Search results

International audience ; What should be the right place for religions in France ? Our debates are old and sharp. France has two legislations : a concordat (Napoléon) for two departments and the common rule (1905). The word "Laîcité" was not employed at the beginning, but appears progressively. Do Muslims living in France are changing the concept ? Do they imply a new manner of seeing things ? What are the results of the attacks of 2015 and 2016 on the opinion ? We analyse in this communication for the universities of Bucharest and Craiova articles published in the newspaper Le Monde. What is the reflection about the concept of "laïcité", what are the traditional arguments and the new ones ? ; La définition de la place des religions est une question récurrente en France. Les débats sont anciens, notamment depuis la période révolutionnaire. Ils ont abouti à un régime de concordat, puis à la loi de 1905 de séparation des Églises et de l'État. Le concept de laïcité est apparu au fil des arguments. La présence de l'islam sur le sol français pose-t-elle des problèmes spécifiques ? Les terroristes islamistes peuvent-ils avoir raison de notre manière de vivre ensemble ? Après un retour sur les débats qui ont accompagné la loi de 1905, nous analyserons ici les articles d'opinion parus dans le journal Le Monde après les attentats de 2015 et de 2016. Il s'agira de présenter les thématiques et les arguments développés, avec un triple souci : identifier ce que l'on pourrait nommer les thèmes et arguments qui concernent indistinctement toutes les religions, les thèmes spécifiquement liés à l'islam, et enfin les thèmes nouveaux qui émergent.

IN THIS PAPER, THE AUTHOR PROVIDES A POLITICAL PREFACE TO THE RECOVERY OF A WELL-KNOWN DOMAIN OF PUBLIC CONCERN IN SOUTH ASIA, ETHNIC AND ESPECIALLY RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, FROM THE HEGEMONIC LANGUAGE OF SECULARISM POPULARIZED BY WESTERNIZED INTELLECTUALS AND MIDDLE CLASSES EXPOSED TO THE GLOBALLY DOMINANT LANGUAGE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. THIS LANGUAGE, WHATEVER MAY HAVE BEEN ITS POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO HUMANE GOVERNANCE AND TO RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN THE PAST, INCREASINGLY HAS BECOME A COVER FOR THE COMPLICITY OF MODERN INTELLECTUALS AND THE MODERNIZING MIDDLE CLASSES OF SOUTH ASIA IN THE NEW FORMS OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE. THESE ARE THE FORMS IN WHICH THE STATE, THE MEDIA AND THE IDEOLOGIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNITY PROPAGATED BY THE MODERN INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE MIDDLE CLASSES PLAY CRUCIAL ROLES.

Editorial cartoons do not just mirror politics, but are also themselves a part of politics. They are more than single-panel graphical commentaries on daily policies, for they construct their own claims on truth. The cartoonist can use the polysemic nature of visual signs and present a distinct framing perspective. Editorial cartoonists with certain ideological stances can become an actor in "the struggle for cultural supremacy," in Tarrow's (1998) term. This struggle refers to efforts by the state, media, and social movements to influence the interpretative processes by which individuals negotiate the meaning of events. This paper analyzes the editorial cartoons in Turkish daily newspapers in terms of their competing framings of contemporary Turkey's secularist-Islamist division. Secularism and Islamism refer here to political projects that seek to transform and reinstitute a sociopolitical order on the basis of some constitutive norms (Çınar 2005, 8–9).

