Suchergebnisse

Das Handbuch enthält auf 200 S. Hauptteil Kurzbiographien der Abgeordneten des Europäischen Parlaments. Der umfangreiche Anhang beinhaltet: Zusammensetzung der Parlamentsorgane (Präsidium, Ausschüsse, Beratende Versammlung AKP-EWG, Generalsekretariat); Aufbau und personelle Zusammensetzung der Fraktionen; die Delegationen für die Beziehungen zu Nichtmitgliedern und zu internationalen Organisationen; die Ergebnisse der Wahlen von 1984 sowie Organisationschemata der Dienste des Generalsekretariats des Parlaments und der Fraktionen. (SWP-Hld)

1. Jo Ann Cavallo and Walter E. Block, Introduction -- 2. Gloria Alvarez, With Liberty and Health Everything Is Possible in This World -- 3. Phillip Bagus, A Voyage of Discovery -- 4. Doug Bandow, A Beltway Odyssey -- 5. Jayant Bhandari, Out of India: From Wretchedness to Capitalism -- 6. James Bovard, Forty Years Sniping at Leviathan -- 7. Connor Boyack, One Person Changes the World -- 8. Per L. Bylund, From Meager Means to Market Anarchism: The Political Evolution of an Ordinary Swede -- 9. Gerard Casey, My Transformation into a Teacher of Liberty -- 10. Jo Ann Cavallo, "To study and at times to practice what one has learned, is that not a pleasure?" -- 11. Christopher J. Coyne, My Path to Becoming an Economist and Peacemonger -- 12. Lauren Daugherty, A Young American for Liberty -- 13. Marianna Davidovich, Family, Freedom, and Flourishing: An Educator's Journey -- 14. Dumo Denga, Moments that Led Me to Libertarianism in South Africa -- 15. Beniamino Di Martino, The Libertarian Mission of a Catholic Priest -- 16. Brian Doherty, Thinking about and Working toward a Less Cruel World -- 17. Lukasz Dominiak, From Growing Up under Socialism to Becoming Libertarian -- 18. Richard M. Ebeling, My Life as an Austrian Economist and Classical Liberal: The Starting Point and Early Years -- 19. Robert B. Eckhardt, Maverick Scientist, Libertarian Capitalist -- 20. Gene Epstein, Mommy Was a Commie: My Personal Voyage from Intellectual Depravity to Libertarianism -- 21. Rafi Farber, My Journey to Liberty -- 22. Bernardo Ferrero, A Florentine Road toward Liberty -- 23. David Friedman, From Philosophy to Economics -- 24. Alan Futerman, Libertarianism as a Path to Life -- 25. Sean Gabb, Born Wanting To Be Free -- 26. Carla Gericke, Live Free and Thrive! -- 27. James Grant, Luckiest Guy on Wall Street -- 28. Zhu Haijiu, Human Action and My Austrian Economics Journey -- 29. Steve H. Hanke, A Life among the "Econ" -- 30. Norman Horn, The Growth of a Christian Libertarian -- 31. Jacob G. Hornberger, My Life as a Libertarian -- 32. Michael Huemer, Intuitive Libertarianism -- 33. Allen Jeon, Austro-libertarianism's Existential Lessons -- 34. Marc Joffe, Learning from Libertarian Disappointments -- 35. Linda K. Kiguhi, Building a Community of Leaders for Liberty in Africa -- 36. Rowland Kingsley, My Story as an African Libertarian -- 37. Peter G. Klein, My Life as an Austrian Economist and Entrepreneurship Scholar -- 38. Barbara Kolm, If You Are a Tyrolean -- 39. Mitchell Langbert, Confessions of a Libertarian in Academe -- 40. Peter T. Leeson, It Began with Richard Nixon -- 41. Brad Lips, Discovering a World of Hope for Liberty -- 42. Carlo Lottieri, Some Notes in View of an Intellectual Autobiography -- 43. Yuri Maltsev, From Moscow toward Liberty -- 44. Lipton Matthews, No Greater Love than Choice -- 45. Allen Mendenhall, A Libertarian Literary Lawyer -- 46. Ilana Mercer, A Woman of the Libertarian Right -- 47. John Mosier, Confessions of a Proto-Austrian Libertarian -- 48. Antony P. Mueller, My Intellectual Journey in Search of a Social Order beyond the State and Politics -- 49. Michael C. Munger, A Presumption in Favor of Liberty -- 50. Robert P. Murphy, How I Became an Austro-Libertarian -- 51. Héctor Ñaupari, A Sower of Freedom in Latin America -- 52. Radu Nechita, Opening Minds and Sharing the Passion for Liberty -- 53. Wanjiru Njoya, From African Socialism to Libertarianism -- 54. Johan Norberg, Anarchy, Minimal State, and Freelance Utopia -- 55. Yuri Petukhov, Russia, My Journey, and the Hayek Foundation -- 56. Roger Pilon, An Unconventional Odyssey -- 57. Guglielmo Piombini, Dazzled by Murray N. Rothbard -- 58. Robert W. Poole, Jr., Building a Libertarian Think Tank -- 59. Michael Rectenwald, From Leftism to Liberty, A Personal Journey -- 60. Dann Reid, The Culinary Libertarian: Combining My Passion for Food and Liberty -- 61. David Chávez Salazar, And I Will Finally Know What Freedom Is -- 62. Antony Sammeroff, A Scottish Lefty Becomes a Libertarian -- 63. Li Schoolland, A Survivor's Story -- 64. Karen Selick, Making Life Less Lonely for Canadian Libertarians -- 65. Parth J. Shah, Challenging India's Socialist Mindset -- 66. Ilya Shapiro, Living the American Dream -- 67. Josef Šíma, The Fall of Communism as Only the First Step Towards a Free Society -- 68. Jo Ann Skousen, From Social Democrat to Libertarian -- 69. Mark Skousen, My Declaration of Independence -- 70. Barry Smith, Thinking Like an Austrian -- 71. Jacek Spendel, Beyond Philosophy: Libertarianism as a Way of Life -- 72. Krassen Stanchev, From the Soviets to Classical Liberalism -- 73. Frank J. Tipler, Physics and Libertarian Philosophy -- 74. Martin van Staden, Law, Voluntaryism, and Being Libertarian in Uninviting Africa -- 75. Laurence M. Vance, Christian Libertarianism -- 76. Richard Vedder, The Life of an Unlikely Libertarian -- 77. Richard E. Wagner, My Non-ideological Path to Becoming a Libertarian Thinker -- 78. Michael A. Walker, Why I Am a Big Government Skeptic and Small Government Advocate -- 79. Nena Bartlett Whitfield, Building the Future Together -- 80. Hiroshi Yoshida, Opening the Taxpayer's Eyes.

