Suchergebnisse

An empirical examination of political corruption in the US states, using as the dependent variable the number of public officials convicted of illegal activities for private gain. Analysis of data from the Dept of Justice, 1977-1987, indicates that corruption is associated with historical/cultural forces, political forces (especially turnout & party competition), & bureaucratic forces (government size & policies that increase bribe opportunities). Structural factors (eg, campaign finance reporting requirements, centralization, direct democracy) are unrelated to corruption. There is some evidence that prosecution of corrupt public officials was subject to partisan & racial targeting during the Reagan administration, & to racial targeting only during the Carter administration. 8 Tables, 49 References. Adapted from the source document.

Using data from the 1972, 1977, & 1982 Censuses of Government Employment & the 1970 & 1980 Population Censuses, a pooled cross-sectional analysis of 529 suburban governments in the US is conducted. The size & wages of the local public LF are examined as a function of: (1) the demand of residents, local workers, & politicians, subject to local fiscal capacity; (2) exogenous influences of the intergovernmental system; & (3) secular trends produced by macroeconomic & general societal changes. It is shown that decisions about the local government LF reflect local conditions, but are also influenced by exogenous, particularly intergovernmental, factors. It is suggested that the already severe limits on the policy-making capacity of suburban municipalities may be even more limited in the future. 2 Tables, 41 References. Modified HA

Hypotheses as to why some firms have PACs and others do not. PAC participation by Fortune-ranked firms in the 1981-82 election period.