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As of this writing, the United States and UK have carried out nine rounds of strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, and Washington is mulling a response to the drone attack that killed three American soldiers in Jordan on Sunday. All of this has increased fears of further escalation in the Middle East and sparked a debate in Congress over the legality and strategic rationale of the U.S. response. Last week, four Senators — Mike Lee (R-Utah), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Todd Young (R-Ind.), and Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) — sent a letter to the president, telling him that under the Constitution, the Congress must deliberate and vote on whether to take the nation to war. Biden did not go to Congress for approval before launching the airstrikes in Yemen."We strongly condemn the repeated Houthi attacks against international cargo ships and U.S. military assets protecting those ships in the Red Sea," the letter reads. However, "while the Houthis and their backers, namely Iran, bear the responsibility for escalation, unless there is a need to repel a sudden attack the Constitution requires that the United States not engage in military action absent a favorable vote of Congress."The missive also lays out a series of questions for Biden to ensure that the American response to the situation in the Red Sea is "strategic and authorized," including whether the strikes fall into the administration's understanding of "self-defense," under which legal authorization the administration carried out the strikes, and on what date U.S. forces were "introduced into hostilities" in Yemen. Why is any of this important? RS asked Senator Lee about the letter, his response to the Jordan attacks, his concerns over a wider war with Iran, and whether other colleagues in Congress feel the same urgency to hold the administration to account.RS: Do you expect President Biden to come before Congress for authorization if the administration plans to respond to the drone attacks in Jordan?Sen. Lee: I do not know if President Biden will voluntarily ask Congress for authorization to retaliate following the drone attacks in Jordan, but he should. He is within his rights to conduct defensive strikes in cases of immediate threats to the United States and its military, but as we have already seen, the Biden administration already interprets this prerogative far too broadly in other areas of the Middle East. It is possible that retaliation is indeed the right move, but we cannot allow President Biden to sleepwalk America into an undeclared war with Iran in the process. RS: You recently sent a letter to President Biden urging him to go to Congress before pursuing further offensive U.S. military action against the Houthis. Why does the president have to go to Congress to authorize these strikes? Are there any plans to pursue a legislative vehicle that would authorize the use of force?
Sen. Lee: Every military decision made by the executive branch must be within the bounds of what the Constitution allows and consistent with the War Powers Resolution. The Constitution deliberately vested the power to make war with Congress, in Article I — keeping this power with the branch closest to the people who will bear the costs. Absent specific authority from Congress, the President reserves the power to defend the U.S. and its forces from imminent attacks. The Biden administration's pattern of engaging in offensive airstrikes without authorization and calling such actions defensive is a warped understanding of the interactions between the legislative and executive branch powers in war making. RS: The letter had four signatories, two from each party. Do you see potential for more bipartisan buy-in on this issue? If not, why not?
Sen. Lee: I have found great success in working with a serious group of members from both sides of the aisle in this space. The 2019 passage of the Yemen War Powers Resolution, which passed both chambers, was made possible by a bipartisan coalition. When the focus is kept on reasserting and restoring the role of Congress in the decision to declare war, a coalition of this kind can make history.RS: There are recent conflicting reports that the Biden administration is considering a withdrawal of troops from Syria. In the past, you have supported efforts to withdraw. Would you support a withdrawal of troops from Syria today?Sen. Lee: The first-order issue I had when U.S. troops were introduced into Syria remains the same today. Congress has never provided authorization for use of military force in Syria, nor has any administration provided a specific mission for U.S. presence that includes clear objectives and timelines on engagement. Strategic errors of this magnitude are how the United States ends up in endless wars, and it is exactly why the decision to make war was intentionally vested in the legislative branch and not in the hands of one, all-powerful but fallible executive.RS: You recently told The American Conservative that "We've been down this road before and we know it costs the U.S. blood and treasure for little gain." How concerned are you about the risk of escalation in the Middle East that could draw the U.S. in even further? What steps do you think could or should be taken to reduce these risks?
Sen. Lee: I am deeply concerned about escalation in the Middle East. For President Biden to admit that airstrikes have not changed the strategic environment in favor of U.S. interests while announcing his intention to continue them is wildly reckless policy. Beyond that, it doesn't seem the administration is concerned about how any of this affects the strategic landscape broadly for the United States. Both the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies acknowledge that we cannot effectively engage in active military campaigns in two theaters at once, even by proxy, and yet the Biden administration seems perfectly content to ignore its own acknowledged limits. RS: Do you support the repeal of the 1991 and 2002 authorizations for the use of military force in Iraq? Do you expect that efforts to repeal these AUMFs will succeed this year?
Sen. Lee: Keeping outdated AUMFs on the books creates an unnecessary risk of misuse. The 1991 and 2002 AUMFs should have been repealed years ago and I joined a number of my colleagues in cosponsoring bipartisan legislation to do this. The repeals passed the Senate last year and I continue to encourage my colleagues in the House to take action to complete the repeal. I also believe that Congress needs to begin a serious debate on the merits of maintaining the 2001 AUMF, which has become the fallback "authorization" cited for most military action in the Middle East.

UPDATE, 1/16: Trump won the Iowa caucuses early-on Monday night, with 51% of the vote totals, followed by Ron DeSantis at 21%, Nikki Haley at 19%, and Vivek Ramaswamy, who later suspended his campaign, at 8%. In exit polling, 12% voters said that foreign policy was their most important issue going into the caucuses, behind the economy (38%) and immigration (34%).On the eve of the Iowa Caucus, a Donald Trump caucus captain said that Nikki Haley was a "warmonger" and a shill for the Deep State, and that Ron DeSantis was pretty much the same.Welcome to the beginning of the 2024 Republican primary contests where foreign policy is very much a part of the conversation.While Trump is still far ahead of his primary competitors, the battle for a distant second is in play. A Des Moines Register/NBC News poll last week showed Trump with 48 percent in Iowa, Haley at 20 percent and DeSantis at 16 percent. Vivek Ramaswamy trails in fourth with 8 percent. The Iowa caucuses begin tonight at 8 p.m. EST.Just as noteworthy, an Associated Press poll released in early January revealed that, "Foreign policy has gained importance among respondents from both parties. Some 46% of Republicans named it, up from 23% last year. And 34% of Democrats list foreign policy as a focal point, compared with 16% a year ago.""It also shows that the Israeli-Hamas war is feeding public anxiety," AP noted, reporting that double the amount of Americans are bringing up foreign policy now as compared to last year's polling on the same subject. The data also showed concerns about U.S. involvement with the Ukraine conflict were about where they were a year ago.But via their positions on both the Israel-Gaza and Russia-Ukraine conflicts, this is a diverse GOP presidential field when it comes to foreign policy.Donald TrumpThe current Republican frontrunner boasted in the spring that he would settle the Ukraine-Russia war in 24 hours. "The key is the war has to stop now because Ukraine is being obliterated," Trump said in March.Meanwhile, he has issued intermittent and mixed messages on Israel-Gaza, though often seems to imply it was a problem of those entities and not necessarily the U.S."So you have a war that's going on, and you're probably going to have to let this play out," Trump told Univision in November. "You're probably going to have to let it play out because a lot of people are dying."Trump appeared to acknowledge that as far as grievances, there were two sides regarding Palestine and the Jewish state. "There is no hatred like the Palestinian hatred of Israel and Jewish people. And probably the other way around also, I don't know," the former president said. "You know, it's not as obvious, but probably that's it too. So sometimes you have to let things play out and you have to see where it ends." Trump has called what was taking place in Gaza "unbelievable."Nikki HaleyIf Trump's inclination on both Ukraine and Gaza is somewhere between diplomacy and letting things play out, there are not two sides in these conflicts for Nikki Haley. For the former United Nations ambassador, there is the impenetrable righteousness of Ukraine and Israel, and the undebatable evil of Russia and Palestine.And she wants the U.S. fully backing the good guys of both. If you liked George W. Bush kicking off the Global War on Terror by declaring, "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists," then Haley is your candidate.For Republicans, particularly in leadership and the donor class, for whom Bush-Cheney still represents the fundamental approach to Republican foreign policy — trying desperately to ignore that attitudes in the Trump-era base have changed — Haley is unquestionably their candidate.Not surprisingly, neoconservative lodestar Bill Kristol is a big Haley fan, and on the flipside, antiwar Republican Sen. Rand Paul recently launched a 'Never Nikki' campaign.Ron DeSantisBut if some Trump supporters revel in calling Haley a "warmonger," Ron DeSantis, who began his campaign promoting himself as a more responsible or viable version of Trump, now often gets lumped in with Haley.After calling Ukraine-Russia a "territorial dispute" in March 2023, the Florida governor seemed quick to walk back his remark, calling Russian head Vladimir Putin a "war criminal."In contrast, Trump has been urged to call Putin a war criminal but has refused to do so, while also admitting Russia "made a mistake" in invading Ukraine. "If you say he's a war criminal it's going to be a lot tougher to make a deal to get this thing stopped," Trump said in May.Haley has said she thinks President Biden isn't being aggressive enough with Russia.DeSantis has said it is far more important to support Israel than Ukraine, and that he would not try to stop Israel's war in Gaza, going so far as to say in the last Republican debate that he would support "mass removal" of the Palestinians.Vivek RamaswamyThe clearest '"America First" foreign policy message in 2024 to date on these two conflicts has not come from Trump, but entrepreneur Vivek Ramaswamy, who doesn't want the U.S. involved in the Russia-Ukraine war and says a negotiated peace with Ukraine giving up some territory is the only solution. "I don't think it is preferable for Russia to be able to invade a sovereign country that is its neighbor, but I think the job of the U.S. president is to look after American interests," Ramaswamy said in June. Haley has said Putin is "salivating" over a Ramswamy presidency — a neocon tactic used in the past on anti-war Republican candidates like Ron Paul, who was constantly accused of siding with America's enemies.Ramaswamy has said Israel had the right to defend itself after the October 7 terrorist attacks, but opposes U.S. intervention and aid, but also says that aid should be contingent on what actions Israel's government takes in Gaza."Israel is barreling toward a potentially catastrophic ground invasion of Gaza without clear objectives," Ramaswamy said in late October. "'Destroy Hamas' is not on its own a viable or coherent strategy."The fight for the foreign policy mantleTwo decades after the Global War on Terror, some candidates still run to carry on the legacy of George W. Bush, but others — even frontrunners — appear to reject that kind of foreign policy.The same goes for some Republican voters, though they appear split on the Ukraine and Israel issues. While a growing number oppose more aid to Ukraine for example, a plurality say the U.S. is not doing enough to support Israel in its war on Gaza and are more likely than Democrats to support Israel's bombardment and siege of the Palestinian territory. There is some hope, with restrainers on the conservative side quite vocally questioning not only the strategic thinking behind Biden's recent strikes against the Houthis, but their constitutionality.What does a Republican foreign policy look like in 2024? We won't know for some time, but it's arguably more of a question than an answer right now than at any time in modern party history.

A year and a half ago I published an Op-Ed article and
Blog post on the great popular revolt in Cuba motivated by economic hardship
and the lack of future prospects, aggravated by the pandemic. I speculated that
since the Army was the country's most powerful and best-organized institution, some generals might try to maintain their advantageous economic
positions by avoiding participating in the repression and seeking a reformist
accommodation. This was not the case. The week after the revolt, five high-ranking
generals died without the causes being clarified and a few months later General
Luis-Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja, head of the business and financial
conglomerate of the Revolutionary Armed Forces that controls the main landmarks
of the Cuban economy, including the tourism sector, and one of the most
important men in the command structure in Cuba, also died suddenly.

Cuba had experienced in July 2021 the largest
anti-government protests since the Revolution. The previous crisis, the
Maleconazo of 1994 (the subject of the documentary Balseros, co-produced
by TV de Catalunya and nominated for an Oscar) ended with 300 people arrested.
The 2021 revolt generated 1,400 detainees, 790 prosecuted and 128 sentenced to
prison terms of up to thirty years.

Between the two crises, the Cuban opposition lost its
historic leaders. Oswaldo Payá was the victim of a probable assassination
attempt; Gustavo Arcos, whom I visited in Havana, died; Elizardo Sánchez, whom
I also met, was held captive by spies and infiltrators. Cardinal Jaime Ortega
must be in Heaven.

In parallel, the exile voice in Miami has almost been extinguished
after the death of its veteran leaders and the adaptation of the next
generation born in the United States. Neither the conservative Mas Canosa nor
the social democrat Jesús Díaz, in whose magazine I collaborated, are among us
anymore, while my friend the liberal Carlos Alberto Montaner has already
written his memoirs. The last time I went to the Café Versailles on 8th Street,
it looked like an abandoned place.

According to economist Albert Hirschman, there are three
alternatives to a political regime: voice, loyalty, and exit. As I have
described, voice has been harshly repressed in Cuba for the last year and a half. But at the same time, the economic situation has worsened, and loyalty to
the regime has diminished.

Last September there was a referendum on gay marriage and
other family issues, which could have been viewed positively given the
Revolution's homophobic record. But it turned into a plebiscite on the regime
and more than half of the census did not vote or voted against, null or blank.
In November there were municipal elections in which 40% of the census did not
participate or rejected the candidates selected by the single party. This
disaffection is unprecedented in Cuba, where in Fidel Castro's time 95% voted.
In the regime's typical response mobilization, they had to get Raul Castro out
of bed, at 91 years of age and without any official position, to see if this
would revive the revolutionary spirit. 

Hirschman explains that when the voice is eliminated and
loyalty is lowered, the only alternative is the exit, i.e., emigration. Thus,
since the July 2021 revolt, some 250,000 Cubans have left the island, a figure
far higher than the sum of all previous emigration crises.

Leaving Cuba by sea is illegal without a visa. Donald
Trump dismantled the U.S. consulate in Havana and suspended the issuance of
visas. But according to the Cuban Adjustment Act, anyone who sets foot on land,
even without a visa, is considered a refugee. Faced with the massive flight, the
U.S. Coast Guard has captured at sea and returned to the island more than two
thousand Cubans trying to reach Florida this past year. At least 100 died in
the crossing.

The other way out requires traveling by plane to the
Bahamas, Panama, Nicaragua, or Mexico and attempting to cross the Mexican
border with the United States on foot. For a Cuban with an average salary
equivalent to thirty-three dollars a month, this type of journey involves a cost
of eight to ten thousand dollars, including ransoms to coyotes and polleros
and bribes to corrupt officials. Despite all this, the number of Cubans who
manage to cross the southern border of the United States has steadily increased
to 35,000 in a month.

During the year 2022, with the presidency of Joe Biden,
the US issued some 20,000 immigrant visas. A few days ago, on January 4, the
Consulate in Havana resumed its services. Long lines and hundreds of thousands
of petitions to leave the island legally are expected, the vast majority of
young people without vital expectations.