This paper argues that secularism as a concept and practice arose from the need in 16th and 17th century Europe to create a neutral space making possible intra- as well as inter-State discourse. This neutral space was from the beginning part of the emerging scientific revolution; it transposed in a different key the dogmatic unicity of the two warring religious denominations. Secular science created the 'sacred/spiritual' as an other-worldly domain totally separate from this-worldly realms of nature and society. By looking at an important festival in coastal Orissa taking place in a so-called 'sacred grove', the paper argues that the category of sacred thus wielded does violence to a different reality where unicity and the sacred/secular dichotomy, among others, are not found. Rather than essentialist categories, local practice conjures a dynamic, shifting, alternating reality, in which no single principle or reality dominates. The paper argues that unicity is lethal to diversity and that secular nation-states have everywhere adopted science as both a strengthening and legitimising tool, thus endangering diversity. Newly emergent religious 'fundamentalisms' negatively mirror the unicity of the secular nation-state, whereas much of local practice retains its diversity-generating ways of life.

La secularización es un proceso que refleja los profundos cambios que han sufrido las sociedades contemporáneas. La religión ha cedido su poder al Estado, a los medios masivos de comunicación e informáticos, a los grupos de poder económico y político. El esquema religioso de valores también ha sido vulnerado. Sin embargo, la necesidad de autonomía humana fincada en la secularización no es ajena a un anhelo de trascendencia que todo ser humano se formula en alguna etapa de su vida. Una mirada objetiva a la dinámica de la secularización permite entender que ella es posible porque forma parte del mismo designio de Dios. De este modo, la secularización es una necesidad de nuestro tiempo afín a la búsqueda de sentido y trascendencia ; Secularization is a process that reflects the deep changes that contemporary societies have suffered. Religion has ceded its power to the state, to mass and informatics media, and to groups of economic and political power. The religious schema of values has been harmed too. Nevertheless the need of human autonomy founded in the secularization is not strange to a desire of transcendence that every human being has formulated at one stage of his life. An objective look at the dynamics of the secularization allows us to understand that secularization is also part of Gods plan. In this sense, secularization is a need of our time adjacent to the searching of sense and transcendence.

AbstractReligious movements have long been challenging the modernist and secularist ideas around the world. Within the last decade or so, pro-religious parties made significant electoral advances in various countries, including India, Sudan, Algeria, and the Palestinian territories. In this article, we focus on the rise of the pro-religious Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- AKP) to power in the 2002 elections in Turkey. Using the Turkish experience with political Islam, we evaluate the explanatory value of Mark Juergensmeyer's rise of religious nationalism theory, with a special emphasis on the "failed secularism" argument. Our analysis indicates that the theoretical approach formulated by Juergensmeyer has a great deal of explanatory power; however, it does not provide a complete explanation for the success of the AKP. The rise of religion in Turkish politics is the result of a complex process over long years of encounter and confrontation between two frameworks of order, starting with the sudden imposition of secularism from above, when the republic was established. Hence, to understand the rise of religion in contemporary Turkish politics, an in-depth understanding of history, politics, and the sources of tension between secularists and Islamists is essential. The findings of this article have important implications for other countries, especially those that are experiencing a resurgence of religion in politics, and are struggling to integrate religious parties into a democratic system.

The revival of the religion in the new context of a global world-society, which is as modern as religious, doesn´t happen only as a sociological result of the dismantling of the postcolonial world —which denies the secularist forecast of the religion decline and provides the pluralism phenomenon with an unthought-of ethical and political complexity and virtuality—, but as a result of the modern reason crisis too, that makes reason rationally unable to justify political life relying on a rationalist ethical monism. The rationalist last foundation crisis affects as much the fundamentalist religious claims —which pretend to interpret the so called «religion resurgence or religion revival» in a «postsecular society» in a rapidly triumphal way, as the secularist claims which pretend to deny the religion any ethical and political virtuality in the public sphere. The democratic turn, antiauthoritarian and antidogmatic, coherently demanded within the context of the modern reason crisis by three wellknown representatives of the postmetaphysical, hermeneutical and pragmatist philosophy, such as Vattimo, Habermas and Rorty, replaces the debate between secularism and religion on the basis of true questions with the other on the basis of solidarity questions. ; La presencia revitalizada de la religión en el contexto globalizado de una sociedad-mundo, tan moderna como religiosa, no acontece únicamente como resultado sociológico del desmantelamiento del mundo postcolonial —que desmiente de hecho el pronóstico secularista del ocaso de la religión y que dota al fénomeno del pluralismo de una complejidad y virtualidad ética/política impensadas—, sino también como resultado de la crisis de la razón moderna y sus postulados, que se revela incapaz de justificar desde el monismo ético racionalista la convivencia política. La crisis de fundamentación racional última afecta tanto a las pretensiones fundamentalistas de la religión —impidiendo una lectura precipitadamente triunfalista del llamado «retorno de la religión» en la «sociedad postsecular»— como a las pretensiones secularistas de negación de toda virtualidad ética y política de la religión en la esfera pública. El giro democrático, antiautoritario y antidogmático, postulado coherentemente en la crisis de la modernidad por tres representantes de la filosofía postmetafísica, hermenéutica y pragmatista, tales como Vattimo, Habermas y Rorty, sitúa el debate entre secularismo y religión en claves no de verdad, sino de solidaridad.

