Suchergebnisse

This article accompanies the following article: Val Gillies, 'Childrearing, Class and the New Politics of Parenting', Sociology Compass 2/3 (2008): 10.1111/j.1751‐9020.2008.00114.xIntroductionRecent years have seen a cultural shift in the way childrearing is conceptualised and targeted by politicians and policy makers. The once‐accepted notion that family relationships lay outside the remit of state intervention is being increasingly challenged. More specifically, parenting is being prioritised as a mechanism for tackling wider social ills such as crime and poverty. Analysis of political rhetoric and policy initiatives reveal a class specific focus on disadvantaged families as failing their children and society as a whole. Poor parents are viewed as reproducing a cycle of deprivation and anti‐social behaviour, and are identified as needing state intervention to improve their childrearing skills. Drawing on qualitative research this paper highlights the gap between sanctioned parenting prescriptions and the lives and values of those they are directed at. As such, it encourages critical dialogue on the topics of social class, family, and public policy.Author recommendsGillies, Val. Marginalised Mothers: Exploring Working‐class Experiences of Parenting. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.This book expands on issues discussed in the article. It explores the lived experiences of mothers who are frequently to focus of public concern and intervention, yet all too often have their voices and experiences overlooked. The book explores how they make sense of their lives with their children and families, position themselves within a context of vulnerability, and resist, subvert, and survive material and social marginalisation.Lareau, Annette 2003. Unequal Childhoods, Class, Race and Family Life. Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press.This book consists of a detailed and insightful ethnography of 12 American families exploring the central role that social class plays in childrearing. The book is arranged in case study chapters to reveal the class bound nature of parenting practices and values.Lind, Craig and Keating, Heather (Eds). Children, Family Responsibilities and the State. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell.This edited collection explores from a UK perspective the state regulation of parents who are considered to be failing in their responsibilities. The included essays seek to explore how rhetoric and policy create the framework in which family and parenting is lived.Welshman, John 2006. 'From the Cycle of Deprivation to Social Exclusion: Five Continuities.'The Political Quarterly 77: 475–84.This article critically examines the concept of a 'cycle of deprivation', which suggests that poverty is passed through the generations as a result of children inheriting values and lifestyles that lock them into permanent disadvantage. The article takes an historical approach comparing UK political rhetoric from the 1970s with contemporary policy assumptions.Reich, Jennifer A. 2008. 'The Child Welfare System and State Intervention in Families: From Historical Patterns to Future Questions'. Sociology Compass 2: 3888–909.The paper consists of a critical historical analysis of state intervention in family life in a US context. The paper details the structural evolutions of the child welfare system and explores the many questions it raises.Vincent, Carol and Ball Stephen J. 2007. 'Dispositions "Making Up" the Middle‐Class Child: Families, Activities and Class'. Sociology 41: 1061.The paper draws on qualitative research findings to demonstrate the significance that middle class parents place on after school and leisure activities for the children. The authors show how the development of particular talents and tastes assume a central role in class reproduction.Nelson Margaret K. and Schutz, Rebecca 2007. 'Daycare Differences and the Reproduction of Social Class'. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 36: 281.Drawing on ethnographic research conducted in two day care centers the authors demonstrate differences between centers serving different segments of the population. The authors rely on Annette Lareau's (2003) concepts of 'concerted cultivation' and the 'accomplishment of natural growth' as a way to describe these differences. The authors then reflect on the potential consequences of different styles of child care for the skills, attitudes, and orientations developed by young children.Online materials http://www.parentingculturestudies.org/ Parenting Culture Studies is an informal network of scholars from different countries and disciplines who are together developing a critique of contemporary parenting culture. http://www.lsbu.ac.uk/families The Families and Social Capital Research Group is based at London South Bank University and focuses on the inter‐relationship between the dynamics of family change and social resource processes. The website carries information on past and present research projects, details of publications, and downloadable working papers. http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/policy.php The Sloan Work and Family Research Network is funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and aims to provide resources, build knowledge, and share information on the topic of work and family. It contains a range of information for academics and researchers, workplace practitioners, state public policy makers. http://www.crfr.ac.uk The Centre for Research on Families and Relationships generates and disseminates research. The website contains information on research projects, publications, and events as well as many downloadable resources. http://www.cpag.org.uk/ The Child Poverty Action Group is the leading charity campaigning for the abolition of child poverty in the United Kingdom and for a better deal for low‐income families and children. They monitor official poverty statistics and carry out research, providing evidence of the shortcomings of the social security and tax credits systems in regular briefings to government ministers, MPs, and the general public. The website provides information about low‐income families and the policies that affect them. http://www.familyandparenting.org/ The Family and Parenting Institute was set up in 1999 by the UK Government to act as a centre of expertise on family and parenting issues and to inform policy. The website carries information on research projects and publications on parenting.SyllabiA virtual library of relevant syllabi on work and family can be accessed online at http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/template.php?name=syllabi as part of the Sloan Work and Family Research Network.Focus questionsWhat is political about parenting?How important is the concept of class in understanding parenting practices?Can parenting be described as a 'skill' to be learnt?'Normal' child development is presented as needing careful parenting. To what extent is this a contradiction?What are the particular challenges facing working class parents?

A key factor in the sustainability of China's economic growth is the potential of Chinese firms to develop innovative capabilities autonomously and international management know-how thus enabling them to move up the technological ladder of the production process and to globalise their operations. If successful, some Chinese firms will eventually develop their own brands and open up subsidiaries abroad like their Japanese and South Korean counterparts a few decades ago. If this is not achieved, then China's future growth could remain overly dependent on overseas markets and foreign technology. Chinese firms could remain highly competitive in traditional labour-intensive exports (such as the textile, lighters and toys industries of the Zhejiang province) or in relatively simple electric products (such as household appliance) but would not possess the capacity to become innovators of high tech products. The Chinese firms could only operate internationally in highly competitive industries characterised by low barriers to entry and with moderate margins while firms from the most advanced economies could continue to extract rents in industries characterised by high tech and/or differentiated products thanks to their technological innovation capacities and management know-how. The purpose of this paper will be to assess the capacity of China's largest firms to transform themselves into global competitors possessing ownership-specific advantages or intangible assets like some of their East Asian counterparts and to determine to what extent could the Chinese state pursue a strategic industrial policy to help them do so. The fact that a firm establishes a subsidiary abroad does not make it a global competitor, not even a Multinational Enterprise (MNE) or a Trans-National Corporation (TNC). According to United Nations' (UN) classification, to be considered as TNC or MNE, a firm must have subsidiaries in at least six different countries. Many Chinese firms satisfy these criteria and can be considered as MNEs. Nevertheless, there is a significant gap in terms of possession of intangible assets between being a multinational enterprise and a top global competitor. According to UN estimates, in 2004, there were 70,000 MNE which controlled 690,000 subsidiaries across the globe (El Mouhoub, 2006: 17). Obviously all of those firms cannot be considered as truly global competitors. To delineate more clearly the prerequisites necessary for a firm to evolve into a global competitor, this section will refer to Dunning's eclectic paradigm and OLI configuration. For Dunning, in order for a firm to transform itself into a MNE, it must possess "ownership-specific advantages". That is, intangible assets which constitute substantial barriers to entry for other potential competitors. Dunning lists the following assets: "product innovations, product management, organizational and marketing systems, innovatory capacity, organization of work, non-codifiable knowledge (bank of human capital experience), ability to reduce the cost of intra and/or inter-firm transactions" (Dunning, 1993: 81). Dunning also includes absolute cost advantages coming from a privileged access to inputs, learning by doing, "knowledge of international markets and operations", "capacity to learn from societal difference in organisational and managerial processes and systems" (Dunning, 1993: 81). In this paper, the term "global competitors" refers to incumbents of their industries which are protected by natural and strategic barriers to entry and which operate across the different regions of the world economy. These global competitors enjoy most and often all of the ownership-specific Expert PDF Evaluation 2 advantages listed above. Many of them are the "prime movers" from America and Europe whose emergence in the late 19th century has been analysed by Chandler (Chandler, 1990). They were joined by the Japanese keiretsu in the 1960's and the South Korean chaebol in the 1980's. This paper will attempt to determine whether emerging Chinese champions are effectively acquiring sufficient ownership-specific advantages to have a hope of joining this group of global competitors. The analysis of China's greatest MNEs and outward FDI flows will show that both the type of ownership-specific advantages and the motivations of Chinese firms investing overseas differ radically from the global competitors of the developed economy. It will also show that, in that respect, Chinese firms are not following the internationalisation path of the Japanese keiretsu in the 1960's or the South Korean chaebol in the 1980's. The first part of the paper will provide an analysis of Chinese outward FDI outflows in an attempt to determine the importance of Chinese MNEs and their performance compared to other developing economies. It will also highlight the limitations of working with such an aggregate when it comes to the official Chinese data of foreign direct investment. The second part of this contribution will provide a qualitative analysis of the overseas projects made by Chinese MNEs. An attempt will be made to determine the technological level and the capital- intensity of their overseas operations. The extent of government protection and support extended to these largest firms and the sector in which they operate will be examined. It will be demonstrated that the largest Chinese firms are located in sectors which are heavily protected and aided by the Chinese central government. Finally, it will be made clear that that Chinese FDI outflows are predominantly motivated by the Chinese government's geopolitical objectives rather than by business profit maximisation. The third part of the paper will provide a comparative analysis of the performance of China's largest firms' with that of their global competitors. Aspects to be looked at include capital-intensity, profits and assets. This comparison has two purposes: to clearly delineate the existing gap between these two groups; and to compare the current relative situation of the largest Chinese firms with that of East Asian MNEs at the time of their overseas expansion. This will reveal that Chinese firms have a much lower degree of profitability and capital intensity than the largest Japanese and Korean firms had in the early stages of internationalising their business operations. The three first parts of this paper will highlight the weaknesses of the largest Chinese firms and the gap with their global competitors in terms of profitability, capital and technology intensity. It will be demonstrated that they are unlikely to transform themselves into global competitors without being sheltered by a strong Chinese state industrial policy, as was the case also for their South Korean and Japanese counterparts at a similar stage of their expansion. The fourth and fifth part of the paper will follow up on this by focusing on the capacity of the Chinese state to pursue a strategic trade and industrial policy necessary to transform its national champions into global competitors.

A key factor in the sustainability of China's economic growth is the potential of Chinese firms to develop innovative capabilities autonomously and international management know-how thus enabling them to move up the technological ladder of the production process and to globalise their operations. If successful, some Chinese firms will eventually develop their own brands and open up subsidiaries abroad like their Japanese and South Korean counterparts a few decades ago. If this is not achieved, then China's future growth could remain overly dependent on overseas markets and foreign technology. Chinese firms could remain highly competitive in traditional labour-intensive exports (such as the textile, lighters and toys industries of the Zhejiang province) or in relatively simple electric products (such as household appliance) but would not possess the capacity to become innovators of high tech products. The Chinese firms could only operate internationally in highly competitive industries characterised by low barriers to entry and with moderate margins while firms from the most advanced economies could continue to extract rents in industries characterised by high tech and/or differentiated products thanks to their technological innovation capacities and management know-how. The purpose of this paper will be to assess the capacity of China's largest firms to transform themselves into global competitors possessing ownership-specific advantages or intangible assets like some of their East Asian counterparts and to determine to what extent could the Chinese state pursue a strategic industrial policy to help them do so. The fact that a firm establishes a subsidiary abroad does not make it a global competitor, not even a Multinational Enterprise (MNE) or a Trans-National Corporation (TNC). According to United Nations' (UN) classification, to be considered as TNC or MNE, a firm must have subsidiaries in at least six different countries. Many Chinese firms satisfy these criteria and can be considered as MNEs. Nevertheless, there is a significant gap in terms of possession of intangible assets between being a multinational enterprise and a top global competitor. According to UN estimates, in 2004, there were 70,000 MNE which controlled 690,000 subsidiaries across the globe (El Mouhoub, 2006: 17). Obviously all of those firms cannot be considered as truly global competitors. To delineate more clearly the prerequisites necessary for a firm to evolve into a global competitor, this section will refer to Dunning's eclectic paradigm and OLI configuration. For Dunning, in order for a firm to transform itself into a MNE, it must possess "ownership-specific advantages". That is, intangible assets which constitute substantial barriers to entry for other potential competitors. Dunning lists the following assets: "product innovations, product management, organizational and marketing systems, innovatory capacity, organization of work, non-codifiable knowledge (bank of human capital experience), ability to reduce the cost of intra and/or inter-firm transactions" (Dunning, 1993: 81). Dunning also includes absolute cost advantages coming from a privileged access to inputs, learning by doing, "knowledge of international markets and operations", "capacity to learn from societal difference in organisational and managerial processes and systems" (Dunning, 1993: 81). In this paper, the term "global competitors" refers to incumbents of their industries which are protected by natural and strategic barriers to entry and which operate across the different regions of the world economy. These global competitors enjoy most and often all of the ownership-specific Expert PDF Evaluation 2 advantages listed above. Many of them are the "prime movers" from America and Europe whose emergence in the late 19th century has been analysed by Chandler (Chandler, 1990). They were joined by the Japanese keiretsu in the 1960's and the South Korean chaebol in the 1980's. This paper will attempt to determine whether emerging Chinese champions are effectively acquiring sufficient ownership-specific advantages to have a hope of joining this group of global competitors. The analysis of China's greatest MNEs and outward FDI flows will show that both the type of ownership-specific advantages and the motivations of Chinese firms investing overseas differ radically from the global competitors of the developed economy. It will also show that, in that respect, Chinese firms are not following the internationalisation path of the Japanese keiretsu in the 1960's or the South Korean chaebol in the 1980's. The first part of the paper will provide an analysis of Chinese outward FDI outflows in an attempt to determine the importance of Chinese MNEs and their performance compared to other developing economies. It will also highlight the limitations of working with such an aggregate when it comes to the official Chinese data of foreign direct investment. The second part of this contribution will provide a qualitative analysis of the overseas projects made by Chinese MNEs. An attempt will be made to determine the technological level and the capital- intensity of their overseas operations. The extent of government protection and support extended to these largest firms and the sector in which they operate will be examined. It will be demonstrated that the largest Chinese firms are located in sectors which are heavily protected and aided by the Chinese central government. Finally, it will be made clear that that Chinese FDI outflows are predominantly motivated by the Chinese government's geopolitical objectives rather than by business profit maximisation. The third part of the paper will provide a comparative analysis of the performance of China's largest firms' with that of their global competitors. Aspects to be looked at include capital-intensity, profits and assets. This comparison has two purposes: to clearly delineate the existing gap between these two groups; and to compare the current relative situation of the largest Chinese firms with that of East Asian MNEs at the time of their overseas expansion. This will reveal that Chinese firms have a much lower degree of profitability and capital intensity than the largest Japanese and Korean firms had in the early stages of internationalising their business operations. The three first parts of this paper will highlight the weaknesses of the largest Chinese firms and the gap with their global competitors in terms of profitability, capital and technology intensity. It will be demonstrated that they are unlikely to transform themselves into global competitors without being sheltered by a strong Chinese state industrial policy, as was the case also for their South Korean and Japanese counterparts at a similar stage of their expansion. The fourth and fifth part of the paper will follow up on this by focusing on the capacity of the Chinese state to pursue a strategic trade and industrial policy necessary to transform its national champions into global competitors.

