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Latest issue consulted: Vol. 598 (Mar. 2005) ; Description based on: Vol. 1, no. 2 (Oct. 1890); title from cover ; Publisher varies ; Some issues have also distinctive titles ; Numerous supplements ; Microfilm. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Vols. 1 (1890)-63 (Jan. 1916) issued as suppl. to Mar. 1916. 1 v.; Vols. 64 (Mar. 1916)-96 (July 1921). 1 v.; Vols. 97 (Sept. 1921)-126 (July 1926). 1 v.; Vols. 127 (Sept. 1926)-152 (Nov. 1930) issued as v. 159, pt. 2; Vols. 153 (1931)-182 (1935). 1 v.; Vols. 183 (1936)-212 (1940). 1 v.; Vols. 213 (1941)-242 (1945). 1 v.; Vols. 243 (1946)-272 (1950). 1 v.; Vols. 273 (1951)-302 (1955). 1 v.; Vols. 303 (1956)-332 (1960). 1 v.; Vols. 333 (1961)-362 (1965). 1 v.; Vols. 363 (1966)-392 (1970). 1 v.; Vols. 393 (1971)-422 (1975). 1 v.; Vols. 423 (1976)-452 (1980). 1 v

Progressive-era ""poverty warriors"" cast poverty in America as a problem of unemployment, low wages, labor exploitation, and political disfranchisement. In the 1990s, policy specialists made ""dependency"" the issue and crafted incentives to get people off welfare. Poverty Knowledge gives the first comprehensive historical account of the thinking behind these very different views of ""the poverty problem,"" in a century-spanning inquiry into the politics, institutions, ideologies, and social science that shaped poverty research and policy. Alice O'Connor chronicles a transfor

Es werden die Zusammenhänge zwischen der Polarisierung von Lebenslagen, gesellschaftlichen Verteilungskonflikten und der Wahrnehmung gesellschaftlicher Ungleichheit in Deutschland thematisiert. Anhand der empirischen Befunde wird deutlich, dass der – über den Wohlstandsindikator Einkommen gemessene – Grad an Ungleichheit und Polarisierung von Lebenslagen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der jüngeren Vergangenheit gestiegen ist. Damit einhergehend, ist die wahrgenommene Intensität des gesellschaftlich besonders relevanten Konfliktes zwischen Arm und Reich nicht unerheblich gewachsen. Hierbei zeigt sich gerade bei sozialpolitischen Problemgruppen – und hier wiederum besonders prononciert bei den (Langzeit-)Arbeitslosen – ein relativ großes Unzufriedenheitspotenzial. Dieses birgt für die Demokratie bzw. für die gesellschaftliche Stabilität in Deutschland gewisse Gefährdungen in sich, wenngleich – zumindest in Westdeutschland – diese Gefährdungen in EU-27-weiter Perspektive eher auf einem mittleren Niveau einzuordnen sind, d. h. in dieser internationalen Relativität nur eine mittlere Gefährdungslage für (West-)Deutschland indiziert wird.

While trauma and loss can occur anywhere, most suffering is experienced as personal tragedy. Yet some tragedies transcend everyday life's sad but inevitable traumas to become notorious public events: de facto ";public"; tragedies. In these crises, suffering is made publicly visible and lamentable. Such tragedies are defined by public accusations, social blame, outpourings of grief and anger, spontaneous memorialization, and collective action. These, in turn, generate a comparable set of political reactions, including denial, denunciation, counterclaims, blame avoidance, and a competition to control memories of the event. Disasters and crises are no more or less common today than in the past, but public tragedies now seem ubiquitous. After Tragedy Strikes argues that they are now epochal—public tragedies have become the day's definitive social and political events. Thomas D. Beamish deftly explores this phenomenon by developing the historical context within which these events occur and the role that political elites, the media, and an emergent ideology of victimhood have played in cultivating their ascendence

The United States Senator from Minnesota is famous for his aggressive stance on heated issues of the day. He is less known, at least to non-academicians, for his unpublicized efforts on behalf of the social sciences. Here Senator Humphrey reviews the government's record on social research support and advocates a new charter of the social sciences.

What are the virtues of institutions we take for granted-universities, the study of the social sciences and humanities, and scholarship on professions such as law? What are the vices of the disciplinary structure of the social sciences, even in the law and society movement and criminology that started as interdisciplinary projects? Research on regulation within an interdisciplinary structure, the Regulatory Institutions Network, is used to illustrate the difficulties of attempts to change direction in the social sciences. The article advocates the creative destruction of disciplinary structures by organizing in tents that study institutionalization (rather than buildings that study categories of institutions). To keep pace with social change, pulling tents down and endlessly pegging out new ones is a path forward. A politics of defending universities and opposing the disciplines that have captured them does not mean advocacy of restructuring. If more interesting work issues from poorly funded tents than from disciplinary edifices, reformers can advance creative destruction.

What are the virtues of institutions we take for granted-universities, the study of the social sciences and humanities, and scholarship on professions such as law? What are the vices of the disciplinary structure of the social sciences, even in the law and society movement and criminology that started as interdisciplinary projects? Research on regulation within an interdisciplinary structure, the Regulatory Institutions Network, is used to illustrate the difficulties of attempts to change direction in the social sciences. The article advocates the creative destruction of disciplinary structures by organizing in tents that study institutionalization (rather than buildings that study categories of institutions). To keep pace with social change, pulling tents down and endlessly pegging out new ones is a path forward. A politics of defending universities and opposing the disciplines that have captured them does not mean advocacy of restructuring. If more interesting work issues from poorly funded tents than from disciplinary edifices, reformers can advance creative destruction.

Most current academic work on political polarization treats partisanship as the dominant motivational driver behind social cleavage and mass polarization. This essay engages in the debate by moving beyond the conceptual straitjacket of partisanship-driven polarization, recasting the primary motives behind political polarization into the three situated and interrelated ideologies that drive the phenomenon of polarization at a mass level, namely, populism, system-justifying attitudes, and state-sponsored ideologies (including religiosity and other cultural identities). By signposting more open-ended, processual, and ambivalent conceptions behind polarization, this article attempts to systematically map the alternative motives of polarization, and in doing so supplement our understanding of the deep ideological divides present not only in Western democracies, but also in many (semi-)authoritarian contexts. The article offers a point of departure for appreciating the coexistence, coevolution, and mutual constitution of the different ideological motives behind polarization, and suggests ways to develop paths to depolarization through a grounded, processual–relational analysis of the world.