die Bürger Mittel- und Osteuropas (MOE) stark unterschiedliche Präferenzen für Staatsverantwortung haben. Kapitel 9 zeigt die erste von zweien Verbindungen zwischen den Einstellungen der Bürger und wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Politik. In konservativen, sozialdemokratischen und liberalen Wohlfahrtsstaaten Westeuropas unterscheiden sich die Unterstützer von Parteien wie es von der Regimetheorie zu erwarten wäre. Dies ist in Südeuropa nur teilweise, in MOE nicht so. Das liegt teilweise daran, dass hier die Unterschiede von Parteien unterschiedlicher ideologischer Ausrichtungen geringer sind, was wieder teilweise mit niedrigeren Wohlfahrtsausgaben erklärt werden kann (das Muster besteht auch außerhalb MOEs). Aggregiert und teilweise verzerrt durch Wahlrecht und Koalitionsbildungen bestimmt das Wahlverhalten die Kabinettszusammensetzung. Kapitel 10 zeigt, wie die Kabinettsstärke von drei politischen Ideologien die Höhe und Verteilung von Renten und Arbeitslosengeld beeinflusst. Innerhalb der Länder ist die Dominanz einzelner Ideologien zwischen den Zeiträumen 1945-1974, 1975-1990 und 1991-2008 sehr stabil, so dass nicht gesagt werden kann welcher Zeitraum für heutige Politik entscheidend ist. Darum können pfadabhängige Verläufe von Programmen nach ihrer Einführung nicht gezeigt werden, jedoch können sich in erwähnter Stabilität Mechanismen der Pfadabhängigkeit widerspiegeln. Vor allem für Westeuropa kann gezeigt werden, dass ökonomisch linke Parteien höhere Lohnersatzquoten, christdemokratische/religiöse Parteien etwas niedrigere und liberale/säkular-konservative wesentlich geringer veranlassen. Christdemokratische/religiöse Parteien führen einkommensabhängige Barleistungen (und Beiträge) ein, die beiden anderen Parteiengruppen präferieren eher gleiche Bezüge (auf unterschiedlicher Höhe).

Concerns about foreign governments seeking influence over U.S. foreign policy are seemingly in headlines every day. President Joe Biden's son, Hunter Biden, earned millions in fees from Chinese partners between 2013 and 2018; Brookings Institution President Ret. Gen. John R. Allen resigned after being accused of secretly lobbying for Qatar (no criminal charges were brought); and a cloud of suspicion that Donald Trump was influenced by foreign interests in Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel, among other countries, hung over his presidency, even after the Mueller investigation failed to provide conclusive evidence that Trump's campaign criminally conspired with Russian officials in the 2016 election campaign.But some of the candidates in the Republican presidential primary field appear to have few if any concerns about collecting six-or seven-figure paydays from foreign sources, according to a review of the candidates' financial disclosures.Unsurprisingly, Donald Trump tops both the polls and as recipient of foreign money, taking between $2 million and $10 million from his companies in the United Arab Emirates, over $5 million from his company in Oman, among other foreign payments totaling well in excess of $25 million and potentially exceeding $50 million. He also received at least $2 million in speaking fees at events connected to the Unification Church, a South Korean evangelical congregation with politically far-right leanings that also owns the conservative Washington Times. Former Vice President Mike Pence also collected $550,000 in speaking fees from a group founded by the late Rev. Sun Myung Moon – who founded the Unification Church. Pence's biggest foreign payments came from groups associated with Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK). This Iranian militant group spent time on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations from 1997 to 2012 due to its role in the killing of six Americans in Iran in the 1970s and an attempted attack against the Iranian mission to the UN in 1992. Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, the group fell out with the Islamic Republic and fled to Iraq, from which it fought alongside Saddam Hussein's army during the Iran-Iraq war. During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Human Rights Watch and the Rand Corporation reported on human rights abuses conducted by the MEK against its own members. The MEK had become increasingly insular, focused on the aggrandizement of its late-leader Masoud Rajavi and his wife, Maryam Rajavi, leading outside observers, including the Rand Corporation, to characterize it as a "cult."Since its delisting as a terrorist organization in 2012 the group worked to rehabilitate its image by featuring high-profile politicians at its conventions, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, former Democratic National Committee Chairwoman Donna Brazile, and former defense official and WestExec and Center for a New American Security co-founder Michèle Flournoy, seeking to frame themselves as a legitimate dissident group and a viable political force in Iran if the Islamic Republic undergoes regime change.Those appearances were often incentivized by lucrative speaker fees, a trend underscored in the former vice president's finances. Pence has received $430,000 from three groups affiliated with the MEK.Former South Carolina governor and former U.S. ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley reported between $50,000 and $100,000 from United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), a New York-based pressure group that opposed the legal sale of medical supplies to Iran early in the COVID-19 pandemic and regularly calls for for heightened sanctions against Iran and against diplomatic efforts to constrain Iran's nuclear program. It's possible those donations are linked to foreign governments as UANI and its affiliated organizations have a number of links to Gulf monarchies. Emails that appear to have originated from the United Arab Emirates' ambassador in Washington, Yousef Al Otaiba, exposed a UANI advisory board member soliciting "support" from the UAE. In another email, Republican Party fundraiser and Saudi lobbyist Norm Coleman provided the tax status of UANI's umbrella group to Otaiba — suggesting a donation from the UAE was forthcoming — and offered to answer any questions from the ambassador. Haley also collected between $100,000 and $1,000,000 each from Canadian Friends of the Jerusalem College of Technology, Barclays Capital Asia, and the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs.Pence and Haley's financial disclosures show a clear trend: foreign-linked groups with an interest in a hawkish U.S. role in the Middle East and regime change in Iran have taken a particular interest in funneling payments to these two candidates. Whether these were one-off payments for speaking appearances or down payments on influencing U.S. foreign policy remains to be clarified.