This Report documents the presentations given at the World's first international conference on the management value of the resource knowledge of small scale, indigenous and commercial fishers. The conference was inspired by Dr Robert (Bob) Johannes, whose 1981 Book 'Words of the Lagoon', was the first serious study in this area, and was co-hosted by the UBC Fisheries Centre, UBC First Nations House of Learning and the BC Aboriginal Fisheries Commission. Over 200 people representing 23 countries and 36 North American First Nation representatives attended. The conference sought to provide a way to 'step beyond' fishers' frustration that their knowledge is ignored and scientists' standard position that the knowledge is anecdotal, and can not easily be captured in the reports, tables and graphs they are used to. In total, 48 papers and 26 abstracts of papers were presented during the three days of the conference. These case studies and presentations included Indigenous, Artisanal, small scale and industrial marine and freshwater fisheries in tropical and temperate environments. Species range from turtles and dugongs, through temperate trawl and tropical multi-species fisheries to the aquarium trade. The conference followed themes relating to the use of fishers' ecological knowledge about fishing practices in environmental management; the relationships between fishers' expertise (knowledge) and management; methodological issues/methods for obtaining and accurately representing fishers' knowledge; the ethical issues relating to collaboration between TEK practitioners, managers, academics and industry; and the valuation of fishers' knowledge from an ecological, economic and social approach. DIRECTOR'S FOREWORD -- CONTRIBUTED PAPERS -- MY GRANDFATHER'S KNOWLEDGE: FIRST NATIONS FISHING METHODOLOGIES IN THE MID FRASER RIVER (Arnie Narcisse) -- A NATIVE CHANT Simon Lucas -- FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE AND MANAGEMENT: DIFFERING FUNDAMENTALS IN ARTISANAL AND INDUSTRIAL FISHERIES (R.E. Johannes) -- THE ROLE OF FISHERS KNOWLEDGE IN IMPLEMENTING OCEAN ACT INITIATIVES IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR (A. S. Power and Dawn) Mercer) -- CLOSING THE LOOP: COMMERCIAL FISH HARVESTERS' LOCAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND SCIENCE IN A STUDY OF COASTAL COD IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, CANADA (Karen Gosse, Joe Wroblewski and Barbara Neis) -- APPLYING LOCAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUSTAINABLE FISHERY: THE CURRENT WEST COAST VANCOUVER ISLAND GOOSE BARNACLE FISHERY EXPERIENCE (Joanne Lessard , Josie Osborne, Ray Lauzier, Glen Jamieson and Rick Harbo) -- PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH IN THE BRITISH COLUMBIA GROUNDFISH FISHERY. (Richard D. Stanley and J. Rice) -- THE DISCOURSE OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN MARINE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (Heidi Glaesel and Mark Simonitsch) -- THE ROLE OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE IN DEPLETING A LIMITED RESOURCE – A CASE STUDY OF THE BUMPHEAD PARROTFISH (BOLBOMETOPON MURICATUM) ARTISANAL FISHERY IN ROVIANA LAGOON, WESTERN PROVINCE, SOLOMON ISLANDS (Richard Hamilton) -- USING FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE GOES BEYOND FILLING GAPS IN SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE – ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCES (Pascale Baelde) -- LOCAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN THE MEKONG RIVER IN SOUTHERN LAOS(Ian Baird) -- SCIAENID AGGREGATIONS IN NORTHERN AUSTRALIA: AN EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES THROUGH COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH. (M.J. Phelan) -- STATUS OF RESEARCH ON INDIGENOUS FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE IN AUSTRALIA AND BRAZIL (Adam Faulkner and Renato A. M. Silvano) -- TRADITIONAL MARINE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN VANUATU – SACRED & PROFANE: WORLD VIEWS IN TRANSFORMATION (Francis Hickey) ACCOUNTING FOR THE IMPACTS OF FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE AND NORMS ON ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (Murray A. Rudd) -- THE USE OF FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF FISH RESOURCES IN MALAWI(Edward Nsiku) -- EXAMINING THE TWO CULTURES THEORY OF FISHERIES KNOWLEDGE: THE CASE OF THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC BLUEFISH (Douglas Wilson) THE VALUE OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE IN SEA TURTLE CONSERVATION: A CASE FROM BAJA CALIFORNIA, MEXICO (Kristin E. Bird, Wallace J. Nichols and Charles R. Tambiah) -- PUTTING FISHERMEN'S KNOWLEDGE TO WORK: THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS (Ted Ames) -- USING EXPERT KNOWLEDGE TO IDENTIFY POSSIBLE GROUNDFISH 'ESSENTIAL FISH HABITATS' (Melanie Bergmann, B. Hinz, R. Blyth, M.J. Kaiser, S.I. Rogers and M. Armstrong) -- INTEGRATION OF FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE INTO RESEARCH ON A LARGE TROPICAL RIVER BASIN, THE MEKONG RIVER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Anders F. Poulsen) -- FISHERS' PERCEPTIONS ON THE SEAHORSE FISHERY IN CENTRAL PHILIPPINES: INTERACTIVE APPROACHES AND AN EVALUATION OF RESULTS (J. Meeuwig, M.A. Samoilys and J. Erediano) -- FOCUSING AND TESTING FISHER KNOW-HOW TO SOLVE CONSERVATION PROBLEMS (Edward F. Melvin and Julia K Parrish) -- BIOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT USING KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION [ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE] (Antonio García-Allut, Juan Freire, Alvaro Barreiro and David E. Losada) -- INTEGRATING FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE WITH SURVEY DATA TO UNDERSTAND THE STRUCTURE, ECOLOGY AND USE OF A SEASCAPE OFF SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA (Alan Williams and Nic Bax) -- 'SUSTAINABILITY VECTORS' AS GUIDES IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: WITH EXAMPLES FROM NET FISHERIES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA (Michael D Pido, Peter Valentine and Mark Fenton) -- FISHERS AND SCIENTISTS: NO LONGER FOE, BUT NOT YET FRIEND (Melanie D. Power and Ratana Chuenpagdee) -- HARVESTING AN INLAND SEA: FOLK HISTORY, TEK AND THE CLAIMS OF LAKE MICHIGAN'S COMMERCIAL FISHERY (Michael Chiarappa) -- CAN HISTORICAL NAMES & FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE HELP TO RECONSTRUCT LAKES? (Johan Spens) -- EXPLORING CULTURAL CONSTRUCTS: THE CASE OF SEA MULLET MANAGEMENT IN MORETON BAY, SOUTH EAST QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA (Tanuja Barker and Annie Ross) -- WHO'S LISTENING? ISLANDER KNOWLEDGE IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN TORRES STRAIT, NORTHERN AUSTRALIA (Monica E. Mulrennan) -- A COLLABORATIVE, CONSULTATIVE AND COMMITTED APPROACH TO EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF DUGONGS IN TORRES STRAIT, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA. (Donna Kwan) -- FISHING FOR ANSWERS: THE INCORPORATION OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE IN NORTHERN AUSTRALIA: DEVELOPING CROSS CULTURAL LITERACY (Melissa Nursey-Bray) THE USE OF TRADITIONAL HAWAIIAN KNOWLEDGE IN THE CONTEMPORARY MANAGEMENT OF MARINE RESOURCES(Kelson "Mac" Poepoe, Paul K. Bartram and Alan M. Friedlander) -- TWO FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND FRONTIER STRATEGIES IN THE PHILIPPINES (Maria F. Mangahas) -- HOW SASI PRACTICES MAKE FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE EFFECTIVE (Agus Heri Purnomo) -- HOW LOCAL FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE IMPROVES THE MANAGEMENT OF FISHERIES IN NEW ZEALAND – A SEAFOOD INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE (G.J. Lydon and A. Langley) -- HISTORICAL AND CURRENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE GREENLAND HALIBUT FROM QUÉBEC FIXED-GEAR FISHERS IN THE GULF OF ST. LAWRENCE (Réjeanne Camirand, Bernard Morin and Louise Savard) -- MARINE RESOURCE KNOWLEDGE RELATED TO FISH CLASSIFICATION IN HAÏTI (Jean W. Wiener) PLATEAU FISHING TECHNOLOGY AND ACTIVITY: STL'ATL'IMX, SECWEPEMC AND NLAKA'PAMUX KNOWLEDGE (Nicholette Prince) -- KAT (AMERICAN EEL, ANGUILLA ROSTRATA) LIFE HISTORY (Kerry Prosper and Mary Jane Paulette) -- THE BARE-FOOT ECOLOGIST'S TOOLBOX (Jeremy D. Prince) -- AN EXAMPLE OF CONSERVATION AND EXPLOITATION ACHIEVED THROUGH A VOLUNTARY FISHERY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (Robert E. Blyth, Michel J. Kaiser , Paul J.B. Hart and Gareth Edwards-Jones) -- INTEGRATING SCIENTIFIC AND LOCAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE (LEK) IN STUDIES OF COMMON EIDERS IN SOUTHERN LABRADOR, CANADA (Heather Chaffey) -- HOW FISHERS' ENDEAVORS AND INFORMATION HELP IN MANAGING THE FISHERIES RESOURCES OF THE SUNDARBAN MANGROVE FOREST OF BANGLADESH (Md. Emdadul Haque) -- WHAT'S IN THERE: COMMON NAMES OF BRAZILIAN MARINE FISHES (Kátia M. F. Freire and Daniel Pauly) -- THE ROLE OF FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE IN CO-MANAGEMENT OF ARTISANAL FISHERIES IN THE ESTUARY OF PATOS LAGOON, SOUTHERN BRAZIL (Daniela Kalikoski, Marcelo Vasconcellos) -- COGNITIVE MAPS: CARTOGRAPHY AND CONCEPTS FOR BACK TO THE FUTURE FISHERIES POLICY (Tony J. Pitcher and Nigel Haggan) -- PAPERS IN ABSTRACT: ORALLY PRESENTED CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGIES, MARKET CONDITIONS, AND SOCIAL RELATIONS: THEIR LINKAGES WITH FISHERS TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE (NEW BRUNSWICK'S INSHORE FISHING FLEET IN THE SOUTHERN GULF OF ST.LAWRENCE). (Omer Chouinard and Jean-Paul Vanderlinden) -- FISHING AT KOMODAH, KITKATLA TERRITORY: RETURNING TO SELECTIVITY (Charles R. Menzies and Caroline F.) -- (Butler) -- THE LEADERSHIP ROLE OF CALIFORNIA FISHING MEN AND WOMEN: PROMOTING SCIENCE IN FISHERIES POLICY AND FISH RECOVERY (Natasha Benjamin, Paul Siri and Zeke Grader) -- INCORPORATING INDIGENOUS INTERESTS AND KNOWLEDGE INTO MANAGEMENT OF THE GREAT BARRIER REEF MARINE PARK (M.L. Sommer and L. O. Rosendale) -- USING FISHERS TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE TO IDENTIFY PRIORITY AREAS FOR CONSERVATION IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN (Lance Morgan) -- THE NOVA SCOTIA LEATHERBACK TURTLE WORKING GROUP: A MODEL FOR SUCCESSFUL COLLABORATION BETWEEN FISHERS AND SCIENTISTS (Michael C. James and Kathleen E. Martin…) -- TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE IN OCEAN AND COASTAL MANAGEMENT: A SURVEY OF RECENT EXPERIENCE IN ATLANTIC CANADA (Paul Macnab and Denise McCullough) -- THE TULALIP TRIBE'S CULTURAL STORIES PROJECT: RECORDING AND USING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE FOR CULTURAL LANDSCAPE RECOVERY, WATERSHED MANAGEMENT AND SALMON PROTECTION (Terry Williams, Julia Gold and Preston Hardison) -- Putting Fishers' Knowledge to Work: Conference Proceedings -- ENVIRONMENTAL SENTINELS: REFRAMING COMMERCIAL FISHING IN PURSUIT OF VALUE, INTEGRITY AND SUSTAINABILITY (Bryan Price) -- DEVELOPING A SET OF INDICATORS FOR EVALUATING THE CONDITION OF A RESOURCE -- CASE: FRESHWATER FISHERIES IN LAOS PDR. (Niels Jepsen, Douglas Wilson & Sommano Phounsavath) -- A METHOD TO ESTIMATE THE ABUNDANCE OF ARAPAIMA GIGAS (CUVIER 1817) -- (Leandro Castello) -- USING FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE TO EVALUATE GREAT LAKES FISHERY MANAGEMENT POLICY (Tracy A. Dobson and Laura F. Cimo) -- THE FISHERMEN AND SCIENTISTS RESEARCH SOCIETY: COLLABORATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF THE KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR MODERN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (Kees C.T. Zwanenburg1, P. Fanning, P. Hurley and W.T. Stobo) -- FISHERIES IN THE GALÁPAGOS ISLANDS: THE PARTICIPATION OF FISHERS IN FISHERY MANAGEMENT (E. Espinoza, J.C. Murillo, M.V.Toral, R.H. Bustamante, F. Nicolaides, G.J. Edgar, J. Moreno, C. Chasiluisa, M. Yépez, J.C. Barreno, S. A. Shepherd, J. Viscaino, M. Villalta, R. Andrade, A.F. Born, L. Figueroa, P. Guerrero, M. Piu) -- HOW CAN WE HAVE MORE PARTICIPATION BY THE FISHERMEN IN FISHERIES SCIENCE? (Virginia Boudreau) -- THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF INCORPORATING INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE INTO FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (Terry Williams and Preston Hardison) -- FISHING IN MURKY WATERS: ETHICS AND POLITICS OF RESEARCH ON FISHER KNOWLEDGE (Anita Maurstad) -- BUILDING NETWORKS FOR INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (Preston Hardison) -- SOCIAL RESEARCH FOR SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES (Christie Dyer and Jessica Paterson) -- ICONS: A SOFTWARE SYSTEM FOR INTEGRATING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (Preston Hardison and Terry Williams) ASSEMBLY OF MAP-BASED STREAM NARRATIVES TO FACILITATE STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT (M.R.S. Johannes, K.D. Hyatt, J.K. Cleland, L.Hanslit, and M.M. Stockwell) -- MIGRATION PATTERNS AND SPAWNING HABITS OF AN IMPORTANT FISH, HELIGOPHAGUS WAANDERSI, OF THE PANGASIIDAE FAMILY IN THE MEKONG RIVER BASIN (Sintavong Viravong) -- INSHORE GROUNDFSH SPAWNING AND NURSERY GROUNDS IN THE BAY OF FUNDY: LEARNING WITH AND FROM FISHERMEN (Jennifer Graham) -- THE CONTRIBUTION OF FISHERS TO THE MANAGEMENT OF SEA-URCHIN FISHERIES IN BARBADOS AND ST. LUCIA (Christopher Parker, Patrick McConney and Allan Smith) -- GENERAL DISCUSSION -- LIST OF AUTHORS -- LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ; Fisheries Centre (FC) ; Non UBC ; Unreviewed ; Faculty ; Researcher ; Postdoctoral ; Graduate

This Technical Note was prepared in the context of a joint World Bank-IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina during October-November 2014. Bosnia's capital markets are currently small, but they have the potential to play a more important role in the country's future.

