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The pol'al structure of Latin Amer cities has evolved, under the impact of migration, from a traditional monolithic order to a triadic system composed of established sectors, a vast subproletariat created by Ru migration, & mediating gov'al instit's. Most theories have anticipated imminent pol'al explosiveness among the new Lc's. These predictions, however, run consistently contrary to empirical findings. Pertinent results are summarized. The weakness of pol'al extremism among these sectors is interpreted primarily as a consequence of a "migrant" ethic which places responsibility for deprivations on non-structural factors. Similarities between orientations of migrants & those of early European immigrants, insofar as they prevent structural blame & subsequent radicalization are outlined. Structural origins of the migrant ethic & the consequences for Latin America of its eventual demise are examined. AA.

Published at: History and politics, 5: 7-27, 2001 [es] Military interventions in Latin America have often been a consequence of social and political actors' dissatisfaction with governments or election results. The external dimension, and in particular US influence, starts to be decisive during the period of ideological polarisation following the Cuban revolution. The new shift in US foreign policy during the Carter administration and the terrible consequences of civil wars and human rights violations have over recent years created a political and social climate clearly opposed to new military interventions. ; Peer reviewed ; Published at: History and politics, 5: 7-27, 2001 [es] Military interventions in Latin America have often been a consequence of social and political actors' dissatisfaction with governments or election results. The external dimension, and in particular US influence, starts to be decisive during the period of ideological polarisation following the Cuban revolution. The new shift in US foreign policy during the Carter administration and the terrible consequences of civil wars and human rights violations have over recent years created a political and social climate clearly opposed to new military interventions. ; [EN] Military interventions in Latin American politics had been often requested by political and social actors, unsatisfied with electoral or governmental results. After the Cuban revolution the foreign dimension acquires a new relevance, as ideological polarization inside many countries increases the US influence on Latin American armies. After a new change in Washington's Latin American policy, during the Carter administration, and the devastating effects of civil wars and violations of human rights, in the last years the social and political climate has been clearly opposite to new military interventions. ; Published at: History and politics, 5: 7-27, 2001 [es] Military interventions in Latin America have often been a consequence of social and political actors' dissatisfaction with ...

Call for Papers for a Special Issue of Alternautas. Deadline: June 30, 2023

A portrayal of the bill-to-law provisions of Latin American constitutions as extensive game forms shows presidential veto powers to be richer, more varied, and more regionally distinctive than hitherto appreciated. Small details and apparent redundancies are surprisingly consequential, the distribution of institutional advantages is both counterintuitive and incompatible with any simple pattern or overall measure of 'presidential power', and regional peculiarities turn out to have been rather well designed to encourage democratic responsibility and executive-legislative agreement more than executive dominance or interbranch deadlock. Tables, Figures, References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2006.]

I watched the Council of the Americas webinar with SOUTHCOM Commander Craig Faller and Civilian Deputy Commander Jean Manes, with Eric Farnsworth moderating. Some interesting discussion, with the kind of emphasis you would expect from SOUTHCOM. Here are my quick thoughts:Major issue is Chinese illegal fishing around Ecuador and Peru (see here for background). I have to wonder how much that could sour Latin American views of China. On Twitter, Tracy North notes that it also affects Nicaragua, which they did not mention. I don't know if that was intentional (because of politics) or not.Manes: the U.S. role in providing aid for Covid "hasn't been covered in the news much" but they keep careful track to make sure no other outside government (esp. China) does more. It's quite the cold way of looking at it--give more aid only if China does so first. The U.S. does not want other countries to "take advantage." I imagine Latin American leaders would not tend to view any Covid aid as "taking advantage." As for the news comment, it sounds in line with Trump but it's a constant in U.S. policy toward Latin America--the news is never quite positive enough of U.S. actions.Faller: can we even call the Maduro regime a "regime" because it's a small group of criminals. Well, they control the government, so yes, it's a regime. That was a surprising and uninformed offhand comment intended as an insult, I guess.Manes: the Colombia peace process is "on pause" because of Covid, at least until a vaccine, like other initiatives around the region. I get this, but one could argue it was already on pause before Covid because the Duque government is not committed to it, and the pandemic is just an excuse.Faller: U.S. training of Latin Americans has actually increased because of technology. That actually makes sense, because at the university we find larger meeting participation.Both Faller and Manes: U.S.-Brazilian relations at the military-military level are very good. I have not followed this, but it also makes sense--at that level it can transcend the politics of the particular government in power.Faller had a not-so-veiled threat to countries pursuing agreements with China: "Our ability to have a trusting relationship will be jeopardized." Such a threat really suggests weakness--China is making inroads and the U.S. cannot figure out how to address it.Manes: once someone decides to emigrate, you've already lost. You need to improve things at home. The big question, though, is how to deal with migrants when they reach the U.S. Her logic would suggest that just sending them home is a bad idea, though obviously that's not the Trump logic.Venezuela: not much new. Faller: the external actors there are the "intricate weave of a Persian rug." Weird way to put it, but whatever.No questions or discussion of Mexico. That surprised me. Mexico as a partner is more important than China as an adversary, I'd say. Update: I've been reminded via email that Mexico does not fall under SOUTHCOM. So this is worth mentioning. But it's weird to hear Central American migration kind of ending there. Subscribe in a reader