The possibility of Britain withdrawing from the European Union - a "Brexit" - has been receiving growing attention. Reports have largely focused on what this withdrawal could mean for the United Kingdom; however, there has been little analysis of what it could mean for the rest of the Union, its individual members, wider Europe, and other states around the world such as the United States and Japan. This analysis gathers 26 views from think-tanks, research institutions, and universities from sixteen EU member states, nine non-EU countries, and a view from the EU's institutions in Brussels. Five overall themes emerge from the contributions: 1. Developments in the UK have not passed unnoticed, but there are varying levels of understanding as to what is driving UK behavior as well as a great deal of uncertainty about the potential impact for the EU and the countries covered. While no country seems to be planning actively for a Brexit, many are aware that this step may become necessary because of developments in the UK's domestic debate. 2. Awareness of the UK's position is largely framed by wider concerns facing the EU, especially the euro zone. For many states, the UK is important, and the EU would be a lesser place without it. Yet while the UK's reform agenda does appeal to some states, the real pressure for reform will remain within the euro zone. Reform agendas might happen to overlap with London's, but with the euro zone continuing to move ahead, they might increasingly diverge. Countries within the euro zone, the pre-in countries, and even Denmark with its opt-out have focused on Germany and France for leadership and have tried to secure a place close to euro zone decision-making. London has become a bystander. 3. While there is some support for the UK's positions on EU reform, conceptual clarity and language are crucial. States like the Netherlands and Germany seek better enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity, not repatriation. A multispeed EU is considered a possibility, but not - as the UK might hope - in a pick-and-choose fashion; there is less and less appetite in Brussels for "third ways" like Switzerland. And because many EU members perceive the UK's long-term EU agenda as opaque or unpredictable, they are hesitant to align with London. 4. Countries both inside and outside the EU are clearly concerned about the economic and, to a lesser degree, security consequences of a British exit. Britain's economic approach - especially its free-market, liberal outlook - would be the most noticeable loss. Yet some countries note a growing "mercantilist" attitude in British thinking; its economic connections to some traditionally close countries have been in decline for some time; and some states will seek to exploit economically Britain's marginalization, using this tactic to strengthen their appeal to global investors. In European foreign, security, and defense policies, the UK is not easily replaced, and the EU and Europe's place in the world would lose from a British withdrawal: France would face Germany's "culture of restraint" on external affairs, while for the United States a Brexit would further complicate transatlantic relations by stunting not only its long-sought improvements to the European arm of NATO but also a reduction in Europe's dependence on the United States and efforts to make Europe take on a more global role. Furthermore, outside powers may seek to play on divisions, choosing between bilateral and multilateral relations when necessary. 5. While these economic and security concerns serve to remind other countries of the UK's role in the EU, they do not necessarily generate sympathy for it, but rather exasperation at the country's inability to offer leadership other than "negative leadership." The UK's debate on limiting immigration is seen as a direct attack on the fundamental right of the free movement of people and labor in the single market. EU countries fear the influence of British Euroskeptics on their own domestic debate and are frustrated with London for not successfully confronting the issue at home. In view of previous episodes of UK-EU difficulties, the EU today is much larger and in parts much deeper. Some member states have little if any attachment to the UK. The British government's rapprochement with Germany while neglecting, and in some areas abusing, relations with former close partners in central and eastern Europe and Scandinavia means it has found itself on the sidelines of EU politics. Some of the UK's criticisms of the EU and proposals for its reform are seen as legitimate. What is not seen as legitimate is advancing these as a purely national interest and using the threat of a Brexit as leverage. London will have to work harder and engage in more effective coalition-building if it wants to succeed in shaping the ongoing debates about EU reform.