In 2011, India's economic growth has slowed to below 7 percent and the stock markets mirrored the weakening economic conditions, but recovered somewhat in early 2012. Industrial sector output growth briefly slipped into negative territory. On the demand side, fixed investment and consumption growth slowed. India's exports were growing very strongly through 2011 despite the worsening economic conditions in Europe, which continued to be India's most important export market. The balance of payments continued to be in surplus during April-September 2011, but the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) reserves declined by a small amount since then. The rupee nevertheless depreciated by 20 percent between August and December, before recovering somewhat in early 2012. Macroeconomic policies presented a mixed picture: the central government is likely to miss the ambitious target for fiscal consolidation it had set in the FY2011-12 budget by about one percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Slippages are due to lower-than-expected revenues and increasing outlays on subsidies, which had been given low budgetary allocations in anticipation of strong policy changes, which failed to materialize. In India, the slowdown in GDP growth witnessed over the last two quarters is likely to extend into the coming fiscal year because of the weakness in investment. In FY2011-12 and FY2012-13, GDP growth is forecast to reach around 7-7.5 percent, a significant slowdown from the 9-10 percent growth in the run-up to the global financial crisis. The slowdown is at least partly caused by structural problems (power projects facing delays due to the lack of coal and gas feedstock, mining and the telecom sectors hit by corruption scandals, unavailability of land and infrastructure).

The Indian economy recovered from the slowdown at the time of the global financial crisis with strong Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, in particular over the first half of FY2010-11. The agricultural sector bounced back strongly after the 2010 monsoon brought normal levels of rainfall, and the industrial sector registered double-digit growth for three consecutive quarters. Inflation came down to 7.5 percent in November but then accelerated again to 8.4 percent in December because of a renewed food supply shock. The current account deficit in FY2009-10 was the largest ever (in US$ terms) and the monthly deficit widened further during the first half of FY2010-11, but the trend then reversed with import growth slowing and export growth accelerating in September-December 2010. With the significant inflation differential between India and its trading partners, the rupees real effective exchange rate (REER) strengthened. On the fiscal side, massive windfall revenue from wireless spectrum auctions and buoyant tax revenue are likely to be offset by two supplementary spending bills. Monetary policy tightening continued with increases in policy rates. This update also discusses several medium-term issues: the link between the real exchange rate and growth, a long-term look at education, demographics and growth, the challenges facing the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), and the mid-term evaluation of the eleventh development plan. On the real exchange rate, economists have pointed out that the most successful emerging market economies have maintained an undervalued exchange rate to promote exports. In India, the real exchange rate has been broadly stable since the early 1990s, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) judges it fairly valued with respect to different measures of equilibrium. However, the growing trade deficit and a large fiscal deficit do not quite fit this picture. Discussing policies, we argue that it would be best to focus on policies that increase productivity and competitiveness.

The much-ballyhooed summit meeting between Xi Jinping and Joe Biden, occurring yesterday on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in San Francisco, was viewed by many observers as a critical opportunity for the two nations to establish a degree of enduring stability in their tumultuous relationship.
Although some limited agreements and understandings were apparently reached and some encouraging remarks uttered, the meeting fell far short of providing an enduring basis for much of anything beyond a willingness to keep talking and avoid conflict.
On the positive side, of greatest note is the fact that the two presidents agreed on steps to reduce the influx into the United States from China of items fueling the fentanyl crisis in this country and affirmed a general desire to strengthen dialogue on various military-to-military topics and reaffirm the openness of direct lines of communication between military leaders responsible for Asia-Pacific security. Additionally, according to the Chinese readout of the summit, President Biden reiterated the so-called five-point commitment he made regarding Taiwan at the Bali summit last year– that the United States does not seek to start a new Cold War, change China's political system, mobilize alliances against China, or support Taiwan independence, and has no intention of engaging in conflict with China.
While certainly helpful, such developments and repetitions of past statements do not appreciably stabilize the overall relationship in an enduring manner, nor, in the absence of such stability, create serious momentum for the creation of a substantive crisis communication dialogue between the two sides. Particularly worrisome is the fact that no progress whatsoever was evident in creating an agreed-upon vision and framework for the relationship that could provide genuine stability over time. Indeed, nothing that occurred at the summit has altered the fundamentally adversarial nature of relations, nor appreciably lessened the deep levels of mutual suspicion and uncertainty that plague it.
For its part, Washington has made it very clear, in comments made before and after the summit by President Biden and senior officials, that it intends to remain primarily focused on improving its competitive capacities at home, pulling countries into greater alignment with the United States in countering China, and competing intensely with Beijing in a largely zero-sum struggle between democratic and authoritarian values, norms, and international structures.
In this effort, achieving genuine, substantive cooperation in reaching a middle ground or compromise on key issues like the climate challenge, high-tech innovation, and developing more broad-based, inclusive economic and trade structures, is either dismissed by U.S. officials as unrealizable or having been tried and failed in the past. And no effort is being made to define what a stable relationship should look like over the long term. In short, the primary focus of U.S. policymakers remains on keeping talking and avoiding the worst case, not the creation of a durable basis for productive, mutually beneficial relations.
For its part, Beijing has shown no evidence that it has altered its view that the problems in the relationship are due solely to U.S. actions. It continues to insist that China only wants "win-win," productive outcomes and that it has no intention nor desire to displace the U.S. position in the world nor undertake policies designed to weaken or constrain the United States. But this belies a determined Chinese effort to reduce international support for U.S. alliances, create alternative economic, security, and political structures to those led by the United States, and increase its military or quasi-military pressure on U.S. allies and partners. Such soothing Chinese words also run counter to internal statements made on several occasions by Xi Jinping and Chinese officials to the effect that China must develop far greater economic and military capabilities in order to counter a United States that is fundamentally committed to weakening China and ending communist party rule.
Whether precipitated by supposedly threatening U.S. actions or rooted primarily in preexisting ideological views (or both), such Chinese behavior and attitudes will continue to validate, in the minds of many U.S. observers, the disingenuous nature of Chinese statements and the fundamentally threatening nature of the Chinese regime and thereby continue to justify arguments for ever greater levels of deterrence over any meaningful attempts at reassurance on virtually any issue, from trade to Taiwan.
Adding to the problem, the mutually reinforcing, negative dynamic still operating on both sides will no doubt continue to generate considerable fatalism among some scholars, political figures, and defense analysts who posit that greatly increased levels of military deterrence are needed to avert an otherwise unavoidable conflict, or that such conflict will ultimately prove inevitable regardless of how much deterrence is employed. From this perspective, the notion that Washington or Beijing can be reassured in meaningful ways on vital issues becomes largely moot.
The most significant source of such pessimism is the specific dynamic regarding Taiwan, along with the poor state of crisis communication between Washington and Beijing. On the former issues, leaders in both countries publicly espouse, in rote terms, their commitment to the original bilateral understanding regarding the island that has kept the peace for decades — involving Chinese support for peaceful unification as a top priority and U.S. support for its One China policy. However, both sides have nonetheless steadily eroded the credibility of that understanding through both words and actions, to the point where such mutual assurances now carry little weight in either capital. As both sides fail to credibly reassure each other, the likelihood of an eventual conflict would increase.
Nothing that Biden and Xi said at their meeting offers the prospect of altering this dynamic going forward, despite Biden's endorsement of the One China policy and his reported reaffirmation of commitments he made last year in Bali. Rather than clearly reaffirming and explaining the basic limits that will exist on U.S. relations with and support for Taiwan (central to the One China policy) and the absence of any deadline for Chinese efforts to unify with Taiwan (central to Beijing's policy of peaceful unification), the two presidents merely repeated past statements, while advising one another to stop provoking the situation.
On defense issues and crisis communication, the two presidents' statement of their commitment to resuming or strengthening a few defense dialogues and channels of communication is certainly a good thing. However, no mention was made of several more important interactions, including the Defense Consultative Talks (renamed the Defense Strategic Dialogue in 2020), the Asia Pacific Security Dialogue (renamed the Defense Policy Exchange, also in 2020), and the Crisis Communication Working Group (CCWG), which fell into disuse after 2021. These dialogues are all highly essential to any effort to provide an enduring and productive foundation for the relationship
In the absence of such stability, the failure of the two presidents to clearly reaffirm the CCWG is particularly disappointing. In fact, resuming CCWG meetings should be the first step in creating a broader crisis dialogue that extends well beyond the mil-mil level. This dialogue should involve both civilian and military officials from several agencies with the experience, knowledge, and authority to discuss the full range of attitudes, policies, and possible mechanisms that relate to managing and preventing crises.
Such an ambitious but necessary effort will likely require the creation of a two-tier or two-channel crisis dialogue, one focusing on national-level issues relating to the strategy and policy aspects of crisis prevention and management, and the second channel relating primarily to defense establishment prerogatives and responsibilities, but with some civilian input. The latter would focus mainly on crisis management mechanisms, and the former on risk reduction/prevention and policy solutions.
Creating such a structure will, in turn, require a willingness on both sides to recognize that they each contribute to the negative dynamic driving toward a crisis over Taiwan or some other bilateral political-military dispute and that both crisis prevention and crisis management must be essential topics for discussion in any efforts to avoid confrontation and conflict. None of this was suggested at the Biden-Xi summit.
Because of this failure, Beijing will likely continue to resist creating genuine crisis management dialogues and mechanisms, viewing them as a way for Washington to escalate its provocative, crisis-inducing behavior while avoiding an actual conflict. And Washington will continue to resist Beijing's desire to discuss crisis prevention, viewing it as a way for China to pressure the United States to reduce its support for Taiwan, or its military presence in Asia.
Overcoming this impasse will not be easy but could occur with the assistance of unofficial crisis dialogues held at the Track Two or Track 1.5 level. Such conversations between former officials, scholars, and military officers, some in existence for years, can raise topics and present ideas and solutions that would prove virtually impossible at the official Track One level. But no hint of this was evident at the summit, or in subsequent remarks by lower-level officials.
The Biden-Xi meeting was arguably a lost opportunity to open the door toward a more genuinely stable and productive long-term Sino-American relationship. At best, it has temporarily slowed the pace toward more contention and possibly conflict, especially over Taiwan. Lacking the will and political courage to take the hard, risky steps that could put relations on a sound footing over the longer term, the two presidents opted for "small beer," in the form of a few soothing words and limited agreements. As a result, the relationship will likely continue to slide downward and remain prone to severe disruptions. Perhaps it is asking too much of the two presidents to take any risks in attempting to reach a more solid foundation, but the stakes involved suggest that they would be well worth taking.

