Suchergebnisse

The EMU has been designed without an instrument for automatic fiscal stabilization on the European level. This article highlights the seriousness of this lacuna by new empirical data, which suggest that fiscal stabilization at the national level has also worked insufficiently. This situation will hamper the EU's efforts to achieve the targets set by the Lisbon Agenda: recent theoretical contributions suggest that a positive macroeconomic environment is a prerequisite for productivity growth and structural reform which form the centrepiece of the Agenda. There are thus strong economic arguments for rethinking the set-up for fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU. We suggest three remedies for the underperformance of the automatic stabilizers: making EU expenditure sensitive to the cyclical situation of the recipient country, introducing an EU corporate tax upon the upcoming revision of the EU budget before 2013 and/or setting up a European unemployment scheme. Adapted from the source document.

This article uses new data from the 1997-2001 British Election Panel Study, the final wave of which was carried out immediately after the 2001 election, to examine the extent to which beliefs about the desirability of EMU & European integration more generally have become important as a source of voters' party preferences, both in absolute terms & relative to the importance of other more typically central concerns facing voters. In doing so, the article tells us something about the extent to which Labour's occupation of the middle ground on many economic & redistributive issues in 1997 & beyond has introduced a new era of British political competition, in which the economy & taxation, for example, are no longer so divisive & in which questions relating to attitudes towards emotive, national identity issues hold center stage. It considers, in other words, whether or not we have seen a potentially lasting realignment of the sort postulated in Evans & Norris's thesis that the 1997 election may have represented a 'critical' change in British politics. 7 Tables, 2 Figures, 1 Appendix, 23 References. Adapted from the source document.

The political economy approach abandons the assumption of politicians always acting as benevolent social planners. Instead, it assumes that policymakers are self-interested individuals who may follow objectives that differ from those of society. In this thesis, three self-contained essays explore the political economy of two topical issues in macroeconomics: central bank independence and banking regulation. Political Determinants of Central Bank Independence (CBI) From a normative perspective, there is little disagreement that the implementation of an independent central bank can be welfare improving. Nevertheless the degree of CBI varies considerably across countries. This paper analyzes the factors that may force incumbent politicians to choose different degrees of CBI. When making this choice, policymakers face a central trade-off: While an independent central bank raises the costs of future policy changes for political successors it also reduces the chances to influence current monetary policy. How Should Large and Small Countries Be Represented in a Currency Union? The European Central Bank (ECB) is assigned to take a European perspective when conducting monetary policy. However, national central bank governors hold the majority in the ECB's decision making body, the ECB Council. If national central bank governors adopt – at least to some degree – a national viewpoint, this may distort monetary policy from the European perspective. This paper derives the optimal voting weights of national central bank governors in the ECB Council that minimize the distortions of monetary policy from the European first best. On the Regulation of Multinational Banks in Europe – Who Should Be in Charge? While cross-border integration in the European banking sector has gained momentum, responsibility for the prudential regulation of banks remains mainly in the national domain. This paper compares the welfare effects of two alternative regulatory regimes for the European Union: home and host country regulation. For the European ...

The history of the Soviet Union highlights the importance of economic problems, with several monetary and then economic crises. The power of coercive decision was rendered in the face of a budget deficit and a monetary crisis without an immediate solution. It was then necessary to liberalise prices and stabilise economic activity through a rigorous macroeconomic policy. The market economy has gradually developed, at the cost of rapid impoverishment of a large proportion of the population. The privatisation process and the reorganisation of military-industrial complexes had to be initiated. The social price is high, but the market economy is on course. The main effort is also to reconvert the military activities that have weighed too much on the Soviet economy. Activities need to be reconverted while making them competitive, which is not the same management logic at all. This results in considerable technological and economic difficulties, very heavy and painful social problems and difficult political support. ; International audience The history of the Soviet Union highlights the importance of economic problems, with several monetary and then economic crises. The coercive power of decision was rendered impotent in the face of a budget deficit and a monetary crisis with no immediate solution. It was then necessary to liberalize prices and stabilize economic activity through a rigorous macroeconomic policy. Gradually, the market economy was established, at the cost of a rapid impoverishment of a large part of the population. It was then necessary to begin the process of privatization and a process of reorganization of the military-industrial complexes. The social price is high, but the march towards the market economy has begun. The main effort also consists in the reconversion of military activities that have weighed too heavily on the Soviet economy. It is necessary to reconvert the activities while making them competitive, which is not at all the same management logic. The result was considerable technological ...

