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This article is the result of research: Colombian educational policies in the nineteenth century Government Plans; It is a study of historical focus, which aims to analyze and investigate, in Constitutions, laws, norms, decrees and perspectives, the educational policies approved by Colombian jurisprudence in the governments of this period. To do this, it is proposed to know, chronologically, and theoretically examine the government plans that laid the foundations of the Colombian educational system, in a period of ideological polarization between the liberal and conservative political parties. This political context originated nine civil wars, which fueled the poverty of the treasury, and the idea of social progress through education, as an enlightened purpose of a State with an anachronically feudal economy. A State whose ungovernability, authoritarian control of the party in power and social injustice, did not prevent the low coverage, quality and educational equity, which left the monarchy, and the Spanish Catholic Church after three centuries in the end of the century. power. As a result of this social instability, it should be expected that the government plans, specified in the law, would bear fruit to a modern educational system, with focus on instruction, inspection and administration, with increased efficiency, infrastructure, inclusion, coverage and educational equity, regarding Spanish medieval education; However, the educational reality, still, as until today, was far from being modern and achieving the coverage, quality and educational equity that the slogans in the government plans proclaimed. ; Este artículo es resultado de la investigación: Políticas educativas de Colombia en los Planes de gobierno del siglo XIX; es un estudio de enfoque histórico, que tiene el objetivo de analizar e indagar, en Constituciones, leyes, normas, decretos y perspectivas, las políticas educativas aprobadas por la jurisprudencia colombiana en los gobiernos de este periodo. Para ello, se plantea conocer, en forma cronológica, y examinar teóricamente los planes de gobierno que sentaron las bases del Sistema educativo colombiano, en un período de polarización ideológica entre los partidos políticos liberal y conservador. Este contexto político originó nueve guerras civiles, lo que avivó la pobreza del fisco, y la idea de progreso social a través de la educación, como propósito ilustrado de un Estado con una economía anacrónicamente feudal. Un Estado cuya ingobernabilidad, control autoritario del partido de turno e injusticia social, no impidieron que, al finalizar el siglo, disminuyera la baja cobertura, calidad y equidad educativa, que dejaron la monarquía, y la Iglesia católica española después de tres siglos en el poder. Como efecto, de esta inestabilidad social, se debe esperar que los planes de gobierno, concretados en la ley, dieran fruto a un Sistema educativo moderno, con eje en la instrucción, la inspección y la administración, con aumento de la eficiencia, infraestructura, inclusión, cobertura y equidad educativa, respecto a laeducación medieval española; no obstante, la realidad educativa, todavía, como hasta hoy en día, estaba lejos de ser moderna y lograr la cobertura, calidad y equidad educativa que proclamaban las consignas en los planes de gobierno. ; Este artigo é resultado de uma pesquisa: Políticas Educacionais da Colômbia nos Planos Governamentais do século XIX, é um estudo com foco histórico, que visa analisar e investigar em constituições, leis, regulamentos, decretos e perspectivas, políticas educacionais aprovadas pela jurisprudência colombiana nos governos desse período. Para isso, propõe-se conhecer cronologicamente e teoricamente os planos do governo que lançaram as bases do sistema educacional colombiano, em um período cuja polarização ideológica entre os partidos políticos liberal e conservador. Um contexto político que originou nove guerras civis, alimentando a pobreza do tesouro, e a ideia de progresso social através da educação, como um objetivo esclarecido de um Estado com uma economia feudal anacronicamente. Um Estado cuja ingovernabilidade, controle autoritário do partido no poder e injustiça social não impediram a baixa cobertura, qualidade e equidade educacional, que deixaram a monarquia e a Igreja Católica Espanhola após três séculos no poder, a diminuir no final do século. Como resultado dessa instabilidade social, espera-se que os planos governamentais especificados na lei deem frutos em um sistema educacional moderno, focado na instrução, inspeção e administração, aumentando a eficiência, infraestrutura, inclusão, cobertura educacional e equidade em relação à educação medieval espanhola; não obstante a realidade educacional, ainda estava, até hoje, longe de ser moderna e de alcançar a cobertura educacional, qualidade e equidade, que foram proclamadas nos planos governamentais.

Mexican graphic artist Constantino Escalante published over five hundred lithographs in the satirical journal La Orquesta from 1861-1868. He caricatured Mexico City's political figures, intellectuals, and the elite during a period in which the country traversed a series of complex political developments including the French occupation and the Liberal struggle to build an independent modernized nation. This dissertation situates Escalante's works within the larger history of visual satire and caricature exploring the disruptive nature of Escalante's lithographs. The prints of Honoré Daumier and Francisco Goya are considered alongside Escalante's works as all three artists were invested in exposing the duplicity of the ruling class but also saw the promise of Enlightenment ideals and an emerging bourgeoisie in moments of national transformation. Chapter One is a brief assessment of the evolving definitions of graphic satire and caricature. Particular theoretical approaches are introduced with the goal of establishing a working definition of caricature and visual satire. By honing in on historically specific facets of Escalante's caricature, his interaction with art historical conventions, and the tensions and ambiguities constructed within his prints, I define his visual language as disruptive caricature. Caricature and visual satire within the political arena are often categorized as either criticism or propaganda. By contrast, I assert that Escalante deployed the power of criticism to contest the legitimacy of political factions and individuals and that he also wielded the coercive power of caricature to assert the agency of La Orquesta and Radical Liberals. The dual function of dismantling and promoting particular political and artistic ideals allowed Escalante and La Orquesta effectively to disrupt nineteenth-century Mexican politics and visual culture.Chapter Two charts the heated battle for a free press that played out in Escalante's prints published in La Orquesta. This chapter examines censorship, circulation, the explosion of lithographic production, and finally the intense conflicts amongst the journalists themselves. The assumption that the primary aim of caricature is to unmask some perceived essential truth is also brought into question. Rather than revealing an essentialized truth, Escalante's prints set a whole range of perceived truths in tension in order to challenge not only the assumptions of the Mexican public but also the individuals and organizations that comprise the structures of government and journalism. Escalante's work ultimately asks the viewer to assess what is being exposed in the process of ridiculing specific targets and their relationships with other figures and situations. Chapter Three examines visual representations of the nation in tension with the disruptive works of Constantino Escalante. I look to Magali Carrera's assessment that national identities were partially defined through a process of accumulating images of progress, human and organic capital, and class structures. I demonstrate that Escalante's deployment of caricature and visual satire tends simultaneously to inhabit and shatter other genres. Prints by Casimiro Castro and photographs by the studio of Cruces y Campa provide pivotal points of comparison. Chapter Four examines the historical development of caricature as a genre in tension with contemporaneous political and cultural developments. The exchange between Escalante and his viewers hinges upon their respective positions as participants in the events that are unfolding before them. But Escalante's visual language is also engaged with art historical developments represented in the prints of Francisco Goya. Through early and late depictions of Benito Juárez, I examine specific historical developments including land reform, the debates surrounding the implementation of the constitution of 1857, struggles within the Liberal party, and shifting visual representations of Juárez. Goya's El Sueño de la razon produce monstruos, Capricho 43 is examined alongside Escalante's 1867-1868 lithographs of Juárez to further exemplify the multivalent constructions of caricature present in both artists' works. Chapter Five considers Escalante's prints within the context of war and occupation. Escalante's lithographs published in La Orquesta leading up to and during the Second Empire (1864-1867) provide a Mexican visual perspective on the conflict and France's occupation of Mexico. Escalante's oeuvre includes a vast array of prints depicting the struggle to establish the Second Empire, the precariousness of Maximilian's rule, the roles of particular individuals in the attempt to solidify French rule, the disillusionment of the conservatives upon realizing that the Emperor had liberal tendencies, and finally, the defeat of the French. Escalante's visual language adeptly registers the dramatic shifts in Mexico's national and political struggles during this period. Escalante never abandoned what he and his fellow Radical Liberals spent decades fighting for – a modern Mexican Republic.