1. Aufgaben und Methoden der Rechtsgeschichte -- 1.1. Der Erkenntniswert der Rechtsgeschichte -- 1.2. Der Aufbau der Untersuchung -- Anmerkungen -- 2. Das Familienrecht Des ABGB 1811 — Wesen und Funktion -- 2.1. Der gesellschaftliche Hintergrund -- 2.2. Die Stellung von Mann und Frau in Ehe und Familie -- 2.2.1. Die Rechtslage im ABGB -- 2.2.2. Wirkung und Funktion der Ehe -- 2.3. Das Institut der Ehe -- 2.3.1. Die Eheschließung -- 2.3.2. Die zwingend-rechtlichen Bestimmungen des ABGB-Eherechts -- 2.3.3. Das Ehehindernisrecht -- 2.3.4. Die Auflösung der Ehe -- 2.3.4.1. Die Scheidung von Tisch und Bett -- 2.3.4.2. Die Trennung -- 2.3.5. ABGB und Sexualität -- 2.4. Die Stellung des Kindes im Familienrecht 1811 40 2*4.1. Das eheliche Kind -- 2.4.1. Das eheliche Kind -- 2.4.2. Das uneheliche Kind -- 2.4.3. Die Vormundschaft -- 2.4.4. Adoption und Legitimation -- Anmerkungen -- 3. Änderung des Familienrechts im Rahmen der Teilnovellen 1914–1916 -- 3.1. Der soziale und politische Hintergrund -- 3.2. Gesellschaftliche Forderungen und Probleme -- 3.2.1. Der Streit um die Reform des Eherechts -- 3.2.2. Die Forderung nach Verbesserung der rechtlichen Stellung der Frau in der Familie -- 3.2.3. Forderungen auf dem Gebiet des Kindschafts- und Vormundschaftsrechts -- 3.3. Verlauf und Inhalt der Reform -- 3.3.1. Die Entstehungsgeschichte der Teilnovellen -- 3.3.2. Der Inhalt der Teilnovellen -- 3.3.3. Das Inkrafttreten der Teilnovellen -- Anmerkungen -- 4. Die Entwicklung des Familienrechts Zwischen 1918 und 1938 -- 4.1. Der politische Hintergrund -- 4.2. Das Eherecht -- 4.2.1. Der Kampf um das Ehesehließungs- und Ehetrennungsrecht -- 4.2.2. Die Beschränkung der Eheschließungsfreiheit -- 4.3. Versuche zur Gleichstellung der Frau im Familienrecht -- 4.4. Verbesserung der Rechtsstellung des Kindes -- Anmerkungen.-5. Das Familienrecht Während der Herrschaft des Nationalsozialismus -- 5.1. Die politischen Rahmenbedingungen und die Ideologie des Nationalsozialismus -- 5.2. Das Eherecht -- 5.2.1. Das Ehesehließungs- und Ehehindernisrecht -- 5.2.2. Das Ehescheidungsrecht -- 5.2.3. Das Erbrecht und das Ehegüterrecht -- 5.3. Die Rechtsstellung des Kindes -- Anmerkungen -- 6. Der Gesellschaftliche Rahmen der Reformen in der Zweiten Republik -- 6.1. Der politische und gesellschaftliche Hintergrund -- 6.2. Die Haltung der Parteien -- 6.2.1. Das Frauen- und Familienbild der SPÖ -- 6.2.2. Das Frauen- und Familienbild der ÖVP -- 6.2.3. Das Frauen- und Familienbild des national-liberalen Lagers -- 6.3. Familienrecht und Gleichheitsgrundsatz -- Anmerkungen -- 7. Die Veränderungen im Familienrecht in der Zweiten Republik -- 7.1. Rechtsüberleitung und Beseitigung des nationalsozialistischen Rechts -- 7.2. Die Auseinandersetzung um die Beibehaltung der obligatorischen Zivilehe -- 7.3. Bemühungen um die Familienrechtsreform und ihre Durchführung -- 7.3.1. Der Reformdruck nach 1945 -- 7.3.2. Reformversuche unter JM Tschadek -- 7.3.3. Die Aufnahme der Reformvorschläge in der Öffentlichkeit -- 7.3.4. Die Strategie der Teilreformen -- 7.3.5. Die Ära der ÖVP-Alleinregierung -- 7.3.6. Die Durchführung der Familienrechtsreform ab 1970 -- 7.4. Allgemeine Bemerkungen zur Familienrechtsgesetzgebung in Österreich -- 7.4.1. Die Ausarbeitung der Entwürfe im BMJ -- 7.4.2. Die Gesetzentwürfe in der Begutachtung -- 7.4.3. Die parlamentarische Beratung -- 7.5. Schwierigkeiten bei der Erschließung des Forschungsmaterials -- Anmerkungen -- 8. Die Neuordnung der Rechtsstellung des Unehelichen Kindes -- 8.1. Das gesellschaftliche Problem -- 8.1.1. Sozialdaten -- 8.1.2. Schwierigkeiten bei der Reform des Unehelichenrechts -- 8.2.Ältere Rechtslage -- 8.3. Forderungen nach Verbesserung der Rechtsstellung des unehelichen Kindes -- 8.4. Die Kodifikationsgeschichte -- 8.5. Der Inhalt der Entwürfe und ihre Aufnahme im Begutachtungsverfahren -- 8.5.1. Die Feststellung der Vaterschaft -- 8.5.2. Der Unterhaltsanspruch -- 8.5.3. Das Erbrecht des unehelichen Kindes -- 8.5.4. Mitsprache- und Besuchsrecht des unehelichen Vaters -- 8.5.5. Gesetzliche Stellvertretung -- 8.5.6. Zusammenfassung der Begutachtung -- 8.6. Die Reform des Unehelichenrechts 1970 -- 8.6.1. Verhandlungen außerhalb des Parlaments -- 8.6.2. Die Beratungen im Nationalrat -- 8.7. Reform des Unehelichenrechts im Rahmen des KindG 1977 -- Anmerkungen -- 9. Die Reform der Geschäftsfähigkeit -- 9.1. Das Problem und der soziale Hintergrund -- 9.2. Ältere Rechtslage -- 9.2.1. Die Entwicklung der Geschäftsfähigkeit im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert -- 9.2.2. Die Entwicklung der Ehefähigkeit -- 9.3. Die ministeriellen Vorarbeiten zum VolljährG -- 9.4. Die Beratungen im Nationalrat -- Anmerkungen -- 10. Die Neuordnung der Persönlichen Rechtwirkungen der Ehe -- 10.1. Sozialdaten -- 10.2. Die ältere Rechtslage -- 10.3. Die Reformdiskussion bis 1970 -- 10.4. Der Weg zur Regierungsvorlage 345 10.4.1. Tendenzen im Begutachtungsverfahren -- 10.4.1. Tendenzen im Begutachtungsverfahren -- 10.5. Die Aufnahme der Regierungsvorlage 1973 -- 10.6. Die Beratungen im Nationalrat -- 10.6.1. Das Wesen der Ehe — Rechte und Pflichten der Ehegatten -- 10.6.2. Mitwirkung im Erwerb des anderen Ehegatten -- 10.6.3. Die Pflicht zum gemeinsamen Wohnen -- 10.6.4. Die gerichtliche Entscheidung über Verletzungen der persönlichen Pflichten der Ehegatten -- 10.6.5. Der Unterhalt -- 10.6.6. Die Verwirkung des Unterhaltsanspruchs — der Schutz des älterwerdenden Ehegatten -- 10.6.7. Die Schlüsselgewalt.