Suchergebnisse

Considering markets with nonpivotal buyers, we analyze the anticompetitive effects of breakup fees used by an incumbent facing a more efficient entrant in the future. Buyers differ in their intrinsic switching costs. Breakup fees are profitably used to foreclose entry, regardless of the entrant's efficiency advantage or level of switching costs. Banning breakup fees is beneficial to consumers. The ban enhances the total welfare unless the entrant's efficiency is close to the incumbent's. Inefficient foreclosure arises not because of rent shifting from the entrant, but because the incumbent uses a long-term contract to manipulate consumers' expected surplus from not signing it. (JEL D11, D21, D43, D86, L13, L51)

Incentives are often associated with narrow financial rewards such as bonuses or executive stock options. But in general such rewards are just a small part of the design of incentives. Properly designed incentive systems have to take into account the full portfolio of activities that the agent can engage in, the array of instruments, many nonfinancial, that are available to influence individuals and consider the factors that motivate them in different settings. Thinking about incentives as a system of interacting instruments and influences has been a major advance in the economics of incentives in recent years. In this lecture I will describe the path from pay for performance to the broader view of incentive systems. (JEL D21, D82, D86, J33, J41, M12, M52)

We quantify how sensitive is migration by star scientists to changes in personal and business tax differentials across states. We uncover large, stable, and precisely estimated effects of personal and corporate taxes on star scientists' migration patterns. The long-run elasticity of mobility relative to taxes is 1.8 for personal income taxes, 1.9 for state corporate income tax, and −1.7 for the investment tax credit. While there are many other factors that drive when innovative individuals and innovative companies decide to locate, there are enough firms and workers on the margin that state taxes matter. (JEL H24, H25, H71, H73, J44, J61, R32)

This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model where the buyer's valuation for the object is uncertain and she observes only a signal about her valuation. The seller gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. Our goal is to characterize those signal structures which maximize the buyer's expected payoff. We identify a buyer-optimal signal structure which generates (i) efficient trade and (ii) a unit-elastic demand. Furthermore, we show that every other buyer-optimal signal structure yields the same outcome as the one we identify: in particular, the same price. (JEL D11, D42, D82, D83, L12)

This paper studies the implications of individuals' knowledge of future job loss for the existence of an unemployment insurance (UI) market. Learning about job loss leads to consumption decreases and spousal labor supply increases. This suggests existing willingness to pay estimates for UI understate its value. But it yields new estimation methodologies that account for and exploit responses to learning about future job loss. Although the new willingness to pay estimates exceed previous estimates, I estimate much larger frictions imposed by private information. This suggests privately traded UI policies would be too adversely selected to be profitable, at any price. (JEL D82, D83, G22, J22, J64, J65)

AbstractThe commercial airframe industry in the US experienced a shakeout from the early 1930s into the post‐Second World War period. Unlike shakeouts in automobiles, tyres, or televisions, the commercial airframe industry's early life cycle was affected by external factors, particularly government demand. Using newly digitized data on all planes introduced in the commercial market between 1926 and 1965, we find that commercial airframe manufacturers with bomber contracts during the Second World War were more likely to have postwar market share than firms without such contracts, controlling for plane characteristics and other forms of government contracting. We attribute the effect of bomber contracts to advantages in R&D learning capacity acquired by firms with military airframe contracts. Despite low (or zero) initial presence in the commercial market, these learning capacity advantages allowed such firms to survive the early period of the shakeout, and later to thrive.

AbstractReinsurance is a vital financial device for enhancing underwriting capacity, ceding risks, and mitigating financial distress. By supplying financial resources and services, reinsurance can facilitate growth and expansion in the insurance business. Focusing on the insurance sector in the emerging Spanish economy and using a novel dataset on fire insurance companies, this article examines the role of fire insurance in the national capital formation, the importance of reinsurance as a vehicle for expanding the country's domestic underwriting capacity, and how the import of capital impacted on the balance of payment, from the introduction of the first comprehensive legislation regarding insurance in 1908 to the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936. Considering the situation of undercapitalization, the singularities of the insurance market, and the changes in regulatory schemes, we find that foreign reinsurance became a key financial vehicle for increasing underwriting capacity in Spain. We also show the struggle of an emerging market to find ways to keep the balance of current accounts and raise capital when financial infrastructure was underdeveloped. The diffusion of reinsurance networks from the core of industrial western countries towards emerging economies was one of the mechanisms for financial modernization on a global scale.

Rothstein (2017) successfully replicates Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff's (2014a, b)—henceforth, CFR's—results using data from North Carolina, but raises concerns about CFR's methods. We show that Rothstein's methodological critiques are invalid by presenting simulations and supplementary empirical evidence which show that (i) his preferred imputation of missing data generates bias; (ii) his "placebo test" rejects valid research designs; and (iii) his method of controlling for covariates yields inconsistent estimates of teachers' long-term effects. Consistent with the conclusions of Bacher-Hicks, Kane, and Staiger (2016) using data from Los Angeles, we conclude that Rothstein's replication study ultimately reinforces CFR's methods and results. (JEL H75, I21, J45)

We analyze sequential, binary voting schemes in settings where several privately informed agents have single-peaked preferences over a finite set of alternatives, and we focus on robust equilibria that do not depend on assumptions about the players' beliefs about each other. Our main results identify two intuitive conditions on binary voting trees, ensuring that sincere voting at each stage forms an ex post perfect equilibrium. In particular, we uncover a strong rationale for content-based agendas: if the outcome should not be sensitive to beliefs about others, nor to the deployment of strategic skills, the agenda needs to be built "from the extremes to the middle" so that more extreme alternatives are both more difficult to adopt, and are put to vote before other, more moderate options. An important corollary is that, under simple majority, the equilibrium outcome of the incomplete information game is always the Condorcet winner. Finally, we aim to guide the practical design of schemes that are widely used by legislatures and committees and we illustrate our findings with several case studies. (JEL D71, D72, I10, J16, J32, K10)

We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption. We define a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable. We characterize stable marriage with intrahousehold (consumption) transfers but without assuming transferable utility. Our revealed preference characterization generates testable conditions even with a single observation per household and heterogeneous individual preferences across households. The characterization also allows for identifying the intrahousehold decision structure (including the sharing rule) under the same minimalistic assumptions. An application to Dutch household data illustrates the usefulness of our theoretical results. (JEL D60, D63, H21, H23, I38)

We study the impact of providing school report cards with test scores on subsequent test scores, prices, and enrollment in markets with multiple public and private providers. A randomly selected half of our sample villages (markets) received report cards. This increased test scores by 0.11 standard deviations, decreased private school fees by 17 percent, and increased primary enrollment by 4.5 percent. Heterogeneity in the treatment impact by initial school test scores is consistent with canonical models of asymmetric information. Information provision facilitates better comparisons across providers, and improves market efficiency and child welfare through higher test scores, higher enrollment, and lower fees. (JEL D83, H75, I21, I28, O15, O18)

This paper introduces a new IV strategy based on IVF (in vitro fertilization) induced fertility variation among childless women to estimate the causal effect of having children on their career. For this purpose, we use administrative data on IVF treated women in Denmark. Because observed chances of IVF success do not depend on labor market histories, IVF treatment success provides a plausible instrument for childbearing. Our IV estimates indicate that fertility effects on earnings are: (i) negative, large, and long-lasting; (ii) driven by fertility effects on hourly earnings and not so much on labor supply; and (iii) much stronger at the extensive margin than at the intensive margin. (JEL D82, J13, J16, J22, J31, J32)