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International audience ; Indicators of agricultural production diversity and market access and/or participation have often been used to try to understand how agricultural production and markets influence dietary diversity of rural smallholder households. Based on a standardized search strategy, 37 studies investigating the association between an indicator of agricultural production diversity and any indicator of dietary diversity were reviewed. The characteristics of the indicators of agricultural production diversity, as well as indicators of market access and/or participation, were assessed. This review demonstrated the wide range of indicators; four types and 14 subtypes of indicators of agricultural production diversity were found in the 37 studies, and three types and 14 subtypes of indicators of market access and/or participation were found in 25 studies. While diversity of measurement ideas allows flexibility, it precludes comparability with other studies and might make it difficult to build a robust body of evidence of the impact of agriculture at farm household level on food security, diet, and nutrition.

The specific languages referred to in this presentation are: scientific language, mathematical language, theological language and philosophical language. Cosmological, scientific or theological models understood as distinct interpretations of a common symbolic language do not ensure, by such a common basis, a possible or legitimate correspondence of certain units of meaning. Mathematics understood as a symbolic language used in scientific and theological interpretation does not bridge between science and theology. Instead, it only allows the assertion of a rational-mathematical unity in expression. In this perspective, theology is nothing less rational than science. The activity of interpretation has an interdisciplinary character, it is a necessary condition of dialogue. We cannot speak about dialogue without communication between various fields, without passing from one specialized language to another specialized language. The present paper proposes to suggest this aspect.

While exercising its power to review the constitutionality of governmental action, the Supreme Court has relied on certain "methods" or "modes" of interpretation – that is, ways of figuring out a particular meaning of provision within the Constitution. The first chapter or report broadly describes the most common modes of constitutional interpretation. The next chapters herein examine the Speech or Debate Clause of the US Constitution; provides an overview of Congress's power under the Constitution and Congress's role in interpreting the nation's founding document; and discusses contemporary issues for Congress with regards to Article V of the US Constitution, and the two methods by which the nation's founding charter may be amended

Examines the consequences of preempting common law or precedents in the 1992 US Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.

Rubin succeeds in persuading us that the traditional equation of "legislation" and "law" is problematic in the administrative state -- that legislation is more often concerned with the (other) organs of government from which "law" emerges than with its direct formulation. Yet even if we accept this as a natural development, not a disease of which the body politic should be purged, the relationships between those responsible for "legislation" and those responsible for "law" should be a matter of active concern. Our wish for law, for conditions that will conduce to its creation, remains relevant to any theories we may hold for legislation. If delegation and void-for-vagueness, for example, do not serve well as direct measures of the worth or validity of legislative products, they continue to embody systemic values deserving of respect and consequently influencing our notions of appropriate relations between the legislative and law making efforts to the extent those are distinct. An insight that properly turns our attention from performance to control needs to notice how various options on the placement or exercise of control may affect the law-character of the system's ultimate output. Congress is not the only institution controlling, and the new theory for which Rubin calls must be concerned both with separation-of-powers questions concerning the appropriate allocation of controls across the whole of government, and the probable impact on Congress's legislating of the various kinds of controls that might be imagined. While today's theory of legislation must be differentiated from our theory of law, one cannot free one from the other. Professor Rubin's analysis pays insufficient heed to the continuing relationships.