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Abstract: Based on a new data set of democratizations occurring between 1960 and 2004, this paper explores the reasons for reversals in young democracies. Adverse initial conditions including poverty, inequality, and ethnic fragmentation are associated with the failure of democracy, but the relationship is not deterministic. Likewise, numerous young democracies have survived in spite of disastrous economic performance. Political institutions play a key role in preventing a return to authoritarianism, but the effectiveness of constraints on executive power appears more important than whether the regime is parliamentary or presidential in structure. These findings suggest a need for greater coordination between democracy promotion assistance and aid intended to foster economic development.

Party systems provide the essential structure of the coalition bargaining environment. Stability in party systems ensures that there are regularities that can be observed in government formation, but most empirical research focuses on established democracies. In new democracies party systems are less institutionalized and interactions between parties are less predictable. This has significant implications for coalition formation. This paper presents the first study of coalition formation in new democracies that employs an empirical design that is comparable to the leading research on Western Europe. It uses a new dataset of potential coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe to examine three explanations for government formation that arise when party systems are weakly institutionalized. The results show that: first, incumbency is a disadvantage for governments when formation occurs post-election. This is due to high levels of electoral volatility in new democracies caused by policy failure and clientalistic practices. Incumbents are advantaged when formation takes place mid-term as weak party system institutionalization leads to an inchoate pattern of interaction between opposition parties which therefore fail to provide a viable alternative. Second, the presence of former dominant parties influences government formation by stifling the development of programmatic competition. Instead, programmatic competition is subjugated to contestation based on historical enmities. Finally, established parties collude to exclude new parties from coalition formation which may be an indicator that party systems are becoming more institutionalized. Overall, this article provides new insights into the importance of routinized and stable political practices and institutions.

How do politicians in advanced democracies get away with violating political norms? Although norm violators confront a powerful establishment that can penalize them, norm violations currently occur in many advanced democracies. This article analyzes the conflicts between norm-violating challengers and established politicians and parties as norm defenders in multiparty systems to contribute to the discipline's understanding of norm erosion processes. Based on diachronic and synchronic comparisons of conflicts over norm violations in Austria and Germany, the article reveals how political challengers can already damage democratic norms from a position of institutional weakness. Norm violators that make ambiguous provocations and can leverage their previously acquired democratic credentials, can more credibly dispel attempts to stigmatize them as undemocratic. In doing so, they turn the tables on the political establishment and portray its sanctions as a form of 'excessive retaliation' that constitutes a norm violation in itself. The article concludes with the unsettling finding that (verbal) norm protection can facilitate norm erosion.

AbstractHow do politicians in advanced democracies get away with violating political norms? Although norm violators confront a powerful establishment that can penalize them, norm violations currently occur in many advanced democracies. This article analyzes the conflicts between norm‐violating challengers and established politicians and parties as norm defenders in multiparty systems to contribute to the discipline's understanding of norm erosion processes. Based on diachronic and synchronic comparisons of conflicts over norm violations in Austria and Germany, the article reveals how political challengers can already damage democratic norms from a position of institutional weakness. Norm violators that make ambiguous provocations and can leverage their previously acquired democratic credentials, can more credibly dispel attempts to stigmatize them as undemocratic. In doing so, they turn the tables on the political establishment and portray its sanctions as a form of 'excessive retaliation' that constitutes a norm violation in itself. The article concludes with the unsettling finding that (verbal) norm protection can facilitate norm erosion.

