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AbstractAlthough Colombia is a major country of emigration, little is known about its citizens' motivations for migration. Social and economic conditions have been studied as determinants of migration, but violence has received less attention. We examine how social networks and violence function to promote emigration from Colombia by linking event‐history data from the Latin American Migration Project to external data on violence and economic conditions. We show that emigration is more likely to be initiated by those with higher education, those with network connections to migrants, and during periods of greater violence and increased police presence. Although violence acts powerfully to determine when people migrate, the geographic distribution of social capital determines where they go. Not surprisingly, migrants go to locations where people in their social networks are currently living or have been earlier.

En distinguant quatre modèles moraux justifiant l'aide au niveau international et en comparant leurs mérites et leurs limites, les auteurs plaident pour la promotion du principe le plus cosmopolite, adapté aux attentes et aux besoins actuels.

AbstractPolitical inequality refers to the unequal influence over decisions made by political bodies and the unequal outcomes of those decisions. Political inequality is a subtype of power inequality, visible within the political processes of all kinds of political structures. In modern democracies, political inequality is simultaneously a dimension of democracy and a dimension of stratification. Two key theoretical and empirical questions are How much political inequality is there? and is political inequality rising, falling, or staying the same? The answer to these key questions requires us to specify the kind of political inequality – voice, response, and their subtypes – and whether we mean equality of political opportunities or of political outcomes. I argue that we need to understand better the form, duration, and magnitude of political inequality within and across nations. We need to study it systematically, continuously, and diligently, and in an inclusive, open‐minded way, inclining our ears to the varied contributions of the many academic disciplines. We should begin by studying political inequality as an international phenomenon and as an interdisciplinary enterprise, and from an intersectional approach.

A basic assumption of much literature on international conflict, mediation, and social psychology is that the process of mediation can break down stereotypes or images which conflicting parties hold of each other; this breakdown is argued to facilitate settlement. The article proposes a method for the systematic testing of this assumption. This approach is then explored with a `plausibility probe' consisting of three case studies: the Israeli-Egyptian conflict from 1973 to 1979; the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots from 1979 to 1983; and the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1985. In all three cases, the predictions of hypothesized relationship were upheld. In the one case (Egypt-Israel) where resolution was reached, images did change, correlated with mediation efforts over time. In cases (Cyprus, Iran-Iraq) where no resolution was obtained, no image change occurred despite mediation efforts. These results suggest that the previously untested hypothesis of mediation theory regarding the importance of image change is a plausible one, and should be pursued with further research in the form of more case studies and large-N analyses.

This essay presents a preliminary model of the factors that influence the value of positive and negative economic incentives in international politics. The first part of the article is a review of prior research findings on incentive value. It integrates several lines of research and organizes the findings into five categories that form the frame of a model of incentive value; target market characteristics, target political structure, characteristics of goods, world market conditions and sender state political structure. Since the studies used to create this frame focus primarily on negative incentives, the second part of the study tries to balance this bias with insights from cases of positive incentives. This analysis suggests some original points; it finds that capital goods are less useful as repeated rewards and that relational norms may affect the value of an incentive. The inductive portion of the analysis also highlights a major difference between negative and positive incentives. For while market forces work against limiting access to substitutes in negative incentives and thus decrease their value, limited alternatives were found to contribute to the value of positive incentives.

AbstractLarge firms played a central role in the "new trade" models that became a major focus of trade economists in the early 1980s. Subsequent literature for the most part kept imperfect competition but jettisoned oligopoly. Instead, as the heterogeneous firms literature burgeoned in the 2000s, monopolistic competition quickly became established as the workhorse model. The use of oligopoly in trade models has been criticized for reasons that we argue are unpersuasive. Renewed incorporation of oligopolistic firms in international trade is warranted. Quantitative investigations of welfare effects of trade policy should again address the impact of such policies on the allocation of profits across countries.