Since 2014 Sweden has had a Feminist Foreign Policy (PEF in Spanish). This concept has been widely used in academic and political circles, without enough progress in its proper definition and delimitation. Scarce theoretical formulations, almost all of them coming from American and/or European academics, fail to provide the improvement of the concept and are limited to a series of minimal characteristics, which are influenced by a liberal and ethnocentric reading of feminism. It allows the notion of PEF to be used to refer to many diverse situations, and to establish, at least symbolically, a sign of equality between cases that have little elements in common; for instance, the foreign policies of Sweden, Canada, and Mexico. This situation is not insignificant, since, on the one hand, it reduces the importance and impact of the proposals that feminism has been developing for decades in the field of international relations theory; and on the other hand, it allows government officials and some intellectuals to appropriate and make superficial use of principles established in the intense struggles that women and other feminized sectors have been involved in for a long time. Faced with this panorama there is a need to conceptualize. It recovers the most transformative elements of the feminist tradition. To this end, we will problematize some theoretical definitions of PEF, and the self-denominated Feminist Foreign Policies currently in existence, showing the notable weaknesses and contradictions that cross them. We then proceed to the elaboration of a definition of PEF that incorporates elements coming from multiple feminisms (radical, decolonial black, indigenous), and that above all adopts explicitly a geographical, cultural, subalternate and counterhegemonic perspective. Likewise, we propose a gradual categorization of those foreign policies that begin to abandon androcentric and cisheteropatriarchal positioning, from the concepts of Foreign Policy with a Gender Perspective (PEPG in Spanish), and Foreign Policy with a Gender Perspective and Feminist Agenda (PEGAF in Spanish), and whose meanings we shall develop. Although the concept of PEF could be used for naming a foreign policy that gives a complete and uncontradicted account of the postulates upheld by feminism, we believe that it is more appropriate to use other, less comprehensive concepts. In general terms, the PEF corresponds to a liberal and institutional feminist approach, which underestimates other social actors as legitimate interlocutors. Their strategies are based on a gender mainstreaming approach, perfected in international organizations and replicated by various state entities; as such they ignore the ethnic, cultural, religious and socioeconomic particularities of the populations in which they are applied. In them, divergences between the multiple governmental spheres are not unusual. Moreover, even within the Ministries of Foreign Affairs it is possible to identify notorious incongruities between sectors that are, or are not, crossed by the gender perspective. Secondly, we suggest the use of the concept of Foreign Policy with a Gender Perspective and Feminist Agenda. Considering that the levels are cumulative, to the previous characterization, we add the importance of substantive representation; the identification and sanctioning of the different forms of violence within and outside national borders; and the need to at least begin to question the heteropatriarchal structures of oppression from a discursive point of view, for which the field of diplomacy is fundamental. This gradually problematizes the meanings and stereotypes disseminated by institutions, understanding that the dispute over women's rights and other sex gender identities must also take place at the symbolic level. In the Swedish case, we understand that it corresponds to what we have called PEGAF. Indeed, Sweden has done important work concerning development assistance, and the financing of international institutions related to the protection of rights and the empowerment of women. Likewise, of all the cases considered, Sweden is the one in which there is the greatest congruence between its foreign policy and its domestic policy, as well as the work that the Nordic country has been carrying out within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to consolidate a gender approach. Even from a discursive point of view, the Swedish authorities have questioned certain characteristics of the international system, and have had diplomatic disputes with some countries based on issues related to the violation of human rights. However, none of the above has been sustained over time, and the back and forth has been constant. There have been notable discrepancies in the commitment to a feminist agenda among the different ministries, and in some areas, such as defense, the transformations have been insignificant. In addition, on many occasions, Sweden has abandoned its commitment to the defense of feminist postulates, when obstacles or risks have arisen in relation to the national interest- as defined in androcentric terms. The conservative turn in immigration matters, or the government's refusal to confront the strategic sector of the arms industry, are evidence of this. Based on the analysis carried out on the case of Canada, we consider that this country can be framed within Foreign Policies with Gender Perspectives (PEPG), since it presents domestic and international antecedents in the work on women's issues. However, the fact that it defines its foreign policy only in one area, such as development assistance, and focuses its empirical work mainly on economic issues, means that it does not achieve the necessary comprehensiveness to place it at the highest level. Likewise, Canada does not make progress in criticizing or questioning, even discursively, the hegemonic global dynamics and institutions, nor does it question its place in the international structure. Finally, evaluating the Mexican case, we ask ourselves: How can we think of a feminist foreign policy when at the domestic level the drug cartels and human trafficking networks continue to exercise their power and violence with total impunity, and in conjunction with broad sectors of politics, justice and the police? How could the Mexican PEF make sense in a country where people continue to "disappear" or become victims of extrajudicial executions within the framework of democracy, most of the time with representatives of the security forces as the ones responsible? In which part of the gender equality plan can we frame the femicides and transfemicides that place Mexico as one of the most dangerous countries to be a woman or dissident of the heteronorma? Regrettably, we consider that the country is not even in a position to aspire to the lowest level described here –that is,the PEPG- since all its current actions (and those of the last decades) are detrimental to the values and principles that the feminist stance upholds. The criticisms raised in the three case studies addressed has sought to identify their weaknesses and to construct more appropriate concepts that would point to the different types of external policies that are currently oriented towards women. Moreover, this would make it possible to define them with an appropriate term that is in line with their real actions and not mere rhetoric. Our work, of course, is not limited to a conceptual correction; but, above all, it tries to generate a concrete contribution for the generation of tools and the definition of public policies that have a positive impact on the life of the communities represented. ; Desde finales del 2014, tras el anuncio de Suecia de embarcarse en una Política Exterior Feminista (PEF), dicho concepto ha sido utilizado de forma amplia en ámbitos académicos y políticos, sin que se haya avanzado en la deconstrucción y delimitación del mismo, desde una mirada plural y crítica del feminismo. Las formulaciones teóricas existentes, provenientes casi todas de académicas/os estadounidenses y/o europeas/os, se limitan a registrar una serie de características mínimas y ambiguas, influenciadas por una lectura liberal y etnocéntrica de los feminismos. Esto permite que se utilice la noción de PEF para nombrar situaciones diversas, y que se establezca, al menos desde lo simbólico, un signo de igualdad entre casos que poco tienen en común; como pueden ser las políticas exteriores de Suecia, Canadá y México. Esta situación no resulta neutral, ya que, por un lado, le quita trascendencia y contundencia a las propuestas que desde hace décadas los feminismos vienen elaborando en materia de teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales; y por el otro, le permite a funcionarios/as, intelectuales y comunicadores/as, apropiarse y hacer un uso superficial de postulados feministas forjados al calor de las intensas luchas que las mujeres, y otros sectores feminizados, vienen llevando a cabo históricamente. Frente a este panorama, resulta necesaria una disputa por el sentido que recupere los elementos más trasformadores de la tradición feminista. El abordaje utilizado en este trabajo es desde las perspectivas feministas críticas en Relaciones Internacionales. Primero, problematizamos algunas definiciones de política exterior feministas que circulan, y analizamos críticamente las autodenominadas políticas exteriores feministas de Suecia, Canadá y México, señalando falencias y contradicciones que las atraviesan. En una segunda instancia, procedemos a la elaboración de una definición de PEF que incorpora elementos provenientes de múltiples feminismos (decolonial, autónomo, negro, indígena), y que se asume explícitamente situada desde una perspectiva geográfica y cultural, subalternizada y contrahegemónica. Finalmente, proponemos una gradualidad en la categorización de aquellas políticas exteriores que empiezan a abandonar posicionamientos androcentristas y cisheteropatriarcales, a partir de la construcción de los conceptos de "Politica Exterior con Perspectiva de Género" (PEPG), y "Politica Exterior con Perspectiva de Género y Agenda Feminista" (PEGAF), cuyos significados y diferencias desarrollamos.

Human freedom and prosperity have varied enormously among and within countries and regions and have changed drastically over short periods. Social sciences research has begun to illuminate how norms and cultures, as well as legal, political, economic, and social institutions, affect freedom and prosperity, but our understanding of how and why these institutions change remains meager. The researchers who gathered at the National Academy of Sciences in 2010 for a Sackler Symposium sought to give a kick-start to the study of institutional dynamics.

The papers presented vary both in their research methods and in the questions they address. The methods range from theory to econometric studies to detailed cases studies, each seeking to highlight some aspect of how institutions change and what accounts for the differences in institutions that emerge in different settings.

Two of the papers in this volume are analyses of stochastic dynamic systems. One captures a process of contagion by which the new norms governing bilateral exchange may invade a population and become widespread. The other studies the evolution of authority in a society with far-sighted decision makers, who sometimes rationally allow erosion in their long-term control to promote sufficiently better short-term outcomes.

The first of these is Peyton Young's “The Dynamics of Social Innovation” (1), which studies the evolution of norms to be used in bilateral interactions. Agents in Young's network model correspond to nodes that interact with their immediate neighbors and earn payoffs in each interaction that depend on how each party behaves. The agents experiment and learn, so behavior in the system can evolve. The paper discusses how the topology of the network, characteristics of individual learning processes, and the size of the potential improvement affects whether norms are adopted, and how quickly. It turns out that a critical property that superior norms (ones that leads to higher payoffs for all) must have for “fast” adoption is that it must be possible for all members of some local clusters of nodes to profit by adopting the norm, even when the other agents in the network do not adopt. This determinant in turn depends on the size of the gains to adopting the norm, as well as on the nature of the network. The nature of the learning process matters, too. For example, too much experimentation can cause a local group to unlearn their superior norm before it has a chance to spread into the rest of the network.

The second is “A Political Model of Social Evolution” by Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin (2), which studies how undemocratic and authoritarian regimes may become progressively more democratic. In their model, choices are made by a changing set of individual decision makers, who rule according to a voting system. Sometimes expanding participation can lead to greater short-run payoffs at the expense of less control in the longer term, and authoritarian regimes may sometimes accept immediate gains even at the risk of reduced control over the longer run. The model provides a framework for studying how the initial state of the system, the payoffs to different actions, and the nature of voting systems affect long-run outcomes of the system. In particular, outcomes can be history-dependent, and change emerges as the combined result of random events and actual choices by the ruling class.

Four of the papers provide general schemata for thinking about a set of issues, from regional and national political leadership and how it affects the evolution of democracy, to the role of international institutions, to the role of norms in promoting economic development both overall and at different stages in development.

Roger Myerson's “Toward a Theory of Leadership and State-Building” (3) surveys his analyses of the problem of nation building, which has both ancient and modern application. The fundamental issues in Myerson's perspective revolve around problems of leadership. On one hand, to gain followers, new leaders must successfully distribute patronage, particularly in times when and places where following the new leader is dangerous. However, the system also needs to provide discipline for the leader, so that promises are kept once the leader gains power. Additionally, for democracy to thrive, it needs to encourage the development of leaders who can establish the credentials and following needed to challenge the existing authority. The paper develops a wide perspective on the groundwork that needs to be laid for nation building, that is, for promoting the development of systems that can evolve into functioning democracies.

Stephen Krasner's “Changing State Structures: Outside In” (4) considers different situations in which, and channels through which, some states deploy purposive strategies to exercise power over other states. His classification covers (i) contracting with basically voluntary agreement of the state that is subject to the influence, (ii) coercion that forces a weaker state to take a particular action or substantially limits its choice set, (iii) institutional power, whereby the stronger state sets the rules of the game of decision-making in the weaker state, (iv) constitutive power, whereby the stronger state establishes the international system within which the weaker state must operate, and (v) productive power, which alters the identities and capabilities of actors in the weaker state. These provide a useful taxonomy and examples for thinking about the interaction between different countries’ institutions and international institutions and organizations.

“Development, Social Norms, and Assignment to Task” by Marcel Fafchamps (5) traces some broad trends in the dynamics of social norms that are required to support different stages in the process of economic development. Developing economies move to greater specialization of labor, requiring more complex interactions to determine efficient allocation of labor to tasks. In the least-developed economies, production occurs in almost self-contained households where workers must be jacks-of-all-trades. As economies develop, families become the basis for small firms that use and eventually employ labor with specialized skills and come to be supervised by the owner or entrepreneur. Finally, as the volume of market transactions grows, large firms arise, with a managerial hierarchy with delegated authority to supervise workers with longer-term employment contracts. Fafchamps examines how the governance of the transactions with workers needs to differ in the different stages, whether the norms and practices appropriate for different stages can coexist or will clash during the dynamics of development, and what this implies for the prospects of successful and speedy development.

In “Individualism, Innovation, and Long-Run Growth,” Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Gerard Roland (6) provide direct and indirect empirical tests supporting the hypothesis that cultures attaching greater social status to innovators experience higher rates of innovation and economic growth. The direct tests use certain cultural scores as independent variables and growth rates as dependent variables. The indirect tests use genetic distance as an instrument for culture, with closer genetic proximity to the US population implying greater cultural similarity.

The last two papers study the roles of two particular but important institutions of development: law (in opposition to custom) and brokerage (facilitating exchange across boundaries).

“Legal Reform in the Presence of a Living Custom: An Economic Approach,” by Gani Aldashev, Jean-Philippe Platteau, and Sake Wham (7) addresses the ability of statutes that empower traditionally disadvantaged groups, such as women, to promote development-enhancing change, even when the statutes conflict with entrenched social norms. Although full enforcement of such laws is rare, by creating an implicit threat to the traditional authorities—loss of face when their decisions are overruled by higher authorities and reduction in the size of the population over which they rule as the disadvantaged populations find better outside options—formal law can shift the bargaining power of parties and lead to changes in outcomes. The paper constructs a theoretical model and offers examples in support.

Finally, “Stabilizing Brokerage” by Katherine Stovel, Benjamin Golub, and Eva Meyersson Milgrom (8) examines one of the most important and puzzling institutions that promotes change through the exchange of goods, services, information, and practices across an otherwise disconnected social network, from one isolated group to another. Agents who do this are called brokers, and their role is problematic. Each side in the transaction may suspect the broker's integrity or impartiality; therefore, brokerage can be fragile. The paper examines and compares three mechanisms that can counter this problem: (i) isolation of brokers into a distinct social group, separated from the transactors, (ii) complete capture of brokers by one side of the transaction, and (iii) grafting of brokerage functions on to other organizations that have separate motives to develop and sustain a reputation for trustworthiness. The authors analyze theoretical considerations and discuss examples of all three, but the inherent fragility of brokerage creates a natural dynamic in which relatively frequent failures are followed by change.

The variety of approaches, in terms of both questions and methods, highlights the richness of this area of research and indeed made for lively discussion at the conference. We hope this collection of papers will serve to broker ideas across disciplines and eventually to deepen social scientists’ understanding of the process of institutional change.