The article focuses attention on the discourses of the Spanish neoliberal think tank Foundation for Social Studies and Analysis (FAES) of the conservative Popular Party (PP). This neoliberal think tank is the main group of actors that produce a deconstructive logic of the Spanish public welfare system to construct a complex set of neoliberal policies. The analysis is developed in the educational policy field to understand the narratives of the Spanish Educational Reform Act. The text is divided into four sections. First, from a theoretical dimension, it addresses different perspectives to analyze the neoliberalism and the processes of privatization in the public education. The second, from a theoretical review, it addresses the new role that think tanks occupy and their advocacy in the design of neoliberal policies. The third, through a socio-historical analysis, reviews how throughout the democratic period (1978) the different Spanish political forces have incorporated mechanisms of endogenous privatization in education as a firm commitment to restructure "the public." The fourth section discusses how the discourses of FAES, extracted from the Web of foundation, articles, books and videos of participants of this think tank, have been used to introduce various mechanisms of hidden privatization in the Spanish educational system, and its commissioning is consolidated by means of the current Educational Reform Act (LOMCE). ; El artículo focaliza la atención en las narrativas del think tank neoliberal Fundación para el Análisis de los Estudios Sociales (FAES) del Partido Popular (PP). Este think tank neoliberal es uno de los principales grupos de actores que han argumentado en las últimas dos décadas la lógica deconstructiva del sistema público de bienestar español en defensa de las políticas neoliberales. El análisis se realiza sobre el campo de la política educativa, con el propósito de estudiar los discursos neoliberales del think tank, y su desarrollo en la nueva ley educativa (LOMCE). El texto es dividido en cuatro secciones. El apartado introductorio, desde una dimensión teórica, sintetiza las diferentes perspectivas de análisis del neoliberalismo y de los procesos de privatización endógena y exógena en los sistemas educativos públicos. El segundo apartado consta de una revisión teórica de los think tanks como nuevos actores de influencia en el diseño e implementación de las políticas neoliberales en los sistemas públicos. El tercer apartado, mediante un análisis socio-histórico, examina cómo en las diversas reformas educativas desde la entrada en la democracia española, independientemente del signo ideológico, han ido incorporando mecanismos de privatización encubierta en la educación pública. El último apartado expone cómo los discursos de FAES, extraídos de la web de la fundación, artículos, libros y vídeos de los participantes de este think tank han sido utilizados para introducir diversos mecanismos de privatización encubierta en el sistema educativo español, y su puesta en marcha se consolidan en la actual reforma educativa (LOMCE). ; O artigo foca a atenção nos discursos do grupo neoliberal Think Tank da Fundação de Estudos Sociais e Análise (FAES), do partido conservador PP (Partido Popular). Este Think Tank neoliberal é um dos principais grupos de atores que tem produzido ao longo das últimas duas décadas uma lógica desconstrutiva do sistema de bem-estar público espanhol para a construção de um complexo conjunto de políticas neoliberais. A análise é desenvolvida no domínio da política educacional para entender as narrativas da Lei de Reforma Educacional espanhol. O texto é dividido em quatro seções. Em primeiro lugar, a partir de uma dimensão teórica, que aborda diferentes perspetivas para analisar o neoliberalismo e os processos de privatização na educação pública. A segunda, a partir de uma revisão teórica, que aborda o novo papel que este grupo ocupa e sua defesa na conceção das políticas neoliberais. O terceiro, através de uma análise sócio histórica, analisa como durante todo o período democrático (1978) as diferentes forças políticas espanholas incorporadas têm mecanismos de privatização endógena na educação como um compromisso firme para reestruturar "o público". A quarta seção discute como os discursos da FAES, obtido a partir da Web de fundação, artigos, livros e vídeos de participantes deste Think Tank, têm sido utilizados para introduzir vários mecanismos de privatização oculta no sistema educativo espanhol, e seu comissionamento está consolidada por meio da corrente Lei de Reforma Educacional (LOMCE).

Book reviewed in this article:CAN MINISTERS COPE? Australian Federal Ministers at Work. By Patrick Weller and Michelle Grattan.JAMES MACARTHUR: Colonial Conservative, 1798–1867. By John Manning Ward.A JUST SOCIETY? Essays on Equity in Australia. Edited by P. N. Troy.EQUITY IN THE CITY. Edited by P. N. Troy.INNOVATION AND REACTION: The life and death of the Federal Department of Urban and Regional Development. By C. J. Lloyd and Patrick N. Troy.SYDNEY; A Social and Political Atlas. By Michael Poulsen and Peter Spearritt.TOWARDS ADAPTIVE FEDERALISM; A Search for Criteria for Responsibility Sharing in a Federal System.PARLAMENTARISCHE BUNDESSTAATEN IM COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS: KANADA, AUSTRALIEN, INDIEN: Ein Vergleich. Bd I. Grundbegriffe und Grundlagen.UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. Edited by G. R. Curnow and R. L. Wettenhall.DECISIONS: Case Studies in Australian Public Policy. Edited by Sol Encel, Peter Wilenski and Bernard Schaffer.THE ABC–AUNT SALLY AND SACRED COW. By Clement Semmler.MELBOURNE STUDIES IN EDUCATION 1981. Edited by Stephen Murray‐Smith.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PRACTICE Edited by J. A. Pettifer.AUSTRALIAN IMPERIALISM IN THE PACIFIC: The Expansionist Era 1820–1920. By Roger C. ThompsonCRITICAL ESSAYS IN AUSTRALIAN POLITICS. Edited by Graeme Duncan.WOOL IN WARTIME: A Study in Colonialism, by Les White.NORTHERN AUSTRALIA: Options and Implications. Edited by Rhys Jones.GUIDE TO NORTHERN TERRITORY RESEARCH RESOURCES IN NORTHERN TERRITORY COLLECTIONS. Compiled by M.A. Clinch for the Northern Territory Government.THE ABORIGINAL TASMANIANS. By Lyndall Ryan.ALBERT HAHL: Governor in New Guinea. Edited and translated by Peter G. Sack and Dymphna Clark.Peter Biskup, 'Dr Albert Hahl–Sketch of a German Colonial Official', Australian Journal of Politics and History 14 (3), 1968, 343–57.Peter Sack, Land Between Two Laws: early European Land acquisitions in New Guinea (Canberra, 1973).Stewart Firth, 'Albert Hahl: Governor of German New Guinea', in James Griffin (ed.), Papua New Guinea Portraits: The Expatriate Experience (Canberra, 1978), 28–48.WOMEN, POLITICS AND CHANGE: The Kaum Ibu UMNO, Malaysia, 1945–1972. By Lenore Manderson.UNEQUAL TREATY 1898‐1997: China, Great Britain and Hong Kong's New Territories. By Peter Wesley‐Smith.THE LAST COLONY: But Whose? A study of the labour movement, labour market and labour relations in Hong Kong. By H.A. Turner et al.CHINA'S INTELLECTUAL DILEMMA: Politics and University Enrolment, 1949–1978. By Robert Taylor.ANATOMY OF THE RAJ: Russian Consular Reports. Edited by Suhash Chakravarty.CLASS AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN KENYA: The Making of an African Petite Bourgeoisie 1905–1970. By Gavin Kitching.THE BRITISH SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. Fourth Edition. By Anthony H. Birch.AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS. Third Edition. By Allen M. Potter, Peter Fotheringham and James G. Kellas.THE PROJECTION OF BRITAIN: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919–1939. By Philip M. Taylor.GREAT BRITAIN GREAT EMPIRE: An Evaluation of the British Imperial Experience. By W. Ross Johnston.THE BRITISH BUSINESS ELITE: Its attitudes to Class, Status and Power. By John Fidler.A CLASS AGAINST ITSELF: Power and the Nationalisation of the British Steel Industry. By Doug McEachern.A LIBERAL DESCENT: Victorian Historians and the English Past. By J. W. Burrow.THE GREAT POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM 1815 1914. By F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen.WHO WERE THE FASCISTS: Social Roots of European Fascism. Edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bern! Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust.DECEPTION IN WORLD WAR II. By Charles Cruickshank.THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1875‐1935: From Ghetto to Government. By W. L. Guttsman.DIE DEUTSCHE INFLATION 1914–1923. Ursachen und Folgen in internationaler Perspektive. By Carl‐Ludwig Holtfrerich.INTERPRETING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. By François Furet.TSAR ALEXIS: His Reign and His Russia. By Joseph T. Fuhrmann.DIARY OF VOLODYMYR VYNNYCHENKO, Vol. 1, 1911–1920. Edited by Hryhory Kostiuk.THE ETHNIC REVIVAL IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Anthony D. Smith.POLITICS IN ETHNICALLY BIPOLAR STATES: Guyana, Malaysia, Fiji. By R. S. Milne.ETHNIC SOLDIERS: State security in a divided society. By Cynthia H. Enloe.ELITES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: The Federalist Years to the Civil War. By Philip H. Burch.BRITISH REGULARS IN MONTREAL: An Imperial Garrison, 1832–1854. By Elinor Kyte Senior.THE POLITICS OF THE SECOND ELECTORATE: Women and Public Participation–Britain, USA, Canada, Australia, France, Spain, West Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Eastern Europe, USSR, Japan. Edited by Joni Lovenduski and Jill Hills.WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN: Essays in Philosophical Anthropology, Political Philosophy and Social Psychology. Edited by Ross Fitzgerald.JEAN BODIN: Selected Writings on Philosophy, Religion and Politics. Edited by Paul Lawrence Rose.MACHIAVELLI. By Quentin Skinner.CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY. By Geoffrey Marshall.THE DESIGN AND UNDERSTANDING OF SURVEY QUESTIONS. By William A. Belson.

