Suchergebnisse

On July 6 and 7, 1948 a meeting was held in Washington to which were invited representatives of the 36 governments which had signed the International Wheat Agreement concluded there March 6, 1948. Representatives of the following countries informed the meeting that their governments had ratified the agreement and had deposited their formal instruments of acceptance with the United States State Department by the deadline of July 1: Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, India, Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Belgium, Cuba, Greece, the Netherlands, and Poland indicated that their legislatures had ratified and that formal instruments of acceptance would be deposited early that month. The representatives present discussed the possibilities of further ratifications, particularly the prospects of ratification by the United States Government, and decided that prospects of ratification during the 1948–49 crop-year were remote. Thereupon, representatives of some of the ratifying states gave notice that their governments withdrew from the agreement, because the guaranteed quantities of countries which had formally accepted it were insufficient to ensure its successful operation. A preparatory committee was appointed consisting of the representatives of Australia, the Benelux customs union, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, France, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States to keep under review prospects of concluding a new international wheat agreement. The United States was invited to convene the meeting as soon as it considered the time propitious to negotiate a new international agreement.

The Europeanisation of civil procedure has moved from slogan to reality. Nevertheless, the European Union does not have its own civil jurisdiction. Therefore the national codes of civil procedure are facing enormous challenges by the increasing access of the European legislator on the law of civil procedure. These challenges have been part of intensive discussions on several research conferences at the Georg-August- University Göttingen and the Eötvös-Lorand-University Budapest. They were focused on the interactions between European Law and the quite different traditions of national codes of civil procedure.

The congress is held by some writers to be the present day antidote to modern man's isolation. Must this be seen as the reason for the constantly large participation in International Conferences on social welfare, in spite of the proliferation of seminars and meetings ?Undoubtedly social workers and representatives of allied professions are not immune from this modern trend. Thus, every two years, when the International Council on Social Welfare organises its international forum there is a veritable "Migration" of office holders in the social welfare field. They come from all quarters to pool, for a week, their experiences and ideas on the selected theme.

Defence date: 17 June 2016 ; Examining Board: Professor Piero Gottardi, EUI, Supervisor; Professor Paola Conconi, Université Libre de Bruxelles; Professor Bernard Hoekman, RSCAS; Professor Thierry Verdier, Paris School of Economics. ; This thesis tackles three topics in international trade: (i) the motives behind restrictions on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and the role of investment agreements, (ii) the determinants of services trade policies, and (iii) the role of domestic institutions in affecting trade flows and the gains from trade. Tariffs have almost completely disappeared but various barriers that restrict FDI still remain. Many trade agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have been signed to lower tariffs and reduce the risks of expropriation whereas few agreements have been signed to lower entry barriers. The first chapter looks at the interaction between political and economic motives for protectionism. Lobbies give contributions to the governments to affect the policies. The repatriation of profits by foreign affiliates leads governments to restrict the entry of multinationals. Given these two motives, the cooperative outcome, which differs from the chosen policy, can be implemented through an agreement. However I highlight two reasons that can explain why such agreements might be unnecessary. First foreign lobbying counteracts domestic lobbying and, under certain conditions, can push the government to choose the cooperative outcome without signing an agreement. Second the presence of tax havens where firms shift their profits removes the gains from cooperation and makes an agreement unnecessary. The second chapter focuses on the determinants of services trade agreements. Most of the literature on trade policy and agreements has focused on goods, tariffs and trade agreements whereas, in this paper, we study services, foreign direct investment and services agreements. We provide a rationale for governments to commit to liberalize. The third chapter contributes to the debate on the role of various institutions in affecting economic exchanges. We focus here on the role of contract enforcement in shaping the optimal organization of firms and the allocation of entrepreneurs across sectors. Different institutional qualities are a source of comparative advantage and export specialization. We find that liberalization leads to asymmetric gains of trade in terms of productivity and reallocation of resources. The country with the poorest institutions benefits less from trade than the country with the best institutions.