-10.6.8. Das Wirtschaftsgeld -- 10.6.9. Das Namensrecht -- 10.6.10. Der Schutz des Wohnbedürfnisses -- Anmerkungen -- 11. Das Unterhaltsvorschußgesetz -- 11.1. Das Problem -- 11.2. Ältere Rechtslage -- 11.3. Der Weg zur Regierungsvorlage -- 11.3.1. Kompetenzrechtliche Fragen -- 11.3.2. Der Entwurf zum UVG -- 11.4. Die Beratungen im Nationalrat -- 11.4.1. Kompetenzrechtliche Grundlagen des UVG -- 11.4.2. Der Kreis der Anspruchsberechtigten -- 11.4.3. Die Höhe des Vorschusses -- 11.4.4. Die Heranziehung der subsidiär Unterhaltspflichtigen -- 11.4.5. Die zur Durchführung des UVG zuständige Behörde -- Anmerkungen -- 12. Das Rechtsverhältnis Zwischen den Eltern und den Ehelichen Kindern -- 12.1. Sozialdaten -- 12.2. Ältere Rechtslage und Problem -- 12.3. Reformvorschläge bis 1970 -- 12.4. Der Weg zur Regierungsvorlage -- 12.4.1. Tendenzen im Begutachtungsverfahren -- 12.4.1.1. Die Gleichstellung von Vater und Mutter -- 12.4.1.2. Die Verpflichtung der Eltern zur Einvernehmlichkeit -- 12.4.1.3. Der Unterhalt des ehelichen Kindes -- 12.4.1.4. Die Beachtung der eigenen Persönlichkeit des Kindes -- 12.4.1.5. Das Zurechtweisungsrecht -- 12.4.1.6. Rechtslage bei Auflösung der Ehe -- 12.4.1.7. Der Einfluß des Gerichts in der Familie -- 12.4.2. Die Regierungsvorlagen 1972 und 1975 -- 12.5. Die Beratungen im Nationalrat -- 12.5.1. Allgemeine Rechte und Pflichten -- 12.5.2. Der Unterhalt des Kindes -- 12.5.2.1. Anteilige Haftung oder Solidarhaftung der Eltern -- 12.5.2.2. Bemessungsgrundlage, Anrechnung der Betreuung auf den Unterhalt -- 12.5.2.3. Minderung des Unterhaltsanspruchs wegen einer Pflichtverletzung -- 12.5.2.4. Die Unterhaltspflicht der Großeltern -- 12.5.3. Einvernehmlichkeitsgebot und Konfliktnorm -- 12.5.4. Gehorsamspflicht und Durchsetzungsrecht -- 12.5.5. Der Aufenthalt des Kindes -- 12.5.6.Die Verwaltung des Kindesvermögens -- 12.5.7. Die gesetzliche Vertretung des Kindes -- 12.5.8. Die Entziehung oder Einschränkung der elterlichen Rechte und Pflichten -- 12.5.9. Die elterlichen Rechte und Pflichten bei Auflösung der Ehe -- 12.5.10. Elterliche Mindestrechte -- 12.5.11. Das Recht, mit dem Kind zu verkehren -- 12.5.12. Die Rechtsstellung des unehelichen Kindes -- 12.6. Ausblicke -- Anmerkungen -- 13. Die Reform des Ehegüter- und Ehegattenerbrechts -- 13.1. Sozialdaten -- 13.2. Ältere Rechtslage und Probleme -- 13.2.1. Das Ehegüterrecht vor der Reform 1978 -- 13.2.2. Das Ehegattenetbrecht vor der Reform 1978 -- 13.3. Ältere Reformansätze -- 13.4. Reformversuche in den 60er Jahren -- 13.4.1. Die Entwürfe zum Ehegüterrecht in der Ära der Großen Koalition -- 13.4.2. Der Gang der Reform während der Zeit der ÖVP-Alleiriregierung -- 13.5. Die Reformarbeit der SPÖ-Alleinregierung -- 13.5.1. Die Abkehr vom Zugewinnausgleichsgedanken -- 13.6. Die Beratungen im Nationalrat -- 13.6.1. Abgeltung für die Mitwirkung im Erwerb -- 13.6.2. Die Aufteilung des ehelichen Vermögens -- 13.6.2.1. Das aufzuteilende Vermögen -- 13.6.2.2. Die Aufteilungsgrundsätze -- 13.6.2.3. Gerichtliche Anordnungen -- 13.6.2.4. Die Ehewohnung -- 13.6.2.5. Die Behandlung der Schulden bei Auflösimg der Ehe -- 13.6.2.6. Der Ausgleich von Benachteiligungen -- 13.6.2.7. Die Abdingbarkeit durch Ehepakte -- 13.6.3. Die Reform des Ehegattenerbrechts -- Anmerkungen -- 14. Die Reform des ehescheidungsrechts -- 14.1. Sozialdaten -- 14.2. Ältere Rechtslage und Problem -- 14.2.1. Scheidung wegen Auflösung der häuslichen Gemeinschaft -- 14.2.2. Die einvernehmliche Scheidung -- 14.2.3. Der Unterhaltsanspruch des Ehegatten nach der Scheidung -- 14.2.4. Die sozialversicherungsrechtliehe Stellung der geschiedenen Frau -- 14.3.Reformbestrebungen bis 1970 -- 14.4. Die Reformarbeit in den 70er Jahren -- 14.5. Die Beratung der Seheidungsreform im Nationalrat -- 14.5.1. Auflösung der häuslichen Gemeinschaft -- 14.5.2. Die einvernehmliche Scheidung -- 14.5.3. Das Scheidungsfolgenrecht -- 14.6. Zusammenfassung und Ausblick -- Anmerkungen -- 15. Zusammenfassung -- 16. Quellenteil -- Nr. 1 Petition des Bundes österreichischer Frauenvereine 1905 -- Nr. 2 Antrag Sever im NR (45/A, II.GP) und Antrag Popp im NR (204/A, II.GP) -- Nr. 3 Justizprogramm der SPÖ 1969 -- Nr. 4 Richtlinien für eine gesetzliche Neuordnung des Familienrechts 1951 -- Nr. 5 Grundsätzliche Postulate der ÖVP zur Familienrechtsreform 1975 -- Nr. 6 Freiheitliche Zielsetzungen zur Familienrechtsreform 1977 -- Nr. 7 Beispiel für eine Eingabe an das BMJ von privat.

