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In the post-Cold War period there has been a dramatic increase in the number of states which can be classified as disrupted, thus creating a major source of political, social and military turbulence and instability in world politics. The causes have been

In the post-Cold War period there has been a dramatic increase in the number of states which can be classified as disrupted, thus creating a major source of political, social and military turbulence and instability in world politics. The causes have been

"This unique study from the OECD Development Centre presents a comprehensive review by independent experts of the relationships and division of responsibility between the 22 member governments of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and NGOs from these donor countries, working in international development. Additional chapters cover the roles of the European Union and the World Bank."--Jacket

This paper analyses the normative underpinnings of China's participation in processes of Arctic regionalization. Building on Gareth Evans' concept of responsible international citizenship, it argues that China's Arctic engagement is chiefly motivated by the government's efforts to promote the wellbeing of Chinese citizens – a state of affairs that the current regime equals with the ideal of social stability. As a responsible international citizen, China should, however, advance this "enlightened self-interest" vis-á-vis other members of the Arctic international society, that is, either internalize the established practices that organize the Arctic region or mold them in peaceful ways. In the empirical parts of the paper, we first identify three concrete aims that drive forward China's participation in Arctic regionalization – creating wealth through more "green" growth, mitigating the effects of climate change on China, and promoting a unifying ideology. We then suggest that China has not directly violated any of the key organizing principles of the Arctic international society, but it has found distinct ways to act out these concrete goals and advance the wellbeing of its citizens. Such means include somewhat challenging the dominant interpretation of these norms and refraining from advocating stricter environmental standards.

Barnett and Duvall have offered a highly useful constructivist taxonomy of power in response to the rationalist question of why constructivists formerly lacked a theory of power. However, in applying their taxonomy of power to the question of global governance, they draw upon a specific interpretation of their 'structural' form of power from the radical theory of Steven Lukes. This move generates a number of ontological and analytic issues that constructivists normally avoid. This article offers three amendments to Barnett and Duvall's thesis. These involve the (1) recognition and use of the subsumption of the constitutive forms of power that they theorize within the concept of 'deontic power', introduced in the institutional philosophy of John Searle and (2) recognition that the posited distinction between subjective and objective interests returns us to a rationalist and materialist ontology that resolves the question of actor interests and motivations through exogenous imputation by the analyst – a retrograde step for constructivist theory that can and should be avoided. (3) In developing the deontic bases of the constitutive forms of power introduced by Barnett and Duvall, we will recover the social means by which power can be exercised as authority.