Suchergebnisse

The risk of an oil supply disruption still exists. Oil reserves are increasingly concentrated in a handful of unreliable regimes, plagued by piracy and terrorism. Natural disasters and chokepoint incidents have increased in frequency. In addition, oil is expected to remain a significant part of the energy mix up until 2030. By that time Europe will be importing 90% of its oil. Thus, oil supply security will become an increasingly important feature of European politics. One way to counter the noxious consequences of an oil disruption is to cooperate. International cooperation is a critical factor in any type of crisis, however, it is especially important when it comes to a finite, highly concentrated and critical commodity like oil. The lack of coordination might lead to scrambling and oil hoarding, which dramatically exacerbate the crisis. Yet cooperation in the oil issue-area has been the subject of only a few studies, none of which provides a systematic and comprehensive analysis. They are also limited in their scope and findings. This dissertation aims to partially fill this lacuna. It employs a structured focused comparison to study European consumer countries' cooperation in times of oil supply shortages. There have been fifteen such crises since the Second World War, three of which with dramatic consequences for the world economy. The analysis evaluates European cooperative efforts in seven of these cases, starting with the Abadan crisis in 1951. The cases are selected on the basis of their magnitude and economic impact. In particular, I look at intergovernmental negotiations within existing international bodies prior to, during and immediately after the crisis. The findings suggest that institutions are more likely to facilitate interstate cooperation in the presence of a strong leader (a hegemon) - a role, which in the case of the oil issue-area was assumed by the US until the early 1970s.

Curbing (without banning) potentially environmentally‐damaging activities that have global, rather than local, effects raises challenges analogous to those faced by a community lacking legislative powers that has to restrict access to a common pasture in order to make its use sustainable. A local community achieves autonomy in a matter such as this by consensual cooperation. In the absence of a world coercive authority, global environmental problems (in which a measure of world autonomy is needed) have to be met similarly by consensual co‐operation among governments. The conditions under which local consensual cooperation have been observed to be successful may also be relevant to global consensual cooperation. In particular there must be clear rules, and devices for interpreting them; they must be acceptable to all parties; and monitoring of compliance is crucial. Even in such cases of quasi‐voluntary compliance, graduated sanctions for infringement, or analogous arrangements, are quite likely to play a vital part. In an international regime for reducing greenhouse‐gas emissions, it is essential that rules should be devised that will appeal as fair and practically tolerable to opinion in both rich and poor countries and to both high and low per capita emitters. This will rule out a regime of uniform percentage reductions without balancing compensation. It will also rule out a regime based on equal per capita claims to engage in the restricted activity. It is desirable that the rules also act to make the allocation of the reductions in the potentially damaging activity efficient. This will favour rules under which financial signals reflecting marginal costs or benefits play some part in the allocation of any target aggregates. It will probably be essential, given prevalent views of justice and differing valuations of environmental goals between rich and poor nations, that the arrangements involve transfers of resources from richer, higher‐per‐capita polluting countries to poorer, lower per capita polluting countries. Nevertheless, reducing emissions sufficiently through a system of tradable quotas summing to the targeted total of emissions – which might seem to meet both this requirement and the need for efficient marginal incentives – has, in its simple form in which the quotas issued are proportional to countries' populations, little chance of being acceptable to rich, high‐emitter nations. An attempt is made to explore solutions to these dilemmas, leading on from the arrangements made under the Kyoto protocol of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Open to contributions from all over the world, the Finnish Yearbook stands out as a forum for theoretically informed, high-quality publications on all aspects of public international law, including the international relations law of the European Union

This paper is concerned with the determinants and consequences of intercontinental migration over the past four centuries. It begins with a review of the history of primarily trans-Atlantic migration to the New World during the period of Colonial settlement. The contract and coerced migration from Europe and Africa gave way, from the 18th century, to an era of free European migration. The period 1850 to 1913 was one of mass migration, primarily from Europe to North America and Oceania and from parts of Asia (primarily India, China and Japan) to other parts of Asia, Africa and the New World. World wars, immigration restrictions and the Great Depression resulted in a period of low international migration (1913 to 1945). In the post-World War II period international migration again increased sharply, but with changes in the nature of the flows, and under the constraints of immigration controls. Europe joined North America and Oceania as a major destination, as did the oil producing Arab countries bordering the Persian Gulf. The paper then explores the reasons for this international migration. Important factors include the relative wages in the origin and destination, the cost of international migration, the wealth to finance the investment, chain migration (kinship and information networks), as well as government subsidies to and restrictions on the free flow of people. The impact of international migration is explored in the context of a two-factor and a threefactor aggregate production function. Implications are developed for the aggregate (average) impact, as well as for the impact on the functional and personal distributions of income. The gainers and losers from international migration are considered. With insights on impact, a political economy approach is used to analyze the determinants of immigration controls. The influence on policy of gainers and losers from immigration was mediated by institutional change and by interest group politics. The long run relationship between globalization and international migration is explored.