At less than three weeks away from the national election, an Obama victory, even if not inevitable, seems today quite likely. Political scientist Larry Sabato of the University of Virginia, in his on-line publication Crystal Ball, has now put Obama over the magic number of 270 electoral votes (50% plus 1 of all electoral votes), with potentially many more votes to be added from close races in several states. Barack Obama leads John McCain in the polls by ten points, and the McCain campaign is in disarray. It has stopped campaigning in some states (i.e. Michigan) and is trying to hold on to other states that traditionally vote Republican but are about to be lost for the first time in decades (Virginia, North Carolina). Barring a huge end-of-October surprise, this trend will firm up and determine the result in favor of Obama. Democrats are also poised to win a majority of seats in the Senate and House of Representatives. The so-called "coattails effect" of the presidential race on the congressional election is starting to worry Republicans, who are becoming very critical of John McCain's campaign. Considering that the electoral race was at a continuous dead heat in the last two months, it is worth discussing what has determined the steady rise of Obama in the polls. First and foremost, of course, was the financial crisis. The astounding institutional banking crisis that originated from the meltdown of the real estate market, the resulting credit crunch, have created an anxiety not seen since the Great Depression of 1930. Historically, the Democratic Party has a better reputation for salvaging the economy in times of crisis. In addition to the historical record, several political scientists, Alan Abramowitz from Emory and Larry Bartels from Princeton among others, have developed models based on the correlation between economic growth and presidential election results, and have found that when the economy is not growing in the second quarter of the election year, the party in power almost without exception loses the election. But just as important as the economic disarray has been the reaction of each candidate to that crisis, and the style of leadership that emerged from it. One week before the Wall Street debacle, McCain had said that" the fundamentals of the economy were strong". That unfortunate statement immediately gave an unequivocal ring of truth to Obama's claim that his opponent was "out of touch" with the realities of the country, and it will probably be remembered in history books as the critical turning point of this election. In the first debate, both candidates were cautious about the rescue plan (which had not yet been fully developed by the Treasury) and answered the questions on the economy as if little had changed. However, two days earlier, McCain had suspended his campaign and announced he was needed in Washington to "help solve the crisis". He had also demanded that the debate be cancelled because "times were too serious for that type of exchange". This was a gamble taken by his campaign and it backfired badly, as Obama (who also flew to Washington and attended the same meeting at the invitation of Bush) insisted that because times were difficult, the debate had become even more important and should take place: Americans were now paying attention to who should be the one to lead them out of this mess. Ultimately, McCain backed down and attended the debate, after no agreement on the Rescue Plan came out of that White House meeting. Although he did very well, was energetic and on message, his erratic pre-debate behavior worked against him by providing ammunition to the opposition, who were thereby able to portray him as unpredictable and over excitable, not the steady hand you would want at the helm of a nation in turmoil. Still, most experts and observers considered the first debate a draw, with both candidates passing their respective tests: Obama proving he was presidential enough to hold the office, and McCain reminding the public of his experience and dedication to the country. However, the polls showed most voters had chosen Obama as the winner. The second debate was in a town-hall meeting format, but with strict control of time and of the questioning. Veteran journalist Tom Brockaw moderated it with a strong hand, but the questions were lame and it was a lackluster performance on the part of everybody involved. However, the body language proved an asset to Obama, who listened respectfully, did not take any notes, and when needed, moved comfortably around the set to approach the public. On the other hand, McCain had a nervous restlessness about him that put him at a disadvantage; he kept going back to his corner to make notes on his opponent's comments and at a certain point referred to Obama as "that one" in what was perceived by many to be an expression of slight contempt. This was compounded by his aimless wondering around the set, at times having to be called on by Brockaw for blocking the moderator's teleprompter. In comparison, Obama looked very relaxed and cool, exuding that kind of calm and self-confidence that most people seem to be yearning for during these difficult times. It paid off, and his numbers started mounting dramatically on the next day. Even before that debate, the McCain campaign had thrown all self-restraint overboard and was using every trick in the book of negative campaigning. Thus, the name of William Ayres has become very widely known across the country, as a "domestic terrorist" who organized a bombing campaign of the Pentagon in the 60s, and as a "close associate to Barack Obama". Ayres was the founder of the Weather Underground movement, which protested against the Vietnam War four decades ago. Today he is a university professor and an educational reformer who has worked with many politicians (both Republican and Democrat) to change the educational system in Chicago. The more McCain slips in the poll numbers, the more we hear allusions to Obama's radical "associate", even if their contacts have been sporadic, that they met only a few years ago, and that Obama was eight years old when Ayres was a radical anti-war activist. McCain, however, did not bring this up in the face-to-face debate, perhaps for fear of opening the door to his own connection to Charles Keating, the convicted Savings and Loan scandal figure of the 1980s, whose investigation by regulators McCain had tried to suppress. McCain's vice-presidential candidate, Sarah Palin, on the other hand, has at every opportunity mentioned Ayres' name at her rallies, working her base up to frenzy to the point of violent threats, with some yelling "off with his (Obama's) head". For good measure, she added underhanded allusions to his "foreignness" (read: race) by saying for example: "He is not a man who sees America the way you and I see it." This decision to play the "guilt by association" game and to associate Obama with terrorism (of any kind) has led to a violent escalation in the rhetoric and has roused the base, but does not seem to be working with the independent voters, as poll after poll continues to show. On the contrary, it seems to have hurt McCain: at last weekend rallies he had to "correct" several of his own supporters who in their questions to him claimed Obama was an "Arab", a terrorist, a criminal. After one of such claims, McCain very determinedly took the microphone away from a woman and told her: "No, Ma'm, that is not true. He is a decent family man with whom I just happen to have disagreements on policy." Surely this disappointed the base, which has been led to believe differently. In all fairness to Senator McCain, he is not a racist; in fact, he is a very moderate, middle of the road Republican who has taken on his own party on matters of campaign finance reform and immigration. Why, then, is he playing this self-destructive game? The only logical answer is: out of desperation, as his numbers slip and several senior Republicans have turned against him. The constant chasing of the headlines, the constant spewing of "rapid responses and frantic emails" has resulted in an incoherent message to the detriment of his own personal appeal. Yesterday Bill Kristol, political analyst and commentator of impeccable conservative credentials, and editor of the Weekly Standard, in an op-ed column in the New York Times, called for McCain to fire his campaign staff, "set himself free" and run as the "cheerful, open and accessible candidate" he was in the past. He said it is the "strategic incoherence and operational incompetence of his staff that has made his campaign dysfunctional…and toxic." To this, McCain retorted that "even Bill Kristol had bought into the Obama line" and that he himself was "exactly where he wanted to be, with the whole media establishment against him." However, Republicans are starting to distance themselves from McCain, who they think is dragging the whole party down and will be responsible for loss of Senate and House Republican races, too. To compound his plight even more, yesterday a bipartisan ethics report by the state legislature of Alaska found Sarah Palin abused her power when she fired the Police Commissioner over a family vendetta against a state trooper (an affair already nicknamed "Troopergate" by the media). Voters seem to have tuned McCain out; it is no longer a question of message. It is a question of leadership, of calm amid the turmoil, of whom Americans want to answer the proverbial three-in-the-morning phone call that rings in the White House. Confronted with the angst and fury of John McCain, his impulsive change of course and mixed messages at a time of enormous economic uncertainty, voters are turning in larger numbers to Obama, who has remained unflustered in the face of nasty accusations. Composed, focused on the economy, he dismisses the violent rhetoric of his opponents, and prefers to focus on the difficulty of the times and on the specifics of his policy solutions. He has sharpened his message, spoken directly to the issues and remained a sea of calm amidst the turmoil, a source of optimism amidst the gloom and doom of the headlines. In the meantime, his campaign has registered hundreds of thousands of voters in many states that have traditionally voted Republican, and that today are surprisingly in play for the Democrats (namely Virginia, North Carolina). The McCain campaign is financially weaker and had to pull out of Michigan, where he was down eight points, in order to concentrate more resources in Florida, where the race is still tight, but where the economy has been severely hit by the real estate bust and by the reduction in tourism due to the credit crunch, all of which may favor Obama. In spite of the 270 electoral votes that put him over the top, with potentially many more votes to be added from close races in several states, an Obama win is still not assured. McCain is defending states that went for Bush in the last two elections and which he absolutely must win in order to have a slim chance at the whole, and therefore he can't be on the offense as much in other states. If Obama wins Indiana, Virginia and North Carolina, he will be the first non-Southerner Democrat to carry these states since John F. Kennedy. That explains the frustration of Republican Party stalwarts with McCain, his irresponsible choice of running mate and the unraveling of his campaign. Ironically, in the first debate McCain accused Obama of not knowing the difference between a tactic and a strategy. It actually seems it is McCain who has confused the two. Populism as a political tactic is common, but as the main strategy it is ineffective and harmful for the country. At times like this, when people are worried about their jobs, their pensions and their health care, the populist message of anger and division is not what the average voter is looking for. They are looking instead for some measure of optimism and reassurance. That is why they have turned to Obama. To win, the McCain campaign should stop playing the race–and-terrorism card, and instead bring up a concept which surprisingly has been all but ignored in this election: that of Washington being swept up by a "one-party rule", with Democrats controlling not only the White House but also Congress. No checks and balances, no limits on government in this country of Lockean traditions? That is a scenario that few Americans would look forward too, even in difficult times. It may win McCain more votes than destructive insinuations about his opponent. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