As Louisiana leftists continue to move through
their stages of grief over this year's statewide election, they pursue yet
another narrative that fails under the cold hard light of data.

So far, liberals among Democrats, within the
media, and in academia have tried to comfort themselves over their blowout
losses that leave perhaps the most conservative governor, Legislature, and
Board of Elementary and Secondary Education in history about to take over. They
do this by telling themselves they delivered their message poorly – when in
reality it's the
message itself at fault – and by bolstering themselves over the illusion
that outgoing Democrat Gov. John Bel Edwards had
notable lasting accomplishments – only if you believe during his years in
office fewer jobs, fewer people choosing to work, many fewer residents, tepid personal
income growth well behind most states, pandemic policy that cost more lives
than preserved, and government growing at three times the rate of inflation are
good things.

The other narrative is that the victory of Republican
Atty. Gen. Jeff Landry to replace
Edwards, as well as legislative gains, is somehow less legitimate because overall
turnout was the lowest since 2011 (slightly lower in the general election,
slightly higher in the runoff). You have journalists
and academicians
propagating that "apathy" suggests there isn't a groundswell to follow diametrically
different options than with which Edwards tried to outflank the GOP-run
Legislature.

Of course, the very reference to 2011, when voters
decisively swept incumbent Republican Gov. Bobby Jindal into power again,
betrays the poverty of the argument. Back then, nobody questioned an even lower
turnout didn't signify extremely positive reviews of Jindal's conservative
agenda, so why is slightly higher turnout this year any less a sign of a healthy
majority in the electorate backing ideologically-similar issue preferences?

And their interpretation isn't backed by the data
from the eight state office election cycles from 2011-23. Most saliently, 2011
and 2023 featured Jindal's and Landry's win in the general elections,
differentiating these from closer 2015 and 2019 contests when Edwards went to
runoffs before winning. Understanding the role turnout played requires breaking
down turnout into groups of whites, blacks, white Democrats, and Republicans.

In 2011, whites participated in the general election
at about 10 percentage points higher than blacks, while white Democrats were
6.5 higher than whites as a whole and 4 points higher than Republicans. For the
runoff, the gap between races fell to less than 7 percent with white Democrats
5 points higher than all whites and 3 points higher than Republicans.

But in 2023, whites as a whole voted at almost the
same rates as they had in both 2011 contests (almost 2 points higher in the
2023 runoff) while blacks voted 2.5 points lower in the general election and almost
a point lower in the runoff at 17.77 percent, with these two figures the lowest
since at least 1995 and likely the lowest in over six decades. This put blacks
at 12.5 points below whites for the general election and 9 points lower in the
runoff. Also in 2023, Republicans outvoted white Democrats by 4 points in the
general election and by 2 points in the runoff – an artifact of the fact that a
dozen years earlier many more Republican voters masqueraded in registration
as white Democrats, as the latter's proportion has fallen from 23.8 to 13.3
percent of the electorate since.

Contrast these numbers with the 2015 and 2019
elections. Whites averaged about 8.5 points higher than blacks in the general
elections but fewer than 3 for the runoffs, while white Democrats and
Republicans over both were about even in turnout. And overall, the competitive 2015
general election voting was only about 3 points higher than for 2023 while the
ultra-competitive 2019 contest was almost 10 points higher.

In short, 2023 general election turnout of the
Republican base, whites with few blacks, was better than in 2011, about as it
was in 2015, but behind compared to 2019. By contrast, that turnout of the base
for Democrats, mostly blacks with some whites, dropped some from 2011, substantially
from 2015, and precipitously from 2019. The pattern largely replicated when comparing
runoffs.

Simply, in 2023 almost all of the GOP base showed
up, but Democrats' base went missing to a significant degree. Too many of the
latter found their candidates and their issue preferences unappealing and
stayed home.

Not everybody has ignored this, such as Louisiana
Weekly's Christopher Tidmore who correctly noted if black turnout had
matched some previous elections, maybe Democrats could have pulled an upset in
a statewide race and perhaps won a few more legislative seats. But too many other
journalists, partisans, and academicians on the left would rather lick their wounds
by fantasizing that somehow Landry and conservatives don't have a mandate
moving forward.

Somewhat surprising results in October Caddo Parish
elections left some very competitive runoff contests on Nov. 18.

The sheriff's
race to replace retiring Republican Sheriff Steve Prator classifies as one
of these – not surprising that it produced a runoff between Republican former
Shreveport Councilor John Nickelson
and Democrat former Shreveport police chief and chief administrative officer
Henry Whitehorn, but surprising that Nickelson pulled 45 percent, 10 points
clear of Whitehorn in a race on paper that favors the Democrat. A major factor
here appears to be differentially reduced turnout between partisans, with
Democrats more likely not to have voted. If that pattern repeats, and it may
well given Prator and his considerable influence backed Nickleson, the general election
leader will win.

However, this hot race may affect the dynamics of
other contests in the parish, although few remain unsettled. While most parish
commission races drew multiple candidates, only one had more than two. Incumbents
and favorites held off challengers – including past District 8 Democrat appointed
Commissioner Ronald
Cothran, who ran in District 10 this time and barely knocked off two
challenging Democrats, including one who barely lost four years ago – the only
big surprise came with District 1 Republican Todd Hopkins
losing to the GOP's Chris Kracman in the race with the highest turnout. A gerrymander
solidly favoring Democrats created almost no interparty competition,
leaving only one contest not internecine and all settled without a runoff.