Fidel Castro repeated several times his curse that
"first the island will sink into the sea before abandoning
communism". Posthumously, he may end up succeeding.In Catalan and Spanish in daily ARA:https://www.arabalears.cat/opinio/cuba-enfonsa-mar-josep-colomer_129_4596330.htmlCOMMENTSResumen certero, conciso y por desgracia triste, de la actualidad de Cuba. Lo he circulado en mi chat hispano-latinoamericano (aún hay irredentos que creen en la revolución cubana).Saludos cordiales.RamónRamón Puig de la Bellacasa AlberolaEmbajador…Impresiona lo que cuentas sobre Cuba, en lo que te veo te has involucrado a fondo. Yo recuerdo mis amigos nicaragüenses, y ahora veo con lo que tienen que vivir, si es que no han salido del país…Víctor Pérez DiazSociólogoMuchísimas gracias por el último articulo que me has enviado sobre cuba.Un fuerte abrazoJose Manuel BandrésTribunal SupremoTerrific article. Gracias.Alfred CuzanWest Florida UniversityTriste realidad!Pedro FreyreAkerman's International PracticeMuy difícil el panorama cubano; no hay mejor metáfora que la referida maldición de Castro que citas. Acabo de regresar una semana, entre la inflación y la depauperación generalizada…Carlos-Manuel Rodríguez-ArechavaletaUniversidad Iberoamericana, MéxicoBellísima y elocuentes palabras. Gracias por abordar este tema. No había pensado lo del vacío de liderazgo miamense que mencionas.Javier CorralesAmherst College, MassachusettsGracias, Josep, por un elocuente y triste artículo.Leandro Prados de la EscosuraUniversidad Carlos IIIAgraït . Desconeixia les actuals tensions a Cuba.Josep M.BricallBarcelonaArtículo muy interesante, como todos los tuyos, que leo con devoción. Merece amplia difusión. En los tiempos que corren, visto lo que sucede en Brasil, USA y Europa, provoca gran curiosidad lo que pueda suceder en Cuba en relación con la democracia.Oscar Rodriguez BuznegoUniversidad de OviedoEnhorabuena por lo atinado de tu texto, aunque sea un escenario lamentableManuel AlcantaraUniversidad de SalamancaMolt bé Josep! El curs passat vaig ser uns mesos a RDom i ho vaig veure d'aprop. El 10 de Febrer me'n hi torno.Joan Maria ThomàsUniversitat Rovira i VirgiliMolt bon article. Important trencar el silenci.Andreu Claret SerraEl PeriodicoMuchas gracias! Un recordatorio necesarioManuel Villoria MendietaUniversidad Rey Juan CarlosExcel·lent. Com sempre.Carlos Castro SanzLa Vanguardia

The political contention that considers forests to be mere economic assets to achieve state welfare has slowly changed into a more conservative view since the Ninth World Forestry Congress in Mexico in 1985 rightly acknowledged that there has been severe tropical forest destruction and environmental deterioration around the globe. Several international agreements to address specific forestry issues have been established and new forms of forest governance have been formed, and an alliance of domestic and international actors have to implement these, mostly in forest-rich countries. These attempts have sometimes met with difficulty, due to the domestic forest-related bureaucracies' own programmes and goals. Here, various interests in domestic politics compete for international support, resulting in the acceptance, rejection of, or changes to, those forest governances. Consequently, international forest governance may be adopted in a country in a form that is different from its original concept. To gain more insight into forest politics as carried out by bureaucracies, and its consequences for forest policy processes and forest resources, this dissertation examines the question of how forest-relevant bureaucracies respond to new international forest governance. This framework contributes to a description of the bureaucratic processes involved in the implementation of selected international forest governances. For this purpose this framework will be structured as follows: 1. Theoretical framework on bureaucratic politics, domestic politics in response to international forest regimes, theory of power, and the concept of absolute and relative power gains; 2. Methodological framework for data collection and analysis of international forest issues relevant in Indonesia, the role of influential actors in specific cases, bureaucracies respond to forest policy introduced by other actors, and power dynamics of actors involved; and 3. Results, highlighting the selection of international forest governance forms by domestic bureaucracies, the effort bureaucracies make to restore their authority over forests, the international influence on forest politics, the forming of super bureaucracy and its suspension, and symbolic forest policy. The origin of this framework consists of five articles, each of which addresses specific questions in selected study cases. The publications are listed below, together with a brief description. Article 1: Wibowo, A., & Giessen, L. (2015). Actor positions on primary and secondary international forest-related issues relevant in Indonesia. Journal of Sustainable Development, 8(3):10-27. This article identifies timber legality, climate change (including the REDD initiative) oil palm plantation and its environmental aspects, harmonisation of wood and forest certification schemes, land use change, forest and species conservation, and deforestation and decentralized forest governance as the seven most relevant forest issues in Indonesia. Article 2: Wibowo, A., & Giessen, L. (2015). Absolute and relative power gains among state agencies in forest-related land use politics: The Ministry of Forestry and its competitors in the REDD+ Programme and the One Map Policy in Indonesia. Land Use Policy, 49, 131-141. It describes how the two forest-related policies involving many state agencies do not work well since there is no strong leading agency responsible for them. Article 3: Wibowo, A., Sahide, M.A.K, & Giessen, L. (2015). From voluntary private to mandatory state governance in Indonesian forest certification: Reclaiming authority and legitimacy by bureaucracies. Article submitted to Global Environmental Change. This describes the strategy of the Ministry of Forestry of increasing its influence over stakeholders along the value chain of domestic timber business, by utilising its authority in Indonesia-EU FLEGT-VPA negotiation. Article 4: Pratiwi, S., Wibowo, A., & Giessen, L. (2015). Third-party certification of forest management in Indonesia: Analysing stakeholders' recognition and preferences. Journal Manajemen Hutan Tropika [Journal of Tropical Forest Management], 21(2), 65–75. This unveils certification schemes preferred by industries and the criteria they use in selecting such schemes. Article 5: Wibowo, A., Pratiwi, S., & Giessen, L. (2015). Comparing forest certification and timber legality systems in Indonesia: Complementary or competitive? Environmental, Development and Sustainability, under revision. This compares two international and one national forest certification scheme with the timber legality verification system in Indonesia that uses the Forest Certification Assessment Guide (FCAG), and concludes that those schemes are in competition and that each of them tries to delegitimise the others. These five publications answer the central question of how forest-relevant bureaucracies respond to new international forest governance. To address this central question, four questions that are more specific are formulated, namely: (i) What policy instruments are international forest governances trying to apply to domestic forest policy?; (ii) Who are the important domestic and non-domestic actors involved in the policy processes concerning specific forest issues?; (iii) How do the main forest-related bureaucracies respond to forest policy introduced by other bureaucracies?; and (iv) What are political factors influence the acceptance of new forest-related policies?. We used non-participant observations, expert interviews, and content analyses of policy documents in most of our works. Specifically, online survey was used to identify stakeholders' perception on forest certification schemes working in Indonesia and Forest Certification Assessment Guide (FCAG) to compare the standard of forest sustainability certification and timber legality verification. We applied theory of actor-centred power, theory of power, concept of absolute and relative power gains, and domestic response to foreign agenda in all publications. The results show that, first, forest-related bureaucracies are more responsive to issues with high economic benefit, and pay less attention to those with low economic benefit. They are also more involved with topics that become issues of international concern, such as timber legality, climate change and REDD+, and oil palm plantation and its environmental aspects. Second, domestic bureaucracies in charge of economic tasks are more involved in the forestry business than those in charge of environmental tasks. In addition to the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Industry are the two ministries most involved in domestic forest governance. Other state agencies that influence domestic forest policy are UKP4 (Presidential Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight, Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan), REDD+ Agency, BAPPENAS (National Development Planning Agency, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional), DNPI (National Council on Climate Change, Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim). Third, domestic bureaucracies form alliances with central power in the states (the president) to be involved in or/and to shape domestic forest policies, and to cooperate with international actors to gain public legitimacy for the way in which they run their programmes. Fourth, the three main cases examined in this dissertation, namely REDD+, one map policy and forest certification, are likely to be symbolic only. Symbolic policy is defined as sense of a non-policy, which formulates goals and instruments but is not assigned with clear responsibilities in terms of implementing agencies, sufficient staff, budget resources and necessary information. This conclusion is based on the fact that REDD+ policy, as well as timber legality verification, are based on weak legal constructions, have no single and strong leading agency responsible for ensuring continuity, and have only weak long-term agendas with no stand-alone budgets or discrete staff. Weak legal construction means that the policy can be changed, postponed or discontinued by other powerful actors, and having no leading agency means that there is an absence of an actor with the power to direct and implement the policy or of an authority that would penalize anyone acting against it.

Throughout 2023,I kept being sarcastic about being post-pandemic, knowing that COVID was still a major problem, even as we stopped acting as if it was.  And then, of course, I got it the last week of the year.  The year started with COVID--my wife and her family got it when she went down to help her mother when she was hospitalized--as well, so it was a strange year of acting like it was not a thing while it was very much a thing.  Since I am not going to be productive today due to my current bout, I thought I would post about the year so that I could remember now and down the road the non-covid-y parts to the year. I can't help but start with the longest stretch of single-dom since college.  Mrs. Spew first went to help her hospitalized mother, but that became a three month or so effort to get my MIL moved out of a four floor townhouse and into a senior apartments facility.  What did I do as a single dude for three months?  Mostly plot and scheme about the kitchen renovation.  While Mrs. Spew was back for the demolition and renovation, all of the decisions were made while she was away.  I did consult via texted pics of counter tops and the like, but as she put it, since I do most of the cooking, it was up to me for most of it.  And it worked out great.  I had two great ski trips to Banff, one with a friend's family and an anniversary trip sans my wife.  Instead, my sister and my daughter joined me.  The most notable part of the first trip was that I did a face plant on a relatively flat part of Lake Louise, proving that my new goggles are tough and leading to my first visit to the Ski Patrol hut for a bandaid. It was the first time I skied with my daughter in quite some time.  I had skied with my sister the previous year as she was re-learning the sport.  In 2023, she was much improved and kept up with me nicely.  The Minister of National Defence, Anita Anand, once again visited my Civ-Mil class by zoom.  This was the second, and, alas, last time, she did that as she got shuffled to a different ministry over the summer.  Last year, it was a last minute thing. This year, I had the chance to prompt the students to ask civ-mil questions as opposed to just big IR questions, and it went really well.     A highlight of the year was going to Florida for my cousin's daughter's Bar Mitzvah.  One of the patterns of the year was bad chair dancing--the guys holding up the various victims here and at other events tended to tilt the chairs forward.  They did better with Samantha than with her sister.  We got to spend the next day at my cousin's house, including their gator-proximate pool.  I hadn't had a chance to play with all four of my cousins' kids at the same time in quite a while, and it was my first time using my old kid-pool skills in sometime.  It was probably appropriate that it was in Florida since 2023 was the 40th anniversary of my family living in Miami--just for one year, but I spent a lot of that year in the pool we had.Speaking of blasts from the past, I went to my first rock concert in ... decades?  Journey came to Ottawa, and since their music was a big part of my teen soundtrack, I got a ticket and went.  No Steve Perry although his replacement sounded good and had lots of energy.  But still a good show. It reminded me why I don't go to concerts--I just don't find watching people make music all that interesting.  I have always enjoyed going to conferences, and this year's ISA was far more normal than last year's.  The previous year was underattended and held in a strange resort in Nashville. 2023's was held in Montreal, a very familiar locale, and most of the folks I like to see at these things were there.  Two highlights were the Presidential speech and an award panel.  I always blow off the Presidential speech except when the President is a friend.  Debbi Avant, who started at UCSD a few years before me, has always impressed me with her sharp insights about international relations, and her speech was Debbi at her finest. The other highlight, also UCSD related, was the lifetime achievement panel for Miles Kahler, my supervisor way back when.  He bristled at the attention a bit about all of this fuss, but it was great to see so much appreciation for his work and for his Miles-ness.  He is retiring... for the second time and I think this one will stick.  So, it was great to see him get all of the love and appreciation.  As I get closer to retirement myself, with two of my friends retiring this year (mine is still about eight years away), I am more committed to telling people how much they have meant to me.  Losing a few friends during the pandemic also is compelling me to make clear to folks how much I appreciate them.  There are few people in this business who supported me and shaped my views than these two, so it was great to see them both celebrated.I joke often about the military-industrial-academic complex, and this year, I got to experience it pretty directly.  Well, the first two parts--there were not many academics nor anything academic going on at CANSEC--the annual show for defence contractors.  The big surprise was not so much how much room the biggest contractors took up but the range of stuff being presented there--from artillery and ammo to drones to uniforms to cables to medical stuff and on and on.  Note in this pic that the firm was promoting gear for pregnant soldiers. I have rarely gone to the graduation ceremonies, but with one of my PhDs graduating and having finally purchased a spiffy cap and gown, it was time to go.  Marshall finished his dissertation in record time, and he didn't cut any corners along the way--it was an award-winning project.  Of all the students I supervised, his work required the fewest comments, so much so that I felt guilty.  I am just glad I don't have the action shot of me messing up his hooding since he is so very tall.    June was also a month of much travel.  First, a DND-organized trip to Riga to chat with NATO folks, Canada's contingent, the Latvian defence folks, and the Strategic Communications conference.  I learned a lot, had a fair amount of excellent beer, and even hung out with the kids from the NATO Field School--an effort run by CDSN Co-Director Alex Moens to teach undergrads and newly graduated folks about NATO.  It was my second time to Riga and my second time to the base where the Canadians are operating.  Going with this group meant more high level briefings, more sharp questions asked by my colleagues that I would not have thought to ask, and, yeah, more beer.The highlight of the year was the delayed anniversary trip with my wife to Spain.  I had a conference in Barcelona, so we flew into Madrid and then drove throughout hot southern Spain: Toledo, Cordoba, Seville, Granada, and Ronda.  My fave was Toledo despite the scariest extended driving experience of my life--the old city streets were so very narrow the proximity alarms in my rental car were going off--all of them.  Along the way, we learned a lot of history, saw some amazing art and architecture, ate really well, and had a lot of sangria.Did I mention it was hot?  Cordoba was probably our second favorite place although Granada was also pretty amazing.  And Ronda had the best tapas in a random bar.  Oh, and Barcelona is just terrific.Great view of Alhambra in Granada with excellent food. Ronda has a bridge over a beautiful gorge.  It also has an historic bullring. Seville was also pretty terrific.  Just an amazing trip.The summer family vacation was once again in Philly since my mother can't travel much.  We found new and old things to do.  I had not realized my older sister is so sharp at scrabble--a shark!  I dominated the axe throwing until the final throws, where Mrs. Spew took the crown!         My sabbatical started in July, and Dave and Phil and I managed to finish our book and submit it in the fall.  Glossy picture of book cover?  Not yet.  Still need to get the reviews and past the editorial board.  As Tom Petty said, the waiting is the hardest part.  Actually, in this case, the writing was the hardest part.The fall was also marked by something I had never experienced before: being the subject of an op-ed. I had written more than a few, but to have someone else dedicate an entire piece to moi?  Oh my.  The background is: in the fall of 2022, a retired general, Michel Maisonneuve was given an award by a veteran's association and used that speech to blast pretty much everyone.  I blogged about it since I found it to be very problematic.  When I heard that he was going to appear at the Conservative Party convention, I wrote an op-ed arguing that this was a dangerous politicization of the Canadian military.  Maisonneuve responded by targeting me, a dual citizen, gasp, in his op-ed.  It was all very strange to be on the other side of an op-ed, especially one filled with ad hominens and straw men.  But I guess this means I am an influencer?The APSA was strange due to a hotel strike, but I had to go as LA is where my daughter lives.  So, I had a good time conferencing and a better time hanging out with her.  The poker game was a bit different as we used a big table in the lobby (my room was way too small).  We were not as rowdy as the table nearby, so it was all good.  I also drove with Mrs. Spew on Mulholland Drive for as far as we could--got lots of great looks at LA and the valley. Jon cleaned up better than I did.Yet more travel as I went to DC with Mrs. Spew for a civ-mil conference and ... the 100th anniversary of the summer camp that was so important to me growing up.  The conference was terrific--I hadn't been to this specific one before--the Inter-university Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.   Definitely going back since it is chock full of smart, sweet folks working on fascinating stuff.  The anniversary gala happened to be the same weekend so I drove up to Baltimore and had a blast seeing old friends and meeting other folks who had similar experiences out in the hinterlands of Maryland.I should note that we had a great CDSN year--each of our events went really well, and we feel we are making a difference. I am so grateful for the team that does all of the heavy lifting.  And at one event, they let us use the patio!  The people, the location, the season all make this one quite special.  The Meeting of the MINDS event, where we brought together the nine networks funded by DND plus DND's Policy group, was a terrific opportunity to learn what the other networks are doing, what has been working for them, and also what DND wants from us. Our Year Ahead event addressed timely issues: how to respond to China's aggression, what the 2024 US election campaign will do to incite extremism, evacuations from conflict zones, and taking a look at the Balkans.  And it was in a funky new location for us.  It even had a slide!The aforementioned conference in DC kicked off a series of trips that is not going to stop until May of 2024.  I went to Seoul to research their civ-mil for the next book--what role do defence agencies think they have?  I learned a lot in those two weeks--still trying to figure that case out--and had a good time seeing more of Korea, including Busan.  Busan had the most beautifully located temple as well as the memorial for UN troops who died in the Korean war.I went directly from Seoul to Copenhagen for a different civ-mil conference.  I had been there a couple of times before, but hadn't seen their war museum, their art museum or their Christmas markets.  The latter showed me that Zurich's smelly gluhwein is not representative of mulled wine, so I had some of that and then made some over winterfest.   Those trips then lead to a quick trip to Toronto for a workshop and then Thanskgiving with the Saideman folks.  Much food was made and consumed.  The highlight of this week was Milo, my niece's dog.  Super sweet.  Oh and seeing my daughter.Since my sister had crashed my anniversary ski trip, I felt it was only fair to crash her ski clinic at Alta.  I had been there about 22 years ago on a Saideman family vacation (my segment, from Lubbock, arrived a day or two late thanks to snow removal challenges in Texas).  I am a much better skier now thanks to all the skiing near Montreal and now my habit of hitting the Canadian rockies on a regular basis.  So, it was fun to see how much more of the place I could do with confidence. The skies each day were so clear and blue.  Just amazing views at all times.  I came home from Alta to deliver cookies near and far.  Each year, I make more (the new kitchen definitely helped), and each year, more people join my nice list.  So, I spent two days driving around Ottawa seeing folks and giving bits of sweet joy.  This started in the first winter of the pandemic when this was the first chance to interact with people in person since the start of the quarantine.  It is a great way to end the year--eating sweets and sharing them.  And meeting a few dogs along the way.We ended the year as usual--in the greater DC area--to celebrate winterfest with my wife's family.  Since my mother-in-law no longer has a townhouse, we had to rent an airbnb near her retirement facility. Which meant we hosted the festivities--first time our family had anything to do with a tree in a couple of decades.  I have been making the big dinner for the past few years, so that was not so different.  It was great to see these folks--twice this year for me as I saw most of them in October when I was in the area for the IUS conference.  A drink mydaughter gotmy spectacular sister-in-law LizI hope you had a great 2023, and you have a happy new year.  I will be on the road for most of the first half of the year, so many more pics of fun places and good food.  Oh, and some research.