The classical liberal concern for freedom of religion today intersects with concerns of equality and respect for minorities, of what might be loosely termed 'multiculturalism'. When these minorities were primarily understood in terms of ethno-racial identities, multiculturalism and freedom of religion were seen at that time as quite separate policy and legal fields. As ethno-religious identities have become central to multiculturalism (and to rejections of multiculturalism), specifically in Western Europe in relation to its growing Muslim settlements, not only have the two fields intersected, new approaches to religion and equality have emerged. We consider the relationship between freedom of religion and ethno-religious equality, or alternatively, religion as faith or conscience and religion as group identity. We argue that the normative challenges raised by multicultural equality and integration cannot be met by individualist understandings of religion and freedom, by the idea of state neutrality, nor by laicist understandings of citizenship and equality. Hence, a re-thinking of the place of religion in public life and of religion as a public good and a re-configuring of political secularism in the context of religious diversity is necessary. We explore a number of pro-diversity approaches that suggest what a respectful and inclusive egalitarian governance of religious diversity might look like, and consider what might be usefully learnt from other countries, as Europe struggles with a deeper diversity than it has known for a long time. The moderate secularism that has historically evolved in Western Europe is potentially accommodative of religious diversity, just as it came to be of Christian churches, but it has to be 'multiculturalised'.

