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In this article I focus on those aspects of Keith Dowding's book that are most concerned with interpretive approaches to the study of politics. I argue that, in ways not adequately captured by Dowding's descriptions, the historical study of political concepts tells us something about their historical political effects and for this reason has a distinct value for how we think about and study politics. Furthermore, I argue, concepts of and about politics, including the concepts of political science, cannot be fully separated from the political contexts of which they are a part. Concepts which function as generalisable explanations at one point in time can shape the thinking and behaviour of political actors and thus be very particular causes. A philosophy or method of political science unaware of or inattentive to this dimension of politics and political science is incomplete.

THE AUTHOR CONTRASTS THE APPROACHES TO THIRD WORLD CULTURES AND TO IMPERIALISM FOUND IN THE WRITING OF RAYMOND WILLIAMS WITH THAT FOUND IN THE WORK OF ALBERT CAMUS.

The specific languages referred to in this presentation are: scientific language, mathematical language, theological language and philosophical language. Cosmological, scientific or theological models understood as distinct interpretations of a common symbolic language do not ensure, by such a common basis, a possible or legitimate correspondence of certain units of meaning. Mathematics understood as a symbolic language used in scientific and theological interpretation does not bridge between science and theology. Instead, it only allows the assertion of a rational-mathematical unity in expression. In this perspective, theology is nothing less rational than science. The activity of interpretation has an interdisciplinary character, it is a necessary condition of dialogue. We cannot speak about dialogue without communication between various fields, without passing from one specialized language to another specialized language. The present paper proposes to suggest this aspect.

The focus of this article is the issue of integrating statutory and other law. A substantial number of statutory cases decided during October Term 1993 offered the Court a choice between treating statutes as static, isolated instructions from higher authority, and regarding them as part of a "unified system of judge-made and statute law." It tended to make the former choice, one that segregates statutes from the common law. The argument here is that, in the process, it diminishes both statute and common law, both legislature and court. Integrating statutes and common law has the opposite effect. Legislative influence and statutes are extended when statutory policy becomes the basis for analogical reasoning to decide cases that have not been provided for. The judicial function is also augmented if the world in which judges act to promote coherence includes statutory as well as judge-made law. Thus, to include statutes implies that judges may shape their readings within the possibilities offered by the text, over time, as changing general law and the social circumstances to which it responds may suggest.