 The Conference of Defence Associations Institute made a splash this week with an open letter "Call for Action: Canada's National Security and Defence in Peril."  It made a heap of news given who signed it: a heap of former ministers of defence, a bunch of ambassadors and high ranking civil servants, and several retired generals and admirals (tis funny to me that the title of the piece omits the squids and skimmers):I respect the hell out of many of the signers as well as folks at CDAI, which as been a terrific partner of the CDSN.  However, I have quibbles, both minor and major, which I would have shared this morning on the radio had the host not gotten the wrong talking points--he asked me about Elon Musk and the CBC.  While it was fun to rant about bad faith actors engaged in vice-signalling, I did prep for the interview and didn't want to waste it, so here's some thoughts about this piece.  First, I want to address a few specific gripes before getting to the larger context.The letter talks about our military capabilities being woefully inadequate to protect our landmass.  That is not only true, that will ALWAYS be true.  How so?  The primary military threat to Canada are missiles launched by Russia/China/North Korea.  We can't stop those.  No matter how much we spend, we can't because we don't have ballistic missile defenses.  The Americans have been working on such defenses since Reagan's Star Wars speech, and they really haven't made much progress on it.  So, we should be clearer about what are the threats and what we need to defend ourselves from those threats.  The biggest threats to Canadian lives and property are stuff outside the military domain: climate change, pandemics, and cyber attacks (while the military has a cyber role, we should not be spending the scarce commodity of disciplined, trained people in uniform on jobs civilians can and should do).  People can cite Russian investments in the north, but we have to keep in mind that they have a whole lot of north to defend.  I do really worry about a war with China, but that is a China-Taiwan conflict that will spillover, and we will never have a navy big enough to make a dent in that conflict.  I say all this, even as I agree with the basic premise--we need to spend more.  But there are some difficulties with that, as I get to, below."We have also fallen short in meaningful contributions to burden
sharing for the collective defence and security of our allies and
partners." Oh really?  What burden has Canada shirked?  Canada paid the third highest price of any ally in Afghanistan and had far less restrictions until it became a training mission.  Canada is one of four framework nations organizing the defense/deterrence/reassurance missions in the Baltics and Poland.  While our contingent has been smaller than the others, the resulting need to organize many smaller and less respected (sorry) contingents has earned Canada a heap of kudos for stepping up when France refused to do so.  Canada has played a leading role in training Ukrainian forces before the Russian invasion of 2022 and since.  Canada has shipped a comparative level of arms and ammunition and other supplies to Ukraine.  When people say Canada has not burden-shared enough, they really mean Canada hasn't spent enough on its military.  But that is not "burden-sharing" because spending on our own military really does not lift the burden that much from the others.  Here's a secret: the US would spend as much as it currently does even if Canada doubled its spending.  Indeed, given the domestic political dynamics driving American defense spending, I am pretty sure that if each and every US ally spent the equivalent of 2% of GDP on defense, the US would still spend about the same.  Which branch of the US military will say: hey, our allies have spent more, we don't need to spend as much?  Which defense contractors?  Which Senators and Representatives?  And, yes, the easiest way to make progress to 2% is to tank the economy since it is all about spending relative to one's economy.  If one's economy grows pretty well, one might find one spending more money absolutely but not relative to that metric.  Canada is spending more on its military than it was a decade ago--more dollars, even if not a greater % of GDP.  More importantly input measures are dumb.  See Anessa Kimball's book for more on the craptastic nature of the 2% conversation.Canadian civil-military relations conversations don't really address the challenges posed by having retired senior officers take political stances the same way these are raised in the US.  But perhaps they should.  If JC Boucher and I get funding, we will be studying whether the signals sent by retired officers cause Canadians to think that they are speaking for the active military.  If so, well, damn.  Because then the military is seen, rightly or wrongly, as taking a partisan stance.  And that ain't good. Folks can say this is a bipartisan letter since it has both former Conservative and Liberal politicians signing it, but nope, that doesn't do the trick since this letter is calling on this government, this party, to do better.  It does not call on Parliament to get its house in order even as the role of parliament in Canadian defence is so much weaker than damn near any other democracy.  So, this is critical of this PM and the Liberal party because they are the ones in power.  Speaking of the former ministers, how many of them are responsible for the current mess?  How many of them cut spending, pushed back procurement processes, under-invested in procurement expertise, and so on?  Most of them?  All of them?  So much easier for them to criticize this stuff now that they are no longer beholden to parties and no longer running for office. Which gets to the part that is most unrealistic: "the Government must radically accelerate timelines for procurement..."  Um, through magic?  A great application of Green Lantern theory.  DND doesn't have enough people to do the procurement stuff to buy the
equipment and such.  So, that needs a heap of work to make happen before one can spend the money. If one were to magically allocate $15b more, the current staffing at DND couldn't spend it.   Ok, the larger context.  The letter is right that the latest budget is disappointing from a defence/security perspective as it had no new money.  In my humble opinion, the gravest threat to the Canadian military is its recruitment and retention crisis.  That being short 16k people means not only that the CAF can't do as much, but that those in the CAF are stressed.  Stressed by having to do multiple jobs, stressed by not being well served by various offices that are understaff, and so on.  These pressures are likely to make it harder to retain people and harder to recruit, which will exacerbate the crisis--a downward spiral.  It would seem to me that while throwing money at the problem won't solve it, it probably could help.  Increase pay, increase benefits, spend more money on recruiting efforts, improve military bases, etc.  I do wonder what is happening to the money that is supposed to be going to the 16k soldiers, sailors, and aviators who aren't in the CAF.  Anyhow, that is one place where the money should be going.  Another key part of the current context is that the Defence Policy Update is late and has generally been an opaque, underwhelming process.  Canada should have a quadrennial process--to review how well the last four years went and whether goals were attained, why DND/CAF fell short, and plans for improving as well as responding to new developments.  Instead, the DPU was going to be, from what folks have gleaned, a sales pitch for spending more money on NORAD modernization (which is necessary but won't actually lead to us being much safer due to that aforementioned missile defence problemo).  We will only be able to evaluate the DPU after it comes out.  The previous review was much better than expected.  Maybe people liked it since it didn't make any hard choices as it didn't force any real tradeoffs.  But it did cost out the spending for the various programs and was pretty transparent.  Of course, when rolled out, much was made of putting personnel first in the document to suggestion putting personnel first in reality, but then Trudeau kept around a Defence Minister who kept around a Chief of Defence Staff that was abusing his power and engaged in sexual misconduct.  So, the proof is in the doing, not in the words on the page.Finally, the political pressures run against most of this.  If we wanted good ships fast and less expensive, we'd buy them from countries that are good at that.  Instead, notice how the ship building is pitched by this government (and by the previous one, just not quite so starkly): That graphic is the cover for the 2015 Liberal Defence Platform.  Notice the purpose of naval investments--jobs.  Not ships.  Jobs.  Not defending maritime approaches.  This is one of the primary reasons why Canada doesn't have the equipment the CAF needs--that decisions are made about jobs and votes. Stephen Harper's plan was to capture Halifax and Vancouver via the shipbuilding program, but now all the parties are held hostage by Irving, Seaspan, and now Davie shipyards.  Folks can argue we need this capacity to maintain and upgrade the ships, but the choice to do it this way is incredibly expensive and ... no frigates (the AOPS ships the navy didn't really want are mostly broken).  When we do import stuff, there is an urge to Canadianize it to make it fit Canadian standards.  So, now we have helicopters that are too heavy.  Oy.  The military always wants to put as much stuff as they can, so that the equipment can operate in all kinds of scenarios since they can only get one type of plane, one type of ship, and so forth.  But that goldplating makes the systems more expensive and less effective.  Again, choices need to be made, which might mean that a ship is good at one thing and not so good at another.  Because you know.... 👉While this government is not great at delivering, most of this is hard-wired into Canadian politics.  Which party is going to get more votes by spending more money on defense?   "We believe this could be best accomplished on a non-partisan basis and would have broad public support."  Um, no.Structural problems can't be fixed with just a call to arms and a smidge more political will (whatever that is).  Maybe this letter might impact those writing the Defence Policy Update, but that impact is likely to be on the packaging as the money is already set.  Trudeau has already made the decision for this year, and given the context--the war in Ukraine, the DPU, etc--I doubt that next year will be any different as we get closer to the next election.  I get the frustration of those signing this letter. I share it.  I write blog posts out of frustration.  Other folks write open letters.  But move the policy needle?  I think not.          

Trying to make sense of U.S. policy toward Cuba is like trying to make sense of a play in the theater of the absurd. The rationales offered by the policy's defenders make no sense, and when they try to explain, they sound like characters in an Ionesco play. Recent legislative proposals from Cuban American members of the House of Representatives are prime examples.Rep. Mario Díaz-Balart (R-Fla.), chair of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, and Rep. María Elvira Salazar (R-Fla.), chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, recently proposed new sanctions locking in Cuba's groundless designation as a sponsor of international terrorism, blocking assistance to Cuba's private sector on the grounds that it doesn't exist, and punishing countries hosting Cuban medical missions for practicing "modern slavery." The last two proposals became law in the omnibus appropriations bill passed last month to avoid a government shutdown.Cuba is on the State Department's terrorism list, even though the Department's latest Country Report on Terrorism offers no evidence for Havana engaging in international terrorism. It cites Cuba's harboring of U.S. fugitives who committed politically-motivated crimes in the United States more than 40 years ago. Meanwhile, the United States for years harbored notorious Cuban exiles like Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles guilty of myriad terrorist attacks against Cuba, including bombing a Cuban airline flight, killing all 73 people aboard, and bombing tourist hotels in Havana.Early in the Biden administration, the White House said it was "committed to carefully reviewing" Cuba's designation, and in October 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken told Colombia's President Gustavo Petro, "We will continue as necessary to revisit those to see if Cuba continues to merit that designation." But just five months later, he told Congress, "We are not planning to remove them from the list." Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Eric Jacobstein told a group of Democratic lawmakers that, contrary to what they had been told previously, there was no review of Cuba's designation underway.Asked in a 2023 press briefing why Cuba was still on the terrorism list, a State Department spokesperson replied that it was because of Cuba's "long track record of egregious human rights abuses, suppression of a free press, suppression of civil society" — which has nothing to do with international terrorism. The official also acknowledged, oblivious to the irony, that the U.S. and Cuban governments engage in regular counter-terrorism cooperation talks under the auspices of a law enforcement agreement concluded during the Obama administration.Last year, Díaz-Balart joined Salazar to sponsor a bill preventing the Biden administration from removing Cuba from the terrorism list until it becomes a multi-party democracy. Although the bill is unlikely to become law this Congress, its disregard for the statutory criteria for designating a country as a sponsor of terrorism brings to mind Humpty Dumpty's declaration in Alice in Wonderland, "When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean."Díaz-Balart had better luck with the omnibus appropriation. When Congress fails to do its job passing the 12 appropriations bills that fund the government, it resorts to omnibus appropriations that lump all the unfinished bills together into one must-pass bill to avoid a government shutdown. All sorts of dubious measures make their way into omnibus appropriations because there just is not time to filter them all out. As chair of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Díaz-Balart was perfectly positioned to insert new Cuba sanctions into the omnibus.The omnibus appropriation prohibits the Biden administration from supporting Cuba's emerging private sector of some 10,000 new businesses, despite the fact that promoting private enterprise has been U.S. policy under Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden. Rep. Salazar calls the private sector a "myth" because some of the businesses are owned by relatives of government officials, even though the vast majority are not. A year ago, Díaz-Balart forced the Biden administration to abandon plans to help the private sector by threatening to block aid for Ukraine. His appropriations language, now law, blocks U.S. funding for "business promotion, economic reform, [or] entrepreneurship" in Cuba.Another provision of the omnibus appropriation would punish countries that pay Cuba for providing medical services on the grounds that such contracts constitute "modern slavery." Since the 1960s, Cuba has sent some 400,000 medical professionals to serve in 164 countries, but in the past two decades medical service contracts have become an important source of foreign exchange earnings.In 2006, President George W. Bush began offering entry to the United States and a fast path to citizenship to entice Cuban doctors serving abroad to defect. Some of those who defected criticized the pressure placed on them to serve abroad, harsh and restrictive working conditions, and the percentage of the contract fees they received. By contrast, doctors serving in the programs report that they volunteered because the wages are significantly higher than their wages in Cuba, and out of a desire to help people in need.During the Obama administration, U.S. and Cuban medical personnel worked together in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake and in west Africa fighting Ebola virus outbreak. President Obama, in his 2016 speech to the Cuban people, praised Cuba's medical internationalism, saying "No one should deny the service that thousands of Cuban doctors have delivered for the poor and suffering." But Cuban American Republicans do deny it.The original House version of the foreign operations appropriation that came out of Díaz-Balart's subcommittee and passed the House would have cut off U.S. assistance to the Pan American Health Organization and all countries and international organizations that have medical contracts with Cuba. Those provisions did not make it into the final omnibus legislation. But the bill that passed denies entry to the United States and threatens financial sanctions against "officials of foreign governments and their immediate family members" whose governments have medical service contracts with Cuba.Cuba has medical personnel serving abroad in dozens of countries, including Mexico, Italy, Qatar, Jamaica, several smaller Caribbean states, and Northern Ireland. Is it really in the U.S. national interest to ban their government officials from the United States? Would Mexico's indispensable cooperation on migration and narcotics trafficking survive such a ban? Luckily, during the negotiations over the final omnibus bill, cooler heads prevailed and made these sanctions subject to a presidential waiver. But they are still the law of the land, with Washington once again arrogating to itself the right to sanction other countries for their relations with Cuba, as if neither their sovereignty nor Cuba's counts for anything in Washington.That is the final absurdity of U.S. Cuba policy. It's not just that so much of it is built on false premises and distorted facts. It's that a small group of conservative Cuban American legislators, obsessed with reducing Cuba to penury, have been able to dictate policies that damage broader U.S. interests in Latin America, Europe, and the Global South. They get away with it because no issue is more important to them than Cuba, and Cuba is not important enough to Biden for him to stand up to them.These policies are not cost free. Like water dripping on a stone they gradually erode the good will of other countries, diminishing Washington's "soft power." The accretion of damage is chronicled by the annual vote at the United Nations General Assembly on Cuba's resolution condemning the U.S. embargo. When the resolution was first introduced in 1992, it passed with 59 countries in favor, 3 against (the United State, Israel, and Romania), and a majority, 71 abstaining. Last year 187 countries voted for the resolution. Ukraine abstained and only Israel joined the United States in voting no.When American patriots declared their independence from the British crown, they detailed their reasons in the Declaration of Independence out of a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind." That respect is not a virtue Washington policymakers should abandon just because the United States has become a superpower.