With the SKYLINE (ANR) research programme, I led a group of researchers in exploring the landscape issues at stake in connection with towers, focusing attention on a particular dimension of the city landscape: the skyline. Because of their architectural characteristics and their prominence, towers become part of the material landscape at all levels. On the other hand, only they can be read and have an impact on the wider landscape in its volume. Sometimes, they act as symbols of a dynamic economy and/or urban renewal and translate into a political project (McNeill 2005; Appert 2008, 2011, 2012). As they are highly visible from far and near, they are among the most widely contested buildings at a time when the landscape is being remobilised both as a living environment, and to win over local populations when it comes to urban projects. In European cities, opposition to towers has become more organised and more widespread: London (Appert and Drozdz 2010), Paris (d'Aboville 2015), but also Seville, Vienna, Barcelona, Geneva and even Saint-Petersburg are affected (Dixon 2009). The first part of Volume 3 describes the resurgence of towers in Europe and elucidates the motivations behind this. The post-war boom years and adherence to urban and architectural modernism precipitated the first construction phase of skyscrapers, both in Eastern and Western Europe. Verticalization of the cities of the continent was brought about by the combined effect of real estate developers and large-scale planning projects by public authorities. The repeated economic crises in the 1970s and 1980s and the rise of heritage preservation aspirations diminished the desire for towers, which were rejected both by a sector of the population and city councils. The 1980's and 1990's saw an all-time low, with just a few exceptions.After this "fallow" period during which very few towers were built, European cities saw a renewed enthusiasm for this architectural and urban form. While the resurgence of skyscrapers has, to date, been somewhat timid in France, it has reached unprecedented proportions in a significant number of other European countries, reflecting a complete change in economic and political contexts. The need to densify cities to meet the demands of sustainable development has broad political consensus. This need is met by a public-private partnership in which city councils become entrepreneurial and adopt an agenda of growth, which usually takes the form of policies that aim to make urban districts more attractive. In this context, towers are once again justified. They are synonymous with maximising land use for residential and commercial functions and – when they are located close to public transport hubs – with signs of network centrality and urban renewal. Economic logic will prevail in what is offered; the choice of towers does not emanate from the people and not necessarily from city councils either. Real estate promoters are henceforth the key players in verticalization. Elected representatives, such as Gérard Colomb in Lyon, or indeed Ken Livingstone and Boris Johnson in London, won over by the symbolism of the towers, mastermind projects to promote their areas. Negotiated urbanism, particularly in the case of London, aims first to accommodate urban growth to the detriment of heritage protection or housing supply.The image of towers will often remain complex and polarised. French players questioned for this part of the study confirmed the hypothesis of the shock factor of modernist architecture of large housing developments among professionals, elected representatives and a section of the population. Taking cognizance of this negative mindset, promoters are not reckoning on a "spontaneous" resurgence of towers (Fincher, 2007; Mollé, 2016). Rather they are tending towards remobilising the mindsets of elevation, domination and distinction to reformulate their vertical housing and office offers as commercial products that combine accommodation, views and lifestyles.The second part of volume 3 revisits the landscape issues at stakes with the return of towers in Europe. Scientific research that has sustainability in its sights, had for a long time failed to recognise the impact the towers had on the landscape. Promoting a sustainable city should not be limited to identifying and creating conditions for lower energy consumption. We should also consider the potential change in the relationship between urban societies and their landscape in the context of verticalization. Projecting urban activities, standards and regulations, the urban landscape is also a territorial marker, a sign of living together and a social and economic resource. The return of towers is mobilising several landscape dimensions. In most cases the skyline - even if it is not always named - is at the core of conflicts between economic players, professionals, elected representatives and associations in terms of material existence and representation of a large part of the urban area read vertically. The second part of the Volume is devoted to this idea. Having recorded and analysed the conflicts in relation to the skyline (Appert, 2008, 2011; Appert and Montès, 2015), I now propose to decrypt the skyline, to stabilise its content and contours, and to discuss its physical and mental representations in order to feed the public debate. The reflection is also intended for a host of players, city councils and associations who are confronted with increasing pressure in favour of verticalization. The proposal I have devised to define the skyline is based on three assumptions. First, the skyline covers a material dimension: it corresponds with an entire combination of views and viewpoints which lead the eye to observe large portions of the urban territory engaging its verticality against the sky. Then, the skyline has a social and cultural dimension: it projects human activities, cultural, social and regulatory norms. In return, through the representation of players, it carries economic values and contributes to lifestyle and well-being. Finally, the skyline is political: as projector and landmark of a pluralist urban society, it is the subject of debates and regulations. The term skyline thus becomes a scientific object that the geographer may engage with, both in a heuristic perspective and in the purpose of decision-making (Chapter 3). Defining the skyline constitutes a first phase in which to discuss three dimensions of the notion, with as many different methodological approaches: the material presence of the vistas and visibility, especially through modelling (Chapter 4), the significance and aesthetic aspects of the skyline, mobilising more sensitive and cultural approaches (Chapter 5) and their reception by experts and lay people gathered by means of surveys (Chapter 6). The last part of Volume 3 constitutes a programme of future research to be carried out in an extension of the ANR SKYLINE programme. This future research will deal with the vertical city, which I continue to feed through two distinct lines of research: dwelling practices in the towers, and the definition and assessment of the urban canopy.The first line, one of the 4 of the industrial chair HEVD (Université de Lyon, labex IMU) is examining dwelling practice in the towers through the production of a vertical home, its representations and the lifestyles therein in France and the United Kingdom. The first observation is the exclusion of the choice of towers in urban renewal schemes in France, even though the other European countries have cumulatively approved more than 350 projects (Appert, 2015). After characterisation of the projects approved in the United Kingdom, it will be a question of examining the exclusion of this architectural choice in France through the recension and analysis of the strategies employed by the players in the real estate industry, as well as the representations with respect to residential towers in France, whether by professionals, players in the real estate industry or people living in towers. Then I will do a more specific study on lifestyles and habits (domestic, mobility, sociability and use of spaces) in private and social housing in residential towers using several case studies. Finally, I will analyse the regulatory constraints and the technical and economical contexts associated with the construction of vertical accommodation in order to understand their repercussions for, on the one hand, the strategies of the players in the real estate industry and on the other, the conditions of occupation and use by the residents. The planned case studies will be about contemporary works involving the partner GFC/Bouygues in London and Lyon, as well as two case studies on social housing, the Montée de l'Observance towers in Lyon and a housing scheme in East London. The second line of research is based on developing the research project for submission of an application to the ANR which I will lead during the next "Villes et bâtiments durables"* call for projects (AAP) in 2016. The project brings together researchers and professionals from various disciplines (geography, information technology, urbanism, architecture, law and sociology) to study the capacity, visibility, potential and possible uses of the urban canopy. Facing the pressures of environmental sustainability and steady urbanisation, roofs (built element of the urban canopy) could contribute additional capacity, constitute spaces for living, leisure and even production, agriculture and electricity, etc. The project envisages: 1/ cross-disciplinary reflection on the delineation of the urban canopy; 2/ an analysis of experience in using rooftops and developing rooftop spaces; 3/ an assessment of the capacity and visibility of the urban canopy and 4/ the development and testing of scenarios for reuse of roofs (in cooperation with the post-doctoral researcher in information technology). ; Avec le programme de recherche SKYLINE (ANR), j'ai emmené un collectif de chercheurs dans l'exploration des enjeux paysagers des tours en focalisant l'attention sur une dimension particulière du paysage de la ville : le skyline. Du fait de leurs caractéristiques architecturales et de leur proéminence, les tours s'inscrivent dans le paysage matériel à toutes les échelles. En revanche, elles seules sont lisibles et impactent le grand paysage lu dans son volume. Elles y jouent parfois le rôle d'emblèmes de dynamisme économique et/ou de renouvellement urbain et traduisent un projet politique (McNeill 2005 ; Appert 2008, 2011, 2012). Par leur visibilité, de près comme de loin, elles font partie des édifices les plus contestés, ce au moment où le paysage est remobilisé à la fois comme cadre de vie et pour faire adhérer les populations aux projets urbains. Dans les villes européennes, la contestation des tours s'organise et s'amplifie : Londres (Appert et Drozdz 2010), Paris (d'Aboville 2015), mais aussi Séville, Vienne, Barcelone, Genève et même Saint-Pétersbourg sont concernées (Dixon 2009). La première partie du volume 3 consiste à caractériser le retour des tours en Europe et à en expliciter les ressorts. Les crises économiques qui se succèdent dans les années 1970 et 1980 et la montée des aspirations à la patrimonialisation réduisent l'appétence pour les tours nées du modernisme et de la phase de verticalisation des Trente Glorieuses. Elles sont rejetées à la fois par une partie de la population et les municipalités. Les décennies 1980 et 1990 sont celles d'un étiage marqué, à quelques exceptions prés.Après cette période d'étiage durant laquelle très peu de tours ont été construites, les villes européennes connaissent un regain d'intérêt pour cette forme architecturale et urbaine. Si le retour des tours est encore modeste en France, il atteint une ampleur sans précédent dans bon nombre de pays européens, témoignant tout d'un changement de contexte économique et politique.La nécessité de densifier les villes pour en réponse aux injonctions du développement durable fait quasi-consensus politique. Elle s'arrime sur une gouvernance publique-privée dans laquelle les municipalités devenues entrepreneuriales adoptent un agenda de croissance qui passe le plus souvent par des politiques visant à rendre plus attractifs les territoires urbains. Dans ce contexte, les tours se trouvent de nouveau légitimées. Elles sont synonymes de maximisation de l'usage du sol pour des fonctions résidentielles et commerciales et, lorsqu'elles sont localisées à proximité des nœuds de transport collectif, des signaux de centralité de réseau et de régénération urbaine. C'est une logique économique de l'offre qui prévaudrait : le choix des tours n'émane pas des populations et pas non plus nécessairement des municipalités. La promotion immobilière est désormais le principal acteur de la verticalisation. Les élus, tels que Gérard Colomb à Lyon, ou encore Ken Livingstone et Boris Johnson à Londres, conquis par la symbolique des tours, instrumentalisent les projets pour commercialiser leurs territoires.Les représentations des tours resteraient souvent complexes et polarisées. Les acteurs français interrogés dans cette partie ont confirmé l'hypothèse d'un traumatisme de l'architecture moderniste, des grands ensembles, parmi les praticiens, les élus et une partie de la population. Prenant acte de cette imaginaire négatif, les promoteurs ne tableraient donc pas sur un retour « spontané » vers les tours (Fincher, 2007; Mollé, 2016). Ils tendraient plutôt à remobiliser les imaginaires de l'élévation, de la domination et de la distinction, pour reformuler leur offre de logements et de bureaux verticaux dans des produits commerciaux qui associent habitat, vue et lifestyles.La deuxième partie du volume 3 revient sur les conflits paysagers suscités par le retour des tours en Europe. Les recherches scientifiques qui ont pour horizon la durabilité, ont longtemps laissé de côté l'impact paysager des tours. Promouvoir une ville durable ne se limite pas à identifier et mettre en œuvre les conditions d'une ville moins énergivore, il s'agit aussi de considérer l'altération potentielle des rapports des sociétés urbaines à leur paysage dans le contexte de verticalisation. Projection des activités, des normes et des règlements urbains, le paysage urbain est aussi un marqueur territorial, une signalétique du vivre ensemble et une ressource économique et sociale. Le retour des tours mobilise plusieurs dimensions du paysage. Dans la majorité des cas, le skyline - même s'il n'est pas toujours nommé - en tant que matérialité et représentation d'une vaste portion du territoire urbain lue dans sa verticalité, est au cœur de conflits entre acteurs économiques, praticiens, élus et associations. La deuxième partie du volume lui est consacré. Ayant acté et analysé les conflits associés au skyline (Appert, 2008, 2011 ; Appert et Montès, 2015), J'ai proposé de le décrypter, d'en stabiliser le contenu et les contours, et d'en discuter les représentations matérielles et mentales pour alimenter le débat public. L'horizon de la réflexion est aussi celui d'un appareillage des acteurs, municipalités et associations, confrontés à une accentuation de la pression à la verticalisation. La dernière partie du volume 3 constitue une programmation des recherches à venir dans le prolongement du programme ANR SKYLINE. Ces recherches futures s'inscrivent dans le champ de la ville verticale, que je continue à alimenter à travers deux axes distincts : l'habiter dans les tours (chaire industrielle HEVD Université de Lyon, labex IMU) et la formalisation et la mesure de la canopée urbaine (ANR CANOPY).