Perhaps the Louisiana Legislature will blaze yet another
new trail this month, in two ways dealing with gubernatorial vetoes.

This branch of state government, with each chamber
now controlled by Republican supermajorities, began making history in 2021 when
for the first time it cued
up a veto session in response to Democrat Gov. John Bel Edwards
vetoing high-profile popular bills passed by large majorities. With the House GOP
then a bit below supermajority status required to meet override vote goals, it
failed to repair the damage.

But it succeeded in 2022 when it had
another veto session, although attached to a special session that led to
the former occurring during the period allotted to the regular session. There,
it went one-for-one in restoring congressional maps Edwards had vetoed.

Now it has a chance to undo vetoes in a veto
session attached to the regular session. This year, Edwards struck
at several high-profile popular bills passed with supermajority votes to spare.
This almost guarantees by the end of this week fewer than half of legislators in
both houses will turn in ballots asking to forgo the session, meaning it will
happen.

And once there, because of the nature of these –
protecting children, parents, teachers, among other items – with such
majorities, and in an election year where several legislators know a vote to
sustain likely will cost them reelection, it's very likely overrides will
succeed on multiple bills. However, that's not all the groundbreaking that
could occur.

Among the three vetoes ever overridden under the
1974 Constitution, none have been of the line-item variety. That could change
this month, because legislative leaders in their zeal to enforce discipline
left the door open to this.

Traditionally, until recently the Legislature would
pass the capital outlay bill (and usually another supplemental one, if not including
some capital items in the general appropriations bill) late in the session and
oversubscribed. That meant the governor could wait until after the session to
cast vetoes, thereby requiring a veto session to override. It also meant that as
the total amounts of all projects exceeded the amount of capacity for bond
sales, the State Bond Commission would have to pick and choose which to forward
among those of the highest priority ranking.

Legislators have liked doing this especially in election
years to create the impression they bring home the bacon, even though some
projects won't get funded on the intended timeline and, if conditions change,
possibly at all. But in 2020, awash in cash from the federal government overreacting
to the Wuhan coronavirus pandemic, the Legislature
didn't oversubscribe. Plus, until Edwards' terms governors had enough clout
to control the SBC, but his increasingly leftist governance alienated enough
other panel members, comprised mostly of other Republican and executive and
legislative branch elected officials, to have its GOP members control of it.

While since 2020 oversubscription has returned,
Edwards hasn't controlled the SBC to pick and choose projects to pursue, thereby
exercising a kind of indirect veto. This left upfront vetoes, which in 2021 were
acknowledged in the veto session but not acted upon. But
in 2022 he was foiled when the Legislature passed the capital outlay bill
early enough so that overrides would have been considered during the regular
session, and he cast no line-item vetoes.