Russia's "Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence," a high-level strategic document, says that Russia "hypothetically" could allow the use of nuclear weapons only "in response to aggression using WMD [weapons of mass destruction]" or if there is "aggression using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened."Responding to France's President Emmanuel Macron's February 6 statement that "no option should be discarded" in ensuring the defeat of Russia, including "troops on the ground" in Ukraine, Russia's President Vladimir Putin said that "we are ready to use any weapon, including [tactical nuclear weapons], when it comes to the existence of the Russian state and harm to our sovereignty and independence. Everything is spelt out in our strategy, we have not changed it."Macron replied that France is also a nuclear power. "We must first and foremost feel protected," Macron said, "because we are a nuclear power." He then added, "We are ready; we have a doctrine [for the use of nuclear weapons]."France is ready to send troops into Ukraine "to counter the Russian forces" and even to prepare for nuclear war. In a March 19 opinion piece in the French paper Le Monde, General Pierre Schill, Chief of the French Army Staff, declares that "nuclear deterrence safeguards France's vital interests." Reminding the world of France's "international responsibilities" and "interests" and "defense agreements," he says that "the French army is preparing for the toughest engagements, making this known and demonstrating it."But what do the French really mean by saying they are "preparing for the toughest engagement" and that Europe must be "ready" to have "troops on the ground" in Ukraine?Macron has said that NATO must not discard the option of "troops on the ground" to ensure that "Russia does not win." But win what? Does Macron want to ensure that Russia does not defeat Ukraine for Ukraine's sake, or does he mean that Russia should not win in Ukraine for the subsequent defense of Europe?Macron said that the time was coming "in our Europe where it will be appropriate not to be a coward" and that it is time for a "strategic leap." He pressed Germany to send their long-range Taurus missiles, reminding them that they once said, "'Never, never tanks; never, never planes; never, never long-range missiles'…. I remind you that two years ago, many around this table said: 'We will offer sleeping bags and helmets.'"When it came to the option of sending troops into Ukraine, Macron said that anyone who advocates "limits" on how the West helps Ukraine "chooses defeat." He insisted that "if the situation should deteriorate, we would be ready to make sure that Russia never wins that war." Europe must be "ready," he said, "to reach the means to achieve our objective, which is that Russia does not win."It sounded as if Macron was talking about Russian victory in Ukraine again when he considered the threshold for sending troops. "We're not in that situation today," he said, but "all these options are on the table." Following a March 7 meeting with parliamentary parties, Fabien Roussel, national secretary of the French Communist Party, reportedly said that "Macron referenced a scenario that could lead to intervention [of French troops]: the advancement of the front towards Odessa or Kiev." Macron's objective again seemed to solely be Ukraine when he said in a March 14 interview, "We are doing everything we can to help Ukraine defeat Russia, because I will say it very simply: there can be no lasting peace if there is no sovereignty, if there is no return to Ukraine's internationally recognized borders, including Crimea."But, against all these apparent narrow references to Ukraine, Macron's subsequent discussions of the threshold for troops sounded more as if they were about the defense of Europe than of Ukraine. He said that "war is back on our [i.e. Europe's] soil" and that Russia is "extending every day their threat of attacking us even more, and that we will have to live up to history and the courage that it requires."On March 14, Macron, again expressing his position that sending troops from NATO countries is an option that should not be discarded, said that "to have peace in Ukraine, we must not be weak." This time, he gave as his reason that Russia's invasion of Ukraine was "existential for our Europe and for France."He proceeded to say that "it wouldn't be us" who would trigger such a move and that France would not lead an offensive into Ukraine against Russia. "It would be Russia's sole choice and sole responsibility," he said. And then he added, "If war was to spread to Europe," it would "be weak, to decide today that we would not respond."But even if Macron means defending Europe from Russia, does he mean from an actual attack or simply a potential attack?With several of his aforementioned statements, Macron sounds like he means that Europe must be ready to defend against an actual attack from Russia after it defeats Ukraine. Yet elsewhere, Macron sounds like he is referring only to a potential attack, saying that Russia must not be victorious in Ukraine because that "would reduce Europe's credibility to zero" and would mean that "we have no security."Interpreting Macron's motives may be even more difficult than ascertaining his statements' bare meaning. Why would Macron express the previously inexpressible and risk crossing the red line of a third world war?It is of course impossible to know Macron's mind, so any analysis is speculative. But there are at least three possibilities.The first is that the intended target of his comments is not Russia at all, but the U.S. and Germany. With American war funding struggling against a congressional dam and Germany refusing to send Taurus long-range missiles, Macron may be trying to apply psychological pressure to his allies to send Ukraine more money and weapons assuming they would find that option more palatable than going even further and sending troops.The second is that the intended target of his comments is Russia. In this possibility, the goal is to create "strategic ambiguity." The purpose would be, as explained by one French diplomat, so that Russia, as it advances west in Ukraine, cannot rely on the assumption "that none of Ukraine's partner countries will ever be deployed" to Ukraine. The French newspaper Le Monde reports that "Macron's office explained that the aim is to restore the West's 'strategic ambiguity.' After the failure of the Ukrainian 2023 counter-offensive, the French president believes that promising tens of billions of euros in aid and delivering—delayed—military equipment to Kyiv is no longer enough. Especially if Putin is convinced that the West has permanently ruled out mobilizing its forces."The third possibility is that the intended target of his comments is Europe. Europe must prepare for the possibility of a Trump administration weakening its commitment to Europe and NATO. That would leave Europe with more responsibility for the defense of Ukraine and of itself. While Germany has been the economic leader of Europe, France has seen itself as the security leader.One diplomat told Le Monde that while Germany "is afraid of escalation…. France wants to give the impression that it isn't afraid." Macron "may have wanted to make it clear to Scholz that their two countries are not in the same league" as Macron positions France to be the security leader of Europe in a post-Biden Trump-led world. Macron has opened the door to the discussion of Western troops on the ground in Ukraine. With the risks that come with opening that door, it will be important for everyone to clarify both Macron's threshold and his motivation for sending troops to Ukraine.This piece has been republished with permission from The American Conservative.

The United States has cast a values veil over its multifaceted match of punishments and restrictions with China. When he dismisses Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a "dictator," the Cold War veteran is making a pointed value judgement that puts a moral spin on the relationship. According to many in Washington, there is a new "axis of evil" out there, and China is the fallen angel, supported by Russia, North Korea, and Iran.If global diplomacy was a morality play, there would surely be no actor more devoted to principles and the fight for good over evil than the Vatican, arguably the consummate values-driven state, despite its own cardinal sins in the human resources department. Of course, in the past, the Roman Catholic church has strayed from the straight and narrow and made soul-wrenching deals with the devil — consider Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, the juntas in Chile and Argentina, and the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. With China, the Holy See is not trying to drive the Communist "Satan" away or turn it into a paragon of religious freedom. The main mission has been to find ways to build trust and gain confidence. Religious affairs and China specialists have drawn parallels between the Vatican and the Chinese Communist Party in the way they are organized, function and exercise authority, leading some to consider the similarities a source of affinity if not mutual understanding. For example, the city-state's diplomatic efforts have remained consistent and persistent from one papal administration to the next, starting arguably with the progressive world-traveling Paul VI back in the 1970s and through the conservative reigns of John Paul II and Benedict XVI, to the liberal non-judgmental crowd-sourcing faith of Francis. Today, there may be no need to pray to Saint Jude for a papal visit to China. It could happen, although the incumbent shepherd, who requires a wheelchair to meet his flock, would seem physically unable to take on such a pilgrimage — there are some 20 cathedrals and basilicas in the mainland. In September, however, he came close, spending five days in neighboring Mongolia, which has only about 2,000 Catholics, compared to about 12 million in China. If, as many papal succession oddsmakers who try to divine the mysterious ways of the Holy Spirit believe, the next pope is from Asia, then hopes for a China trip will surge. And the momentum of goodwill and history could bring the bishop of the Eternal City to the Forbidden City.The Holy See's diplomatic agenda with China is less complicated than Washington's. The Vatican has simple objectives — to unify the Roman church so there is coherence in its management and in catechism and theology, and to protect Catholics everywhere so that they are free to worship in churches and practice their faith openly. The missionary work here is not as much of a priority, though in other parts of the world, the Church is battling to keep souls on pews and recruit priests.In 2018, the Vatican signed an agreement with Beijing on a process for appointing bishops in the patriotic Chinese church — the open part of the church that pays allegiance to the state. In the order of the mass in the patriotic church, the pope does get mentioned, along with the bishop of the diocese, while the state does not, exactly as is the practice in churches around the world. Catholics in China who are loyal to the pope have worshipped underground in secret, or at least discreet, locations. The Vatican-Beijing agreement on bishops, with the pope having the last word on Chinese-approved candidates, essentially recognizes the spiritual authority of the Holy Father, with the state nominally a regulator or monitor of religious affairs. The hopeful prayer is that if the selection process works smoothly, this would make it possible for underground Chinese Catholics to surface and eventually allow the Vatican to establish formal relations with Beijing. For now, the Holy See has diplomatic relations with and representation in Taiwan as the Republic of China, with a nunciature or embassy in Taipei. There has been no nuncio appointed since 1971; a chargé d'affaires is the highest-ranking resident official. Meanwhile, the Holy See maintains a "study mission" in Hong Kong — a de facto consulate — that is manned by a Vatican diplomat, typically a monsignor, or clergyman of stature.These diplomatic missions are by no means the only means of engagement. Two Chinese bishops, both of whom Pope Francis nominated from a list put forward by Beijing, participated in the October synod convened by the pope to discuss church issues and policy. After the Holy See complained that China had appointed a bishop earlier this year who had not received the papal imprimatur, no Chinese prelates were on the initial list of synod participants. But on the eve of the gathering, the two were included on the final roster. While they turned up, they left midway through the three-week conference. Francis has also reached out to Beijing in other ways. Hong Kong archbishop Stephen Chow, whom the pope recently made a cardinal, visited Beijing in the spring before receiving his red biretta. In November, the head of the Chinese Catholic church, Bishop Joseph Li Shan paid a return visit to Chow's archdiocese. When his plane entered Chinese airspace en route to Mongolia, Francis issued a message of greetings. "I ask Chinese Catholics to be good Christians and good citizens," he said days later to the congregation at a stadium mass in Ulaanbaatar, which Catholics from China and around the region attended. That same month, the Vatican sent its envoy on the Ukraine conflict to China. Cardinal Matteo Zuppi, who had been to Kyiv, Moscow and Washington prior to Beijing, was received by the special envoy for Eurasian affairs, the first-ever meeting in the Chinese capital between the Holy See and a senior Chinese official. This effort was reminiscent of the Holy See's behind-the-scenes efforts to reconcile the U.S. and Cuba. Contrary to its crusading past, the Vatican has been brokering peace among nations since even before the establishment of the city-state in 1929. It was involved in the negotiations to end both world wars and sought to mediate between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.China and the Vatican have engaged in high-level talks before. In 2020, at the Munich Security Conference, Archbishop Paul Gallagher, the Vatican secretary for relations with states, considered to be the Holy See's foreign minister, met Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi. The two discussed the agreement on bishops, which has been renewed twice despite disputes over certain appointments, increasing restrictions on religious freedom, and reports of the destruction of churches in parts of China. The pope, who, as his predecessors did, faces criticism, including from his own cardinals for engaging Beijing, acknowledged in a Reuters interview last year that the deal was "slow going," but stressed that the Church had to take a long view and that imperfect dialogue was better than nothing. The diplomacy lesson offered by the world's chief values-card player is that pragmatism, patience and consistency are the best tools for doing the godly work of peace and security building. With China, there will be setbacks to endure and sacrifices to make. A workable deal requires painstaking negotiation and may not be ironclad. But with faith and perseverance, an understanding can be reached — and eventually a miracle might happen.

La manumisión fue uno de los tantos caminos que le permitió a las personas esclavizadas, acceder a la libertad con o sin dinero de por medio. Esta práctica, heredada del sistema esclavista romano, estuvo presente en el continente americano al unísono con la esclavitud misma. Para una mejor comprensión, la manumisión la hemos dividido en dos momentos: manumisión notarial y manumisión republicana. La primera surge paralelamente con la esclavización, siendo su espacio natural la notaría. A ella acudían los esclavizados, los amos y los testigos para finiquitar la libertad, después de firmar un documento que se conoció como carta de libertad o de manumisión. En él, quedaron consignados todos los pormenores de la transacción. La segunda aparece como resultado de la independencia; de la participación de las personas esclavizadas en este proceso y de las promesas de libertad de Bolívar. El escenario de ella fueron las Juntas de Manumisión, organismos republicanos; que si bien no cumplieron a cabalidad con el objetivo para lo cual fueron creadas, se encargaron de administrar y otorgar las libertades. En el Caribe colombiano, en las dos formas que asumió la manumisión, fueron los esclavizados los protagonistas principales en la consecución de la libertad. La Constitución de Cartagena de 1812, fue la primera en legislar en Colombia en torno a la manumisión republicana. Fue allí en donde se inició el largo camino hacia la abolición que culminó el Io de enero de 1852. En este sentido, el Congreso y la Constitución de Cúcuta de 1821, se erigieron como el punto de quiebre del proceso de abolición, ya que aprobaron la Ley de Partos, que en contravía de los intereses de los esclavizados terminó avalando la extinción gradual de la esclavitud y no inmediata como lo había prometido Bolívar. Solo accederían a la libertad los hijos de las esclavizadas que nacieran a partir de esta fecha, pero después de trabajarles a los amos de sus madres 18 años, y con esto resarcir los gastos de su manutención. Durante estos 40 años la abolición se convirtió en uno de los problemas cruciales de la independencia y la postindependencia, que enfrentó no solo a los abolicionistas y antiabolicionistas, sino también a los recién aparecidos partidos Liberal y Conservador. Las contradicciones ideológicas y políticas en torno a la abolición que esgrimieron los sectores enfrentados, se saldaron cuando el Estado les garantizó el pago o indemnización por los esclavos a liberar. Sin lugar a dudas, todos estos contrapunteos estuvieron influenciados por fenómenos externos tales como la Revolución Francesa, la Independencia de E.U., el Movimiento Juntero, Las Cortes de Cádiz y la ofensiva abolicionista inglesa.Además, es menester señalar que la decisión final de aprobar la abolición absoluta, estuvo mediada por el ascenso al poder del recientemente formado partido Liberal que lideró las aspiraciones de la elite de modernizar al país, e introducir los cambios que permitieran superar el atraso, y romper definitivamente con algunas prácticas heredadas de España. Para conseguir este objetivo, los liberales hicieron realidad una serie de reformas, conocidas en su momento como Revolución de Medio Siglo, entre las que sobresalió la abolición de la esclavitud que finalmente fue aprobada el 21 de mayo de 1851. Paralelamente a esta abolición jurídica o parlamentaria, hubo otra de carácter marginal que, manipulada por las personas esclavizadas, condujeron a la libertad, y que en la larga duración contribuyeron significativamente con la destrucción definitiva de la esclavitud. Entre ellas podemos mencionar algunas como la presión jurídica, la denuncia del amo para conseguir la libertad o mejor trato, la autocompra de la libertad, el "buen" comportamiento y el ahorro para comprar la libertad, entre otros. A todas las anteriores hay que agregarle la de mayor espectacularidad: el cimarronaje. A esta vía alternativa para acceder a la libertad la hemos tipificado como abolicionismo negro o abolición desde abajo. Es preciso aclarar que con la entrada en vigencia de la Ley de abolición, no terminaron los problemas para los antiguos esclavizados, esencialmente por la negativa de los antiguos amos a perder los privilegios y ventajas que les ofreció la esclavitud. Por ello le pusieron trabas al pago de las indemnizaciones, se opusieron a liberar a los jóvenes esclavizados menores de 18 años, le negaron los derechos políticos y la nacionalidad a los exclavizados y finalmente acuñaron el concepto de "individuos emancipados", para recordarle a los antiguos esclavos el estigma que pendía sobre ellos por no ser personas libres de nacimiento, sino libertos. ; The manumission was one of the ways that let slaves access to freedom with or without economical support. This practice was inherited from the roman slavery system and was present in the whole American continent. For a better understanding, the manumission has been divided in two stages: Notarial and republican. The first one emerges from the slavery itsef and was used by slaves, owners and witnesses to agree on freedom by signing a freedom or manumission letter that includes all the specific details of the agreement. The second one was born as the result of independence; from the participation of all slaves involved in this process and Bolivar's promises of freedom. It was developed in the manumission meetings, republican organizations that administered and gave freedom despite the fact of not achieving the main objective of their creation. In the Colombian Caribbean, the two ways that manumission was in charge of, were the slaves as main characters of the freedom process. 1812 Cartagena's constitution was the first one to consider republican manumission. 11 was the starting point of the end of slavery that was granted in January 1st 1852. In this way, the congress and 1821 Cucuta's constitution played an essential role in the abolition process by approving The Birth Law that gradually contributed to the freedom process instead of obtaining it immediately as Bolivar thought. Newborns would get their freedom if they were born after this date but only after have worked during 18 years for their mothers' owners to pay for their expenses. During these 40 years, the abolition turned into one of the most relevant problems for independence and post-independence that not only faced the abolitionists and their detractors but also the new political parties Liberal and conservatives. The ideological and political contradictions about abolition finished when the government guaranteed payment for the slaves that were about to be free. All these facts were clearly influenced by the French revolution, The United states independency, The Movimiento Juntero, The Cortes of Cadiz and The abolitionist English offensive. Furthermore, it is important to mention that the final decision of approving absolute abolition, was supported by the increasing power of the new liberal political party that wanted to change some old regulations directly related to Spain. In order to achieve this goal, the liberals developed some important reformations known as the Half century revolution which brought the slavery abolition approved in May 21st 1851. In pararell of this legal abolition, there was another one leaded by slaves that contributed to freedom and in long term to obtained the total destruction of slavery. Some examples of it were the juridical pressure, the legal complaints against the owner, self purchase of freedom, among others. It is necessary to exalt the most important of all: The Cimarronaje: understood as the complete abolition of slavery. It is important to clarify that within the new law of abolition, problems did not finish for old slaves, mainly because their owners did not want to lose all the benefits slavery gave them. For this reason they did not agree on freeing under 18 slaves, they denied political rights to their slaves and finally categorized them into non free people.