In most parts of the world, the political processes have arisen out of social matrix. Tribes, clans, castes, classes have existed around a social organization. Economy, polity, religion, family and kinship networks have operated under a social framework. When Aristotle said that man is a political animal he had in mind the social element. In ancient Greece the political and the social were interdependent. F.D. Coulanges in his study of ancient cities noted that in Greek city states, the political activities of free citizens (who excluded women and slaves) were associated with social and religious duties and obligations. The people who gathered at the public forum participated in city cults which honoured their ancestors and deities and subsequently engaged themselves in political discussion. The Roman cities also had similar cuts which were led by the senators in the presence of citizens. The modern states have treated political work as a formal process which is independent of other factors. At present, the direct participation of people in politics has become a thing of the past. The domestic element has almost vanished due to the rise of representative democracy. J. Habermas has stated that in the post – 17th century Europe the public sphere has disappeared, because the direct participation of people in the city councils has mostly disappeared. Harold Laski, the British thinker, has observed in a cryptic way the today public opinion is neither public nor opinion. In other words, politicians have taken over the functions of public who previously expressed their opinion freely. The Indian society has not only been multi-ethnic but also multi-religious. Indian religions are pantheistic in which the nature is seen as a manifestation of divinity. By contrast of the monotheistic religions of West Asia the divinity was withdrawn from nature and made transcendental. In the Pre-Christian era (at the time of the rise of Jainism and Budhism) there were numerous small-scale republics in the North. We find references to them in the Budhist Jatak tales (composed both Pali and Sanskrit). These small tales had a strong demotic character: 1 Cell phone number: (+91) 80-3240 8782 22 ПОЛИТИКА И РЕЛИГИЈА У САВРЕМЕНОЈ ИНДИЈИ ПОЛИТИКОЛОГИЈА РЕЛИГИЈЕ бр. 1/2013 год VII • POLITICS AND RELIGION • POLITOLOGIE DES RELIGIONS • Nº 1/2013 Vol. VII they elected their rulers mostly on merit; there was widespread participation of people in the political affairs. In 3rd century B.C. Alexander reached the borders of India; this even gave rise to a socio-political ferment. Although Alexander abruptly returned to Macedonia, Chanakya (also known as Kautilya) used the threat of Greek invasion to mobilize the people towards building a central state. He inspired Chandragupta (a warrior) to establish the Mauryan state in eastern India. Thereafter, many such states came up in different parts of India. In spite of their aggressive or despotic tendencies, these large states brought about social stability. By decree they protected the many ethnic groups which were getting absorbed into the caste system. Although the caste system was hierarchic, yet it was based on reciprocal ties. Besides, they laid the foundations for socio-economic development. In the southern peninsula the village councils known as panchayats became highly effective in the rural areas. These panchayats controlled land, fostered community participation in the village affairs and punished the wrong-doers. The southern kings never disturbed their autonomy. In the north also the village panchayat flourished till the 10th century. In the wake of British rule (17th century) these village councils declined. Radhakamal Mukerjee, the Indian sociologist, described them as "democracies of the East". Although many Indians are not educated, they have exercised intelligence in choosing their representative for assembly and parliament. This is largely due to the legacy of the panchayats. The Indian political systems have been traditionally guided by two types of juridical texts. I. The dharmashastras (composed by Manu and others). II. The nitishastras (such as Kautilya's Arthashastra, Shukra's Nitisara and Bhisma's address to the princes in Mahabharata which is known as Shantiparva). The texts of the first type laid down rules for conducting cacred duties, codes of conduct, punishment for transgression. The texts of the second type deal with more mundane matters related to agriculture, irrigation, imports and exports and military organization. It is here that Indian secularism originated. In other words, the rulers protected both sacred and secular pursuits of their subjects. The Indian rulers (Hindu, Budhists and Jaina) followed the same texts in administering justice, conducting warfare against the invaders and maintaining internal peace. Further, the two ancient systems of Indian philosophy – Vaisheshika and Samkhya were highly ratiocinative. They laid the foundations for developments in Indian science. Alburini, the Persian scholar, described in detail India's developments in science, mathematics and astronomy in the 10th century AD. This clearly shows that Indian religions have not opposed science which is a secular activity. The Indian constitution (1951) has not seen any contradiction between religion and secularism. Both types of activities are legitimate in India. All people of India have freedom of worship; only condition is that one religious group should not interfere in the religious life of another group. However, in the recent years the Hindu, Sikh and Muslim militant groups have arisen and disturbed the social POLITICS AND RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA 23 C.N. Venugopal , POLITY, RELIGION AND SECULARISM IN INDIA: A STUDY OF INTERRELATIONSHIPS • (pp 21-40) harmony. These tensions and problems will be more fully analyzed in the larger version of this paper.

La laicidad representa un principio importante para la consolidación de un Estado de derecho y la ilustración de la ciudadanía. No obstante, a pesar y debido a su importancia, sufre constante ataques por parte de distintas fuerzas sociales y políticas. En este artículo, el autor identifica cuatro enemigos de la laicidad: el clericalismo, los fundamentalismos religiosos, el comunitarismo y el laicismo. El objetivo consiste no sólo en denunciar esos enemigos sino también en proporcionar argumentos contra sus ataques al principio de laicidad. ; Laicity (or secularism) embodies an important principle for the rule of law and the enlightenment of the citizenship. Nonetheless, and because of this relevance, different social and political forces constantly criticize it. In this article, the author identifies four enemies: clericalism, religious fundamentalisms, communitarianism, and laicism. The aim is not only to denounce those enemies but also to provide some arguments against their attacks to the principle of laicity. ; Este trabajo forma parte del proyecto "Professor Visitante do Exterior" (PVE) de la CAPES, en colaboración con la PUC-Rio (Pós-graduação em Direito / Núcleo de Direitos Humanos). Integra también el proyecto de investigación "Secularización, Laicidad y Libertad de Conciencia" -CSO2011-14850-E. El autor quiere agradecer el apoyo de la Fundación Gregorio Peces-Barba para el Estudio & Cooperación en Derechos Humanos.