The other consequential race in the parish also
headed to a runoff: assessor. With long-serving Democrat Charles Henington retiring,
the contest drew current employee Democrat Kristin Gonzalez, recent employee
Republican Brett
Frazier, both of whom are white, and two black Democrats, accountant and
previous House candidate Reginald Johnson and Southern University Shreveport
professor Regina Webb.

Intriguing about this race was whether Gonzalez
could capture enough vote from Democrats to pass both Johnson and Webb and meet
Frazier in an expected runoff. She didn't with Webb eking out a spot but well
behind Frazier who captured 46 percent of the vote. No doubt Frazier's long
record of experience in the office helped, while Gonzalez's may have been tarnished
by an incident where a supporter of hers apparently conducted
electioneering from the assessor's office on her behalf. Although Democrats
received 54 percent of the vote in the general election, dynamics suggest
Frazier can peel off enough votes from Gonzalez supporters in particular to win
against an opponent with no background in assessing property.

Both the sheriff's and assessor's races should be
close. Just as close likely will be the two remaining legislative contests on
the ballot. In others that included Caddo Parish (some overlapping with Bossier
Parish discussed here),
previous officeholders Thomas Pressly
in Senate District 38, Danny McCormick in
House District 1, Michael
Melerine in House District 6, and Larry Bagley in
House District 7 all cruised.

This left House District 3 and Senate District 39,
both of which produced close contests among three and four candidates. In HD 3,
Democrat Caddo Commissioner Lyndon Johnson found himself barely squeezed out (confirmed
by a recount) by Democrat Caddo Parish School Board Member Jasmine Green,
who herself barely trailed former candidate Democrat Joy Walters, who narrowly lost four
years ago in a different district. Campaign finance reports suggest Walters is
employing an aggressive ground- and web-based strategy, with Green sticking to
mailouts. Green is a semi-incumbent which may be to her advantage, but Walters
already has shown herself to be a good campaigner.

In SD 39, Democrat former state Rep. Barbara
Norton with her past colorful career couldn't keep up with current Democrat
state Reps. Cedric Glover and Sam Jenkins. Having her divide the black
vote almost cost Glover a shot at Jenkins, as the former barely outpaced perennial
candidate Republican Jim Slagle, built upon the strength of the seven out of 92
precincts in Bossier Parish.

But Glover, who trailed Jenkins 34 to 26 percent, because
of those GOP voters has a decent chance of surpassing Jenkins in the runoff.
Both vote as doctrinaire liberal Democrats in the Legislature, but on some
local issues Glover has bucked party leaders including issues that might attract
Republicans, and he
endorsed Shreveport Republican Mayor Tom Arceneaux
in the 2022 mayoral campaign against retiring SD 39 Democrat state Sen. Greg Tarver, whose controversial
career makes a portion of both Republican and Democrats in the electorate wary
and who
has endorsed Jenkins.

Jenkins vastly has outspent Glover and has support
from state and local Democrat activists, aside from a few on the outs with the
party who back Glover. But if Glover can pick up most of Slagle's vote and a
decent chunk of Norton's – she was no fan of Tarver's having run against him in
2019 only to be disqualified – he could win.

https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/us-news/why-is-congress-so-polarized-its-the-institutions/  Why Is Congress So Polarized? It's the Institutions Political polarization has reached the point that dissident Republicans have fired their own Speaker. How did the political scene get this bad? The explanation lies in a flawed electoral structure that incentivizes extreme positions. The issue was about shutting down the government. It ended up shutting down Congress. The recent removal of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Kevin McCarthy, reflects a policy conflict and shows a serious institutional flaw. The controversial policy is the public debt. The United States' national debt reached nearly 100% of GDP, prompting Congress to suspend its debt ceiling months ago. Last month, Congress failed to reach an agreement for the annual budget. Ultras in the Republican party wanted to scrap certain expenses, in particular those regarding the supply of weapons and aid to Ukraine.
A last-minute agreement avoided shutdown for a few weeks, but the wacky little wing of the Republican caucus accused Speaker McCarthy of betraying the party and triggered a motion to remove him. The episode is not completely new, as the past three Republican speakers of the House were pestered by their own side and resigned or retired before being ousted. But this is the first time in history that they've succeeded in actually firing the Speaker. A conflict over policy The policy conflict should not be dismissed as simply the result of acrimony. Bipartisanship and cooperation in Congress flourished during several decades of foreign tension through World War II and the Cold War as external existential threats triggered national unity. But when the mortal external risk became paltry, it looked like there were no limits to internal confrontation. Over the last thirty years, the public agenda of controversial issues has grown enormously. With just a little exaggeration, one could say that the international Cold War was replaced with a domestic political war. Right now, it is not coincidental that the most aggressive Republicans spurn US aid to Ukraine. A focus on external conflict would reduce the space for domestic policy and make internal confrontation less easy. The new war in Israel may increase their malaise. A conflict caused by institutions The institutional flaw is that the framework based on the separation of powers with only two parties incentivizes and exacerbates political animosity. With pervasive partisan antagonism, the filters and "checks" between the House, the Senate and the presidency do not produce fair balances as expected. Actually, mutual checks between institutions boost parties' hostilities and preclude effective governance. The two major political parties in the US encompass a range of policy proposals and ideological orientations comparable to the typical European system with multiple parties: There are liberals and socialists within the Democratic Party, conservatives and populists within the Republican Party, and the minor Greens and Libertarians flanking each side. The system has produced factional candidacies and long disputes within each party to select its candidates. There is ideological plurality within parties, but not at the level of competitive bidding for public office. This forces political polarization, as I analyze in my book, Constitutional Polarization: A Critical Review of the U.S. Political System. An additional factor is the system of primary elections to select candidates. In traditional closed-party primaries, low participation heavily skews the vote toward extreme positions on issues with no social or political consensus. The participants in primaries are typically the most active and ideologically motivated people in the entire electorate, so they often favor candidates prone to foster antagonism.
In congressional primaries, only about a fifth of eligible voters tend to participate. On many occasions, the winner in a primary for an open seat, which tends to attract multiple candidates, wins only a plurality of the vote. Thus, many candidates for House seats have been selected by less than a tenth of their party voters. Closed-party primaries can select minority-supported candidates that might not be most preferred by the general public. This is how the House of Representatives is formed and why some of its members sometimes behave like firebrands. It may be significant that none of the eight Republicans who voted to overthrow McCarthy were elected in any of the five states that select their representatives by top-two open primaries or by ranked-choice voting, alternative systems to closed party primaries that favor more moderate and consensual winners (Louisiana, Washington, California, Alaska, and Maine). The immediate consequence of the current calamity is the blockage of legislation for the next few weeks. Yet even if the House resumes its activity soon, the threat of a government shutdown in November remains on the horizon.