*Bayartsengel Damdinjav, Chuck Davis, Steven Jones, Zach Long, Claudia Risner, Sydney Sheppard, Christina Slentz Climate change is the global challenge of the twenty-first century, a threat that carries dire environmental, social, security, and economic implications for every region of the world. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the primary driver of climate change is the increase in greenhouse gas emissions attributed to human activities. Although climate change must be met with a comprehensive global response in order to effectively address the effects of harmful greenhouse gases (GHG), these efforts depend on the actions taking place within nations. The United States, the greatest per-capita emitter of GHG, and China, that produces the largest amount of GHG overall, bear a good deal of responsibility for the problem. The United States, in particular, with its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and its inability to craft a viable climate change agenda, has failed to offer the leadership needed to secure meaningful reductions in GHG. This essay seeks to establish perspective by profiling the political, social, and economic circumstances within six nations (three advanced industrial countries and three newly modernizing countries) and the European Union (EU) in order to better understand the dynamics involved in achieving a global solution to climate change.Case Studies1.- European UnionThe European Union has led the push for climate change regulationsto curb emissions 30% by 2030 and 80%-95% by 2050. To reach that goal, it has invested significant funds targetting 20% of the EU budget from 2014-2020 towards climate related measures. The EU believes that climate change policies will not only preserve the planet for generations to come but will also create greater long-term health and economic benefits. This position can be attributed to the lack of politicization of climate change in the EU allowing politicians to advocate forward thinking policies without the constant fear of political or electoral retribution. Furthermore, the close proximity of EU member states and their relatively small size creates an "all in this together" mentality allowing them to harness their resources to compete with larger world powers.2.- United KingdomWidely acknowledged as one of the foremost countries addressing climate change, the United Kingdom moved definitively to establish a science-based framework for approaching this global phenomenon even prior to the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. This de-politicizing effort is revealed in the staunch support of conservatives like Margaret Thatcher, whose instrumental leadership set this critical tone and aided in the formation of the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1990, and Tony Blair, who seized his 2005 G-8 presidential term as an opportunity to promote the reduction of GHG through mitigation technologies, sustainable energy, and adaptation strategies. The UK has fostered domestic integration of climate and energy policies to reduce ill effects at home as well as international cooperation in the form of a post-Kyoto strategy and the ongoing European Union's Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), designed to blend climate change collaborative goals of equity distribution and cost effectiveness.3.- CanadaCanada's efforts to address climate change can be best described as leaping forward, stepping back and, finally, standing in place. An original early proponent for mitigation since 1975, under the Chrétien administration in the 1990s, the country committed to relatively aggressive reductions - - a 30% decrease over projected 2010 emissions - - as part of the Kyoto Protocol. However, a clear implementation plan proved elusive until 2005, at which time "Project Green" successfully established meaningful initiatives. Although temporarily rolled back the following year under the more business-friendly Harper administration, a brief surge in climate change public awareness subsequently forced the return of some mitigation initiatives. Currently, climate change policy stagnation is largely explained by prioritizing economic growth over environmental concernsparticularly in the wake of the 2008 Credit Crisis.It is further complicated by Canada's neighbor to the south - - the administration of President Barack Obama who supports addressing GHG emissions and a clean energy future.4.- AustraliaAustralia's international position on climate change reflects its domestic policy agenda. For the first 10-years of the Kyoto Protocol, 1997-2007, Australia was a climate change laggard based on both its refusal to ratify the agreement and its largely symbolic GHG reduction policies. In 2007, Australia ratified the Protocol and implemented stringent abatement policies but is now reversing course. What caused the shifts Down Under? Two domestic factors, electoral interests and political leadership, are most influential. Compared to economic growth, voters' prioritization of environmental issues rose until 2007 and then declined. The political leadership within the Coalition government (1996-2007, reelected in 2013) favors business and the fossil fuel industry, and is skeptical of climate change. This stands in contrast to the Labor Party (2007-2013) that favors GHG emissions reductions. So, although Australia has committed internationally to a 5% reduction of 2000 level emissions by 2020, it still lacks a consistent domestic policy to achieve this goal. Russia Russia experienced massive industrial decline in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. Despite the fact that there has been a significant reduction of GHG emissions, Russia still ranks third on the list of the largest greenhouse gas emitters in the world. Problems caused by climate change in recent decades include public health risks, increased recurrence, intensity and duration of droughts in some regions, extreme precipitation patterns, floods, and over-moisturized soil and permafrost degradation in the northern regions. However, the climate change issue does not constitute a priority for Russian authorities. Several internal factors, such as a well-rooted skepticism within the Russian scientific community towards anthropogenic global warming, low environmental awareness among Russian citizens, and the priority given to the country's economic restoration, suggests that Russian climate policy is to a great extent being driven by the pursuit of benefits in areas other than that of environmental policy.ChinaOne of the best ways to summarize China's approach to climate change is via a domestic politics model. Decisionmakers involved in China's climate change policy belong to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and there is little or no foreign influence over them. Among these decision makers, the most influential have managed to frame the issue as one of sovereignty and economic development. These hardliners see climate change as an issue that threatens China's sovereignty and its right to develop economically. As such, it has taken a stance of not joining any multilateral agreement until the U.S. does so. Thus, China's right to develop economically is assured. Domestically, China has made progress developing solar and wind technology for domestic use and for foreign markets. However, it continues to use fossil fuels, especially coal,to ensure that it develops along the lines deemed acceptable to the CCP.IndiaIndia's position on climate change is guided by two priorities - - namely, sustainable development and the elimination of poverty. With a growing economy that demands more energy for growth, there are hundreds of millions of people without access to electricity in India. Energy use and consequently greenhouse gas emissions will grow substantially in the coming decades. As a modernizing country, India is not bound to any GHG emission reduction goals under the Kyoto Protocol. However, it has established a National Action Plan on Climate Change and implemented a combination of mitigation and adaptation policies to reduce the country's contributions to climate change. These policies include energy conservation, promotion of renewable energy, abatement of air pollution among others. While India's development will require growth in energy use, the country must work to reduce the energy intensity of its production processes.Comparative AnalysisOn the basis of political, economic and social factors, a comparative analysis of the case studies reveals three key groupings: supporters of international climate change policy that involves implementing significant carbon mitigation reduction requirements; fickle hesitators who, if cooperative, face major reduction requirements; and unburdened supporters who face little-to-no mitigation requirements. The EU and the UK, as a climate change leader, fall into the first category, politically defined as highly democratic and economically and regionally integrated. The EU and the UK have softened views on sovereignty, have historically utilized the market for political/social ends, and normatively seek international cooperation as a means of reducing risk.For Canada and Australia,reduced support for international action on climate change is largely based on modern era socio-political attitudes and a perceived threat to their economic viability. Stemming from strong political views on state sovereignty, they are historically less likely to cooperate on international initiatives and, unlike the economically integrated EU and UK, are not willing to constrain markets in the name of political or social ends. These nations traditionally prefer individualistic as opposed to collective responses to major issues and consequently see cooperative action as risky.The newly modernizing countries of China, India and Russia exhibit different degrees of democracy and are not economically integrated nor fully industrialized. While highly centralized political authority is helpful in making international level commitments, enforcement capacity is hindered domestically. Willingness to cooperate is generally conditional upon gaining financial assistance and technical support needed for development. For China and Russia, the first priority is maintaining state authority and social well-being for the sake of stability. Environmental policy is put forward only when these priorities are not threatened. For India, the focus centers on lifting its population out of poverty that takes precedence over international climate change cooperation.ConclusionOverall, countries willing to cooperate internationally and make sacrifices to mitigate the causes of climate change perceive a lower economic and political threat for doing so than countries that refuse. In fact, the supporters of international climate change policy are more likely to view global warming as an all-encompassing economic, political, and social threat rather than as a discrete environmental threat. Having said this, they also see potential opportunities in assuming the role of early adaptors to climate change.Countries reluctant to support international cooperation face domestic political barriers that the comparative analysis above indicates is due primarily to economic perceptions and viability. Some countries that have rejected a commitment to international cooperation have, in fact, implemented national or sub-state abatement policies. At the same time, others ignore the threat entirely.In short, differences in behavior toward climate change indicates that not all countries perceive the threat the same. The task for climate change leaders, therefore, is to maintain their resolve to educate global populations such that perceptions of economic risk become less significant than perceptions of climate change risk. At the same time, they must offer best practices of reducing compliance costs and sharing knowledgeto build a clean energy agenda in order to ensure a sustainable global solution to climate change. *Students in the Graduate Program in International StudiesOld Dominion University, USAUnder the Direction of Professor Glen Sussman

