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This article addresses the absence of a federal equalisation programme in the United States, which is a significant aspect of 'American exceptionalism'. Comparing the United States with Australia and Canada, we argue that three factors are relevant when accounting for this absence. On one hand, we turn to two societal factors to explain why there was never much political appetite for the creation of a stand-alone equalisation programme in the United States, namely the lack of a direct threat to the territorial integrity of the United States after 1865 and the comparative weakness of the idea of social citizenship in that country. On the other hand, our analysis shows that key institutional features of American political institutions, particularly strong bicameralism combined with the absence of formal party discipline, help illuminate why it would have been difficult to create an equalisation programme even if there had been some societal pressures to do so. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractChildren's centres are intended to be a mainstream, universal service. They began in 2004 and their origins are diverse. Some replaced various forms of local provision, most notably Sure Start programmes; others were established from scratch. Issues for exploratory empirical work have been identified from the guidance issued by central government. Using interview data from three urban local authorities, this article explores the nature of the 'core offer' that centres are expected to provide and the way in which they have pursued the goal of integrating staff and services. The article highlights the problems of balancing a focus on the child and on the parent; of reconciling childcare provision as part of the employability agenda and as a means to educational achievement for the child; of permitting local variation while achieving consistency; of the role of monitoring in relation to developing good practice; and of achieving integration in a mixed economy of care. We find that despite the greater specification of the core offer for children's centres compared to that for Sure Start, there are substantial differences between children's centres in terms of services, while the mixed economy of provision poses considerable challenges to the goal of integration.

ABSTRACTThis article provides empirical evidence onex anteandex postindicators of regulatory quality and the relationship between those indicators and market performance in liberalised EU-15 network industries. It finds a low level of regulatory independence and competence, a high level of cross-country variations in regulatory quality, and widespread absence of correlation betweenex anteregulatory quality andex postperformance indicators. On the basis of these findings, it suggests that the design of national regulatory agencies (NRAs) in Europe is not optimal and may be conducive to regulatory ineffectiveness or outright regulatory failure. Nevertheless, the existence and strengthening of EU-level regulators could enable EU member states to reduce the risk of regulatory failure by encouraging coordination and adoption of best practice.

Environmental agencies provide a variety of regulatory, consulting, analysis, and other services that are typically funded by a mix of mechanisms including taxes, fees, contributions, and earmarked streams. Public deliberation in this area mostly attends to the levels of funding of these services, with inadequate attention to the relationship between means and funding adequacy, or between means and agency performance.The characteristic business models of such agencies provide useful guidance regarding appropriate funding mechanisms. In particular, five different such models are commonly found, each with strong analogies to other familiar kinds of enterprise: (i) Agriculture: the Wildlife Ranch; (ii) Habitat; (iii) Maintenance: the Park; (iv) Consulting, education, and permits: the Think Tank; (v) Risk Spreading: Insurance; and (vi) Enforcement: The Police. Each of these models has strong although not usually decisive implications for the type of funding mechanism best suited to it. Budget analysis and internal accounting that incorporates these models would improve agencies' practice and their claims on appropriate funding. The analysis uses the California Department of Fish and Game as an example.

Election reform has become a major issue since the 2000 election, but little consideration has been given to the issues associated with managing them. In this article, we use principal–agent theory to examine the problems associated with Election Day polling place voting. We note that Election Day voting manifests problems that agency theory shows are difficult to overcome, including adverse selection of and shirking by poll workers. We then examine alternate methods of voting, such as early, absentee, and Internet voting, and show how these reforms can mitigate many of the more severe principal–agent problems in election management.

Our understanding of international competition in regulatory policies has not progressed much because conventional theories lead to a bewildering range of conclusions. Empirical evidence has shown the limitations of simplistic models. Fresh work should overcome the obsession with 'races' and 'final outcomes' of conventional theoretical approaches and start modelling real-world mechanisms of regulatory competition. The first part of the article shows the limitations of conventional theories. The second introduces eight problems that explanations of international regulatory competition should address. It also discusses how the articles presented here contribute to the solution to problematic aspects of the puzzle. The conclusion reports results achieved in terms of key concepts of regulatory competition, sequences of cooperation and competition, the role of non-unitary actors in networked regulatory action, and why regulatory competition is still limited, both in the EU and in transatlantic relations.

Compares the pre-election spending of President George W. Bush with that of other election year presidents, especially against that of President Richard Nixon, 1971-1972. Each president faced similar economic situations, such as war expenditures, large budget deficits, a depreciation of the US dollar, & changes in monetary policies. On all counts, Nixon's electoral economic engineering to acquire votes gains the advantage over that of Bush. Bush still cannot compare to election year presidents of other countries, such as Mexican Presidents Jose Lopez Portillo in 1982 & Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1996, nearly every Italian prime minister, & even British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher pushed for looser macroeconomic policies during reelection campaigns. President Jimmy Carter in 1979 became an exception in resisting pre-election economic engineering by appointing tough-minded Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman. Assuming Bush does not outdo Nixon's spending in the months remaining before the 2004 election, Bush's pre-election spending will not have the same bad post-election aftermath as did Nixon's. M. James

Outlook for political and economic reform following defeat of the Liberal Democratic party. Focuses on Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa's initiatives to weaken the "iron triangle" of conservative politicians, senior bureaucrats, and big business leaders.

Political consequences of the Vietnamese withdrawal, scheduled to be completed Sept. 30, 1989.

Response of East German leadership to Soviet reforms; internal and external economic, political, and social pressures.