On June 3, 2017, a "Congress on Iceland's Democracy" met in Berkeley—an outgrowth of a previous effort in Iceland to "crowd source" a new constitution. The citizens of Iceland had led their parliament to create a new and extraordinarily representative convention consisting of citizens more-or-less chosen randomly from all walks of life. The convention functioned completely in the open and excluded all politicians. The result, approved overwhelmingly in a 2012 national referendum, would truly have been a "constitution of the people." Despite the approval by huge majorities, in 2013, it failed in parliament as a result of fierce lobbying by vested interests against the provision that Iceland's natural resources would be constitutionally mandated to benefit the public, rather than continuing to be held by private owners. Regardless of its prospects for success, Icelandic efforts should be of great interest to all constitutional scholars, and to those scholars and practitioners who seek a more open and inclusive way to formulate policy, including constitutions—the fundamental law of a state. Intended to stimulate further debate, this essay pursues some initial reflections on the U.S. Constitution specifically, and of constitutions in general. It also examines the role of elites, especially in constitutional formulation, and here pays special attention to the United States.
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In: Thomas J. Horton, Drew DeGroot & Tyler Custis, Addressing the Current Crisis in NCAA Intercollegiate Athletics: Where Is Congress?, 26 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 363 (2016).
THIS PAPER DEFINES SEVERAL INTERRELATED CHANGES IN THE WAYS MEMBERS OF THE U.S. HOUSE HAVE ALLOCATED THEIR PERSONAL STAFF AND IN THE DUTIES OF THEIR STAFFS. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF STAFF PER MEMBER HAS INCREASED, THE PROPORTION OF STAFF ASSIGNED TO THE DISTRICT RATHER THAN TO WASHINGTON HAS INCREASED, AND CONSTITUENCY DUTIES FORMERLY PERFORMED BY WASHINGTON STAFF HAVE DEVOLVED ON THE ARGUMENTED DISTRICT STAFF. ALL OF THESE CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED BOTH BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE GENERATIONS OF HOUSE MEMBERS AND WITHIN COHORTS SERVING IN SUCCESSIVE CONGRESSES. HOWEVER IN OLDER COHORTS THESE CHANGES ARE LESS MARKED THAN IN NEWER COHORTS. BECAUSE THE GENERALLY LARGER DISTRICT STAFFS PERFORM MORE OF THE SERVICE TO CONSTITUENTS THAN FORMERLY, THE WASHINGTON STAFF CAN SPEND MORE TIME ON LEGISLATION AND OTHER DUTIES NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE CONSTITUENCY. THESE FINDINGS MAY EXPLAIN WHY THE AVERAGE MEMBER OF THE NEW GENERATION OF HOUSE MEMBERS HAS BEEN BOTH MORE SUCCESSFUL AT THE POLLS AND MORE ACTIVE IN POLICY MAKING.