En el marco de los debates sobre los procesos políticos actuales en América Latina, este trabajo presenta un análisis críti­co del artículo «La democracia en América Latina: la alternativa entre populismo y de­mocracia deliberativa» de O. Guariglia. La lectura del trabajo nos permite mostrar las limitaciones de la argumentación. Por un lado porque no confronta una posición normativa de la democracia deliberativa contra otra con­cepción normativa que defendería el populis­mo (en la obra de E. Laclau). Por otro lado, porque las evidencias empíricas sobre los populismos realmente existentes son escasas e imprecisas. Estos límites sin embargo contribuyen al debate porque reavivan la controversia sobre ¿qué democracia? Y habilitan distintas preguntas como ¿Qué conceptos normativos de democracia están presentes en la región? ¿cuáles han sido los alcances de los procesos políticos en América Latina bajo gobiernos «populistas» en el siglo XIX? ¿Qué posibilidades reales hay de democratizar ór­denes sociales atravesados por profundas des­igualdades como las de los países latinoame­ricanos?. Las respuestas a estos interrogantes pueden elaborarse desde distintas miradas que aportan pluralidad al debate. ; In the context of discussions on political processes in Latin America, this paper presents a critical analysis about the article «Democracy in Latin America: between populism and deliberative democracy» by O. Guariglia. Reading the work allows us to show the limitations of argumentation. On the one hand because it no confronts a normative position of deliberative democracy against other normative conception would defend populism (in the work of E. Laclau). Furthermore, because the empirical evidence on populism actually existing are few and imprecise. These limits however contribute to the debate because it revived the discussion about what democracy? And open several questions such as: What are normative concepts of democracy in the region? What have been the implications of political processes in Latin America under governments «populist» in the xxi century? Are there real possibilities of democratizing social orders that are crossed by deep inequalities as Latin American? The answers to these questions can be made from different perspectives.

How does economic performance affect support for democracy in emergent democracies? Government approval studies do not directly evaluate this. Recent literature suggests using separate assessments: Citizens in emergent democracies-through political trust-distinguish between government approval and democratic support. This article directly assesses the question for Asia's democratizing nations of Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines. Two results are relevant: First, economic performance explains government approval over time and across these democratizing nations. This result accords with findings from other regions to lend to the accumulation of knowledge from extending study to Asia. Second, economic performance does not explain democratic support; instead, political trust is statistically related to democratic support. Specifically, although political trust and economic performance both explain government approval, political trust outweighs economic conditions in explaining democratic support. These results show that by building political trust in the democratizing system, citizens may hold officials accountable while remaining committed to democratic development. Theoretically, then, this article synthesizes diverse findings in the literature to enrich theory building.

Previous scholarship describes an inconsistent role for democratic institutions in driving political participation. Some research has detected signs of attachment leading to greater engagement while others observe a negative, statistical relationship (Levi and Stoker, 2000). In the liberal and electoral democracies of Asia, where support for democratic values appears to be growing (Chu and Huang, 2010; Sanborn, 2015), institutions have taken an outsized role in an individual's decision to participate. This may be reflective of a 'broken back' form of democratization, where an engaged citizenry is continually frustrated by poor performing government actors (Rose and Shin, 2001). In this article, I evaluate the role of efficacy, internal and external, on the decision to attend rallies, participate in campaigns, and contact officials. I find that citizens engage in these actions when they are internally engaged in politics and frustrated with government performance. While this finding offers a simple explanation for the decision to participate, it also signifies the obstacles to democratic consolidation posed by poor-performing institutional actors.

In Party Politics and Economic Reform in Africa's Democracies, M. Anne Pitcher offers an engaging new theory to explain the different trajectories of private sector development across contemporary Africa. Pitcher argues that the outcomes of economic reforms depend not only on the kinds of institutional arrangements adopted by states in order to create or expand their private sectors, but also on the nature of party system competition and the quality of democracy in particular countries. To illustrate her claim, Pitcher draws on several original data sets covering twenty-seven countries in Africa, and detailed case studies of the privatization process in Zambia, Mozambique and South Africa. This study underscores the importance of formal institutions and political context to the design and outcome of economic policies in developing countries

Electoral fraud has become an integral part of electoral competition both in established democracies and less-than-democratic regimes. In this paper I study electoral fraud in the non-democratic setting. First, I present evidence of fraud sustainability and growth over the lifetime of non-democratic regimes in post-Soviet and Sub-Saharan countries. Second, I provide a theoretical model that explains the observed tendency of growing fraud.