With the SKYLINE (ANR) research programme, I led a group of researchers in exploring the landscape issues at stake in connection with towers, focusing attention on a particular dimension of the city landscape: the skyline. Because of their architectural characteristics and their prominence, towers become part of the material landscape at all levels. On the other hand, only they can be read and have an impact on the wider landscape in its volume. Sometimes, they act as symbols of a dynamic economy and/or urban renewal and translate into a political project (McNeill 2005; Appert 2008, 2011, 2012). As they are highly visible from far and near, they are among the most widely contested buildings at a time when the landscape is being remobilised both as a living environment, and to win over local populations when it comes to urban projects. In European cities, opposition to towers has become more organised and more widespread: London (Appert and Drozdz 2010), Paris (d'Aboville 2015), but also Seville, Vienna, Barcelona, Geneva and even Saint-Petersburg are affected (Dixon 2009). The first part of Volume 3 describes the resurgence of towers in Europe and elucidates the motivations behind this. The post-war boom years and adherence to urban and architectural modernism precipitated the first construction phase of skyscrapers, both in Eastern and Western Europe. Verticalization of the cities of the continent was brought about by the combined effect of real estate developers and large-scale planning projects by public authorities. The repeated economic crises in the 1970s and 1980s and the rise of heritage preservation aspirations diminished the desire for towers, which were rejected both by a sector of the population and city councils. The 1980's and 1990's saw an all-time low, with just a few exceptions.After this "fallow" period during which very few towers were built, European cities saw a renewed enthusiasm for this architectural and urban form. While the resurgence of skyscrapers has, to date, been somewhat timid in France, it has reached unprecedented proportions in a significant number of other European countries, reflecting a complete change in economic and political contexts. The need to densify cities to meet the demands of sustainable development has broad political consensus. This need is met by a public-private partnership in which city councils become entrepreneurial and adopt an agenda of growth, which usually takes the form of policies that aim to make urban districts more attractive. In this context, towers are once again justified. They are synonymous with maximising land use for residential and commercial functions and – when they are located close to public transport hubs – with signs of network centrality and urban renewal. Economic logic will prevail in what is offered; the choice of towers does not emanate from the people and not necessarily from city councils either. Real estate promoters are henceforth the key players in verticalization. Elected representatives, such as Gérard Colomb in Lyon, or indeed Ken Livingstone and Boris Johnson in London, won over by the symbolism of the towers, mastermind projects to promote their areas. Negotiated urbanism, particularly in the case of London, aims first to accommodate urban growth to the detriment of heritage protection or housing supply.The image of towers will often remain complex and polarised. French players questioned for this part of the study confirmed the hypothesis of the shock factor of modernist architecture of large housing developments among professionals, elected representatives and a section of the population. Taking cognizance of this negative mindset, promoters are not reckoning on a "spontaneous" resurgence of towers (Fincher, 2007; Mollé, 2016). Rather they are tending towards remobilising the mindsets of elevation, domination and distinction to reformulate their vertical housing and office offers as commercial products that combine accommodation, views and lifestyles.The second part of volume 3 revisits the landscape issues at stakes with the return of towers in Europe. Scientific research that has sustainability in its sights, had for a long time failed to recognise the impact the towers had on the landscape. Promoting a sustainable city should not be limited to identifying and creating conditions for lower energy consumption. We should also consider the potential change in the relationship between urban societies and their landscape in the context of verticalization. Projecting urban activities, standards and regulations, the urban landscape is also a territorial marker, a sign of living together and a social and economic resource. The return of towers is mobilising several landscape dimensions. In most cases the skyline - even if it is not always named - is at the core of conflicts between economic players, professionals, elected representatives and associations in terms of material existence and representation of a large part of the urban area read vertically. The second part of the Volume is devoted to this idea. Having recorded and analysed the conflicts in relation to the skyline (Appert, 2008, 2011; Appert and Montès, 2015), I now propose to decrypt the skyline, to stabilise its content and contours, and to discuss its physical and mental representations in order to feed the public debate. The reflection is also intended for a host of players, city councils and associations who are confronted with increasing pressure in favour of verticalization. The proposal I have devised to define the skyline is based on three assumptions. First, the skyline covers a material dimension: it corresponds with an entire combination of views and viewpoints which lead the eye to observe large portions of the urban territory engaging its verticality against the sky. Then, the skyline has a social and cultural dimension: it projects human activities, cultural, social and regulatory norms. In return, through the representation of players, it carries economic values and contributes to lifestyle and well-being. Finally, the skyline is political: as projector and landmark of a pluralist urban society, it is the subject of debates and regulations. The term skyline thus becomes a scientific object that the geographer may engage with, both in a heuristic perspective and in the purpose of decision-making (Chapter 3). Defining the skyline constitutes a first phase in which to discuss three dimensions of the notion, with as many different methodological approaches: the material presence of the vistas and visibility, especially through modelling (Chapter 4), the significance and aesthetic aspects of the skyline, mobilising more sensitive and cultural approaches (Chapter 5) and their reception by experts and lay people gathered by means of surveys (Chapter 6). The last part of Volume 3 constitutes a programme of future research to be carried out in an extension of the ANR SKYLINE programme. This future research will deal with the vertical city, which I continue to feed through two distinct lines of research: dwelling practices in the towers, and the definition and assessment of the urban canopy.The first line, one of the 4 of the industrial chair HEVD (Université de Lyon, labex IMU) is examining dwelling practice in the towers through the production of a vertical home, its representations and the lifestyles therein in France and the United Kingdom. The first observation is the exclusion of the choice of towers in urban renewal schemes in France, even though the other European countries have cumulatively approved more than 350 projects (Appert, 2015). After characterisation of the projects approved in the United Kingdom, it will be a question of examining the exclusion of this architectural choice in France through the recension and analysis of the strategies employed by the players in the real estate industry, as well as the representations with respect to residential towers in France, whether by professionals, players in the real estate industry or people living in towers. Then I will do a more specific study on lifestyles and habits (domestic, mobility, sociability and use of spaces) in private and social housing in residential towers using several case studies. Finally, I will analyse the regulatory constraints and the technical and economical contexts associated with the construction of vertical accommodation in order to understand their repercussions for, on the one hand, the strategies of the players in the real estate industry and on the other, the conditions of occupation and use by the residents. The planned case studies will be about contemporary works involving the partner GFC/Bouygues in London and Lyon, as well as two case studies on social housing, the Montée de l'Observance towers in Lyon and a housing scheme in East London. The second line of research is based on developing the research project for submission of an application to the ANR which I will lead during the next "Villes et bâtiments durables"* call for projects (AAP) in 2016. The project brings together researchers and professionals from various disciplines (geography, information technology, urbanism, architecture, law and sociology) to study the capacity, visibility, potential and possible uses of the urban canopy. Facing the pressures of environmental sustainability and steady urbanisation, roofs (built element of the urban canopy) could contribute additional capacity, constitute spaces for living, leisure and even production, agriculture and electricity, etc. The project envisages: 1/ cross-disciplinary reflection on the delineation of the urban canopy; 2/ an analysis of experience in using rooftops and developing rooftop spaces; 3/ an assessment of the capacity and visibility of the urban canopy and 4/ the development and testing of scenarios for reuse of roofs (in cooperation with the post-doctoral researcher in information technology). ; Avec le programme de recherche SKYLINE (ANR), j'ai emmené un collectif de chercheurs dans l'exploration des enjeux paysagers des tours en focalisant l'attention sur une dimension particulière du paysage de la ville : le skyline. Du fait de leurs caractéristiques architecturales et de leur proéminence, les tours s'inscrivent dans le paysage matériel à toutes les échelles. En revanche, elles seules sont lisibles et impactent le grand paysage lu dans son volume. Elles y jouent parfois le rôle d'emblèmes de dynamisme économique et/ou de renouvellement urbain et traduisent un projet politique (McNeill 2005 ; Appert 2008, 2011, 2012). Par leur visibilité, de près comme de loin, elles font partie des édifices les plus contestés, ce au moment où le paysage est remobilisé à la fois comme cadre de vie et pour faire adhérer les populations aux projets urbains. Dans les villes européennes, la contestation des tours s'organise et s'amplifie : Londres (Appert et Drozdz 2010), Paris (d'Aboville 2015), mais aussi Séville, Vienne, Barcelone, Genève et même Saint-Pétersbourg sont concernées (Dixon 2009). La première partie du volume 3 consiste à caractériser le retour des tours en Europe et à en expliciter les ressorts. Les crises économiques qui se succèdent dans les années 1970 et 1980 et la montée des aspirations à la patrimonialisation réduisent l'appétence pour les tours nées du modernisme et de la phase de verticalisation des Trente Glorieuses. Elles sont rejetées à la fois par une partie de la population et les municipalités. Les décennies 1980 et 1990 sont celles d'un étiage marqué, à quelques exceptions prés.Après cette période d'étiage durant laquelle très peu de tours ont été construites, les villes européennes connaissent un regain d'intérêt pour cette forme architecturale et urbaine. Si le retour des tours est encore modeste en France, il atteint une ampleur sans précédent dans bon nombre de pays européens, témoignant tout d'un changement de contexte économique et politique.La nécessité de densifier les villes pour en réponse aux injonctions du développement durable fait quasi-consensus politique. Elle s'arrime sur une gouvernance publique-privée dans laquelle les municipalités devenues entrepreneuriales adoptent un agenda de croissance qui passe le plus souvent par des politiques visant à rendre plus attractifs les territoires urbains. Dans ce contexte, les tours se trouvent de nouveau légitimées. Elles sont synonymes de maximisation de l'usage du sol pour des fonctions résidentielles et commerciales et, lorsqu'elles sont localisées à proximité des nœuds de transport collectif, des signaux de centralité de réseau et de régénération urbaine. C'est une logique économique de l'offre qui prévaudrait : le choix des tours n'émane pas des populations et pas non plus nécessairement des municipalités. La promotion immobilière est désormais le principal acteur de la verticalisation. Les élus, tels que Gérard Colomb à Lyon, ou encore Ken Livingstone et Boris Johnson à Londres, conquis par la symbolique des tours, instrumentalisent les projets pour commercialiser leurs territoires.Les représentations des tours resteraient souvent complexes et polarisées. Les acteurs français interrogés dans cette partie ont confirmé l'hypothèse d'un traumatisme de l'architecture moderniste, des grands ensembles, parmi les praticiens, les élus et une partie de la population. Prenant acte de cette imaginaire négatif, les promoteurs ne tableraient donc pas sur un retour « spontané » vers les tours (Fincher, 2007; Mollé, 2016). Ils tendraient plutôt à remobiliser les imaginaires de l'élévation, de la domination et de la distinction, pour reformuler leur offre de logements et de bureaux verticaux dans des produits commerciaux qui associent habitat, vue et lifestyles.La deuxième partie du volume 3 revient sur les conflits paysagers suscités par le retour des tours en Europe. Les recherches scientifiques qui ont pour horizon la durabilité, ont longtemps laissé de côté l'impact paysager des tours. Promouvoir une ville durable ne se limite pas à identifier et mettre en œuvre les conditions d'une ville moins énergivore, il s'agit aussi de considérer l'altération potentielle des rapports des sociétés urbaines à leur paysage dans le contexte de verticalisation. Projection des activités, des normes et des règlements urbains, le paysage urbain est aussi un marqueur territorial, une signalétique du vivre ensemble et une ressource économique et sociale. Le retour des tours mobilise plusieurs dimensions du paysage. Dans la majorité des cas, le skyline - même s'il n'est pas toujours nommé - en tant que matérialité et représentation d'une vaste portion du territoire urbain lue dans sa verticalité, est au cœur de conflits entre acteurs économiques, praticiens, élus et associations. La deuxième partie du volume lui est consacré. Ayant acté et analysé les conflits associés au skyline (Appert, 2008, 2011 ; Appert et Montès, 2015), J'ai proposé de le décrypter, d'en stabiliser le contenu et les contours, et d'en discuter les représentations matérielles et mentales pour alimenter le débat public. L'horizon de la réflexion est aussi celui d'un appareillage des acteurs, municipalités et associations, confrontés à une accentuation de la pression à la verticalisation. La dernière partie du volume 3 constitue une programmation des recherches à venir dans le prolongement du programme ANR SKYLINE. Ces recherches futures s'inscrivent dans le champ de la ville verticale, que je continue à alimenter à travers deux axes distincts : l'habiter dans les tours (chaire industrielle HEVD Université de Lyon, labex IMU) et la formalisation et la mesure de la canopée urbaine (ANR CANOPY).

With the SKYLINE (ANR) research programme, I led a group of researchers in exploring the landscape issues at stake in connection with towers, focusing attention on a particular dimension of the city landscape: the skyline. Because of their architectural characteristics and their prominence, towers become part of the material landscape at all levels. On the other hand, only they can be read and have an impact on the wider landscape in its volume. Sometimes, they act as symbols of a dynamic economy and/or urban renewal and translate into a political project (McNeill 2005; Appert 2008, 2011, 2012). As they are highly visible from far and near, they are among the most widely contested buildings at a time when the landscape is being remobilised both as a living environment, and to win over local populations when it comes to urban projects. In European cities, opposition to towers has become more organised and more widespread: London (Appert and Drozdz 2010), Paris (d'Aboville 2015), but also Seville, Vienna, Barcelona, Geneva and even Saint-Petersburg are affected (Dixon 2009). The first part of Volume 3 describes the resurgence of towers in Europe and elucidates the motivations behind this. The post-war boom years and adherence to urban and architectural modernism precipitated the first construction phase of skyscrapers, both in Eastern and Western Europe. Verticalization of the cities of the continent was brought about by the combined effect of real estate developers and large-scale planning projects by public authorities. The repeated economic crises in the 1970s and 1980s and the rise of heritage preservation aspirations diminished the desire for towers, which were rejected both by a sector of the population and city councils. The 1980's and 1990's saw an all-time low, with just a few exceptions.After this "fallow" period during which very few towers were built, European cities saw a renewed enthusiasm for this architectural and urban form. While the resurgence of skyscrapers has, to date, been somewhat timid in France, it has reached unprecedented proportions in a significant number of other European countries, reflecting a complete change in economic and political contexts. The need to densify cities to meet the demands of sustainable development has broad political consensus. This need is met by a public-private partnership in which city councils become entrepreneurial and adopt an agenda of growth, which usually takes the form of policies that aim to make urban districts more attractive. In this context, towers are once again justified. They are synonymous with maximising land use for residential and commercial functions and – when they are located close to public transport hubs – with signs of network centrality and urban renewal. Economic logic will prevail in what is offered; the choice of towers does not emanate from the people and not necessarily from city councils either. Real estate promoters are henceforth the key players in verticalization. Elected representatives, such as Gérard Colomb in Lyon, or indeed Ken Livingstone and Boris Johnson in London, won over by the symbolism of the towers, mastermind projects to promote their areas. Negotiated urbanism, particularly in the case of London, aims first to accommodate urban growth to the detriment of heritage protection or housing supply.The image of towers will often remain complex and polarised. French players questioned for this part of the study confirmed the hypothesis of the shock factor of modernist architecture of large housing developments among professionals, elected representatives and a section of the population. Taking cognizance of this negative mindset, promoters are not reckoning on a "spontaneous" resurgence of towers (Fincher, 2007; Mollé, 2016). Rather they are tending towards remobilising the mindsets of elevation, domination and distinction to reformulate their vertical housing and office offers as commercial products that combine accommodation, views and lifestyles.The second part of volume 3 revisits the landscape issues at stakes with the return of towers in Europe. Scientific research that has sustainability in its sights, had for a long time failed to recognise the impact the towers had on the landscape. Promoting a sustainable city should not be limited to identifying and creating conditions for lower energy consumption. We should also consider the potential change in the relationship between urban societies and their landscape in the context of verticalization. Projecting urban activities, standards and regulations, the urban landscape is also a territorial marker, a sign of living together and a social and economic resource. The return of towers is mobilising several landscape dimensions. In most cases the skyline - even if it is not always named - is at the core of conflicts between economic players, professionals, elected representatives and associations in terms of material existence and representation of a large part of the urban area read vertically. The second part of the Volume is devoted to this idea. Having recorded and analysed the conflicts in relation to the skyline (Appert, 2008, 2011; Appert and Montès, 2015), I now propose to decrypt the skyline, to stabilise its content and contours, and to discuss its physical and mental representations in order to feed the public debate. The reflection is also intended for a host of players, city councils and associations who are confronted with increasing pressure in favour of verticalization. The proposal I have devised to define the skyline is based on three assumptions. First, the skyline covers a material dimension: it corresponds with an entire combination of views and viewpoints which lead the eye to observe large portions of the urban territory engaging its verticality against the sky. Then, the skyline has a social and cultural dimension: it projects human activities, cultural, social and regulatory norms. In return, through the representation of players, it carries economic values and contributes to lifestyle and well-being. Finally, the skyline is political: as projector and landmark of a pluralist urban society, it is the subject of debates and regulations. The term skyline thus becomes a scientific object that the geographer may engage with, both in a heuristic perspective and in the purpose of decision-making (Chapter 3). Defining the skyline constitutes a first phase in which to discuss three dimensions of the notion, with as many different methodological approaches: the material presence of the vistas and visibility, especially through modelling (Chapter 4), the significance and aesthetic aspects of the skyline, mobilising more sensitive and cultural approaches (Chapter 5) and their reception by experts and lay people gathered by means of surveys (Chapter 6). The last part of Volume 3 constitutes a programme of future research to be carried out in an extension of the ANR SKYLINE programme. This future research will deal with the vertical city, which I continue to feed through two distinct lines of research: dwelling practices in the towers, and the definition and assessment of the urban canopy.The first line, one of the 4 of the industrial chair HEVD (Université de Lyon, labex IMU) is examining dwelling practice in the towers through the production of a vertical home, its representations and the lifestyles therein in France and the United Kingdom. The first observation is the exclusion of the choice of towers in urban renewal schemes in France, even though the other European countries have cumulatively approved more than 350 projects (Appert, 2015). After characterisation of the projects approved in the United Kingdom, it will be a question of examining the exclusion of this architectural choice in France through the recension and analysis of the strategies employed by the players in the real estate industry, as well as the representations with respect to residential towers in France, whether by professionals, players in the real estate industry or people living in towers. Then I will do a more specific study on lifestyles and habits (domestic, mobility, sociability and use of spaces) in private and social housing in residential towers using several case studies. Finally, I will analyse the regulatory constraints and the technical and economical contexts associated with the construction of vertical accommodation in order to understand their repercussions for, on the one hand, the strategies of the players in the real estate industry and on the other, the conditions of occupation and use by the residents. The planned case studies will be about contemporary works involving the partner GFC/Bouygues in London and Lyon, as well as two case studies on social housing, the Montée de l'Observance towers in Lyon and a housing scheme in East London. The second line of research is based on developing the research project for submission of an application to the ANR which I will lead during the next "Villes et bâtiments durables"* call for projects (AAP) in 2016. The project brings together researchers and professionals from various disciplines (geography, information technology, urbanism, architecture, law and sociology) to study the capacity, visibility, potential and possible uses of the urban canopy. Facing the pressures of environmental sustainability and steady urbanisation, roofs (built element of the urban canopy) could contribute additional capacity, constitute spaces for living, leisure and even production, agriculture and electricity, etc. The project envisages: 1/ cross-disciplinary reflection on the delineation of the urban canopy; 2/ an analysis of experience in using rooftops and developing rooftop spaces; 3/ an assessment of the capacity and visibility of the urban canopy and 4/ the development and testing of scenarios for reuse of roofs (in cooperation with the post-doctoral researcher in information technology). ; Avec le programme de recherche SKYLINE (ANR), j'ai emmené un collectif de chercheurs dans l'exploration des enjeux paysagers des tours en focalisant l'attention sur une dimension particulière du paysage de la ville : le skyline. Du fait de leurs caractéristiques architecturales et de leur proéminence, les tours s'inscrivent dans le paysage matériel à toutes les échelles. En revanche, elles seules sont lisibles et impactent le grand paysage lu dans son volume. Elles y jouent parfois le rôle d'emblèmes de dynamisme économique et/ou de renouvellement urbain et traduisent un projet politique (McNeill 2005 ; Appert 2008, 2011, 2012). Par leur visibilité, de près comme de loin, elles font partie des édifices les plus contestés, ce au moment où le paysage est remobilisé à la fois comme cadre de vie et pour faire adhérer les populations aux projets urbains. Dans les villes européennes, la contestation des tours s'organise et s'amplifie : Londres (Appert et Drozdz 2010), Paris (d'Aboville 2015), mais aussi Séville, Vienne, Barcelone, Genève et même Saint-Pétersbourg sont concernées (Dixon 2009). La première partie du volume 3 consiste à caractériser le retour des tours en Europe et à en expliciter les ressorts. Les crises économiques qui se succèdent dans les années 1970 et 1980 et la montée des aspirations à la patrimonialisation réduisent l'appétence pour les tours nées du modernisme et de la phase de verticalisation des Trente Glorieuses. Elles sont rejetées à la fois par une partie de la population et les municipalités. Les décennies 1980 et 1990 sont celles d'un étiage marqué, à quelques exceptions prés.Après cette période d'étiage durant laquelle très peu de tours ont été construites, les villes européennes connaissent un regain d'intérêt pour cette forme architecturale et urbaine. Si le retour des tours est encore modeste en France, il atteint une ampleur sans précédent dans bon nombre de pays européens, témoignant tout d'un changement de contexte économique et politique.La nécessité de densifier les villes pour en réponse aux injonctions du développement durable fait quasi-consensus politique. Elle s'arrime sur une gouvernance publique-privée dans laquelle les municipalités devenues entrepreneuriales adoptent un agenda de croissance qui passe le plus souvent par des politiques visant à rendre plus attractifs les territoires urbains. Dans ce contexte, les tours se trouvent de nouveau légitimées. Elles sont synonymes de maximisation de l'usage du sol pour des fonctions résidentielles et commerciales et, lorsqu'elles sont localisées à proximité des nœuds de transport collectif, des signaux de centralité de réseau et de régénération urbaine. C'est une logique économique de l'offre qui prévaudrait : le choix des tours n'émane pas des populations et pas non plus nécessairement des municipalités. La promotion immobilière est désormais le principal acteur de la verticalisation. Les élus, tels que Gérard Colomb à Lyon, ou encore Ken Livingstone et Boris Johnson à Londres, conquis par la symbolique des tours, instrumentalisent les projets pour commercialiser leurs territoires.Les représentations des tours resteraient souvent complexes et polarisées. Les acteurs français interrogés dans cette partie ont confirmé l'hypothèse d'un traumatisme de l'architecture moderniste, des grands ensembles, parmi les praticiens, les élus et une partie de la population. Prenant acte de cette imaginaire négatif, les promoteurs ne tableraient donc pas sur un retour « spontané » vers les tours (Fincher, 2007; Mollé, 2016). Ils tendraient plutôt à remobiliser les imaginaires de l'élévation, de la domination et de la distinction, pour reformuler leur offre de logements et de bureaux verticaux dans des produits commerciaux qui associent habitat, vue et lifestyles.La deuxième partie du volume 3 revient sur les conflits paysagers suscités par le retour des tours en Europe. Les recherches scientifiques qui ont pour horizon la durabilité, ont longtemps laissé de côté l'impact paysager des tours. Promouvoir une ville durable ne se limite pas à identifier et mettre en œuvre les conditions d'une ville moins énergivore, il s'agit aussi de considérer l'altération potentielle des rapports des sociétés urbaines à leur paysage dans le contexte de verticalisation. Projection des activités, des normes et des règlements urbains, le paysage urbain est aussi un marqueur territorial, une signalétique du vivre ensemble et une ressource économique et sociale. Le retour des tours mobilise plusieurs dimensions du paysage. Dans la majorité des cas, le skyline - même s'il n'est pas toujours nommé - en tant que matérialité et représentation d'une vaste portion du territoire urbain lue dans sa verticalité, est au cœur de conflits entre acteurs économiques, praticiens, élus et associations. La deuxième partie du volume lui est consacré. Ayant acté et analysé les conflits associés au skyline (Appert, 2008, 2011 ; Appert et Montès, 2015), J'ai proposé de le décrypter, d'en stabiliser le contenu et les contours, et d'en discuter les représentations matérielles et mentales pour alimenter le débat public. L'horizon de la réflexion est aussi celui d'un appareillage des acteurs, municipalités et associations, confrontés à une accentuation de la pression à la verticalisation. La dernière partie du volume 3 constitue une programmation des recherches à venir dans le prolongement du programme ANR SKYLINE. Ces recherches futures s'inscrivent dans le champ de la ville verticale, que je continue à alimenter à travers deux axes distincts : l'habiter dans les tours (chaire industrielle HEVD Université de Lyon, labex IMU) et la formalisation et la mesure de la canopée urbaine (ANR CANOPY).

