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Proc., 19-27. annual conventions of the U.S. Brewers' Assoc., p. 82-194. ; Half-title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Parties face a trade-off between motivating partisans to participate in the election and appealing to issue-oriented middle-of-the-road voters. We show that, consequently, parties may diverge from the median voters' preferred policy by sending ambiguous messages to voters which include announcements of alternative platforms. Moreover, surprisingly, an increase in the size of a partisan constituency may lead to platform convergence towards the median voters' preferred policy. We identify two conditions for this outcome. First, the electorate is sufficiently divided such that full convergence does not occur and, second, the majority of the non-partisan voters is more inclined to the party with increased support of partisans. Adapted from the source document.

What happens when partisanship is pushed to its extreme? In With Ballots and Bullets, Nathan P. Kalmoe combines historical and political science approaches to provide new insight into the American Civil War and deepen contemporary understandings of mass partisanship. The book reveals the fundamental role of partisanship in shaping the dynamics and legacies of the Civil War, drawing on an original analysis of newspapers and geo-coded data on voting returns and soldier enlistments, as well as retrospective surveys. Kalmoe shows that partisan identities motivated mass violence by ordinary citizens, not extremists, when activated by leaders and legitimated by the state. Similar processes also enabled partisans to rationalize staggering war casualties into predetermined vote choices, shaping durable political habits and memory after the war's end. Findings explain much about nineteenth century American politics, but the book also yields lessons for today, revealing the latent capacity of political leaders to mobilize violence.

Change in the American electorate has traditionally been studied by comparing the number of independents to the number of partisans, and comparing the impact of partisanship to the impact of issue voting. Stable numbers of partisans and stable correlations between partisanship and attitudes and behavior are interpreted to mean continuity in the electorate. These comparisons, though useful, ignore the possibility that the meaning of partisanship and the reasons behind its impact on attitudes and behavior may have changed as well. As the potential for independent behavior and political sophistication increases in the United States, the most sophisticated and rational partisans are able to lay aside their party labels, leaving fewer, less rational partisans. This argument is tested and supported using data from the National Election Surveys of 1952 through 1980.

There are many similarities between Dewey and Marx, particularly the claim by each to have united theory and practice. But this article argues that the distance between the two remains great. Dewey denies what Marx affirms; namely, that partisanship performs a variety of positive functions in the movement towards a more morally adequate society and in the moral transformation of man. Against Marx, Dewey argues that the "rivalry of parties" must come under the control of the norms of critical inquiry which, Dewey believes, can also serve as the site of a more comprehensive and nonpartisan social interest. The article concludes that both Dewey and Marx are correct in what they have to say about partisanship, but in a more limited way than either would acknowledge. If partisanship is functional in the reconstruction of society, as Marx holds, and dysfunctional to the moral growth of the individual, as Dewey holds, then the controversy between liberal amelioration and radical politics is likely to persist.

The possibility of holding representatives to account through regular elections is one of the cornerstones of representative democracy. The precise role of partisanship in doing this has not been extensively examined. Using survey data from Europe (2002–2012), we show that partisanship can weaken or strengthen accountability, depending on its sources. If it is an affective-psychological attitude, as the Michigan school suggests, then it weakens accountability because it acts as a perceptual screen. If, however, it is a calculation of party performance which is constantly updated by citizens, then it strengthens accountability. The findings suggest that partisanship in Europe has been quite responsive to performance over the ten-year period. Instead of acting as a screen that inhibits accountability, partisanship appears rooted in calculations of party performance and so enhances accountability. However, the effects are asymmetric with left-leaning partisans more sensitive to the performance of their governments than right-leaning partisans.

Abstract. Merged survey and aggregate data sets allow examination of the inter‐relationship between individual characteristics and contextual variables. The addition of constituency context variables to the Canadian National Election study of 1979 enhances our ability to explain variations in partisanship. Party weakness in a constituency, female NDP candidates, and the lack of an incumbent seeking re‐election all render partisanship more flexible. Concentrations of Roman Catholics and the university educated in a constituency solidify Liberal and NDP strength respectively. Problems of study design and data interpretation presently limit our ability to utilize combined micro‐macro analysis.

AbstractGovernments in advanced industrial democracies generally regulate foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows with two types of policy measures: entry barriers and post-establishment restrictions. This article provides an integrated account for the two types of FDI restrictions, which is largely absent in the existing literature. We argue that the government's choice of FDI policies is shaped by a compound effect of the incumbent's ideological orientation and the political influence of unionized labour. Although inward FDI broadly benefits domestic workers, the entrance of multinational corporations (MNCs) adversely impacts the unionized interests of labour by transforming the labour market in ways detrimental to unions' wage-bargaining leverage. Leftist governments, driven by the preferences of their labour constituency, tend to lift entry barriers to FDI in order to promote capital inflows. At the same time, leftist governments may also need to address unions' concerns about inbound MNCs by tightening post-establishment restrictions on FDI, which impose constraints on the globalized business and operational model of MNCs. We argue that leftist incumbents generally liberalize entry barriers but tighten post-establishment restrictions when the level of labour unionization is high. We found evidence consistent with our argument from country-level and sector-level analysis of FDI restrictions, using a sample from the early 2000s to the mid-2010s of Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.