MUSTAFA KEMAL--ATATURK--DIED FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER HE ESTABLISHED THE TURKISH REPUBLIC AFTER SHAPING A MODERN COURSE FOR HIS COUNTRY. THE ISSUES OF ATATURK'S VIEWS ON NATION BUILDING AND ISLAM, NOW THE RELIGION OF 98 TO 99 PERCENT OF TURKEY'S POPULATION (JUST A FEW MORE PERCENT THAN IN 1923), AND HOW HIS SUCCESSORS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO BALANCE SECULARISM WITH THE RESURGENCE OF RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS IS ADDRESSED IN THIS ARTICLE. HOWEVER, BEFORE DISCUSSING THE POLICIES OF ATATURK AND HIS SUCCESSORS, THE ARTICLE ADDRESSES THE PERSONALITY OF ATATURK AND HIS PATH TO POWER, SO AS TO UNDERSTAND HOW THE TURKISH LEADER DEVELOPED HIS IDEAS CONCERNING NATION BUILDING AND ISLAM.

Abstract
This article offers an interpretation of late modern social imaginaries and their relationship to religion and violence. I hypothesize that the transition from the 'secular age' to a so-called 'post-secular constellation' calls on us to critically reconsider the modern trope that all too unambiguously ties religion and violence together. Discussing the fault lines of a secularist modernity spinning out of control today on various fronts, I argue that the narrative semantics of the so-called 'return of religion' is frequently adopted as an imaginative catalyst for confronting these contemporary discontents – for better and worse. In linking recent work on 'social imaginaries' with Paul Ricœur's discussion of the productive role of imagination in social life, I then explore the transformative potential of religious imagination in its inherent ambiguity. In conclusion I demonstrate that this quality involves a poietic license to start all over, one which can be used to expose both the violence of our beloved political ideals of freedom and sovereignty, as well as their repercussions on religious practice.

Contemporary studies on Syria assume that the country's Ba'thist regime has been effective in subduing its Islamic opposition, placing Syria at odds with the Middle East's larger trends of rising Islamic activism and the eclipse of secular ideologies as the primary source of political activism. Yet this assumption founders when confronted with the clear resurgence in Islamic militantism in the country since 2004. This book examines Syria's current political reality as regards its Islamic movement, describing the country's present day Islamic groups - particularly their social profile and ideology - and offering an explanation of their resurgence. The analysis focuses on: Who are today's Syrian Islamic groups? Why and how are they re-emerging after 22 years of relative silence as an important socio-economic and political force? How is the Syrian state dealing with their re-emergence in light of Syria's secularism and ideologically diverse society? Bridging area studies, Islamic studies, and political science, this book will be an important reference for those working within the fields of Comparative Politics, Political Economy, and Middle Eastern Studies.

Contemporary studies on Syria assume that the country's Ba'thist regime has been effective in subduing its Islamic opposition, placing Syria at odds with the Middle East's larger trends of rising Islamic activism and the eclipse of secular ideologies as the primary source of political activism. Yet this assumption founders when confronted with the clear resurgence in Islamic militantism in the country since 2004. This book examines Syria's current political reality as regards its Islamic movement, describing the country's present day Islamic groups - particularly their social profile and ideol