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AbstractPeremptory norms, or norms jus cogens, hold a unique position in the hierarchy of international law. Unlike customary international law and treaty law, peremptory norms abide no derivation and are binding on all states regardless of their willingness to be bound by them. As a result, the authority of peremptory norms, it is argued, cannot be adequately explained by current positivist and voluntarist explanations of their authority. This article discusses the inadequacies of the positivist explanation and puts forward an alternative natural law explanation for the authority of peremptory norms which avoids the conceptual difficulties found in the positivist account. Finally, in the concluding section I address a number of potential realist and post-modernist counter arguments to my position and dismiss them as unconvincing.

AbstractThe ongoing Syrian civil war calls for a re-evaluation of using force to protect human rights. This article does not rake over the much-debated issue of whether a right of humanitarian intervention exists aslex lata. Instead, it addresses the little reviewed normative issue of whether the rightshouldexist in international law to support and reflect a pluralistic understanding of sovereignty. Despite advancements in international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law, this wider fabric of international law preserves Westphalian sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. It denies any right of humanitarian intervention.

AbstractIn the 36 years since Francis Mann published Foreign Affairs in English Courts, the engagement of the United Kingdom courts with issues of international law has greatly increased. This article addresses the reasons underlying this trend and identifies four key developments: first, the nature of international law has evolved to embrace individuals as subjects; second, the Human Rights Act 1998 has had a profound influence, often requiring domestic courts to rule on matters of international law in order to give effect to the European Convention on Human Rights; third, in recent decades there has been a growing willingness on the part of courts in the United Kingdom to address and investigate the conduct of foreign States and issues of public international law; and fourth, these developments have been accompanied by a shift in attitudes to the relationship between customary international law and the common law.

The International Law Commission held its fifty-second session in Geneva from May 1 to June 9, 2000, and from July 10 to August 18, 2000, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Chusei Yamada of Japan. The Commission elected Professor Djamchid Momtaz of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Kamil E. Idris of Sudan to fill the vacancies left by the death of Doudou Thiam of Senegal and the election of Awn Al-Khasawneh of Jordan to the International Court of Justice.

In War and Self-Defense David Rodin uncovers many flaws of current thinking about war. Rodin correctly points out that the justification of national self-defense goes beyond the justification of individual self-defense. He accurately rejects the standard notion of moral symmetry—the accepted view that both just and unjust warriors can permissibly kill enemies as long as they observe the laws of war. Rodin vindicates the right view: if a war is unjust, each and every injury caused by the unjust warrior is a criminal act. There are no morally justified killings by those who fight unjust wars. Further, Rodin rightly rejects various holistic theories of self-defense. Last but not least, he correctly denounces what I have called the Hegelian Myth, the idea that tyrannical governments are worth defending against interventions aimed at deposing them because they are protected by the principle of sovereignty.