"In Party Politics and Economic Reform in Africa's Democracies, M. Anne Pitcher offers an engaging new theory to explain the different trajectories of private sector development across contemporary Africa. Pitcher argues that the outcomes of economic reforms depend not only on the kinds of institutional arrangements adopted by states in order to create or expand their private sectors but also on the nature of party system competition and the quality of democracy in particular countries. To illustrate her claim, Pitcher draws on several original datasets covering twenty-seven countries in Africa and detailed case studies of the privatization process in Zambia, Mozambique, and South Africa. This study underscores the importance of formal institutions and political context to the design and outcome of economic policies in developing countries."--Provided by publisher

The capitalist democracies of western Europe and the U.S. have developed extensive social programs, based on the principle of solidarity, that provide assistance to the destitute, the unemployed, the sick, the disabled, and the elderly. Due in part to growing levels of spending on these solidarity programs that may threaten financial solvency in some of these countries and in part to a growing belief that social programs should help people work and achieve self-sufficiency, these countries have implemented "work activation" policies that try to encourage, entice, and cajole physically-able people to work. Experience implementing such work activation policies now suggests that policy can emphasize the relatively new goal of work activation while still achieving the traditional social purpose of solidarity programs by greatly reducing poverty. The aim of this paper is to review the experiences of the U.S. and selected European nations in attempting to balance solidarity with work activation by discussing both the components of an ideal work activation system and the problems these systems often encounter. The problems examined include too few jobs, recessions, low wages, and disconnected adults. The overarching purpose of the paper is to find a balance between the goals of social solidarity and work activation.

The capitalist democracies of western Europe and the U.S. have developed extensive social programs, based on the principle of solidarity, that provide assistance to the destitute, the unemployed, the sick, the disabled, and the elderly. Due in part to growing levels of spending on these solidarity programs that may threaten financial solvency in some of these countries and in part to a growing belief that social programs should help people work and achieve self-sufficiency, these countries have implemented work activation policies that try to encourage, entice, and cajole physically-able people to work. Experience implementing such work activation policies now suggests that policy can emphasize the relatively new goal of work activation while still achieving the traditional social purpose of solidarity programs by greatly reducing poverty. The aim of this paper is to review the experiences of the U.S. and selected European nations in attempting to balance solidarity with work activation by discussing both the components of an ideal work activation system and the problems these systems often encounter. The problems examined include too few jobs, recessions, low wages, and disconnected adults. The overarching purpose of the paper is to find a balance between the goals of social solidarity and work activation.

As economies and cultures morph due to technoscience, vampire entities also mutate so as to still provoke fear ‒their bodies change, their populations grow and their networks expand; yet the way to annihilate them becomes less obvious. Responding to these modern day changes, Guillermo del Toro and Chuck Hogan's television series The Strain (2014-2017) uncannily echoes, or perhaps foreshadows, the social realities under an informational, networked, and epidemiological paradigm. The filmmakers here present viewers with hybrid monsters and environments that are highly interconnected and pathogenic, reflecting contemporary social fears regarding failing democracies and global pandemics. Drawing from Guillermo del Toro's recent television collaborations, this article examines how twenty-first century vampiric bodies comment on a society altered by informational and technoscientific labyrinths. The labyrinths analyzed here, and the bodies hidden within them, are presented as looming threats that may destroy democracies in order to institute a totalitarian regime. Profit-driven institutions and governments, beholden to ominous masters in a more global and interrelated economy, invite malevolent actors who are allowed to dominate, exploit, and kill everyday citizens.

Recently, many comparativists and democratic theorists have argued that democracy is in imminent peril, even in countries that are thought to be its strongholds. But theorists like Andrew Gamble, Wolfgang Streeck, and David Runciman suggest that some democracies are too embedded to collapse. Instead, they argue these democracies are experiencing long-term structural crises. This article explains how this alternative kind of crisis works. It conceives of legitimacy crises as 'chronic crises' in which democratic procedures are contested even as the democratic political system is affirmed. In these crises, democracies are threatened by distortion and deadlock rather than death. The article gives a precise account of chronic legitimacy crises. It treats legitimacy as a scalar concept, going beyond binary views where legitimacy is something a state either has or lacks. It distinguishes periods of chronic crisis from stable periods and from acute crises. It shows how chronic crises are distinctively about legitimacy. It carves out conceptual space for a different kind of legitimacy crisis, and it assists comparativists in thinking about how younger democracies differ from older ones.