Perceived lesser quality of gubernatorial candidates
except for the front runner explains why voting in Louisiana's contest for its
top job likely will decline markedly this cycle.

The latest statewide figures for registration by
party and race are Democrats at 38.7 percent, Republicans at 33.8 percent, and
others at 28.5 percent, with whites comprising 62.8 percent, blacks 31.2
percent, and others 6 percent. This contrasts with 2019 figures at the same
time of year of 42.4 percent Democrats, 31 percent Republicans, and 27.6 other/no
parties, and whites being 63.5 percent, blacks 31.3 percent, and others 5.2
percent. Reflecting the population drain throughout the two terms of Democrat
Gov. John Bel Edwards,
only 8,000 more voters were registered now than four years ago.

However, early in-person
voting was down considerably compared to 2019,
after years of increasing proportions. It was off by nearly a fifth, or 66,000.
Louisiana has had early no-excuse voting since 2008, and throughout this period
analysts have grappled with understanding year-over-year changes in numbers and
proportions in terms of whether these would predict eventual turnout and
whether any party benefitted. It has been assumed that a learning curve existed
for voters which caused largely a substitution effect; i.e., almost all early
voters would have voted on election day, but increases from similar election to
election were confounded by the learning curve of more voters realizing they
could vote and then taking advantage of voting early. But dropping off in early
voting, and considerably, unmistakably denotes a lack of enthusiasm compared to
the previous similar election, as it seems unlikely that those intending to
vote would delay deliberately their vote choice.

Compared to 2019, when Democrats were 43.8 percent,
Republicans 41.5 percent and others 14.7 percent, and whites made up 72
percent, blacks 25.4 percent, and others 2.6 percent, of early voters, in 2023
Democrats had only 40.1 percent with Republicans at 44.6 percent and others/none
at 15.3 percent with whites having 71 percent, blacks 26.1 percent, and others
2.9 percent. In raw numbers, Democrats fell nearly 30,000, less than the white
decline of 33,000 while Republicans dropped just 5,000 and blacks only 7,000.

If assuming the exact same forces at work this
upcoming governor's election as with its 2019 counterpart, back then early in-person
voting accounted for 11.5 percent of the electorate which eventually cast over
1.343 million votes or 45.9 percent of the electorate, then this year with that
early voting comprising 9.2 percent translates to only 36.7 percent turnout and
just 1.091 million cast. By contrast, 2015 saw turnout of 39.2 percent, and
2011 of 32.8 percent.

 This overview points to two factors explaining the
potential 20 percent drop in turnout. First and foremost, Democrats have a pair
of weak main candidates from which to choose. Former cabinet member Shawn Wilson is the most leftist major
candidate ever to run, even more than Edwards, which repels traditional liberal
populists that were the party's backbone for a century. And their alternative,
independent trial lawyer Hunter Lundy
who is a social conservative but who backs classic leftist redistributionist
politics, comes across as too raw and simple.

Neither candidate excites the base beyond
activists, something that manifests clearest in the statistics as a big drop in
white Democrats voting early. Even blacks, who tend to be more socially
conservative as a whole than in most states especially outside of the large
metropolitan areas, aren't excited about Wilson, the first major black
gubernatorial candidate in the state's history not competing against a major
white Democrat.

The other is the dominance of GOP Atty. Gen. Jeff Landry, endorsed by most conservative
politicians and organizations and the Republican Party, and well-funded far
above other GOP alternatives. This has created the impression that he's already
won entry into the runoff, if not the race itself, which discourages casual
voters not interested much in outcomes of other offices and in particular
Republicans not enthusiastic about him but who see no viable alternative from
within the party. Even some casual voters who like Landry figure he has it in
the bag and they won't need to show up for him to win.

This makes 2023 much like 2011, when the popular
GOP incumbent Gov. Bobby Jindal so dominated the field that no quality
candidate would run against him. Then, some Republicans stayed home thinking a
general election victory was a sure thing (they were right) and Democrats
without a real candidate skipped that one (a number of Board of Elementary and
Secondary Education and state legislative contests had much higher turnouts, since
these were seen as more competitive).

If Landry doesn't win outright in the general election
– possible, but not probable – and thereby faces Wilson in the runoff, look for
a noticeable decline in that contest as well. Like it or not, competitiveness matters
in making people care about elections.