After two weeks of drama and excitement, the Democratic and the Republican National Conventions have drawn to an end, and an exhausted American public will now have to focus on the home stretch of the presidential campaign. There is general agreement that both candidates achieved their most important convention objectives. Obama re-introduced himself to America as an ordinary man, a down-to-earth candidate who understands their problems and proposes solutions, while McCain moved away from George W. Bush and re-emerged as his party's maverick: the independent, likable and trustworthy reformer that puts "the country first". In spite of the truncated schedule of the Republican National Convention due to the hurricane that hit the Gulf Coast, McCain's surprise announcement of his running mate, and his acknowledgement of his own party's mistakes in the last eight years, appear to have taken some of the wind from under Obama's wings.The most recent Gallup poll has Obama leading 44% to 40 % in voters' approval ratings, while a CBS poll has them at 40% each. It is clear that the race is now in a dead heat and that McCain has been on the rebound, narrowing down the eight percent margin that Obama had before the Conventions. Taking into account that Obama has already had his post-convention bounce, the direction of this change favoring McCain will continue. Historically, after Labor Day and the end of the two conventions, poll numbers appear to hold pretty steadily all the way up to the election, which means that, barring an "October surprise", the outcome of this election will again be too close to predict.This is an enormous accomplishment for McCain, whose candidacy was given up for dead by pundits mid-way trough the primary last year. Americans love survivors, and both his life story and his political narrative fit this characterization perfectly. Credit is given of course to the candidate himself, but also to his campaign director Rick Davis, who had the audacity to take a 180-degree turn and recast him as the candidate of change. How he did it will be a textbook example for campaign strategists in years to come.First, McCain came into the Republican Primary as too independent, too secular and too much of a critic of George W. Bush, to be chosen as the Grand Old Party's nominee. In the course of the primary campaign, he moved closer to the President, repeatedly reminding voters that in the Senate, he had voted in favor of the President's initiatives 90% of the time. A clip of this acknowledgement is being used by the Obama campaign with glee in a TV commercial that plays several times an hour in the network stations. After a terrible start, and after firing several top advisers and restructuring his whole campaign plan, he regained the confidence of the Republican voters, mainly because he was the most credible, experienced and likable of the Republican presidential candidates. These may be the same attributes that put him today in a dead heat with Obama, in spite of the lowest numbers of approval ever for the Republican Party he represents.Second, serious campaign strategic thinking went into in his choice of Vice-president and in planning the timing of this announcement. Sources close to the campaign have confirmed that, to counterbalance the perfectly choreographed Democratic Convention, the choice of Joe Biden for Vice- presidential candidate, and Obama's acceptance speech, McCain wanted to recast himself as the bipartisan candidate that reaches across the isle, and regardless of the disapproval of Republican Party stalwarts, pick Democrat Joe Lieberman, his very close friend, as his running mate. It took some serious coaxing by his staff for him to pick Sarah Palin, the little-known governor of Alaska, instead. This has so far proved to have been a very shrewd decision. With the announcement made on the next morning after Obama's acceptance speech, McCain's campaign was able to take away the momentum and the headlines from the Democrats. It was all about the Republican ticket from then on, with the Obama campaign having been unable so far, to regain the initiative. Palin's speech on the convention floor was watched by almost as many people as Obama's. She came out swinging and directly attacked Obama for his lack of experience. Her delivery was flawless, she was relaxed and funny, and the public loved her. She electrified the Republican base and injected new imagery into the Republican tableau: that of a young working mother with a family of five that enamored the pro-life voters by having knowingly had a baby with Down syndrome. The case for family values was somewhat blurred twenty-four hours later when her campaign confirmed rumors that her seventeen-year old daughter was pregnant. But Palin was able to turn this in her favor by presenting herself as a no-exceptions pro-life candidate, and thus pre-empted the avalanche of criticism that would have surely come her way from all sides. Asked for his reaction, a circumspect Obama said that the candidates' private lives should not be a topic for the presidential race and asked reporters to "back off". Finally, there was John McCain's acceptance speech that rounded up what turned out to be a positive, yet odd, week for the Republican Convention. This was the first time that an incumbent President did not attend his party's convention since Lyndon B. Johnson skipped the violence-ridden 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago. Indeed, George W Bush made only a short appearance via satellite on the second day of the convention. His parents were there the first two days, but were conspicuously absent during McCain's speech. Vice-president Cheney was also absent throughout the three days. Senator McCain is a good communicator for smaller, town hall settings where he can speak directly to supporters, but strongly dislikes reading prepared speeches from the teleprompter to big audiences. The Convention hall was thus rearranged for his speech, to give the impression of a smaller venue, with the Republican delegates closer to him. But it was a fifty-minute long speech so he did have to read it. Although not a magnificent speaker, he came across as sincere and credible. Some have acclaimed it as the best Republican speech since Reagan's at the 1984 Convention. It drew the strongest interest of all speeches so far this election year: it was watched by 38.9 million people, more than Obama's (38.4 million) and Palin's (37 million). It was well-structured and aimed at delivering a convincing yet circumvoluted message of change. It started with a long narrative of his life experiences as a Navy pilot and prisoner of war, then went on to offer a candid confession of his party's long list of mistakes in the last eight years, and culminated with his re-introduction to the American public as the bipartisan candidate that can find solutions, bring about change and lead the country into a more secure and prosperous future. He presented in detail a forceful narrative of his life: the son and grandson of admirals and an Annapolis graduate, he became a fighter pilot and fell prisoner of war in Vietnam. He survived the "Hanoi-Hilton", was rescued, married an Arizona heiress and became Senator for that state for thirty years. Even if nothing new, this biographical portrait reminded the audience of his patriotism, his commitment to the country, his all-American upbringing and his strength, all of which makes him a fully vetted, trustworthy, and, by implication, a better candidate than his counterpart.What surprised many observers was what an NBC analyst called his "Declaration of Independence" and later "McCain's divorce" from the Republican Party and from George Bush. The latter was mentioned only once during the speech, and even then not directly by name, when McCain thanked "the president" for his leadership after the September 11 attacks. After that came a litany of mistakes the Republicans have made in the last few years, delivered in a contrite tone and followed by very weak applause by the audience. ("We were elected to change Washington and we let Washington change us. We lost the trust of the American people when some Republicans gave in to temptations of corruption."). It was as if he had directly responded to the beckoning of the British journal The Economist who had him on its cover a week ago with the title: "Bring the Real McCain back", an allusion to the fact that during the Primary season, many of his economic and national security policies looked like another term of George Bush. The Economist preferred an earlier version of McCain that was much more independent and acceptable to their point of view. In acknowledging the errors and missed opportunities of the previous years, the "real" McCain, the maverick, was back. He recognized the corruption and the hubris of his party, and, taking a page from the Democrats' platform, promised to govern for the American people and not for private interests or lobbies: "And let me just offer an advance warning to the old, big-spending, do-nothing, me-first, country-second crowd: change is coming… to Washington."McCain had a tactical tightrope to walk: during the whole primary season, his campaign had been aggressively courting the support of the conservative, Evangelical Republican base. Having cemented that support with the choice of ultra-religious Palin, he used the opportunity of his acceptance speech to appeal to a broader audience. He broke free of the Bush legacy of budget deficits and a failed foreign policy, recast himself as the candidate of change and made his pitch for the center of the political spectrum, the independent voters and disgruntled Reagan Democrats. In the most arousing part of his address, he presented himself as the Republican leader that will bring the Grand Old Party back to its original path and restore its unity, its pride and its principles. He also stressed his bipartisanship and delivered a strong blow to Obama's claim to that same mantel, by saying," Again and again I have worked with members of both parties to fix problems…and I have the record, and the scars, to prove it. Senator Obama does not." He ended by stressing his national security experience and courage to confront enemies: "We face many dangerous threats but I am not afraid.I am prepared for them."This speech may not have been the most dynamic of the Republican Convention (Sarah Palin took the kudos for that), and it was by no means a policy speech. Instead, its greatest value was the tone in which it was delivered and the level of comfort McCain awakened in the voting public. He focused on patriotism and on reforming Washington's bad habits; he communicated a sense of confidence, credibility and competence that may have reassured many undecided voters and that made him look almost Reaganesque. While Barack Obama insists that this election will be decided based on the issues (the economy, the unpopular war), McCain contends it will be decided on which candidate has the better judgment to move the country forward. In the fifty-some days left before the election, both campaigns will focus on the "battleground states" (Ohio, Virginia, Pennsylvania and Michigan), so their messages will be narrowly tailored to those constituencies. But all voters will have another chance to take a new look at the candidates side by side on three upcoming debates, and then decide on who is better suited to lead the country in such difficult times. They will vote based on their pocketbooks and on gut feelings, on rational interests and on irrational emotions. Considering the closeness of the race, the complexity that the Electoral College injects into the process, and the fact that all political thinking is biased toward the thinker's own wishes and emotions, it is only fair for this writer to abstain from predicting the outcome. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

From the Wall Street Journal Feb 2. After 30 days I can post full text. A Consumption Tax Is the Shock Our Broken System NeedsSomething remarkable happened last month. On Jan. 9, Georgia Rep. Buddy Carter introduced the "Fair Tax" bill to the House of Representatives, and secured a promise of a floor vote. The bill eliminates the personal and corporate income tax, estate and gift tax, payroll (Social Security and Medicare) tax and the Internal Revenue Service. It replaces them with a single national sales tax. Business investment is exempt, so it is effectively a consumption tax. Each household would get a check each month, so that purchases up to the poverty line are effectively not taxed.Mainstream media and Democrats instantly deplored the measure. Mother Jones said it would "turbocharge inequality." Rep. Pramila Jayapal called it a "tax cut for the rich, period." The New Republic asserted that consumption taxes are "always a dumb idea"—but presumably not in Europe, where 20% value-added taxes finance welfare states—and called it a "Republican dream to build a wealth aristocracy."Even the Journal's editorial board disapproved, though mostly on politics rather than substance, admitting a consumption tax "might make sense" if Congress were "writing the tax code from scratch." The board worried that we might end up with income and sales taxes, like Europe. And the tax change won't pass, making it is a "masochistic vote" that it will "give Democrats a potent campaign issue."But our income and estate tax system is broken. It has high statutory rates with a Swiss cheese of exemptions, immense cost, unfairness and distortion. Former President Trump's taxes are Exhibit A, no longer making headlines because we learned that he simply aggressively exploits the complex rules and deductions that Congress offers to wealthy politically connected real-estate investors.A consumption tax, with none of the absurd complexity of our current taxes, is the answer. It funds the government with the least economic distortion. A consumption tax need not be regressive. It's easy enough to exempt the first few thousand dollars of consumption, or add to the rebate.More important, the progressivity of a whole tax and transfer system matters, not of a particular tax in isolation. If a flat consumption tax finances greater benefits to people of lesser means, the overall system could be more progressive than what we have now. A consumption tax would still finance food stamps, housing, Medicaid, and so forth. And it would be particularly efficient at raising revenue, meaning there would potentially be more to distribute—a point that has led some conservatives to object to a consumption tax.Others complain that the rate will be high. An effective 30% consumption tax, added to state sales taxes as high as 10%, could add up to a 40% or greater rate. But taxes overall must finance what the government spends. Collecting it in one tax rather than lots of smaller taxes doesn't change the overall rate. It's better for voters to see how much the government takes.A range of implicit subsidies will disappear. Good. Subsidies should be transparent. Money for electric cars, health insurance, housing, and so forth should be appropriated and sent as checks, not hidden as tax deductions or credits. They can still be as large as Congress and voters wish. However, it is vital to keep the tax at a flat rate and not try to redistribute income or subsidize industries by different tax rates.Will there be some problems of compliance and evasion? Probably, but sales taxes or value-added taxes are hardly new, untested ideas. The Fair Tax bill addresses many objections and real-world concerns, and more refinements can follow. A value-added tax or personal-consumption tax can achieve similar goals.This is a big moment. For a long time, consumption taxes have been debated in academic articles, books, think-tank reports, administration white papers and so forth. When the U.S. eventually decides to reform the tax code, consumption taxes will be the obvious answer. It is great news that real elected politicians like Rep. Carter get it, and are willing to stick their necks out to try to get it passed.No, it's not likely to pass this year, or next. All great reforms take time. The 8-hour workday and Social Security started as wild-eyed dreams of the socialist party. Civil rights took bill after bill being voted down. The income tax took a long time. But if we never talk about the promised land and only squabble over the next fork in the road, surely we will never get there.