Dottorato di ricerca in Storia d'Europa: Società, politica e istituzioni(XIX-XX Secolo) ; Una curiosa espressione di Jacques Delors, più volte utilizzata nel corso della sua carriera, definì le istituzioni comunitarie come un "O.P.N.I., oggetto politico non identificato". L'affermazione di Delors appare come un compromesso tra l'interesse a tutela dei diritti degli Stati e la necessità di attribuire al processo di integrazione europea istituzioni stabili e soprattutto autonome. In realtà, i caratteri di profonda instabilità mostrati dal modello di Comunità ne fecero scaturire due orientamenti interpretativi differenti. Il primo considerò il raggiungimento dell'obiettivo prefissato nella realizzazione di una unione politica; come sostiene Riccardo Perissich, "Ai limitati trasferimenti di sovranità già decisi, altri ne sarebbero seguiti, anche se sempre in modo graduale. Coerentemente con questo approccio, le istituzioni avrebbero dovuto evolvere verso un modello classico. La Commissione si sarebbe trasformata in un esecutivo federale; il Consiglio dei ministri in un "Senato degli Stati"; l'Assemblea parlamentare in un vero Parlamento federale"1. Il secondo orientamento si basò sull'idea che il principio di sovranità non potesse essere frammentato e che il conferimento di potere previsto dai Trattati fosse più di carattere tecnico che politico. Questa seconda interpretazione aumentò i dubbi e la diffidenza nei confronti della Commissione e ancor più del Parlamento. C'è da dire inoltre, che gli Stati firmatari dei Trattati si riconobbero più nella prima lettura del modello, con un necessario distinguo per la Francia che, all'epoca dell'entrata in vigore era presieduta dal generale Charles De Gaulle, fortemente contrario, come noto, all'idea di una qualsiasi minima cessione di potere a livello sovranazionale. A seguito della fusione di CECA, CEE ed EURATOM una sola Commissione unificò l'apparato amministrativo mentre al Parlamento europeo venne assegnato unicamente il compito di esercitare il potere in materia di bilancio, oltre ad una funzione meramente consultiva; l'elezione diretta del Parlamento fu contemplata nell'articolo n.138 del Trattato istitutivo della Comunità europea nel quale, oltre ad essere indicato il sistema di elezione dei parlamentari europei delegati come provvisorio, 1R. Perissich, L'Unione Europea una storia non ufficiale, Milano, Longanesi, 2008, p.54. venne previsto che il Parlamento avrebbe elaborato progetti volti alla realizzazione di una procedura di elezione uniforme per tutti gli Stati membri. Di fatto, negli anni che intercorsero tra il 1951 e il 1976, furono presentate numerose proposte orientate all'istituzione della procedura di elezione a suffragio universale diretto che, dopo molte difficoltà, trovarono soltanto nel 1979 la loro attuazione; questo risultato rappresentò l'inizio di una nuova era in cui l'importanza della comunicazione politico-istituzionale giocò un ruolo fondamentale per creare il necessario contatto con i cittadini, in previsione della loro partecipazione al voto europeo. Ricordiamo come nel 1974, al vertice francese presieduto da Valéry Giscard D'Estaing, venne adottata la decisione di istituire il Consiglio europeo e l'elezione diretta del Parlamento. L'evento avrebbe esercitato una notevole influenza nella dinamica istituzionale europea; nonostante il suo assetto di Assemblea diversa da quelle nazionali, il Parlamento europeo direttamente eletto avrebbe preteso un aumento della propria influenza politica così come del proprio peso istituzionale. Attraverso le elezioni, i cittadini europei avrebbero potuto accrescere progressivamente il loro interesse nei confronti dei temi comunitari riuscendo a percepire meglio l'esistenza di un'istituzione fino ad allora poco conosciuta. Su questo aspetto federalisti e "gradualisti" si collocarono su posizioni discordanti, in quanto i primi da sempre consideravano il Parlamento eletto come "Congresso del popolo europeo" e quindi come il potere costituente della futura Federazione europea. Personalità di spicco sui singoli piani nazionali, costantemente impegnate nella causa dell'integrazione europea (solo per citare alcuni nomi si ricordano Altiero Spinelli, Simone Veil, Helmut Kohl, Jacques Chirac), oltre ad esponenti politici ed intellettuali che interpretarono un ruolo di forte influenza all'interno dei loro partiti riguardo alla scelta europeista (per l'Italia ricordiamo Giorgio Amendola, Enrico Berlinguer, Mauro Ferri, Gaetano Arfè), si impegnarono con l'intento di legittimarne il ruolo rispetto alle altre istituzioni, in particolar modo la Commissione. I parlamentari eletti nel primo suffragio universale diretto si trovarono quindi ad affrontare temi che andavano dalla questione dei paesi comunisti ai rapporti con il Terzo mondo, alla progettazione di una televisione europea fino alla necessità di redigere una prima bozza di Costituzione europea. Il ricorso alle candidature di personalità politiche ben note all'opinione pubblica quali Enrico Berlinguer, Simone Veil, Willy Brandt, si pensò potesse offrire un maggiore potenziale all'organizzazione della propaganda. La campagna elettorale del giugno 1979, così come le altre due successive, fu tuttavia caratterizzata, soprattutto in Italia e Francia, da argomenti troppo spesso collegati alla dialettica politica della propria nazione. In ogni caso l'informazione data ai cittadini europei fu in grado di suscitare un inevitabile interessamento ai problemi comunitari, ma soprattutto alla realtà sovranazionale. L'affluenza al voto fu comunque inferiore rispetto alle elezioni nazionali. Nei motivi della scarsa partecipazione al voto, oltre l'assenza di dibattito propriamente europeo vi fu anche il fatto che le strategie dei partiti tesero ad una sorta di strumentalizzazione delle elezioni europee, puntando attraverso le campagne elettorali al perseguimento di obiettivi nazionali. Il primo scrutinio diretto fu in grado comunque di dare una ventata di novità al concetto di democrazia europea. La nuova legittimità consentì al Parlamento di consolidare nel tempo i propri poteri e di interpretare un ruolo all'interno del processo decisionale comunitario che all'epoca poteva dirsi quanto meno "nebuloso". Una volta fissato il periodo di svolgimento delle prime elezioni, le forze politiche nazionali dovettero sostenere una sfida che le avrebbe costrette a rimettersi in gioco, cercando di rinnovare gli argomenti e i temi individuati per le campagne elettorali nazionali. Una maggiore consapevolezza riguardo alla necessità di allargare l'orizzonte, senza trascurare tuttavia il contatto con i propri elettori e cercando le possibili somiglianze con gli altri partiti europei, avrebbe consentito di conciliare la propria ideologia in un contesto più ampio. Occorre tener presente come tra il 1975 e il 1979 si fossero create all'interno dell'Assemblea parlamentare non eletta, formazioni politiche rappresentative di partiti accomunati da un orientamento affine a quello nazionale. La diversità di ideologie, tuttavia rendeva queste coalizioni molto deboli, soprattutto per via della tanto difficile integrazione ostacolata dalla predominanza degli interessi nazionali anteposti a quelli comunitari. La primazia dei partiti nazionali ha sempre costituito un ostacolo all'autonomia di azione dei gruppi e delle federazioni lasciando, fino ad oggi, inattuata la costituzione di veri e propri partiti europei. All'indomani del primo suffragio universale diretto, tuttavia, il nuovo parlamentare europeo avrebbe assunto il ruolo di trait d'union tra il proprio elettorato, il proprio partito, la coalizione europea e il Parlamento stesso. I tratti caratterizzanti il percorso politico-istituzionale del Parlamento europeo sono stati oggetto di approfondimento nello studio dei casi relativi ai tre Paesi considerati rivelando le differenze che, per la natura stessa del ruolo giocato nel contesto sovranazionale, non hanno risparmiato il processo di integrazione e, nel caso specifico, la partecipazione alle elezioni dirette del Parlamento. Accomunando Italia e Francia, paesi fondatori della Comunità europea che si dimostrarono troppo intenti a trattare temi nazionali durante le campagne elettorali, nel Regno Unito l'idea di Europa si coniugò con la costante valutazione di tutti gli elementi che sarebbero risultati convenienti per partecipare, senza che tutto ciò costringesse a modificare o rinunciare a quanto già in possesso, atteggiamento che trovò nella linea di governo di Margaret Thatcher una perfetta interpretazione durata per l'intero decennio esaminato. Se per il primo suffragio universale diretto l'attività maggiore fu quella di approntare nuovi metodi organizzativi per le campagne elettorali, adatti alla ricerca di un consenso più ampio, diretto a legittimare l'istituzione sovranazionale, nella seconda e terza tornata le riflessioni delle forze politiche si resero necessarie per cercare di individuare le cause del progressivo calo partecipativo. I difetti di una comunicazione politica spesso basata su issues nazionali, soprattutto riguardo la Francia, ha di sicuro rappresentato una delle possibili cause, ma l'atteggiamento stesso dei partiti, apparso frequentemente poco incline a credere seriamente nell'importanza delle elezioni, ha lasciato percepire incertezza ai cittadini europei. Per altro verso, anche le campagne elettorali comunitarie, sebbene abbiano investito molte risorse per cercare di catturare il consenso dell'opinione pubblica, hanno mostrato la parziale efficienza dei mezzi messi in atto. Elezioni di second'ordine quindi? E' possibile parlarne ancora in questi termini? Da quanto emerso nel corso della ricerca condotta sul versante storico-politologico, il livello delle elezioni europee non risulta affatto secondario. Il dato partecipativo, anzi è inversamente proporzionale alla quantità di lavoro preparatorio sia dal punto di vista politico che amministravo-istituzionale, ben superiore a qualsiasi suffragio nazionale. Ci si chiede allora perché gli elettori non abbiano risposto con altrettanto entusiasmo. Qui le risposte trovano differenti possibilità da tenere nella giusta considerazione: la poca attenzione ai temi comunitari, la qualità della comunicazione, l'errore di propagandare l'evento troppo a ridosso delle date di svolgimento, l'eccessiva distanza tra istituzioni e cittadini, il livello culturale degli elettori, i giorni della settimana individuati per i suffragi spesso troppo vicini ad elezioni nazionali appena svolte, la classe politica poco convinta. In realtà tutti questi fattori rappresentano concause della scarsa partecipazione. Il cittadino europeo in mezzo a questo guazzabuglio è il personaggio principale di una performance in cui lui stesso determina la riuscita. Nonostante i numeri evidenzino una progressiva flessione nei dieci anni esaminati, i cittadini non sono rimasti indifferenti di fronte alle novità introdotte dal processo di integrazione europea. Spesso, soprattutto durante i sondaggi, accanto ad una percentuale di "indifferenti" o "euroscettici", molti intervistati hanno lamentato la poca autorità del Parlamento europeo nel contesto istituzionale comunitario2 confidando in ulteriori progressi strutturali. Il mancato raggiungimento di questo obiettivo, preannunciato già prima del 1979, insieme alle vicende politiche legate al proprio Paese, ha gradualmente provocato negli elettori reazioni di protesta attraverso il non voto o il voto negativo3, comportamenti capaci di delineare una partecipazione differente rispetto alla decisione di esprimere la propria scelta. Questo tipo di elettore ha mostrato di essere stato raggiunto dall'informazione diffusa durante le campagne elettorali e, sulla base di quanto appreso, ha deciso consapevolmente di non votare o di esercitare un voto diverso annullando o votando scheda bianca; quindi si è recato ai seggi, 2 Si vedano a questo proposito i risultati emersi nella pubblicazione della Commissione delle Comunità europee, Eurobarometro – L'opinione pubblica nella Comunità europea, Vol.1, 32/89, Direzione generale Informazione, comunicazione e cultura, Bruxelles, 1989. 3 Cfr. A. Gianturco Gulisano, La fenomenologia del non voto, in R. De Mucci (a cura di), Election day. Votare tutti e tutto assieme fa bene alla democrazia?, cit. non è rimasto inerte disinteressandosi di quanto stava accadendo. L'auspicio di un consolidamento istituzionale del Parlamento e di una maggiore coesione politica della Comunità europea non ancora raggiunti, anche per responsabilità delle politiche nazionali, ha posto l'elettore in condizione di negare il proprio contributo o protestare verso il mancato conseguimento dei risultati. L'accrescimento della conoscenza e del coinvolgimento, sebbene presenti, non sono andati di pari passo con la partecipazione. Elementi di insoddisfazione hanno caratterizzato il comportamento dell'elettore realmente europeista. I cittadini europei possono in realtà collocarsi in tre macro aree nelle quali si ritrovano gli europeisti, gli euro avversi e gli euroscettici. Se le aspettative degli europeisti sono rimaste deluse, gli euroavversi hanno parzialmente esercitato il diritto di voto alimentando quelle liste comunque presenti nella competizione europea. Gli euroscettici, invece hanno rappresentato il punto nevralgico dell'elettorato. Trovandosi in quella parte di popolazione attenta ad osservare quali e quanti cambiamenti sarebbero avvenuti a partire dal 1979 hanno avuto modo di consolidare la loro posizione continuando a percepire la Comunità ancora lontana e prevalentemente scomoda se non inutile. A differenza dell'europeista deluso che comunque ha continuato a partecipare, magari protestando, e dell'euroavverso che ha espresso il suo disappunto preferendo i partiti antieuropeisti, l'euroscettico ha proseguito nell'osservazione, affiancandosi agli incerti che sono rimasti a casa. A questo punto sono apparse inevitabili ulteriori valutazioni verso quegli elementi che caratterizzano le elezioni in genere. Ciò che attrae il cittadino ai seggi elettorali è prevalentemente il peso che le elezioni possono esercitare sui cambiamenti del governo nel proprio Paese. Il "less at stake" delle elezioni europee ha rappresentato sicuramente uno dei motivi scatenanti i sentimenti appena descritti; lo scenario si profila diverso, In such 'marker-setting' elections, voters have an incentive to behave tactically, but in a sense of the word 'tactical' that is quite different from what we see in National elections, where large parties are advantaged by their size. In a markersetting election the tactical situation is instead characterized by an apparent lack of consequences for the allocation of power, on the one hand, and by the attentiveness of politicians and media, on the other4. La mancanza di conseguenze sul livello nazionale garantita dalle elezioni europee ha "alleggerito" l'elettore della responsabilità di orientare con la propria scelta il corso della politica nazionale. Sebbene nel 1979 vi fu un'attività partitica a livello transnazionale, consentita anche dalla disponibilità di fondi in quel periodo, l'attenzione dell'elettorato fu minima. In termini di risultati transnazionali la percezione fu praticamente irrilevante; circa il cinquanta per cento dei votanti ammise di non aver idea di quali gruppi avessero ottenuto maggiori consensi. Altro aspetto da non sottovalutare si collega allo sproporzionato successo ottenuto dai partiti più piccoli rispetto ai grandi; è in questo caso che si può parlare di voto punitivo nei confronti della politica del governo nazionale. Molte le sfaccettature e tutte fondamentali per riuscire a capire il perché delle differenze comportamentali dell'elettorato, differenze che nei tre Paesi oggetto di studio si sono rivelate estremamente rappresentate. In linea con la tradizione, gli elettori dell'Italia e della Francia hanno mostrato una partecipazione considerevole, evidentemente legata alle vicende che hanno caratterizzato il dibattito politico nazionale negli anni 1979 – 1989. Il voto "pseudo-obbligatorio" dell'Italia ha mantenuto alta la percentuale dei votanti, ma i risultati hanno mostrato orientamenti variabili nelle tre tornate esaminate. Il caso francese ha mostrato una escalation della destra attraverso i consensi ottenuti dal Front National in risposta ad un importante declino del Partito comunista, anche in considerazione di una progressiva dispersione di voti dovuta alla presenza di numerose liste, in particolar modo nel 1989. Il caso anglosassone si colloca in una posizione particolare rispetto agli altri due Paesi, ma sarebbe più giusto dire rispetto a tutti gli altri. A fronte di un orientamento nazionale tendenzialmente contrario alla Comunità europea, fra le ideologie maggiormente rappresentative si è distinto un Partito conservatore desideroso di giocare un ruolo importante nel contesto europeo, consapevole quindi del significato che la competizione europea 4 C. Van der Eijk, M. Franklin, M. Marsh, What voters teach us about Europe-Wide Elections: what Europe-Wide Elections teach us about voters, in "Electoral Studies", vol. 15, n. 2, p. 157. avrebbe potuto assumere per la riuscita dell'intento. L'importanza del suffragio sovranazionale non fu invece immediatamente compresa dai Laburisti, che di fatto ottennero una pesante sconfitta nel corso del primo appuntamento con lo scrutinio europeo, ravvedendosi in seguito e riuscendo a superare i Conservatori anche grazie all'inizio del declino del governo Thatcher. Un elemento che ha accomunato tutti i Paesi della Comunità è stato rappresentato dalla progressiva affermazione dei Verdi. Lo studio effettuato attraverso una costante attenzione al dibattito politico di ciascun Paese, insieme alle strategie attuate dagli attori, consapevoli fin dall'inizio che la sfida europea li avrebbe impegnati non più o meno di quella nazionale, ma sicuramente in modo diverso, ha condotto ad un approfondimento verso il singolo cittadino che assumendo in sé il ruolo di attore principale ne ha determinato gli esiti. Le risultanze dei dati emersi dalle consultazioni avvenute negli anni 1979 – 1989 non possono considerarsi soltanto per il puro dato numerico. La molteplicità dei fattori che hanno influito sulla scelta di votare o meno ha mostrato un elettore che, pur appartenendo a paesi diversi e con differenti livelli culturali, è stato in grado di decidere basandosi su considerazioni affatto superficiali, operando un'attenta scelta dei numerosi elementi che avrebbero potuto favorire il rafforzamento politico-istituzionale europeo: una tacita selezione dell'elettorato, che inevitabilmente ha lasciato fuori tutti coloro che non hanno ritenuto importante impegnarsi per una consultazione ritenuta priva di un qualsiasi tornaconto. Classe politica poco convinta, informazione discutibile, scarsa conoscenza da parte dei cittadini riguardo al ruolo del Parlamento europeo, inefficacia della comunicazione, hanno contribuito a costruire un elettore diverso dal solito, più attento, in possesso di maggiore senso critico nei confronti di uno scenario nuovo e molto più complesso rispetto a quello nazionale5. Dalla pluralità di elementi emersi durante la ricerca attraverso il ricorso all'interdisciplinarietà per cercare di comprenderne maggiormente i significati, sono emersi dettagli che hanno stimolato ad ulteriori approfondimenti. 5 Cfr. Commissione delle Comunità europee, Eurobarometro – L'opinione pubblica e l'Europa, 9/89, Direzione generale Informazione, comunicazione e cultura, Bruxelles, 1989. Successivamente alle considerazioni storico – politiche , ciò che si è voluto sottolineare, attraverso l'analisi sociologica, riguardo alle elezioni europee nel loro complesso e nella loro perpetua considerazione di elezioni secondarie, è che tutti i fattori esaminati ne mostrano un'immagine differente, che non vuole assolutamente porsi in contrasto con l'interpretazione dei dati puri, ma vuole indurre a considerare maggiormente i numerosi fattori, che per la qualità e la quantità riscontrata permettono di ottenere un quadro più completo dei fatti, andando oltre al mero dato partecipativo sul quale, indubbiamente, la differenza con la partecipazione nazionale è di tutta evidenza. L'esame approfondito è apparso ancor più necessario alla luce del tortuoso processo di costruzione europea e del macchinoso assetto istituzionale comunitario, al fine di poter tenere nella giusta considerazione il maggior numero di elementi possibile, non tanto per giustificare i risultati, ma quanto, piuttosto, per riflettere su di essi cercando di distribuire una responsabilità policentrica a partire dalle forze politiche per finire al cittadino stesso. ; Jacques Delors used to talk about European institutions as an O.P.N.I Object Politique Non Identifié. His opinion appears a compromise between his interest to protect National rights and the need to give lasting and autonomous governance to the European integration process. Actually from the European Community model, two different ways of thinking the governance derived both influenced by the instability of the model itself. The first one aimed at a political union; as Riccardo Perissich says: "Ai limitati trasferimenti di sovranità già decisi, altri ne sarebbero seguiti, anche se sempre in modo graduale. Coerentemente con questo approccio, le istituzioni avrebbero dovuto evolvere verso un modello classico. La Commissione si sarebbe trasformata in un esecutivo federale; il Consiglio dei ministri in un "Senato degli Stati"; l'Assemblea parlamentare in un vero Parlamento federale"6. The second one tried not to neglect the sovereignty principle by transferring technical and political power according to the Treaties. This second view increased doubts and mistrust towards the European Parliament and Commission as well. European Member States agreed above all with the first view, except for the France of Charles De Gaulle who was still convinced of his idea of not giving power to supranational level. Following the unification between ECSC, EEC and EAEC there was a single Commission for the whole administrative system while the Parliament had competence on the European budget; direct election to European Parliament was referred to as "temporary" in Article 138 of the European Community Treaty; then the Parliament would plan the way for a single procedure election regarding all Member States. Between 1951 and 1976 there were many proposals to define a direct universal suffrage, but only in 1979 this target was achieved. This result meant a significant change also for the polical and institutional 6R. Perissich, L'Unione Europea una storia non ufficiale, Milano, Longanesi, 2008, p.54. communication that became fundamental to reach citizenship during the election campaign. In 1974, during the French summit chaired by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, were both established the European Council and the direct election of the European Parliament. The European Parliament finally elected by European citizens would require an increase in both political and institutional influence. The direct elections would enhance popular interest in European affairs as well as raise people's awareness of the Parliament itself. This last aspect emphasized the differences between the federalist and the "gradualist" trend. The first one considered the direct elected Parliament as a "Congress of European People", that is to say the constituent power of the future European Federation. Many famous people were constantly engaged in the European integration cause as politicians and intellectuals did by committing themselves to legitimizing the role of the European Parliament in relation to other institutions, particularly the European Commission. Reference can be made to Altiero Spinelli, Enrico Berlinguer, Simone Veil, Helmut Kohl, Jacques Chirac, just to mention some of them. Members of the European Parliament (MEP's) began their job by addressing many issues such as the question of communist nations or planning for a European TV or preparing a draft for the European Constitution. Appointing political celebrities such as Enrico Berlinguer, Simone Veil, Willy Brandt was a way to make the propaganda more effective. The 1979 election campaign as well as the other two following ones was, however, characterized by arguments too often associated with the national political discourse. All the information given to European citizens succeeded in generating interest in supranational reality above all. The turnout was lower than in national elections and the reason has to be found in the behaviour of political parties in discussing mostly national issues aiming at national targets. In spite of this, the first direct election to the European Parliament gave a breath of fresh air to the meaning of European democracy. The newly acquired legitimacy gave the European Parliament the opportunity to consolidate its power by acting a definite role inside the European decisional process that was, at that time, nebulous to say the least. Once the electoral date was scheduled all the national political parties had to face a challenge that forced them to renew their themes and topics previously chosen in national campaign. There was greater awareness of the necessity to broaden the horizon without loosing contact with voters by looking for similarities in other European political parties. This is what would allow single ideologies to merge in a wider context. We must to consider that between 1975 – 1979 inside the European Parliament there were representatives of parties sharing outlooks similar to the national ones, but different ways of thinking made these coalitions too weak, above all because of the predominant national interests. The primacy of national parties has always been an obstacle to the autonomy of groups and federations, neglecting the implementation of European parties. After the first direct European elections the new MEP's were a kind of "trait d'union" with their own electorates, their own party, the European coalition and the Parliament as well. The peculiar features of the political-institutional path of the European Parliament concerning the three countries studied showed differences that have characterized their participation in European elections. While Italy and France, founding members of EC, were too busy to deal with national issues during electoral campaign, the UK was more attentive to evaluate the benefits of participation and Margaret Thatcher, who was Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990 was particularly suited for such an attitude. While during the first direct election there was a need to bring some new element in organizing the electoral campaign in order to reach a wider consensus, the following two elections made political forces more reflective about the decline in turnout. Too many national issues made the communication weak, particularly for the French campaign. What citizens perceived was the little confidence of political parties and that was the reason for such a large incertitude among the people. On the other hand, the Community campaign too showed a partial efficiency. So what kind of elections are we talking about? Still "second order" elections? This is not the picture that emerged from my research conducted on the historical and political fields. Participation is inversely proportional to the preparatory work, both from a political point of view and from an administrative-institutional one, which was far superior to any national suffrage. So, why didn't voters participate so enthusiastically? Many answers are possible because many are the causes of such an odd behaviour: little attention to European issues, quality of communication, propaganda too close to the election date, distance between citizens and istitution, the cultural level of voters, election dates too close to those of national elections, lack of confidence of the political class were all contributing factors in low participation. In the middle of this mess the European citizen becomes the protagonist for the success of such a performance. Despite numbers reveal a gradual decline in the ten years examined, European citizens have not remained indifferent to the changes introduced by the European integration process. Many surveys showed that in addition to a percentage of "indifferent" or "eurosceptical" people, there were citizens who asked for a stronger Parliament hoping that this result would be reached sooner or later. The failure to achieve this goal as well as the political events of each nation have gradually caused an outcry against the vote expressed either in nonvoting or in negative-vote; these different behaviours show a different way of participating . The voter who, though informed by the electoral campaign, decided not to vote or to give a different vote by cancelling his vote or returning blank−voting ballot, went nevertheless to the polling station and didn't stay at home ignoring what was happening. The unfullfilled hope for an institutional strengthening of the Parliament and for greater political cohesion of the European Community, due to political responsibilities, didn't allow the voter to contribute or protest against the non-achievement of results. Citizens' increased knowledge and involvement did not keep pace with the participation; some elements of dissatisfaction have characterized the behaviour of the pro-Europe voter. The three main groups in which European voters may be included are pro- Europe, anti-Europe and eurosceptics. Whereas the pro-Europe voters' expectations have been disappointed, the anti-Europe voters have partially exercised the right to vote feeding this kind of lists in the European competition. Eurosceptics, on the other hand were the centerpiece of the electorate. Being careful observers of which and how many changes have occurred since 1979, citizens have been able to consolidate their position by continuing to perceive the Community as still too distant and mostly uncomfortable if not useless. They have continued their observation by standing together with those uncertain people who stayed at home. At this point it appeared inevitable to assess also those elements that characterized the elections in general. What attracts people to the polling station is mainly the weight that elections may have on the governmental changes in their own countries. The "less at stake" of European elections surely showed one of the reasons just described. We are therefore facing a different context, In such 'marker-setting' elections, voters have an incentive to behave tactically, but in a sense of the word 'tactical' that is quite different from what we see in National elections, where large parties are advantaged by their size. In a markersetting election the tactical situation is instead characterized by an apparent lack of consequences for the allocation of power, on the one hand, and by the attentiveness of politicians and media, on the other7. The lack of consequences on the national level where European elections are concerned lightened voters by taking away their responsibility in directing the national political course. Although in 1979 there was a political activity at the transnational level, the electorate's attention was very scarce. The result showed 50% of voters admitting to their disinformation about the groups that achieved greater consensus. 7 C. Van der Eijk, M. Franklin, M. Marsh, What voters teach us about Europe-Wide Elections: what Europe-Wide Elections teach us about voters, in "Electoral Studies", vol. 15, n. 2, p. 157. Another issue is the large success gained by smaller parties; in this case it is possible to talk about a "punishment vote" against the policy of the national government. The three cases studied showed different ways of participating. Italian and French voters showed a considerable participation according to their tradition also because in the 1979 – 1989 period there was an interesting political debate. The Italian "pseudo-compulsory" vote kept the percentage of voters high, but the outcome showed changing directions during the above mentioned period. Looking at the outcomes got by the Front National the French case showed an escalation of the Right next to to a significant decline of the Communist Party. There was also a substantial dispersion of voting because of so many rolls, particularly during the 1989 elections. The British case is a special one for the particular behaviour towards the European integration process. The Conservative Party wanted to play an important role in the European context and for this reason European elections were considered as a way to succeed in it. On the contrary the Labour Party did not immediately understand the importance of such a crucial opportunity; the outcome of the 1979 European elections was disastrous and they met an evident defeat that therefore was useful to understand many things for future elections. All three countries have seen the progressive growth of the Green Party. The present study has paid constant attention to to the political debate in each country, and to the strategies implemented by the actors, who were aware from the beginning that the European challenge would engage them in different ways. It was, moreover, focused on the individual citizen's ability to determine the election outcome. Considering the outcome through the mere numerical data gives a partial view of the whole context. There are so many aspects that influenced the decision to vote or not. There was a selection among voters that showed citizens who desired a more political union operating a political and institutional strengthening in opposition to those who did not want to engage themselves in an election without any gain. An unconvinced political class, questionable information, lack of knowledge among citizens about the role of the European Parliament have built a different voter, a more attentive one, with a greater critical sense towards a newer context different from the national one. The diverse elements which have emerged from this interdiciplinary study have led to further insights. After historical considerations, a sociological analysis has been carried out on European elections as a whole and their "second order" perception. From these considerations a new picture has emerged, which is not in absolute contrast with the interpretation of the raw data. The quality and the quantity of so many factors allow a more complete picture of the facts, going beyond the mere participation on which, undoubtedly, the difference with the national presence is quite evident. Detailed examination appeared necessary in the light of the tortuous European building process, in order to take into account as many elements as possible, not only to justify the results, but rather because, to reflect on them trying to deploy a polycentric responsibility from the political forces to the citizens themselves.