A long-term assessment of the EU integration process is attempted for the1971-2015 period, by comparing per capita Gross Domestic Product (in constant Purchasing Power Parities) and its change, for EU-15 and non-EU states that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. A growing divergence is found between Greece but also Portugal and the EU southern periphery on the one hand, and Luxembourg, Ireland and Scandinavian states on the other that have benefi ted from EU integration, especially after the Eurozone was formed. Those EU-15 members that have joined the Eurozone have not benefi ted as much as non-members. It is suggested that two types of states can be trapped by the integration process: The relative or absolute losers of the currency zone, like Greece and states like the UK that have benefi ted less from integration, while choosing to remain at an earlier integration stage. Given the mix of monetary and fi scal policies pursued, resolving the former problem will require setting-up a common production union to advance competitiveness and co-operation, while solution to the latter should avoid the risk of disintegration and of the permanent loss of EU membership.

La cátedra Jean Monnet es una cátedra universitaria otorgada por la Comisión Europea en el marco de su plan de acción. Tienen como objetivo reforzar la docencia y la investigación sobre la integración europea en las universidades, tanto de los Estados miembros como de terceros países. Su nombre hace honor a quien fuera un político francés que, como asesor de Robert Schuman, contribuyó decisivamente a poner los cimientos de las entonces Comunidades Europeas. -- La primera etapa de esta publicación concluyó en el año 2018, comenzó una segunda época en el año 2019 con el nombre Revista "Integración Regional y Derechos Humanos".-- Apéndice jurisprudencial

The current problems on the aftermath of the global credit crunch left the weakest Euro countries in the turbulence of a debt crisis, which has been spread in five countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain respectively) and raised the question of a Euro zone future survival. The surviving barriers have to do with limitations and restrictions on the single market, the lack of political union and different monetary policy targets. Incentives to secede are also present. However, a possible withdraw of a country would have high cost for all the participants and it could lead to monetary union's demolition. The costs related with a possible withdraw are high, thus it is difficult for a country to leave a union. In the recent debt crisis, the countries accepted bailouts from their counterparts and international organizations in order to prevent the Euro zone collapse spreading the crisis further. Three possible Euro zone future scenarios are analyzed. The volunteer or not breakup of the union and reintroducing of national currencies, the breakup of the Euro zone to two currencies consisting Optimal Currency Areas (OCAs)is analyzed by using thirteen equally weighted optimum area criteria and the imposition of an interest equalization tax(IET) in order to make the Euro zone a single OCA. The results show that the asymmetries lead to the crisis persists in a possible two Euros area and this scenario cost is higher than union dissolution's. An IET can help Euro zone in the short time to develop sustainable characteristics.

Purpose: The independence of the economic policy of national states in the European Union is a relevant and politically controversial issue as notions of lost sovereignty are often evoked by populist political options. It is therefore important to distinctly outline the actual state of affairs. Methodology: Methodology is descriptive and comparative. The article starts by surveying traditional and recent political, institutional and economic arguments on policy convergence in areas undergoing economic integration. The article continues by contrasting the complex notion of economic sovereignty and the ongoing development of economic policy constrictions of EU (and eurozone) membership. Croatia is then compared to relevant economies in key economic policies in response to the crisis of 2008/09 in order to evaluate the maneuvering room left by the various policy constrictions. Results: Particular attention is devoted to the comparison of exchange rate policy, fiscal policy and monetary policy employed by member states in response to the crisis of 2008/09. While economic independence in terms of crisis management is clearly reduced by virtue of EU and eurozone membership, its effects should not be felt as a change of policy direction in the case of Croatia. Conclusion: We conclude that the policy restrictions imposed by EU membership and expected entry into the eurozone are in line with economic restraints and exhibited national policy preferences prior to EU accession.

Purpose: The independence of the economic policy of national states in the European Union is a relevant and politically controversial issue as notions of lost sovereignty are often evoked by populist political options. It is therefore important to distinctly outline the actual state of affairs. Methodology: Methodology is descriptive and comparative. The article starts by surveying traditional and recent political, institutional and economic arguments on policy convergence in areas undergoing economic integration. The article continues by contrasting the complex notion of economic sovereignty and the ongoing development of economic policy constrictions of EU (and eurozone) membership. Croatia is then compared to relevant economies in key economic policies in response to the crisis of 2008/09 in order to evaluate the maneuvering room left by the various policy constrictions. Results: Particular attention is devoted to the comparison of exchange rate policy, fiscal policy and monetary policy employed by member states in response to the crisis of 2008/09. While economic independence in terms of crisis management is clearly reduced by virtue of EU and eurozone membership, its effects should not be felt as a change of policy direction in the case of Croatia. Conclusion: We conclude that the policy restrictions imposed by EU membership and expected entry into the eurozone are in line with economic restraints and exhibited national policy preferences prior to EU accession.