Judicial independence and accountability are central legal and political values. Chapter III of the Australian Constitution entrenches the minimum standard for judicial independence. The High Court is the guardian against that standard being encroached. A mechanism for judicial accountability in the federal jurisdiction must be consistent with Chapter III. In recognition that the High Court will strictly enforce the primacy of Chapter III, the Parliamentary Judicial Misbehaviour or Incapacity Commission Bill is "a conservative constitutional approach to ensure validity".2 Section 72 of the Constitution provides a notional standard for the removal of federal judges; "proved misbehaviour or incapacity". However, the section does not clarify the appropriate procedure which the Parliament can adopt as they contemplate removal. T11e PJMIC would facilitate the credibility and transparency of parliamentary deliberations under s72 by providing an investigative service. Since the PJMIC does not adjudicate, or even directly receive, complaints, its scope of operation will be unlikely to infringe the exclusive vesting in s72. The PJMIC Bill is paralleled by a proposed amendment to the Senate and House of Representative Standing Orders. This amendment would impose important safeguards against the use of parliamentary privilege on hi vial or reckless grounds. 3 The misuse of parliamentary privilege in this regard would have serious consequences for public confidence in a Justice. Significant difficultly is presented by the situation of judicial misbehaviour or incapacity which, although constitutive of undesirable conduct, would not satisfy the threshold for removal. Where judicial misbehaviour or incapacity has directly impacted the outcome of a case, the appeals process may provide an immediate remedy. However, it should not remain the obligation of a party to detect and enforce proper judicial conduct. Where less serious judicial misconduct or incapacity has occurred, it is apt to question what the practical protection ensured by the concept of judicial independence is. If judges do not have margin to make some errors of judgement without a looming accountability mechanism, substantive make some errors of judgement without a looming accountability mechanism, substantive judicial independence is defeated. Under the current federal arrangement the treatment of complaints is effectively selfregulated by the judiciary. That is, complaints are resolved by an informal and collegial approach. This arrangement has recently been criticised as unacceptably secretive and lacking in transparency. 4 Given the growing public imperative for the transparent treatment of complaints, it is undesirable that judicial accountability in the federal jurisdiction remain an informal, differentiated and ad hoc procedure. In Australia, the use of judicial commissions has been controversial and inconsistent. The Judicial Commission of New South Wales, made constitutionally viable by the Kable doctrine, is increasingly presented as an ideal judicial commission. Although Victoria and Western Australia are currently contemplating the replication of the JCNSW, it is unlikely that a reform would be consistent with Chapter III in the federal context. The PJMIC is not structured to address less serious complaints, and neither it feasible to independence is defeated. Under the current federal arrangement the treatment of complaints is effectively selfregulated by the judiciary. That is, complaints are resolved by an informal and collegial approach. This arrangement has recently been criticised as unacceptably secretive and lacking in transparency.4 Given the growing public imperative for the transparent treatment of complaints, it is undesirable that judicial accountability in the federal jurisdiction remain an informal, differentiated and ad hoc procedure. In Australia, the use of judicial commissions has been controversial and inconsistent. The Judicial Commission of New South Wales, made constitutionally viable by the Kable doctrine, is increasingly presented as an ideal judicial commission. Although Victoria and Western Australia are currently contemplating the replication of the JCNSW, it is unlikely that a reform would be consistent with Chapter III in the federal context. The PJMIC is not structured to address less serious complaints, and neither it feasible to replicate the JCNSW. Accordingly, this paper recommends a replication of s21 B(IA)(b) of the Family Law Act 1975 in each federal court statute. It also adopts the recommendation of the Access to Justice Advisory Committee (1994) ('AJAC') proposal for the introduction of court charters. If each federal court would codify their expectations for performance standards in a charter, this would allow for judges, court staff, parliamentarians considering a s72 motion, and the general public to have the same expectations and information. A charter could also outline a comprehensive process for the treatment of complaints within each court; it could express precisely the responsibilities of the chief justices in complaint handling; and could implement the Constitutional Committee (2009) recommendation that the federal courts should publish quarterly complaint handling summaries.

Активизации действий «мягкой силы» Турции в странах евразийского региона способствовали ее история и географическое положение на пересечении путей из Европы в Азию, как и наличие национальной, религиозной и языковой общности народов, проживающих на данных территориях. За два последних десятилетия комплекс внутрии внешнеполитических факторов привел к значительной трансформации политики «мягкой силы» в Турции, что усилило ее влияние в странах, которые входят в сферу геополитических интересов этой страны, в первую очередь в странах Кавказа и Центральной Азии. Главным внешнеполитическим фактором стало образование новых независимых государств после распада СССР в 1991 г. Изменение подхода к внешней политике Турции было обусловлено приходом к власти в 2002 г. Партии справедливости и развития (AKP), умеренно консервативной направленности, ориентированной на западные ценности. Демократические реформы снизили уровень влияния военных на политику страны и укрепили гражданское общество Турции. Реформы также привели к более тесному вовлечению новых акторов, таких как бизнес-организации и организации гражданского общества, во внешнюю политику Турции. Благодаря Ахмету Давутоглу, министру иностранных дел Турции (с мая 2009 г. по настоящее время), был выработан новый подход в турецкой внешней политике, основывающийся на доктрине «стратегической глубины» (Stratejik Derinlik). Ключевым аспектом нового подхода стала «политика нулевых проблем» с соседними странами, предполагающая наращивание политического диалога, экономическую взаимозависимость и культурное согласие. «Политика нулевых проблем» стимулировала усиление политики «мягкой силы» Турции. Кроме того, после арабских волнений в Северной Африке и на Ближнем Востоке турецкая государственная модель стала рассматриваться как источник подражания, что также усилило турецкое влияние. Немаловажным аспектом наращивания «мягкой силы» стало активное участие Турции в различных международных объединениях.Выработанные турецкими дипломатами и специалистами в сфере международных отношений за этот небольшой период времени стратегии, механизмы и конкретные действия реализации «мягкой силы» в сфере продвижения языка, образования и науки, делового сотрудничества, содействия развитию доказали свою эффективность, что демонстрирует позитивный и привлекательный имидж Турции, сложившийся в общественном мнении большинства стран. Для реализации политики «мягкой силы» Турция использует не только двустороннее, но и многостороннее сотрудничество. Например, с целью усиления взаимодействия со странами Центральной Азии и Кавказа Турция выступила инициатором создания таких организаций, как Совет по сотрудничеству тюркоязычных стран (CCTS), Парламентская ассамблея тюркоязычных стран (TurkPA), Организация по культуре и искусству тюркоязычных стран (TÜRKSOY). Несмотря на достигнутые положительные результаты политики «мягкой силы», перед Турцией стоит задача выработать многомерную стратегию продвижения своего влияния за рубежом с учетом необходимости решения текущих внешнеполитических вопросов, таких как стимулирование переговоров с ЕС и смягчение напряжения в отношениях с Сирией и Кипром. В данной статье представлен исторический обзор и анализ политики «мягкой силы» Турции, ее концептуального содержания и механизмов реализации, которые базируются на конкретных страновых примерах. ; This article provides a historical background and analysis of Turkey soft power policy, its concept and tools. Turkey's use of soft power in Eurasian countries is facilitated by its history and position at the intersection between Europe and Asia, as well as ethnic, religious and linguistic communities on its territory. Over the last two decades, complex internal and external factors have transformed its soft power policy and enhanced its influence in the countries where it has geopolitical interests, especially in Caucasus and Central Asia. The main external factor was the formation of new independent states after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Turkey's foreign policy approach was transformed by the rise to power of the centre-right conservative Justice and Development Party in 2002. Democratic reforms reduced the military's influence over foreign policy, strengthened civil society and increased the active participation of actors such as business and civil society organizations in foreign policy. In addition foreign affairs minister Ahmet Davuto lu's new approach of "Zero Problems with Our Neighbours," based on the doctrine of strategic depth (Stratejik Derinlik) and using political dialogue, economic interdependence and cultural harmony, reinforced Turkish soft power. Moreover, protests in the Middle East and North Africa led to a consideration of the Turkish state model as an example to be followed. Another important factor was Turkey's participation in various international institutions. The efficient use of soft power strategies, tools and activities in language promotion, education and scientific cooperation, business collaboration and development assistance by Turkish diplomats and experts in international relations has resulted in a positive and attractive international image of Turkey. Turkey implements its soft power policy through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. For example, it established the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (CCTS), the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries (TURKPA) and the Joint Administration of Turkic Culture and Art (TÜRKSOY) to increase collaboration with target countries. Despite of the positive outcomes from soft power, Turkey needs a multidimensional strategy to promote its influence abroad that takes into account key foreign policy objectives such as negotiations with the European Union and decreasing tensions with Syria and Cyprus.