Andehrs Behring Breivik no encaja en ninguna categoría existente de actuación violenta o política. Como lo revela su manifiesto, que dará que hablar durante años, Breivik es un terrorista sui generis.Brevemente, Breivik es un joven noruego que el pasado viernes cometió dos ataques terroristas. En el primero detonó una bomba en el distrito gubernamental de Oslo. En el segundo apareció disfrazado de policía en una pequeña isla donde se celebraba una reunión anual de las juventudes del Partido Laborista del país, y atacó a la multitud con armas y municiones de guerra.El manifiesto que el agresor envió a algunos miles de contactos horas antes de cometer el ataque es una obra sin precedentes en la historia de la acción criminal e ideológica. En primer lugar, el texto suma más de mil quinientas páginas, de las cuales Breivik es el autor de más de la mitad. En segundo lugar, la obra está escrita en perfecto inglés, con el objetivo expreso de difundir la ideología ahí presentada a la mayor cantidad de personas posible. En tercer lugar, los contenidos del trabajo son muy variados y llegan a un nivel de detalle inaudito. Este último aspecto es lo que hace de Breivik y su manifiesto algo extraordinario. Entre otras cosas, el lector encontrará:Una exposición detallada de la ideología política del autor (a la cual llama "Cultural conservatism or a nationalist/conservative direction"), con discusiones sobre Antonio Gramsci, György Lukács, Karl Marx, la historia del comunismo, tablas estadísticas sobre la demografía europea y otros elementos.Una descripción de los orígenes de la organización que pretende tener detrás, la Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici o PCCTS. El nombre es el término en latín para la orden medieval monástica y militar más conocida como los Templarios.Una guía meticulosa sobre cómo comprar los ingredientes para la elaboración de explosivos, así como su preparación, su detonación en ensayos, e incluso dónde y cómo esconderlos.Una guía similar para la obtención de armas, con discusiones de diversas fuentes como la mafia albanesa o la rusa. También explica cómo preparar una armadura de combate, así como los principios del combate urbano con armas de fuego.Una bitácora de su "trabajo" desde 2002 en adelante, que incluye su dieta con detalles sobre su ingestión de proteínas y su rutina diaria.Un presupuesto de toda su "obra" desde ese año en adelante. Breivik afirma haber invertido €317.000 a lo largo de una década en su "proyecto".Instrucciones para la construcción de su epitafio.Instrucciones para la implementación de un sistema de medallas, uniformes y ritos para la orden neo-templaria, con diagramas, nombres y criterios para la aplicación de cada una.Pasos básicos de contra-inteligencia para evitar ser detectado.Un currículum vitae completo.No hay cuestiones de menor importancia para Breivik: el ensayo también incluye discusiones detalladas sobre el estado actual de la educación terciaria en Estados Unidos y Europa, extensas explicaciones sobre la teología y la historia islámica, críticas hacia las letras del hip-hop misógino estadounidense, listas de canciones inspiradoras, etc. Una enorme proporción de los textos, como el propio Breivik admite, son de autores con argumentos válidos y que están muy lejanos de promover o aceptar actos de violencia como el suyo.El cuadro que ofrece la lectura de este ensayo es de una persona de una enorme inteligencia, capacidad de organización y, sobre todo, disciplina. Breivik es un individuo altamente preparado física y mentalmente para la grotesca tarea que se propuso. Tal como indica su ensayo, ya tiene preparados los discursos que realizará en su juicio, que pretende que sea altamente público. Antes de lanzar su ataque ya tenía decidido qué criterios aplicaría con el abogado que le asignara el estado, lo que le contestará al juez y demás quienes le digan que es un criminal psicótico, y cómo planea que termine el juicio.Esto último hace que sea poco probable que aparezcan otros Breiviks – aunque sigue siendo posible. Resulta simplemente increíble que pueda haber otro individuo que comparta la misma ideología hasta el mismo nivel de compromiso, y que sobre todo elija seguir el mismo camino.Breivik se ve a sí mismo como una persona fuertemente politizada, por lo cual es necesario discutirlo en esos términos. De los primeros que surgen apuradamente en los medios –seguramente por no haber leído el manuscrito-, no se aplica casi ninguno. Breivik no es nacionalsocialista o "neo-nazi"; tampoco es asimilable al Unabomber (por más que haya coincidencias en sus textos), ni al Ku Klux Klan o a los partidos nacionalistas europeos.De hecho, quizá la forma más correcta de definir a Breivik es resucitando el significado verdadero de un término muy abusado: "de derecha". Breivik ha elegido responder a la amenaza que percibe en Europa, que es sin dudas el Islam, con un remedio neo-medieval. En su ensayo, Breivik postula que la forma óptima de organización política en Europa debe estar basada en la monarquía, y no en repúblicas:"The king or queen of a country is more democratic than a president ever could be because he or she represents all citizens." (el original no es de Breivik).El noruego está a favor de la fusión de todas las iglesias bajo el Papa nuevamente, aún siendo él mismo luterano (no practicante, a diferencia de lo que sugieren los medios). La nueva mega-Iglesia tendría un monopolio público de la religión, así como acceso privilegiado a los contenidos de la educación y los medios. Su visión de una sociedad conservadora es esta: "Ladies should be wives and homemakers, not cops or soldiers (…) Children should not be born out of wedlock. Glorification of homosexuality should be shunned."Aunque Breivik dedica literalmente cientos de páginas a textos sobre la historia de la violencia islámica contra Europa (y también sobre el caso opuesto), en ningún momento menciona los más de mil años de calamidades, miseria y sufrimiento humano que fueron consecuencia directa del sistema medieval-monárquico-eclesiástico.El principal objetivo de Breivik y sus "templarios" es la erradicación de la presencia del Islam en Europa a través de tres modalidades. La primera es la conversión al cristianismo (incluyendo como variable su creación intelectual más débil, los cristianismos "agnóstico" y "ateo"). Esta vía tiene clarísimos componentes anti-liberales y anti-democráticos, ya que los musulmanes conversos deberían renunciar a sus nombres, idiomas, vínculos con sus países de origen (incluso por vía electrónica) y otras cuestiones básicas. Para Breivik, incluso será necesario que "All traces of Islamic culture in Europe will be eradicated, even locations considered historical" – algo por definición poco "conservador".Además, Breivik no tiene ilusiones sobre el "liberalismo islámico": "to take the violence out of Islam would require it to jettison two things: the Quran as the word of Allah and Muhammad as Allah's prophet. In other words, to pacify Islam would require its transformation into something that it is not."La segunda modalidad de erradicación del Islam es la limpieza cultural, que consistiría de deportaciones o expulsiones (Breivik menciona muchos modelos, incluyendo las gigantescas ordenadas por Stalin). La última es la exterminación.Es en referencia a esto último que Breivik dedica un pasaje a discutir a Adolf Hitler y el nacionalsocialismo. El autor se aleja de estos claramente, aunque por razones muy diferentes de las del ciudadano común. Su explicación es que la "causa" nacionalsocialista y el liderazgo de Hitler destruyeron a los nacionalismos europeos por más de un siglo (es decir, hasta bien entrado el siglo XXI), porque optaron directamente por el camino de la exterminación. El resultado fue una guerra que terminó en derrota, y la entrega del continente al bolchevismo y uno de sus herederos, la socialdemocracia multicultural.Esto explica una de las principales diferencias entre Breivik y el movimiento neo-nacionalsocialista es su posición respecto a Israel y los judíos. El terrorista noruego interpreta al estado israelí como un modelo a seguir de "reunión nacional" étnica, y simpatiza enormemente con su lucha anti-jihad. Ergo, para Breivik se trata de un aliado ante un enemigo en común. El mismo principio aplica Breivik, quien se define como anti-racista, a las alianzas que propone con asiáticos orientales, hindúes y otros con tal de luchar contra el Islam.A quien sí defiende Breivik abiertamente es a Slobodan Milosevic. De hecho, el noruego argumenta que fueron los ataques de la OTAN a la Serbia de ese dictador genocida lo que primero despertó su instinto conservador. Esa podría ser una pista significativa para entender el rompecabezas ideológico del agresor, ya que las dos intervenciones internacionales en Yugoslavia ocurrieron antes del Once de septiembre, que es el gran disparador de la actual preocupación por la jihad entre muchos occidentales.En la visión de Breivik, quizá el sistema de organización social ideal sería elapartheid, pero a diferencia del caso de Sudáfrica, no dentro de un país. Para él, los judíos deberían haber sido expulsados de Europa en los 1930s; ahora deberían ser expulsados los musulmanes. El autor incluso menciona los casos de países de Asia Oriental del presente, como Corea del Sur y Japón, como ejemplos de naciones étnicamente homogéneas y prósperas. Evidentemente, Breivik es una persona que piensa en términos profundamente colectivistas. No hay derechos individuales para las personas que no forman parte de su grupo. Esta forma de concebir el mundo, sumada a la forma en que Breivik se presenta como líder de un movimiento ideológico violento, lo hacen similar a figuras como Lenin, Hitler, Mao, el Che Guevara u Osama bin Laden.De hecho, como todo pretendiente a líder carismático, Breivik incluye en su manifiesto instrucciones para tener preparadas fotografías en las que el atacante se "vea bien", pensando en el momento en el cual su rostro sea visto por el mundo – tal como está ocurriendo ahora. Así se lo propuso Breivik: "As a Justiciar Knight you will go into history as one of the most influential individuals of your time. So you need to look your absolute best and ensure that you produce quality marketing material prior to operation." El texto incluso recomienda utilizar una cama solar y aplicarse maquillaje antes de tomarse las fotografías.El aspecto más sorprendente del planteo de Breivik es el blanco que escogió para su ataque. Al leer el inmenso manifiesto y contrastarlo con los hechos de los días pasados, es inevitable quedarse con la sensación de que fue todo una excusa para perpetrar un acto de extrema violencia contra jóvenes inocentes (y desarmados, por supuesto). El manifiesto incluso lo admite con una subsección entera: "The cruel nature of our operations". Breivik explica que aunque el enemigo objetivo es el Islam en Europa, el objetivo inmediato son los europeos que han trabajado durante cerca de medio siglo para que exista esa presencia islámica en la región.Estos son, para el noruego, los multiculturalistas, marxistas y demás miembros de una suerte de élite europea. De hecho, su objetivo explícito es que para el año 2020 ocurran golpes de estado en diversos países de Europa occidental (junto con la abolición de la Unión Europea), de modo de instalar regímenes conservadores que trabajen para la eliminación simultánea del marxismo multicultural y del Islam.Estas élites y su "political correctness" son las responsables, para Breivik, de que no se puedan discutir abiertamente cuestiones que preocupan a un nacionalista conservador como él. La principal de ellas es la presencia de musulmanes en Europa. La sección tres del manifiesto es fundamental, porque tras más de 750 páginas de "diagnóstico" sobre el estado actual de Europa, el autor quiebra con todos los demás que citó y anuncia su alejamiento de la vía pacífica. Por ejemplo, en la página 791 aparece, como un subtítulo más, un anuncio importante: "Why armed resistance against the cultural Marxist/multiculturalist regimes of Western Europe is the only rational approach".De hecho, en esa sección hay varias páginas dedicadas a enunciar los cargos legales que se le imputan a multiplicidad de líderes europeos. Como parte de su gigantesca acusación contra el sistema político-social europeo de posguerra, Breivik incluso ofrece cálculos específicos de las cantidades de europeos cuyos derechos han sido violados de diversas maneras por los efectos de esas políticos, que van desde la violación y el asesinato hasta los despidos de personas. Todos se imputan, en conjunto y criminalmente, a estas "élites" cuya muerte se anuncia poco a poco.En lugar de estas personas aparecerá, en palabras de Breivik, un "cultural conservative tribunal" en cada país que implemente un nuevo régimen político. Como parte de esta iniciativa, aparecen mencionadas casualmente algunas medidas atroces: "All Muslims are to be immediately deported to their country of origin. Each family (family head) will receive 25 000 Euro providing they accept the deportation terms. Anyone who violently resists deportation will be executed". Breivik también prevé compensaciones financieras para los sujetos que fueron "víctimas intelectuales" del sistema previo, así como específicamente para los ciudadanos de Serbia por el bombardeo de OTAN. También incluye los parámetros de su propia "ley de medios", por utilizar un desafortunado término rioplatense, que implica la imposición de cuotas de periodistas e intelectuales "conservadores" y nacionalistas en diversas organizaciones mediáticas.El método que ha elegido Breivik, conscientemente sin duda, es similar al viejo anarquismo de la propaganda por el hecho, que consiste de atacantes solitarios que cometen actos espectaculares de demostración e inspiración ideológica. El noruego llama a su campaña de violencia "A Declaration of pre-emptive War" contra sus dos enemigos. Breivik indica claramente que aquellos que existan como él actualmente en Europa son pocos pero que están en aumento; su ataque está pensado para encender la chispa de la conmoción en la región, lo cual incluiría también la aparición de más adeptos. Tácticamente, el ataque del pasado viernes 22 de julio en Noruega es definido por su autor como "military shock attacks by clandestine cell systems".Hay más pasajes que directamente preanuncian el ataque que Breivik escogió lanzar: "consider making use of a remote detonation, (…) to attract attention to one location. Ensure that the enemy forces are heading for this location. By then, you will be on the opposite side of town and in the middle of the process of finishing your primary goal." El blanco se vuelve cada vez más específico: el primero de la lista que hay en el manifiesto es "political parties - cultural Marxist/multiculturalist political parties."En el apartado correspondiente a este tipo de organización, el primer país detallado es Noruega, y el primer partido que aparece ahí es el "Norwegian Labour Party". Más adelante, nuevamente en primer lugar entre una lista de blancos, dice que un blanco primario es: "the annual party meeting of the socialist/social democrat party in your country."Curiosamente, aunque Breivik propone algunas formas de organización colectiva (como la neo-templaria), sus instrucciones para los actos de terrorismo son estrictas respecto a que las células deben ser individuales. Es por eso que Breivik el terrorista pasó desapercibido, a juzgar por la información disponible, incluso en los círculos nacionalistas no violentos.De los nueve miembros que supuestamente asistieron en 2002 a la reunión fundacional en Londres de la organización neo-templaria (todos anónimos), cuatro son descritos como "cristiano ateo" o "cristiano agnóstico". El propio Breivik está muy indeciso respecto a su religión: "I'm not going to pretend I'm a very religious person as that would be a lie (…) I consider myself to be 100% Christian (…) I'm not an excessively religious man". Sería interesante saber qué opinaría Hugues de Payens, fundador de la orden original, respecto a esta falta de disciplina teológica (que en realidad es una ausencia total). Son sin ninguna duda los nombres de estos nueve miembros iniciales, y de otros, lo que más están buscando los servicios de inteligencia de varios estados europeos.La visión del mundo de Breivik está claramente influenciada por el pensamiento colectivista, y su propia obra parece aproximarse a un sistema de pensamiento que podría llamarse ideológico. Es por eso que es posible concluir que no se trata de un lunático desequilibrado que pertenece a un manicomio. Es peor que eso: una persona que en todo momento supo lo que hacía, que se preparó durante años para hacerlo, y que desplegó un alto nivel de meticulosidad para lograrlo. Hasta el efecto de su ataque está pensado desde hace años: "The art of asymmetrical warfare is less about inflicting immediate damage but all about the indirect long term psychological and ideological damage. Our shock attacks are theatre and theatre is always performed for an audience".Las descripciones más personales de Breivik son reveladoras del grado de control que tenía sobre sí mismo: "I have managed to stay focused and highly motivated for a duration of more than 9 years now (…) I have never been happier than I am today (…) I do a mental check almost every day through meditation and philosophizing (…) I simulate various future scenarios relating to resistance efforts, confrontations with police, future interrogation scenarios, future court appearances, future media interviews etc".El objetivo de Breivik es la fundación de una nueva cadena de nacionalismos post-nazis en Europa, y es importante que ese proyecto fracase. El autor concibió un "100 year plan to contribute to seize political power in Western European countries currently controlled by anti-nationalists" (de ahí el título de su manifiesto: 2083). En sus planes más delirantes hacia el futuro, Breivik menciona todo tipo de planes, desde el robo y la detonación de armas nucleares en las capitales europeas hasta la colaboración con Al-Qaeda, el gobierno de Irán, y otros terroristas islámicos.Como se dijo anteriormente, el manifiesto es increíblemente largo y contiene todo tipo de cosas. Hay discusiones muy detalladas sobre la niñez ("My best friend for many years, a Muslim"), adolescencia (incluyendo encuentros con pandillas pakistaníes y un pasado como "graffiti artist") y juventud del autor, con descripciones (con nombres) de sus amigos y hasta las vidas sexuales de sus familiares más cercanos. Hay planes para la importación de inmigrantes en la era "post-islámica" de Europa, con detalles sobre los horarios, la compensación, las localidades y más. Breivik tiene hasta pensado cuál será el nuevo himno de Europa. También explica que él no fue el fundador de la organización neo-templaria, sino el octavo miembro (algo que recuerda a la historia de Adolf Hitler y su ingreso al NSDAP), y que a través de ella conoció a un criminal de guerra serbio en Liberia. Su mentor fue un inglés, fundador de la organización y sin duda un importantísimo blanco para la inteligencia doméstica británica en este mismo momento.Actualmente el "caso Breivik" se encuentra en una etapa que el propio terrorista ya tiene planeada desde hace años: "Your arrest will mark the initiation of the propaganda phase. Your trial offers you a stage to the world (…) A Justiciar Knight is not only a valorous resistance fighter, a one man army; he is a one man marketing agency as well". El terrorista está muy consciente de la opinión que el mundo se ha formado sobre él, y ya ha recorrido mentalmente el camino para superar el ostracismo de su causa: "It might sound completely ridiculous and funny to most people today. But by presenting the following accusations and demands in all seriousness we are indirectly conditioning everyone listening for the conflicts and scenarios ahead. They will laugh today, but in the back of their minds, they have an ounce of fear, respect and admiration for our cause and the alternative and authority we represent".Breivik no es un criminal o incluso un terrorista común. Es una figura nefasta con una ideología totalmente nueva. Es muy importante conocer los términos ideológicos y metodológicos en los que operó, porque existe una preocupante posibilidad de que haya otros como él en el futuro.*Licenciado en Estudios Internacionales - Universidad ORT Uruguay Candidato al Master of Arts in Security Studies - Georgetown University

