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Two players choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. An "extremist," who can either be a hawk or a dove, attempts to manipulate decision making. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist increases the likelihood of conflict, and reduces welfare, by sending a public message which triggers hawkish behavior from both players. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist instead sends a public message which causes one player to become more dovish and the other more hawkish. A hawkish (dovish) extremist is unable to manipulate decision making if actions are strategic substitutes (complements). (JEL D74, D82)

The social contexts of Ur neighborhoods provide a dimension to Ur politics that extends beyond the characteristics of discrete political actors. The political effects of these spatially defined social environments depend on individual characteristics, as well as neighborhood properties; the contextual effects are not constant across individual categories or within individual categories across contexts. Using Democratic Party identification as the dependent variable, two reactions to context are demonstrated: conflict & assimilation. Data were gathered from 1968 Buffalo, NY, surveys & 1970 census tracts. The interdependency of individual characteristics & contextual properties determines: (1) which reaction occurs where for which individuals, & (2) the extent of political differences between occupational classes. 2 Tables, 5 Figures. Modified HA.

Background: Suicidal behavior is one of the most important problems in psychiatric clinics. Several sociodemographic and clinical characteristics may have different effects on suicidal behavior. Aims: To examine the sociodemographic and clinical characteristics of a sample of 144 suicide attempters admitted to a Turkish emergency clinic for a suicide attempt. Methods: All subjects were interviewed by a consultant psychiatrist. For all individuals, data on DSM-IV psychiatric diagnoses, sociodemographic data, Beck's Hopelessness Scale (BHS), Becks's Suicidal Ideation Scale (SIS), and Beck's Suicidal Intention Scale (BSIS) were collected. Results: The majority of suicide attempters were females characterized by low educational status and low religious orientation. Drug overdose was the most common method of suicide attempt and conflict within the family was the most fre uent psychological stress factor. Three- uarters of attempters (74.6%) met DSM-IV criteria for at least one psychiatric diagnosis. Of these, 28.5% met criteria for major depressive disorder. Suicide attempters with depression tended to be immigrant, urban dwellers with high scores on the suicide intent scale. Conclusions: In the present study, the findings are useful in showing the risk factors related to suicidal behavior.

A probabilistic game‐theoretic model is developed within both a static and a dynamic framework to capture adversary–defender conflict in the presence of backlash. I find that not accounting for backlash in counteradversary policies may be costly to the target government. But to minimize adversarial backlash requires understanding how backlash emerges and if, and how, adversaries strategize to goad target governments into policies that induce backlash. The dynamic version of the model shows that when backlash occurs with a time lag, an escalation of the conflict is likely to occur.

AbstractDoes a mediator's stated approach (Facilitative, Inclusive, Transformative) predict their behavior at the mediation table? This question is explored through analysis of 149 cases from District Court day of trial mediation in four Maryland jurisdictions and 156 Circuit Court Family Division court‐referred custody and visitation mediation cases in three Maryland jurisdictions. Through factor analysis and multiple regression analysis, this research found a mediator's stated approach does not fully predict their behavior at the mediation table, and that some self‐reported approaches are more predictive of certain actual mediator behaviors (e.g., reflecting, eliciting, offering opinions) than others.

An analyst who owns stock in the company she covers may be tempted to protect or enhance her personal interests. This paper examines how this potential conflict of interest affects the reporting of sell-side analysts by identifying and collecting two samples, the first from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form 144 filings, and the second from voluntary ownership disclosures. Ordered probit analyses show that owning analyst recommendations are slightly more cautious than those of the control analysts. There is little robust evidence that stock ownership leads to optimistic analyst reporting, however findings indicate that analysts who are consistently optimistic are owners. The results are consistent with a conclusion that analyst stock ownership, unlike other potential incentives, may not be a significant concern since in many cases multiple nonowning analysts also provide reports. Being an outlier potentially reduces any benefit to the owning analyst and risks her personal reputation. In the absence of a detrimental effect, ownership offers a potential benefit as a credible signal of an analyst's conviction in a company's prospects.

Delimitation of the territorial waters and continental shelf in the Aegean Sea constitutes a constant source of conflict and produces recurrent crises between Greece and Turkey. This article explores directions that the Greek—Turkish dispute over the delimitation of territorial waters can take through an evolutionary game framework. Crises are found to follow routines and practices involving challenges to the status quo and reactions preceding mutual retreat. Hence, the status quo in the Aegean Sea can persist even in the form of aggressive behavior. It is also possible that the dispute will evolve into a stable state of conflict where no cooperative foreign policy can survive.

Delimitation of the territorial waters & continental shelf in the Aegean Sea constitutes a constant source of conflict & produces recurrent crises between Greece & Turkey. This article explores directions that the Greek-Turkish dispute over the delimitation of territorial waters can take through an evolutionary game framework. Crises are found to follow routines & practices involving challenges to the status quo & reactions preceding mutual retreat. Hence, the status quo in the Aegean Sea can persist even in the form of aggressive behavior. It is also possible that the dispute will evolve into a stable state of conflict where no cooperative foreign policy can survive. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

Dealing with the post-World War II security issues, in this article I outline an approach that takes into account the context of the weak states in Third World environments. In this respect, first of all I make a case that domestic politics should be factored in the security concerns of states. Especially in the Third World context domestic political and social dissentions become key factors in defining foreign policy behavior of such states. Secondly, I highlight regional context, especially unstable regional conditions, regional hierarchies, and other factors that contribute to conflict propensities of states situated in the Third World environments. Finally, I make a case that, compared to democracy, legitimacy is a better variable to explain the link between domestic politics and foreign policy behavior of the Third World states. Legitimacy is not only value-neutral variable, but can also be applied across time and place.

The authors investigate the expectations generated by the "interaction opportunity" model initially developed by Most and Starr for the study of diffusion. The impact that borders and alliances have as "treatments" on the overall war behavior of states is the focus of study, looking at both individual and interactive effects. Using the war behavior of all states in the system from 1815–1965, the analyses support the expectations generated by the interaction opportunity model. The treatments of warring border nations and warring alliance partners, of various types and combinations, predispose states to be at war.