Among topics discussed: Attending Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Virginia; Martin Luther King, Jr., not allowed to speak there; University of Virginia Law School; Griffin Bell and Taliaferro County case; desegregation; Taliaferro County in receivership; NAACP; Washington, D.C., Kennedy and Johnson eras; Rome, Georgia, attorney Bob Brenson and Diola Peek case; King and Spalding law firm; realization of unfairness toward the poor; tenants and Atlanta Housing Authority; missionaries from Yale University and Northeast; Ide's mother and Sarah Lawrence College, disadvantaged children; growing up in segregated Pickens, South Carolina; Brenson, Frank Johnson, Elbert Tuttle, John Minor Wisdom, workers with Georgia Legal Services; Atlanta Legal Aid Society and Nancy Cheves; Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO); Michael Padnos; Betty Kehrer; Fred LeClair, Emory University, and Georgia county economic study; Georgia Younger Lawyers Section and legal aid; Jim Elliott; Phil Heiner; Betsy Neely and Reginald Heaver Smith Program ("Reggie"), Virginia Law School; explanation of "Reggie"; Ben Shapiro; funds from Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW); Jim Parham; DFACS; Herschel Saucier; beginning of legal aid approved by Bar at St. Simons meeting; Stell Huie; Georgia Indigent Legal Services Program; common attacks against legal aid; Emory University and legal aid; Ben Johnson; Dean Johnson; Maynard Jackson; Bucky Askew; Dan Bradley; American Bar Association (ABA); Justice Lewis Powell; John Cromartie; importance of State Bar's involvement; H. Sol Clark, Mr. Legal Aid in Georgia; opposition from older, conservative lawyers; Dan Bradley and OEO; formation of Georgia Legal Services outside the Bar; Cubbege Snow, Jr., of Macon; Gus Cleveland; Atlanta Saturday Lawyers; arguments made against legal aid; John Hopkins of King and Spalding; Edgar and Jean Kahn; National Legal Aid and Defenders Association (NLADA); Sargent "Sarge" Shriver; Earl Johnson; Al Kehrer, husband of Betty Kehrer, union organizing; Democratic Party; Steve Gottlieb and Brunswick; Savannah; Joe Bergen; Sonny Seiler; New Orleans. Gov. Lester Maddox acceptance of federal funds for Legal Aid; Maddox considered a populist; Gov. George Wallace of Alabama; Richard Nixon and China; memories of Phil Heiner; core group (Ide, Kehrer, Neely, Parham, Ben Johnson, et al.) meeting at Tasty Town; Ben Shapiro; Austin Ford and Ben Brown, first board of directors; War on Poverty; legal aid as a spinoff of the War on Poverty and Civil Rights; Ide traveling to other states to help with formation of legal aid; Bill Tharpe of North Carolina; Spencer Gilbert of Mississippi; Georgia as a model; fading out of Georgia Indigent Legal Services; Pierre Howard and the budget funding; Mary Margaret Oliver of Gainesville; Nancy Cheves of Columbus; Evans Plowden of Albany; Tom Dennard of Brunswick; decision to go out in the state; Frank Myers of Americus; Milton Carlton of Swainsboro; Albert Fendig of Brunswick; Georgia Criminal Justice Council; funding changes during the Nixon era; Jeff Donfeld; Bud Crowe; Howard Phillips of California; Lewis Powell; threats to Legal Aid: Reagan administration, Murphy Amendment, Edith Green Amendment; limitations to funding; California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc. (CRLA); function of lawyers under the English system before Revolution; Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, president of Florida State University and former ABA president; John McKay and Republicans; Warren Rudman; Jack Adams, Cubbege Snow, and Gus Cleveland: Bar leaders; funding debates in state legislature; Pierre Howard; Norman Underwood; hiring Betty Kehrer; Savannah Bar Association opposition to legal aid. Joe Bergen's lawsuit against Steve Gottlieb; Sonny Seiler; Aaron Buchsbaum; suit thrown out; Judge Land; Ruth Combs; Martin "Marty" Layfield; Greg Dellaire of Seattle; Denny Ray; trouble non-southern lawyers had relating to southern culture; Taliaferro County, Judge Bell, receivership; Ide's legal services in Africa and Eastern Europe; comparison with American law system; references to the West Bank and Bosnia; Sonny Seiler in Sea Island, Georgia, 1970s; sheriff of Dawson County, Georgia, and election; Bob Hall and Supreme Court of Georgia; Seiler's law firm burned; threats against Frank Johnson; Brenson and Peek case; shifts in legal system; Austin Ford; Revius Ortique of New Orleans; Dorothy Bolden; issues with Latino community; Fulton County and Latinos; Ide's reflections on legal service career; Phyllis Holmen; Bucky Askew; changes in post World War II America, Eisenhower administration; liberation movements; Brown v. Board of Education; Fourteenth Amendment, legal services' relationship to the U.S. Constitution; responsiveness of State Bar's leadership; Andrew Young and "Save Georgia Indigent Legal Services"; Taliaferro County; trial in Augusta, Georgia; Judge Morgan; Judge Bell; Judge Frank Scarlett and attitude toward Plessy v. Ferguson; Howard Moore; Don Hollowell; Charlie Bloch; discussion on school system; administration of Gov. S. Ernest Vandiver; Discussion on Judge Bell; Sibley Commission; cooperation within legal services. ; Bill Ide is a past president of the American Bar Association (1993-1994). He served as an attorney in the Atlanta and Washington, D.C., law firm of Long Aldridge & Norman and is currently with Monsanto. He has been active with legal aid in Georgia since he was a law student.