However, 2023 returned to the pattern of oversubscription
and late outlay bill passage, allowing Edwards to cast a slew of project
vetoes, aimed
almost exclusively at fiscally- and socially- conservative Republicans, after
the session. This happened with the tacit cooperation of the nominally GOP
chamber leadership who wanted bigger government to give party members pork bragging
rights for reelection.

The question is whether enough members want to
have their cake and eat it as well. The punished Republicans who voted for fiscal
restraint and/or brought successfully bills that shamed Edwards and legislative
liberal Democrats could have their projects restored, for two reasons. Senators
who went along with bigger government lost those vetoed projects in their districts
anyway and would like to seem these restored. Also, unpunished GOP representatives
may realize that if they don't help out their afflicted colleagues now that in
the future they could wind up on the short end of leadership power plays and
would need similar help to rescue their projects.

Benjamin
Franklin's wisdom may prevail this year for line-item vetoes: legislators
must all hang together, or most assuredly they shall all hang separately. A
single override of this nature would make double history.

An Oped in the Wall Street Journal on the "fair tax" proposal. As usual, I have to wait 30 days to post the full version The bill eliminates the personal and corporate income tax, estate and gift tax, payroll (Social Security and Medicare) tax and the Internal Revenue Service. It replaces them with a single national sales tax. Business investment is exempt, so it is effectively a consumption tax. I've been writing about consumption taxes for a while. Some previous posts on these points,  VAT (WSJ), A progressive VAT, Consumption tax, Tax reform, Taxes, Alternative Minimum Tax, also  Wealth and Taxes Convexification and complication Tax graph Economists and Taxes Corporate tax burden Tax Reform Tax reform again (WSJ) Corporate tax reading list Corporate tax (zero) Trump taxes 2 Those address a lot of the what ifs and whatabouts. But it's not progressive! (Meaning, better off people pay the same rate, not the same amount, not "politically progressive"). Already the "fair tax" proposal adds Each household would get a check each month, so that purchases up to the poverty line are effectively not taxed.Yes, effectively universal basic income from Republicans! One could do more. And as in the above forest of links there are plenty of ways to make a consumption tax as progressive as you'd like. But the most important point, with added emphasis: the progressivity of a whole tax and transfer system matters, not of a particular tax in isolation. If a flat consumption tax finances greater benefits to people of lesser means, the overall system could be more progressive than what we have now. A consumption tax would still finance food stamps, housing, Medicaid, and so forth. And it would be particularly efficient at raising revenue, meaning there would potentially be more to distribute—a point that has led some conservatives to object to a consumption tax.Even the supposedly far right radical Republican plan bends here to political expediency in my view. Why should this particular tax add progressively, rather than just finance transfers? Won't the rate be too high? If the government spends 40% of GDP, and consumption is 85% of GDP, then the consumption tax rate has to be 47%. Wow! But taxes overall must finance what the government spends. Collecting it in one tax rather than lots of smaller taxes doesn't change the overall rate. It's better for voters to see how much the government takes. (Currently taxes don't cover spending because we borrow a lot, but that can't last forever). What about "starve the beast." Consumption taxes or a VAT are so efficient, government will grow. Keep an inefficient system so that government is forced to cut spending. While great economists advocated that view, it does not seem to be working! BTW, I don't have a big view on consumption tax, sales tax, VAT. From where we are now, all three are about the same. There are differences, that will matter in the end. The fair tax bill actually has a lot of the thought out detail one expects. The main point: Get out of the day by day politics. It's great news that a clean good fundamental reform idea is making it to actual legislation. This is a big moment. For a long time, consumption taxes have been debated in academic articles, books, think-tank reports, administration white papers and so forth. When the U.S. eventually decides to reform the tax code, consumption taxes will be the obvious answer. It is great news that real elected politicians like Rep. Carter get it, and are willing to stick their necks out to try to get it passed.No, it's not likely to pass this year, or next. All great reforms take time. The 8-hour workday and Social Security started as wild-eyed dreams of the socialist party. Civil rights took bill after bill being voted down. The income tax took a long time. But if we never talk about the promised land and only squabble over the next fork in the road, surely we will never get there.