With the SKYLINE (ANR) research programme, I led a group of researchers in exploring the landscape issues at stake in connection with towers, focusing attention on a particular dimension of the city landscape: the skyline. Because of their architectural characteristics and their prominence, towers become part of the material landscape at all levels. On the other hand, only they can be read and have an impact on the wider landscape in its volume. Sometimes, they act as symbols of a dynamic economy and/or urban renewal and translate into a political project (McNeill 2005; Appert 2008, 2011, 2012). As they are highly visible from far and near, they are among the most widely contested buildings at a time when the landscape is being remobilised both as a living environment, and to win over local populations when it comes to urban projects. In European cities, opposition to towers has become more organised and more widespread: London (Appert and Drozdz 2010), Paris (d'Aboville 2015), but also Seville, Vienna, Barcelona, Geneva and even Saint-Petersburg are affected (Dixon 2009). The first part of Volume 3 describes the resurgence of towers in Europe and elucidates the motivations behind this. The post-war boom years and adherence to urban and architectural modernism precipitated the first construction phase of skyscrapers, both in Eastern and Western Europe. Verticalization of the cities of the continent was brought about by the combined effect of real estate developers and large-scale planning projects by public authorities. The repeated economic crises in the 1970s and 1980s and the rise of heritage preservation aspirations diminished the desire for towers, which were rejected both by a sector of the population and city councils. The 1980's and 1990's saw an all-time low, with just a few exceptions.After this "fallow" period during which very few towers were built, European cities saw a renewed enthusiasm for this architectural and urban form. While the resurgence of skyscrapers has, to date, been somewhat timid in France, it has reached unprecedented proportions in a significant number of other European countries, reflecting a complete change in economic and political contexts. The need to densify cities to meet the demands of sustainable development has broad political consensus. This need is met by a public-private partnership in which city councils become entrepreneurial and adopt an agenda of growth, which usually takes the form of policies that aim to make urban districts more attractive. In this context, towers are once again justified. They are synonymous with maximising land use for residential and commercial functions and – when they are located close to public transport hubs – with signs of network centrality and urban renewal. Economic logic will prevail in what is offered; the choice of towers does not emanate from the people and not necessarily from city councils either. Real estate promoters are henceforth the key players in verticalization. Elected representatives, such as Gérard Colomb in Lyon, or indeed Ken Livingstone and Boris Johnson in London, won over by the symbolism of the towers, mastermind projects to promote their areas. Negotiated urbanism, particularly in the case of London, aims first to accommodate urban growth to the detriment of heritage protection or housing supply.The image of towers will often remain complex and polarised. French players questioned for this part of the study confirmed the hypothesis of the shock factor of modernist architecture of large housing developments among professionals, elected representatives and a section of the population. Taking cognizance of this negative mindset, promoters are not reckoning on a "spontaneous" resurgence of towers (Fincher, 2007; Mollé, 2016). Rather they are tending towards remobilising the mindsets of elevation, domination and distinction to reformulate their vertical housing and office offers as commercial products that combine accommodation, views and lifestyles.The second part of volume 3 revisits the landscape issues at stakes with the return of towers in Europe. Scientific research that has sustainability in its sights, had for a long time failed to recognise the impact the towers had on the landscape. Promoting a sustainable city should not be limited to identifying and creating conditions for lower energy consumption. We should also consider the potential change in the relationship between urban societies and their landscape in the context of verticalization. Projecting urban activities, standards and regulations, the urban landscape is also a territorial marker, a sign of living together and a social and economic resource. The return of towers is mobilising several landscape dimensions. In most cases the skyline - even if it is not always named - is at the core of conflicts between economic players, professionals, elected representatives and associations in terms of material existence and representation of a large part of the urban area read vertically. The second part of the Volume is devoted to this idea. Having recorded and analysed the conflicts in relation to the skyline (Appert, 2008, 2011; Appert and Montès, 2015), I now propose to decrypt the skyline, to stabilise its content and contours, and to discuss its physical and mental representations in order to feed the public debate. The reflection is also intended for a host of players, city councils and associations who are confronted with increasing pressure in favour of verticalization. The proposal I have devised to define the skyline is based on three assumptions. First, the skyline covers a material dimension: it corresponds with an entire combination of views and viewpoints which lead the eye to observe large portions of the urban territory engaging its verticality against the sky. Then, the skyline has a social and cultural dimension: it projects human activities, cultural, social and regulatory norms. In return, through the representation of players, it carries economic values and contributes to lifestyle and well-being. Finally, the skyline is political: as projector and landmark of a pluralist urban society, it is the subject of debates and regulations. The term skyline thus becomes a scientific object that the geographer may engage with, both in a heuristic perspective and in the purpose of decision-making (Chapter 3). Defining the skyline constitutes a first phase in which to discuss three dimensions of the notion, with as many different methodological approaches: the material presence of the vistas and visibility, especially through modelling (Chapter 4), the significance and aesthetic aspects of the skyline, mobilising more sensitive and cultural approaches (Chapter 5) and their reception by experts and lay people gathered by means of surveys (Chapter 6). The last part of Volume 3 constitutes a programme of future research to be carried out in an extension of the ANR SKYLINE programme. This future research will deal with the vertical city, which I continue to feed through two distinct lines of research: dwelling practices in the towers, and the definition and assessment of the urban canopy.The first line, one of the 4 of the industrial chair HEVD (Université de Lyon, labex IMU) is examining dwelling practice in the towers through the production of a vertical home, its representations and the lifestyles therein in France and the United Kingdom. The first observation is the exclusion of the choice of towers in urban renewal schemes in France, even though the other European countries have cumulatively approved more than 350 projects (Appert, 2015). After characterisation of the projects approved in the United Kingdom, it will be a question of examining the exclusion of this architectural choice in France through the recension and analysis of the strategies employed by the players in the real estate industry, as well as the representations with respect to residential towers in France, whether by professionals, players in the real estate industry or people living in towers. Then I will do a more specific study on lifestyles and habits (domestic, mobility, sociability and use of spaces) in private and social housing in residential towers using several case studies. Finally, I will analyse the regulatory constraints and the technical and economical contexts associated with the construction of vertical accommodation in order to understand their repercussions for, on the one hand, the strategies of the players in the real estate industry and on the other, the conditions of occupation and use by the residents. The planned case studies will be about contemporary works involving the partner GFC/Bouygues in London and Lyon, as well as two case studies on social housing, the Montée de l'Observance towers in Lyon and a housing scheme in East London. The second line of research is based on developing the research project for submission of an application to the ANR which I will lead during the next "Villes et bâtiments durables"* call for projects (AAP) in 2016. The project brings together researchers and professionals from various disciplines (geography, information technology, urbanism, architecture, law and sociology) to study the capacity, visibility, potential and possible uses of the urban canopy. Facing the pressures of environmental sustainability and steady urbanisation, roofs (built element of the urban canopy) could contribute additional capacity, constitute spaces for living, leisure and even production, agriculture and electricity, etc. The project envisages: 1/ cross-disciplinary reflection on the delineation of the urban canopy; 2/ an analysis of experience in using rooftops and developing rooftop spaces; 3/ an assessment of the capacity and visibility of the urban canopy and 4/ the development and testing of scenarios for reuse of roofs (in cooperation with the post-doctoral researcher in information technology). ; Avec le programme de recherche SKYLINE (ANR), j'ai emmené un collectif de chercheurs dans l'exploration des enjeux paysagers des tours en focalisant l'attention sur une dimension particulière du paysage de la ville : le skyline. Du fait de leurs caractéristiques architecturales et de leur proéminence, les tours s'inscrivent dans le paysage matériel à toutes les échelles. En revanche, elles seules sont lisibles et impactent le grand paysage lu dans son volume. Elles y jouent parfois le rôle d'emblèmes de dynamisme économique et/ou de renouvellement urbain et traduisent un projet politique (McNeill 2005 ; Appert 2008, 2011, 2012). Par leur visibilité, de près comme de loin, elles font partie des édifices les plus contestés, ce au moment où le paysage est remobilisé à la fois comme cadre de vie et pour faire adhérer les populations aux projets urbains. Dans les villes européennes, la contestation des tours s'organise et s'amplifie : Londres (Appert et Drozdz 2010), Paris (d'Aboville 2015), mais aussi Séville, Vienne, Barcelone, Genève et même Saint-Pétersbourg sont concernées (Dixon 2009). La première partie du volume 3 consiste à caractériser le retour des tours en Europe et à en expliciter les ressorts. Les crises économiques qui se succèdent dans les années 1970 et 1980 et la montée des aspirations à la patrimonialisation réduisent l'appétence pour les tours nées du modernisme et de la phase de verticalisation des Trente Glorieuses. Elles sont rejetées à la fois par une partie de la population et les municipalités. Les décennies 1980 et 1990 sont celles d'un étiage marqué, à quelques exceptions prés.Après cette période d'étiage durant laquelle très peu de tours ont été construites, les villes européennes connaissent un regain d'intérêt pour cette forme architecturale et urbaine. Si le retour des tours est encore modeste en France, il atteint une ampleur sans précédent dans bon nombre de pays européens, témoignant tout d'un changement de contexte économique et politique.La nécessité de densifier les villes pour en réponse aux injonctions du développement durable fait quasi-consensus politique. Elle s'arrime sur une gouvernance publique-privée dans laquelle les municipalités devenues entrepreneuriales adoptent un agenda de croissance qui passe le plus souvent par des politiques visant à rendre plus attractifs les territoires urbains. Dans ce contexte, les tours se trouvent de nouveau légitimées. Elles sont synonymes de maximisation de l'usage du sol pour des fonctions résidentielles et commerciales et, lorsqu'elles sont localisées à proximité des nœuds de transport collectif, des signaux de centralité de réseau et de régénération urbaine. C'est une logique économique de l'offre qui prévaudrait : le choix des tours n'émane pas des populations et pas non plus nécessairement des municipalités. La promotion immobilière est désormais le principal acteur de la verticalisation. Les élus, tels que Gérard Colomb à Lyon, ou encore Ken Livingstone et Boris Johnson à Londres, conquis par la symbolique des tours, instrumentalisent les projets pour commercialiser leurs territoires.Les représentations des tours resteraient souvent complexes et polarisées. Les acteurs français interrogés dans cette partie ont confirmé l'hypothèse d'un traumatisme de l'architecture moderniste, des grands ensembles, parmi les praticiens, les élus et une partie de la population. Prenant acte de cette imaginaire négatif, les promoteurs ne tableraient donc pas sur un retour « spontané » vers les tours (Fincher, 2007; Mollé, 2016). Ils tendraient plutôt à remobiliser les imaginaires de l'élévation, de la domination et de la distinction, pour reformuler leur offre de logements et de bureaux verticaux dans des produits commerciaux qui associent habitat, vue et lifestyles.La deuxième partie du volume 3 revient sur les conflits paysagers suscités par le retour des tours en Europe. Les recherches scientifiques qui ont pour horizon la durabilité, ont longtemps laissé de côté l'impact paysager des tours. Promouvoir une ville durable ne se limite pas à identifier et mettre en œuvre les conditions d'une ville moins énergivore, il s'agit aussi de considérer l'altération potentielle des rapports des sociétés urbaines à leur paysage dans le contexte de verticalisation. Projection des activités, des normes et des règlements urbains, le paysage urbain est aussi un marqueur territorial, une signalétique du vivre ensemble et une ressource économique et sociale. Le retour des tours mobilise plusieurs dimensions du paysage. Dans la majorité des cas, le skyline - même s'il n'est pas toujours nommé - en tant que matérialité et représentation d'une vaste portion du territoire urbain lue dans sa verticalité, est au cœur de conflits entre acteurs économiques, praticiens, élus et associations. La deuxième partie du volume lui est consacré. Ayant acté et analysé les conflits associés au skyline (Appert, 2008, 2011 ; Appert et Montès, 2015), J'ai proposé de le décrypter, d'en stabiliser le contenu et les contours, et d'en discuter les représentations matérielles et mentales pour alimenter le débat public. L'horizon de la réflexion est aussi celui d'un appareillage des acteurs, municipalités et associations, confrontés à une accentuation de la pression à la verticalisation. La dernière partie du volume 3 constitue une programmation des recherches à venir dans le prolongement du programme ANR SKYLINE. Ces recherches futures s'inscrivent dans le champ de la ville verticale, que je continue à alimenter à travers deux axes distincts : l'habiter dans les tours (chaire industrielle HEVD Université de Lyon, labex IMU) et la formalisation et la mesure de la canopée urbaine (ANR CANOPY).