"There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one." - Alexis De Tocqueville Over the Memorial Day long weekend, the White House announced President Obama's nominee to replace retiring Judge David Souter in the Supreme Court. Barring any unforeseen circumstances, Circuit Court of Appeals judge Sonia Sotomayor will be confirmed by next September, in time for the new Supreme Court term starting in October of this year. Obama has pressed the Senate Judiciary Committee to start hearings and be ready to vote before the August Congress recess, but Republicans would like more time to scrutinize her sizable record and score some political points in the process.Because the nomination was announced during the Senate's Memorial weekend recess, the first reaction on the Conservative side came from anonymous blogs, from radio talk host Rush Limbaugh and from former speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. Needless to say, the attacks were fierce. Sotomayor was alternatively portrayed as an "activist judge" intent on making policy from the bench, a "reverse racist" and a candidate with "insufficient credentials" (the latter being the most laughable of all and the one that gives you the measure of the lack of seriousness of the rest: a Princeton summa cum laude graduate, and Yale Law Review editor, with over 17 years of experience as a federal judge, and over 3,000 decisions made, Sotomayor's credentials are anything but impeccable). This week the Republican Senators, who will actually be in charge of the process, tried to regain the initiative and significantly moderated the tone of the discourse. Indeed, the vetting process to the highest tribunal of the land should focus on Sotomayor's earlier decisions from the bench (she has been both a US district and a circuit court judge), her views on the Constitution and the law, on the rights of states and on the importance of precedent, and not , as her anonymous detractors would like us to think, on empty slogans, her taste for Puerto Rican food or the way she pronounces her name (accentuating the last syllable, which is seen by these ignorant critics as lack of assimilation to the Anglo culture). But having been born in the Bronx from poor immigrants, and risen in class and status to where she is today, Judge Sotomayor is more than ready for the fight. Her life experiences have taught her to see the world through different perspectives. She is not in the least intimidated by other groups' prejudices presented as righteousness, and by those who are targeting her, as Mary Sanchez from the Florida Sentinel so aptly puts it, "as if a weaker species had wandered into their den".The Republican Party is in such disarray that different elements within it are constantly and recklessly trying to score points with the electorate, using any tactic at hand without much consideration of its consequences. Given the solid majority of Democrats in the Senate, and the fact that several Republicans are likely to vote in favor of Sotomayor (she was, after all, nominated by George H.W Bush for the federal bench the first time (1992) and approved unanimously by the whole Senate), the question for Republican elected officials is how far to go in their attacks without producing an irreversible backlash at the polls from women and Hispanics for years to come. At the same time, they will be pressed by the extreme right to do some damage to the nominee and through her, to the President. Judicial fights are part and parcel of the political struggle over the court's direction, and even if the replacement of Souter with Sotomayor is not likely to change the balance of the court, the hearings should be used as a stage to present the philosophical differences between the two parties, rather than as a nasty squabble over personal characteristics, anonymous character attacks and meaningless slogans. The ideological mix in the Court (5 conservatives-4 liberals, with Justice Kennedy as the swing vote, sometimes voting with the liberals) will remain the same; the Democrats right now have a filibuster-proof majority, and there will be other Supreme Court nominations by this President to come, so the Republicans should recognize that the only battle worth fighting in this case is a clean one, free from vitriol and toxicity. Scholars have identified four primary selection criteria used by presidents in their appointments of Supreme Court justices: merit, ideology, friendship and representation. Obama's choice of Sotomayor was based on her impressive credentials, her experience of seventeen years in the federal judiciary, which offers some insight into her judicial philosophy (similar to Obama's), and her charisma and compelling biography as a Latina born in the Bronx. She therefore clearly meets three of those four criteria. Obama's short list included three other women with similar credentials, all close friends of his, but none of them Latinas.Sotomayor's ideology appears to match Obama's, himself a constitutional scholar, in that both share a penchant for pragmatism and a conscientious quest for justice and fairness under the law. For example, although she has a thin record on abortion cases and therefore her position is not clear, in one case concerning the right of the federal government to attach conditions to the use of its foreign aid money, she ruled against the pro-abortion group. In several cases of gender or racial discrimination she decided against the minority or female plaintiff. This makes some groups on the Left somewhat apprehensive. It would not be the first time that a President nominates a judge based on compatible ideology and is later disappointed when his appointee votes with the "other" block. But her vote affirming the decision by the city of New Haven to scrap a promotion test which only white firefighters had succeeded in (Ricci v. De Steffano) is what is making the headlines: the Right's intention is to portray her as a "reverse racist" and an unequivocal defender of affirmative action. Ironically, this case will come before the Supreme Court this summer, and many think her decision (unanimously made by a panel of three judges) could be overturned just before her hearings get under way, thus providing more ammunition to the opposition. Also making the headlines is her 2001 statement, during a La Raza Law Symposium, that "a wise Latina woman, with the richness of her experience, would reach "better"conclusions than a white male"who hasn't lived that life." This week Obama regained control of the debate that Republicans had been craftily shaping, by excusing her for the wrong choice of the word "better" and by explaining that what she meant was that "her life experience will give her more information about the… hardships people are going through." This was an allusion to the fourth criteria listed above, that is, the one of representation, in this case, of Hispanics/Latinos. Since the Supreme Court is not an elected body, it follows that its representativeness is not a must. Credentials, wisdom and judicial temperament should suffice for judges to fulfill their role as interpreters of the Constitution and neutral arbiters of the law.However, the history of the Supreme Court suggests that Presidents do make efforts at representativeness when choosing their nominees, certainly to gain the political sympathies of new groups, but also to give legitimacy to the body and its main function of judicial review. (Indeed, such legitimacy has been disputed on and off since the Marbury v. Madison decision of 1803 gave its judges, appointed for life, unelected and unaccountable to nobody, the exclusive authority to decide on the constitutionality of laws for all spheres, including those of the other branches of government. This was a power that Thomas Jefferson vehemently opposed because it was nowhere to be found in the Constitution and it undermined the principle of checks and balances.)In the early part of the twentieth century, religious affiliation became a major focus, and by 1916 both a Catholic and a Jewish judge had been appointed. As different religious groups became more assimilated and religion became a non-issue to the appointment process, the imbalance of race and gender became the major considerations. But a quick review of the "representatives" of those categories shows that their representation can at times be symbolic or passive. While Sandra Day O'Connor, a conservative appointed by Reagan to close the "gender gap", actively represented women's interests in her jurisprudence and many times voted with the liberal block, Clarence Thomas, the second black judge to accede to the Supreme Court, has actively opposed affirmative action, which he regards as a noxious policy that undermines personal merit and creates resentment in the majority group. In contrast, the justice he replaced, Thurgood Marshall, the first African American in the court, was a leader of the civil rights movement who had made his reputation as a young lawyer, successfully arguing before the court the unconstitutionality of segregation in public education inBrown v Board of Education. Finally, both Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia are Catholic but find themselves at opposite sides of the ideological spectrum.In sum, to paraphrase Justice Day O'Connor, if human beings are the sum total and the product of their experiences, they cannot be defined by their gender, ethnicity, race or religion alone. Sonia Sotomayor is a very experienced federal judge with remarkable credentials who will, according to her own statements, attempt to decide every case based on its merits as it relates to the law, using objective legal standards. She also happens to be a woman of Puerto Rican origin, proud of her humble origins and of her cultural roots. And she meets all of the criteria Obama was looking for in a Supreme Court judge. Given the predominance of Democrats in the Senate, her confirmation is almost certain. Let us hope that the confirmation process itself is guided by honest inquiries and arguments on the merits of her appointment, on her judicial temperament and philosophy, and not turned into a media circus of innuendo, slurs and empty slogans that can scar a nominee for life, and in the process, devalue our democracy.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

With NATO's 75th anniversary summit drawing near, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz told the Munich Security Conference in February that Germany would this year meet NATO's 2% of GDP target for defense spending and would sustain this level "through the 2020s and 2030s."But Bastian Giegerich, the head of the London-based International Institute for Security Studies, has said that reversing the effects across Europe of more than 20 years of underfunding of defense capabilities will take at least a decade of substantially increased defense spending. He's not alone in thinking this way, and for good reason. Germany's 2024 budget allocates 51.8 billion euros for defense, by itself short of the 2% of GDP NATO benchmark. Germany seems on course, however, to meet the target by drawing down the 100 billion euro emergency fund announced by Scholz in his famous Zeitenwende (epochal change) speech to the Bundestag in February 2022. Disbursements from this fund are projected to keep Germany's defense spending at or above the 2% of GDP mark through 2028, after which Germany plans to fund defense through the regular budget process. Achieving this will require an increase of approximately 30 billion euros over the 2024 defense outlay. An increase of this magnitude to defense spending from the regular budget process will require overcoming very serious obstacles. Germany has well established limits on the fiscal deficit, which will create politically destabilizing distributional conflict when other spending priorities are forced to adjust to make room for a bigger defense budget.. This constraint will be even more binding if the economy, expected to grow at only 0.2% this year, remains weak. Fiscal probity is baked into German political culture and shored up by formal legal constraints. The "debt brake" written into the constitution in 2009 holds the federal budget deficit to 0.35% in any budget year. The opposition Christian Democratic (CDU/CSU) party, which, according to current polling trends, seems likely to return to power in the 2025 elections, is wary of any attempt to circumvent or reform the debt brake, which legally can be suspended only by invoking "emergency" conditions, as was done to fund pandemic spending, and to unlock 100 billion euros for defense spending in 2022. Last November, Germany's Constitutional Court ruled against the government's plan to repurpose 60 billion euros of unspent COVID funding to pay for green energy transition programs. The ruling coalition had to scramble to fill the hole in its budget, exposing the vulnerability of Germany's fiscal policy to distributional constraints. Farmers took protests onto the streets of Berlin to demand restoration of their diesel fuel subsidy. This kind of social tension is likely to follow any attempt to shift massive resources to the defense sector by cutting other programs. The green energy transition remains a priority for the coalition's two main parties — the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens — even though both are fully convinced of the need to boost defense spending. The fiscally conservative Free Democrats (FDP) and their leader, Finance Minister Christian Lindner, adamantly oppose reforming the debt brake or raising taxes. The only obvious way to square this circle would be to consider the continuing war in Ukraine an emergency and thereby unlock another 100 billion euros. This is obviously not an ideal way to finance a program of rearmament that might take decades, and such a maneuver might not survive scrutiny by the Constitutional Court in any case. It is becoming evident that, even with the provision of emergency funding, the defense industrial base can expand only gradually, and weapons procurement processes are limited by the time needed to manufacture new weapons and equipment, whether from Germany, elsewhere in Europe or the United States. For example, the 18 Leopard 2 battle tanks ordered to replace those supplied to Ukraine will arrive two years from now at the earliest. Meanwhile, Ukrainian president Zelensky recently assailed Germany for not delivering the Taurus missiles; he claimed Berlin decided the missiles were necessary for defending Germany instead.Social Constraints: Leadership and Public AttitudesThe German military was underfunded for years before February 2022, because the political leadership absorbed the liberal triumphalism of the 1989 democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and believed history pointed to global convergence on the liberal democratic model.Efforts to expand military recruitment began after the 2014 Russian takeover of Crimea, but has failed to attract new recruits in sufficient numbers. The number of troops remains stuck at 180,000. Some are now calling for reinstituting mandatory military service.The most effective and vocal advocate for Germany's rearmament is Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, an SDP politician widely touted as a possible successor to Scholz. Pistorius has said that the Bundeswehr must be made "kriegstüchtig" (war ready) and warned that Russia might attack a NATO member within the coming 8-10 years.These statements, very much against the grain of Germany's antecedent anti-militarist political culture, have not dented Pistorius' popularity. German elites and, to a lesser extent, the broader society seem to be moving toward greater acceptance of the need for national rearmament.The European Vision: Too Many Cooks?The European Commission has advanced its own plans to coordinate the financing of rearmament across Europe, favoring and fostering synergies among European defense-industrial firms. In principle, this initiative should pose no problem for Germany since Scholz, a committed European, has repeatedly stated that the EU is the framework for Germany foreign and security policy.Nevertheless, the Commission risks competing with member nations for available resources for equipment and weapons acquisition. Most member countries, including Germany and France, conceive of defense cooperation in a multilateral pan-European context, but would insist that member nations remain in the driver's seat.Emmanuel Macron's exhaustive vision for Europe— the "Sorbonne II" speech of April 26 — dealt extensively with the European imperative to develop a more capable conventional deterrent, albeit within NATO.His framing of the issue was the stark warning that "Our Europe can die," but he did not endorse any pooling of national sovereignty on defense policy. On the contrary, he pledged personally to convene "all partners" to develop a "new defense paradigm" for the "credible defense of the European continent."This is an intergovernmental framework rather than one featuring a leading role for the European Commission.Why the Path Ahead is DifficultBastian Giegerich of IISS says that for Germany "the mental shift, the societal resilience" needed to underpin rearmament "has not happened." This is true, but it is not only a matter of changing hearts and minds. Germany's limitations are embodied in its institutional framework and very resistant to change, given the perceived challenges from the populist right, the climate policy imperative, its generous social safety net, the fragmented party system, the self-imposed but broadly popular fiscal constraints, and complex coordination problems with key partners (above all France) and the European Commission. This transformation, even if embraced without reservation by Scholz or his successors, is a vastly complex and fraught agenda.