The article traces the trajectory of the Movimiento pro Universidad del Norte (MUN) [Pro-Northern University Movement] founded in late 1968 in the city of Salto in northern Uruguay, with the aim of pushing for the establishment of a university in the region to serve as an alternative to that of Montevideo. With Uruguay mired in a grave economic, social and political crisis and a debate running between the Executive Office and the Universidad de la República on the future of higher education, the movement reconfigured one of Salto's long-standing demands. This demand had originally united various social and political sectors that lacked affiliation to a political party, as a banner for groups that ended up supporting the shift to authoritarianism over time. It also relied on the support of the department's driving forces, professional corporations, local administrators and representatives of the departmental government linked to conservative sectors of the traditional parties. Among its adherents, it is worth mentioning radical right-wing student organization Juventud Salteña de Pie (JSP), a direct antecedent of Juventud Uruguaya de Pie (JUP) created in October 1970, due to its subsequent relevance. National backing came from various political actors and groups as well as right-wing media entities. The MUN also inspired intense mobilization among regional and national bodies to the point that it gained the backing of Jorge Pacheco Areco's government. For these sectors, the founding of another state university constituted an opportunity to impose an institutional-political model different to that which prevailed in the Universidad de la República. ; El artículo que se presenta reconstruye la trayectoria del Movimiento pro Universidad del Norte (MUN) fundado, a fines de 1968, en la ciudad de Salto, al norte del país, con el objetivo de promover la instalación en esa región de una universidad concebida como alternativa a la de Montevideo. Mientras Uruguay atravesaba una grave crisis económica, social y política, y en el marco de las discusiones entre el Poder Ejecutivo y la Universidad de la República sobre el futuro de la educación superior, este movimiento reconvirtió una antigua reivindicación salteña, en la que originalmente habían confluido diversos sectores sociales y políticos y que carecía de adscripción político-partidaria, en una bandera de los grupos que terminaron apoyando el giro autoritario de los años. Se nutrió del apoyo de las 'fuerzas vivas" del departamento, corporaciones profesionales, dirigentes locales y representantes del gobierno departamental vinculados a los sectores conservadores de los partidos tradicionales. Entre sus adherentes cabe destacar, por su relevancia posterior, a la organización estudiantil de derecha radical, Juventud Salteña de Pie (JSP), antecedente directo de la Juventud Uruguaya de Pie (JUP) creada en octubre de 1970. A nivel nacional fue respaldado por diversos actores y grupos políticos así como órganos de prensa de derecha. El MUN, además, llevó adelante una intensa movilización de proyecciones regionales y nacionales al punto que obtuvo el respaldo del gobierno de Jorge Pacheco Areco. Para estos sectores la fundación de otra universidad pública constituyó una oportunidad de imponer un modelo político-institucional diferente al que prevalecía en la Universidad de la República. ; Cet article retrace la trajectoire du Movimiento pro Universidad del Norte (Mouvement pro Université du Nord - MUN), fondé fin 1968 dans la ville de Salto, dans le nord de l'Uruguay, dans le but de promouvoir l'installation dans cette région d'une université qui puisse représenter une alternative à celle de Montevideo. Tandis que le pays traversait une grave crise économique, sociale et politique, et à la suite de discussions entre le Pouvoir exécutif et l'Université de République sur le futur de l'enseignement supérieur, ce mouvement transformait une ancienne revendication locale, qui, à son origine, avait vu confluer hors du giron des partis divers secteurs sociaux et politiques, en mot d'ordre des groupes qui finirent par soutenir le virage autoritaire de cette période. Il se nourrit de l'appui des « forces vives » du département, des ordres professionnels, des dirigeants locaux et des représentants du gouvernement départemental liés aux secteurs conservateurs des partis traditionnels. Parmi ses adhérents, il convient de souligner, en raison de sa pertinence ultérieure, l'organisation étudiante de la droite radicale, Juventud Salteña de Pie (JSP), le prédécesseur direct de Juventud Uruguaya de Pie (JUP), créée en octobre 1970. Au niveau national, le mouvement était relayé par divers acteurs et groupes politiques, ainsi que par des organes de presse de droite. En outre, le MUN organisa une intense mobilisation régionale et nationale qui lui permit d'obtenir le soutien du gouvernement de Jorge Pacheco Areco. Pour tous ces secteurs, la fondation d'une autre université publique constituait une opportunité d'imposer un modèle politico-institutionnel différent que celui qui prévalait à l'Université de la République. ; O artigo reconstrói a trajetória do Movimiento pro Universidad del Norte (MUN), fundado no fim de 1968, na cidade de Salto, no norte do Uruguai, com o objetivo de promover, como alternativa à Universidade de Montevidéu, a instalação de uma universidade nessa região. Enquanto o Uruguai atravessava uma grave crise econômica, social e política, e no âmbito das discussões entre o Poder Executivo e a Universidad de la República sobre o futuro da educação superior, este movimento converteu uma antiga reivindicação saltenha, para a qual haviam originalmente convergido diversos setores sociais e políticos fora do âmbito político-partidário, em uma bandeira dos grupos que acabariam apoiando a virada autoritária da época. Nutriu-se do apoio das 'forças vivas" do departamento, de corporações profissionais, dirigentes locais e representantes do governo departamental vinculados aos setores conservadores dos partidos tradicionais. Entre os seus adeptos cabe destacar, por sua relevância posterior, a organização estudantil de direita radical Juventud Salteña de Pie (JSP), antecedente direta da Juventud Uruguaya de Pie (JUP) criada em outubro de 1970. Foi apoiado, em nível nacional, por diversos atores e grupos políticos, assim como por órgãos da imprensa de direita. Além disso, o MUN levou adiante uma intensa mobilização de projeção regional e nacional, a ponto de obter apoio do governo de Jorge Pacheco Areco. A fundação de outra universidade pública constituiu para estes setores uma oportunidade de impor um modelo político-institucional diferente daquele que prevalecia na Universidad de la República. ; 本文回顾了乌拉圭地方æ°'众争å–æˆç«‹åŒ—索托大学（MUN）çš"ç»´æƒè¿åŠ¨ã€'在1968年底，在乌拉圭çš"北方城çš"索托å¸'，æ°'众行动起æ¥ï¼Œäº‰å–在å½"地æˆç«‹åŒ—索托大学，作为除了ä½äºŽé¦–都çš"è'™ç‰¹ç»´å¾·æ¬§å¤§å­¦ä¹‹å¤–çš"乌拉圭æ°'ä¼—çš"å¦å¤–一个选项ã€'é'£ä¸ªæ—¶å€™ä¹Œæ‹‰åœ­æ­£åœ¨ç»åŽ†ä¸€åœºç»æµŽï¼Œç¤¾ä¼šå'Œæ"¿æ²»å±æœºï¼Œå›´ç»•è¡Œæ"¿æƒåŠ›æœºå…³å'Œå…±å'Œå›½å¤§å­¦ï¼ˆUniversidad de la República）之间进行了一场关于高等教è'²å‰é€"çš"大讨论，这场讨论ç'¹ç‡ƒäº†ç´¢æ‰˜åœ°æ–¹æ°'众争å–æˆç«‹ä¸€ä¸ªåœ°æ–¹å¤§å­¦çš"ç»´æƒè¿åŠ¨ï¼Œæ­¤è¿åŠ¨æŠŠåŽŸæ¥äº'ä¸ç›¸å¹²çš"社会å'Œæ"¿æ²»å›¢ä½"è"系在一起，他们åŽæ¥æ"¯æŒäº†ä¸ƒåå¹´ä»£å‡ å±Šæƒå¨æ"¿åºœã€'æ­¤è¿åŠ¨å¾—到了主è¦æ¥è‡ªäºŽåœ°æ–¹æ"¿åºœéƒ¨é—¨çš"èŒå'˜å'Œå®˜å'˜ï¼Œç¤¾ä¼šèŒä¸šå›¢ä½"，地方绅士，地方ä¿å®ˆçš"æ"¿æ²»é¢†è¢–çš"æ"¯æŒã€'主è¦çš"å'与者是激进学ç"Ÿç»´æƒç»"织JSP-Juventud Salteña de Pie (JSP)，其åŽæ¥å'展æˆä¸ºï¼ˆäºŽ1970å¹´æˆç«‹çš"）乌拉圭é'å¹´ç»"织Juventud Uruguaya de Pie (JUP)ã€'在全国范围内，此è¿åŠ¨å¾—到了å"ç•Œå"æ"¿æ²»å›¢ä½"å'Œç»´æƒåª'ä½"çš"æ"¯æŒã€' 争å–æˆç«‹MUNçš"è¿åŠ¨å'展æˆä¸ºå…¨å›½æ€§è¿åŠ¨ï¼Œå¾—到了阿å‹'ç§'总统çš"æ"¯æŒï¼ˆJorge Pacheco Areco）ã€' 对这些团ä½"å'Œä¸ªäººæ¥è¯´ï¼Œæˆç«‹å¦å¤–一所公立大学å¯ä»¥æž"建一个ä¸åŒäºŽå…±å'Œå›½å¤§å­¦çš"高等教è'²çš"æ"¿æ²»å'Œæœºæž"模å¼ã€'å…³é"®è¯ï¼šå¤§å­¦ï¼Œç»´æƒè¿åŠ¨ï¼Œæ"¿æ²»å²ï¼Œä¹Œæ‹‰åœ­