Nowadays teams are used in almost any organization as they are able to respond adequately to the changes from the business environment. Thus, the focus of this thesis is to analyse team working thoroughly by looking at individual team members satisfaction, behaviour and career prospects. Only by investigating first the individuals we can get a proper picture of how the team is functioning as the sum of individual efforts, commitment and relationships among group members shape the actual team. Which are the compensation schemes preferred by the employees? Are there any other types of non-monetary rewards that contribute to higher satisfaction or helping behaviour? And does it really payoff to be part of a team in terms of increase cooperation among group members and potential promotions? These are the research questions that I plan to answer in my dissertation. In the specific case of human resource management it is proper for companies to adapt their compensation systems to their team-based structures (Zobal, 1998; Shaw et al., 2001). However, there are few studies about the effect of the new compensation design on employee satisfaction and helping behaviour. In line with equity theory and theory of cooperation it is important to investigate which other variables that managers can control influence team members satisfaction and cooperation. However, most prior research has studied the relationship between perceived fairness with pay and job satisfaction (Donovan, Drasgow & Munson, 1998; Masterson et al. 2000; Haar & Spell, 2009; Casuneanu, 2010) but little is known about the specific effects of different types of compensation applied on team member satisfaction and citizenship behaviour. Another variable considered to influence satisfaction and other positive work-related attitudes (i.e.cooperation), is autonomy, regarded by the literature as a non-monetary reward (Lawler, 1971). Nevertheless, previous research was either theoretical (Predergast, 2002; Raith, 2008) or considered autonomy at individual level (Karasek, 1979; Ortega, 2009). Given that there are few studies that take into account the influence of autonomy at team level the focus of this thesis is to study the effects of both individual and team-based autonomy on employee behaviour, satisfaction and career prospects. The contribution of this dissertation resides also in the introduction of both types of autonomy which are explored in detail and expected to work like a buffer that compensates for potential injustices of the reward system. While team working has proved to have advantages for productivity (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1989; Hamilton, Nickerson & Owan, 2003), cooperation (Miller and Hamblin; 1963; Van der Vegt et al., 2003; Bamberger & Levi, 2009) and knowledge sharing (Siemsen, Balasubramanian & Roth, 2007) its effects on career advancement prospects received little attention. Furthermore and in line with employee learning theory and previous career development literature, the connection between productivity and promotion has been studied but the complex set of variables (at individual and group level) that affects advancement beyond this needs further investigation. The data that I use in this thesis comes from the fourth European Working Conditions Survey conducted in 2005 by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions1. This survey provides an analysis of working conditions in the 27 countries of the European Union, in the two candidate countries (Turkey and Croatia), in Switzerland and Norway. In total, nearly 30.000 individual workers were interviewed in face-to-face interviews in their own homes between September and November of 2005, but I kept mainly the observations referring to employees working in a team. The focus of this thesis is the team member given that it is essential to understand individual behavior and expectations in order to understand work groups. Once inside the team, individual satisfaction, cooperation and career opportunities have to be carefully looked at, as through a microscope, in order to analyze the underlying factors which influence them. I attempt to address this central theme through three essays, each one exploring a different research question and using the same dataset described above. Chapter 1 entitled The Antecedents of Satisfaction with Pay in Teams: Do Performance-based Compensation and Autonomy Keep Team-members Satisfied? aims to investigate the effects performance-based compensation and autonomy on satisfaction with pay in the context of team working. Given that previous literature suggests that organizations using team working should also change their compensation system accordingly, I aim at developing a complex perspective that considers the influence of different monetary and non-monetary rewards on satisfaction with pay. Drawing from agency theory, equity theory and theory of cooperation I predict that both piece rates and team-based rewards are associated with higher pay satisfaction. Moreover, I claim that autonomy in the form of both individual and team-based contribute to increased satisfaction with pay. Using a cross-sectional dataset of randomly selected European employees who are asked about specific working and living conditions, results confirm that both productivity based rewards and autonomy are important tools when it comes to determining employee satisfaction. Managers should know when to introduce rewards based only on individual merits so as to keep their workers motivated and when to give use autonomy as a buffer to compensate for potential fairness lacks in the payment system. In Chapter 2 entitled The Determinants of Helping Behavior in Teams I address the antecedents of helping behaviour in teams by looking at performance based compensation and autonomy. Given that previous literature has mainly examined each determinant separately, I aim at developing a complex perspective that considers their effect simultaneously. Using agency theory, social exchange theory and the theory of cooperation, I predict that piece rates and individual productivity payments decrease cooperation while and empowerment, at both individual and team level, leads to more helping behavior. This paper measures helping behaviour through the degree of assistance received by a team-member from other colleagues. We assume that workers receive help-from somebody else who may be called the good Samaritan- in two cases: first, when somebody else has something to gain if he or she offers help (for instance higher common reward or the perspective of receiving help himself) and second, when somebody else wants to help only because he or she can, this person being the Good Samaritan. I claim that a potential explanation that goes beyond compensation and autonomy refers to altruistic behaviour. Results yield support for the majority of the hypotheses confirming that managers could control their employees through either the compensation system or through autonomy in order to determine them to assist others. Practical implications are also identified and new directions for further research are proposed. In Chapter 3 entitled Team Participation and Career Advancement I study the relationship between team affiliation and career advancement. Given that previous literature has mainly examined the connection between productivity and promotion, it is interesting to analyze the complex set of variables that affect career prospects beyond this. Drawing from employee learning and career development literature I aim at investigating both the antecedents and consequences of team affiliation. I claim that both the level of education and tenure are associated with team participation while inside the group, together with individual and team-based autonomy, they lead to high career advancement prospects. The findings suggest that managers may prefer to select in teams employees who are highly educated or have a large history and experience with the organization and once inside the team, team affiliation, individual autonomy, higher education and team discretion in the form of team freedom over the choice of the group leader contribute to high career prospects as expected. The implication regarding attaining further education is in line with findings from Arrow (1972), Spilerman & Lunde (1991) and Chao & Ngai (2001) who consider education credential as an important signal about employee level of competence ; El foco de esta tesis es analizar el trabajo en equipo mirando a los miembros individuales del grupo la satisfacción, el comportamiento y perspectivas de carrera. Sólo mediante la investigación de los individuos podemos tener una idea correcta de cómo el equipo está funcionando siendo de hecho la suma de los esfuerzos individuales, el compromiso y las relaciones entre los miembros del equipo. ¿Cuáles son los planes de compensación preferidos por los empleados? ¿Hay algún otro tipo de recompensas no monetarias que contribuyan a una mayor satisfacción o al comportamiento de ayuda entre los miembros del grupo? Y realmente recompensa formar parte de un equipo en términos de incrementar la cooperación entre los miembros del grupo y promociones potenciales? Estas son las preguntas de investigación que tengo la intención de responder en mi tesis. Los datos que utilizo en esta tesis vienen de la cuarta Encuesta europea sobre las condiciones de trabajo realizada en 2005 por la Fundación Europea para la Mejora de Vida y de Trabajo. Este estudio ofrece un análisis de las condiciones de trabajo en los 27 países de la Unión Europea, en los dos países candidatos (Turquía y Croacia), en Suiza y Noruega. En total, casi 30.000 trabajadores individuales fueron entrevistados en las entrevistas cara a cara en sus propias casas entre septiembre y noviembre de 2005, pero analice principalmente las observaciones que se refieren a los empleados que trabajan en equipo. El objetivo de esta tesis es estudiar el miembro del equipo ya que es esencial para comprender el comportamiento individual y las expectativas a fin de entender los grupos de trabajo. Una vez dentro del equipo, la satisfacción individual, la cooperación y las oportunidades profesionales tienen que ser cuidadosamente examinados, como a través de un microscopio, con el fin de analizar los factores subyacentes que los influyen. Abordare este tema central a través de tres ensayos, cada uno explorando un tema de investigación diferente y utilizando el mismo conjunto de datos descrito anteriormente. Capítulo 1 tiene como objetivo investigar los efectos de la compensación y la autonomía en la satisfacción individual con goce de sueldo en el contexto del trabajo en equipo. Teniendo en cuenta que la literatura previa sugiere que las organizaciones con trabajo en equipo también deben cambiar su sistema de compensación en consecuencia, quiero desarrollar una perspectiva compleja que tenga en cuenta la influencia de los diferentes premios monetarios y no monetarios en la satisfacción con goce de sueldo. Partiendo de la teoría de la agencia, la teoría de la equidad y la teoría de la cooperación mi predicción es que tanto a destajo y las recompensas basadas en el trabajo en equipo están asociados con la satisfacción más alta con el pago. Por otra parte, también afirmo que la autonomía tanto en la forma individual como en equipo contribuye a una mayor satisfacción con goce de sueldo. Los resultados, utilizando la base de datos descrita anteriormente, confirman que tanto la compensación basada en la productividad y como la autonomía son herramientas importantes a la hora de determinar la satisfacción del empleado. Los gerentes deben saber cuándo hay que introducir recompensas basadas únicamente en los méritos individuales con el fin de mantener a sus trabajadores motivados y cuándo usar la autonomía como un amortiguador para compensar posibles carencias en la equidad del sistema de pago. En el capítulo 2 estoy analizando los antecedentes de la ayuda en equipos mediante la compensación basada en el rendimiento y la autonomía. Dado que estudios anteriores han examinado cada determinante sobre todo por separado, este ensayo apunta a desarrollar una perspectiva compleja que tenga en cuenta el efecto de las dos al mismo tiempo. Partiendo de la teoría de la agencia, la teoría del intercambio social y la teoría de la cooperación, predigo que los pagos individuales en función de la productividad disminuyen la cooperación, mientras que el empoderamiento, tanto a nivel individual como al de equipo, lleva a un comportamiento más ayuda. Este artículo mide el comportamiento de ayuda a través del grado de ayuda recibida por un miembro del equipo de otros colegas. Asumimos que los trabajadores reciban ayuda de otra persona que pueda ser llamada el Buen Samaritano, en dos casos: primero, cuando alguien tiene algo que ganar si él o ella ofrece ayuda (por ejemplo, mayor recompensa común o la perspectiva de recibir ayuda de otros) y en segundo lugar, cuando alguien quiere ayudar sólo porque él o ella puede, esta persona siendo altruista, o el Buen Samaritano. Afirmo que una posible explicación que va más allá de la compensación y la autonomía se refiere a la conducta altruista. Los resultados apoyan la mayoría de las hipótesis confirmando que los gerentes podrían controlar a sus empleados ya sea a través del sistema de compensación o a través de la autonomía para determinarlos ayudar a otros. Las implicaciones prácticas están también identificadas y nuevas direcciones para futuras investigaciones propuestas. En el tercer ensayo estudio la relación entre la participación en el equipo y las promociones. Dado que en estudios anteriores se ha examinado sobre todo la relación entre la productividad y la promoción, es interesante analizar el complejo conjunto de variables que afectan las perspectivas de carrera más allá de este. Utilizando la teoría de aprendizaje de los empleados y la literatura de desarrollo profesional el objetivo de este 15 capítulo es investigar tanto los antecedentes como las consecuencias de la afiliación a un equipo. Sostengo que tanto el nivel de la educación y la tenencia se asocian con la participación del equipo, mientras que en el interior del grupo, junto con autonomía individuales y al nivel de equipo, conducen a altas perspectivas de promoción. Los resultados sugieren que los directivos prefieren seleccionar en los equipos a los empleados que tienen una educación alta o tienen una larga historia y experiencia en la organización y una vez dentro del grupo, ser parte de un equipo, tener autonomía individual, educación superior y gozando de autonomía a nivel de equipo -en forma de la libertad la elección del líder del grupo- conducen a altas perspectivas en la carrera, tal como se esperaba. La implicación con respecto a lograr un nivel alto de educación está en consonancia con las conclusiones de Arrow (1972), Spilerman y Lunde (1991) y Chao y Ngai (2001) quienes consideran la educación una importante señal sobre el nivel de competencia de los empleados