The broad consensus among U.S. and Australian policymakers in support of AUKUS masks an ongoing debate in Australia over the wisdom and necessity of the technology-sharing agreement.There are deep divisions in the Australian Labor Party over the planned acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines from the U.S. The government of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was able to shut down the dissenters at their party conference earlier this year, but opposition to AUKUS is growing as the full costs become more widely understood.Polling, meanwhile, consistently finds that public support for AUKUS remains below 50%, and that support seems likely to dwindle as the public takes into account the tradeoffs required for funding such a huge military project.There are many Australian critics across the political spectrum who question why their government is making such an ambitious and expensive commitment when it doesn't appear to serve Australian interests. One such critic is Sam Roggeveen of the Lowy Institute, who has written an exceptional new book from a "liberal-conservative" and realist perspective challenging the conventional wisdom about AUKUS and the future of the U.S.-Australian alliance. In "The Echidna Strategy: Australia's Search for Power and Peace," Roggeveen argues that Australia does not need the nuclear-powered submarines or the closer connection with Washington that they represent, and he proposes instead a strategy aimed at discouraging possible future attacks with a focus on maritime denial and strengthening Australia's relations with Indonesia and the Pacific Island nations. Like the porcupine strategy for Taiwan to which he compares it, the echidna strategy (based on the spiny anteater-like creature) is designed to defend without provoking, and as such it has no need for military capabilities that give Australia the ability to strike at the Chinese mainland. Accordingly, he sees AUKUS as not merely wasteful, but also potentially quite dangerous by antagonizing China and putting Australia on the path to unnecessary participation in a future war alongside the United States.The goal of the echidna strategy, then, is to make Australia like the strategy's adorable namesake: "spiky, but unthreatening."Among other things, "The Echidna Strategy" is a welcome antidote to the hawkish groupthink and threat inflation that dominate the conversation about China. Roggeveen doesn't discount China's growing military capabilities, but he doesn't panic about them, either. Commenting on the push for a much larger military budget, he says, "When we examine the threat coldly, it simply does not demand that kind of effort."The same could be said of the threat that China poses to U.S. interests, and he does say that: "America's core security interests are not threatened by China's rise." As Roggeveen explains, the U.S. will not maintain its commitments in Asia over the longer term "because that order, while favorable and valuable to America, is not a sufficiently vital interest to justify the immense scale of competition required to maintain it."He acknowledges that this runs against conventional wisdom, but he expects that eventually the U.S. will recognize that the costs of its current role in Asia are unnecessary. That is why he considers a long-term bet on the U.S. in an increasingly tight alliance to be an error.Roggeveen also invokes Eisenhower's warning about military spending as theft committed at the expense of other public goods: "Even when managed perfectly, defence spending is a huge weight on a budget that could always be better used to improve the wealth and wellbeing of the Australian people." The high cost of AUKUS over the coming decades would put a massive weight on the budget, and as Roggeveen shows, it is not necessary for Australian security.The chief problems that he identifies with AUKUS are that it is unnecessary and makes Australia less secure. "Australia is embarking on its largest ever defence contract so that it can take the fight to China, yet there is no obvious reason to do so, and nobody asked us to do so. In the process, we will make Australia less secure because we give China a reason to take a more aggressive position towards us, and because we tie ourselves to a defence partner that is becoming increasingly unreliable."The only good news is that it will take so long for the main pillar of AUKUS to be implemented that "there is time for Australia to change course." Roggeveen makes a compelling case in the rest of the book that changing course is essential.One of Australia's key advantages is distance. Roggeveen urges Australia to exploit this advantage as much as possible, which is why he sees the pursuit of capabilities that enable Australia to go on the offensive against China as being so misguided. "Why compress the distance between us when we can exploit it?"He proposes that Canberra focus on defensive capabilities to counter threats as they approach Australia rather than acquiring the means to go on the attack. This is both less provocative and much less expensive, and in the end it will make Australia more secure. As he sees it, the Australian government's current course gets things badly wrong because it "incentivises China to pay more military attention to us." Restrainers in the U.S. would do well to apply the insights from this book to our own policy arguments.While he is focused squarely on Australian foreign policy, Roggeveen's book is a valuable resource for Americans as we debate our government's approach to China and Asia. Many restrainers will agree with his assessment that the current U.S. military presence in Asia isn't needed to secure vital U.S. interests. Because of that assessment, he questions the long-term reliability of the U.S. commitment to the alliance, and he assumes that Australia needs to prepare for a future in which the U.S. is not going to be there to defend it.He acknowledges that the current consensus in Washington seems to be committed to an even more ambitious role in Asia, and he allows that the U.S. might go all-in on rivalry with China, but in that case the echidna strategy will be just as valuable by keeping Australia out of a future U.S.-Chinese clash.One of Roggeveen's many excellent points in "The Echidna Strategy" is that the alliance with the United States exists to serve Australian interests and there are circumstances in which it may be appropriate to let the alliance go. As he puts it, "If refusing to participate in a war over Taiwan triggers the nullification of the alliance, then Australia would be better off without the alliance." This is a refreshingly clear acknowledgment that Australia has no compelling reason to take part in such a war, and it should force policymakers in both Canberra and Washington to rethink their assumptions about this question. One of the purposes of the alliance with Australia is to help preserve international peace and security in the Pacific. It should not be used to dragoon Australia into a war of choice. If Washington tries to use the alliance in this way, it may end up with one less ally.Roggeveen admits that the echidna strategy is not "an emotionally satisfying strategy for Australia," but as he shows throughout the book it is a much smarter and more responsible one. The strategy itself may not be emotionally satisfying, but "The Echidna Strategy" will satisfy its readers.

Das Verhältnis der Elite Rußlands zum Westen ist ein Problem, das bereits einige Jahrhunderte lang aktuell ist und in den verschiedenen Phasen der Geschichte seine jeweilige Spezifik hatte, die von der außen- und innenpolitischen Situation abhing. Doch bei allen historischen Veränderungen ist eines konstant geblieben: Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis zum Westen war mit dem Kampf der verschiedenen politischen Parteien und Gruppen verbunden. Im 19.Jahrhundert waren dies die "Westler" und "Slawophilen", 1998 sind es die "Kommunisten" und "Demokraten". Konstant bleibt auch die "Plattform" des Kampfes, d.h. der Problemkreis, um den sich der politische Kampf dreht. Der Bericht basiert auf verschiedenen Informationsquellen. Dies sind die Ergebnisse der Meinungsumfrage von 200 Vertretern der Elite über die Entwicklungswege Rußlands im Kontext seines Verhältnisses zum Westen; die Ergebnisse einer Kontentanalyse politischer Programme von 40 Parteien; Antworten von 15 Vertretern der intellektuellen Elite auf eine spezielle Meinungsumfrage "Rußland und der Westen"; Pressematerialien über die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Rußland und dem Westen. (BIOst-Dok)