Am 15. Oktober, dem Tag der Parlamentswahlen in Polen, findet zeitgleich ein Referendum statt. Die Regierung will die Bürgerinnen und Bürger zu vier Themen befragen und behauptet, auf diese Weise deren Meinung der Bürger zu wichtigen Fragen in Erfahrung bringen zu wollen. Die Opposition und viele Experten glauben hingegen, dass es sich um einen taktischen Schachzug handelt, um der Regierungspartei zu helfen, zusätzliche Stimmen zu gewinnen. Was sagen die Fakten?Referendum in PolenDie polnische Verfassung sieht in Artikel 125 vor, dass in Angelegenheiten, die für den Staat von besonderer Bedeutung sind, ein landesweites Referendum durchgeführt werden kann.Eine landesweite Volksabstimmung kann vom Sejm mit absoluter Stimmenmehrheit in Anwesenheit von mindestens der Hälfte der gesetzlichen Abgeordnetenzahl oder vom Präsidenten mit Zustimmung des Senats mit absoluter Stimmenmehrheit in Anwesenheit von mindestens der Hälfte der gesetzlichen Senatorenzahl angeordnet werden. Beteiligt sich mehr als die Hälfte der Stimmberechtigten an der Abstimmung, so ist das Ergebnis bindend.In der polnischen Geschichte nach 1989 gab es schon einige Volksabstimmungen. Die wichtigsten waren das Verfassungsreferendum im Jahr 1997 (die Wahlbeteiligung lag bei fast 43%, damals galt die 50% Hürde noch nicht), in dem die Bürger die neue polnische Verfassung billigten, und das EU-Referendum im Jahr 2003 (die Wahlbeteiligung lag bei fast 59%, aber die Abstimmung dauerte zwei Tage), in dem die Polinnen und Polen den polnischen EU-Beitritt unterstützten. Andere Abstimmungen waren wegen der niedrigen Beteiligung nicht bindend.Die Fragen und des Referendums ihre BedeutungDie entsprechende Verordnung hat der Sejm mit den Stimmen der Regierungspartei Recht und Gerechtigkeit (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) Mitte August im Sejm verabschiedet. Zur Abstimmung gestellt werden vier Fragen:(1) Unterstützen Sie den Ausverkauf von Staatsvermögen an ausländische Unternehmen, was zu einem Verlust der Kontrolle der Polinnen und Polen über strategische Wirtschaftsbereiche führt?(2) Unterstützen Sie eine Anhebung des Renteneintrittsalters, einschließlich der Wiedereinführung des erhöhten Renteneintrittsalters von 67 Jahren für Männer und Frauen?(3) Unterstützen Sie die Beseitigung der Barriere an der Grenze zwischen der Republik Polen und der Republik Belarus?(4) Unterstützen Sie die Aufnahme Tausender illegaler Immigranten aus dem Nahen Osten und Afrika gemäß dem von der europäischen Bürokratie auferlegten Zwangsumsiedlungsmechanismus?Zu der Formulierung der Fragen haben Juristen und verschiedene Organisationen (Menschenrechteorganisationen, Think Tanks, Juristenverbände und andere) viele Bedenken geäußert. Es wird der Vorwurf erhoben, dass der ungenaue und allgemeine Charakter der vier Referendumsfragen nicht nur verhindere, dass der gesamte Kontext und die Folgen der Entscheidung berücksichtigt werden, sondern auch deren Umsetzung fraglich bleibe. Das verbindliche Ergebnis des Referendums führt nämlich zu der rechtlichen Verpflichtung der staatlichen Institutionen, die Entscheidung umzusetzen. Kommentatoren fragen daher etwa, wie eine Umsetzung der Entscheidung, dass die Barriere an der Grenze zu Belarus nicht beseitigt wird, oder dass das Renteneintrittsalters nicht angehoben wird, aussehen solle, wenn bei der Volksabstimmung keine zeitlichen Perspektiven angegeben wurden.Viele NGOs meinen auch, dass die Art und Weise, wie die Fragen, über die am 15. Oktober per Referendum entschieden werden soll, kommuniziert werden, es unmöglich mache, das Recht der Bürger auf Information zu gewährleisten. Die Fragen des Referendums und die erläuternden Spots, die die Regierungspartei dazu veröffentlichte, sind laut Experten in einer Weise formuliert, die eine These enthält und ausdrücklich ein bestimmtes Abstimmungsverhalten nahelegt. Sie suggerieren, dass in allen vier Fällen die Opposition eine andere Meinung hat, was nicht der Wahrheit entspricht (niemand fordert zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt eine Erhöhung des Rentenalters oder den Abriss des Grenzzauns). Des Weiteren glauben die Gegner des Referendums, die Erklärungsspots der Regierung würden falsche, vereinfachende Informationen enthalten und sich rhetorischer und emotionaler Manipulationen bedienen, die beim Zuschauer bewusst ein Gefühl der Verunsicherung erzeugen sollen. Als Beispiel ist hier die Verwendung von sehr emotionalen Begriffen ("Ausverkauf", "illegale Einwanderer", "Bürokratie") oder das Ansprechen von anti-muslimischen Ängsten (die Frage nach "Immigranten aus dem Nahen Osten und Afrika") zu nennen. Es birgt die Gefahr, die Menschen zu verärgern und Hass- und Gewaltgefühle zu schüren. Außerdem beinhalten die Fragen Unwahrheiten. Zum Beispiel will die EU Polen nicht zwingen, Flüchtlinge aufzunehmen, wie es aber die entsprechende Referendumsfrage suggeriert.Der wichtigste Vorwurf ist aber laut Kritikern des Referendums, dass es bei den Fragen meist um die Akzeptanz der aktuellen Politik der Regierung geht (die vier zur Abstimmung gestellten Themen begleiten die Regierungsarbeit seit Jahren und die Regierungspartei PiS hat dazu eine klare Meinung). Das macht die Verbindung des Referendums mit den Wahlen problematisch. Die PiS kann die Referendumsthemen dazu nutzen, eigene Positionen noch stärker im Wahlkampf zu positionieren. Die Frage nach der Privatisierung oder dem Renteneintrittsalter soll vermutlich Ängste vor einer liberalen Herrschaft in der rechten Wählerschaft wecken, die Fragen nach Immigranten und dem Grenzzaun die angebliche Schwäche der Opposition in Sicherheitsfragen zeigen. Es geht aber, so manche Kommentatoren, weniger darum, die eigene Wählerschaft zu mobilisieren, sondern vor allem darum, die Wähler der Opposition zu verunsichern. Durchgesickerte PiS-interne Umfragen sollen zeigen, dass die für das Referendum gewählten Themen – Privatisierung, Rentenalter, Migranten oder die Reaktion auf die Krise an der Grenze zu Belarus – die Wähler der Opposition, einschließlich der Bürgerkoalition, spalten. Viele von ihnen fürchten zum Beispiel die Privatisierung, weil sie glauben, dass der Staat die Menschen besser vor Krisen schützen kann als private Unternehmen. Auch die Ängste vor Migration sind nicht auf die PiS-Wählerschaft beschränkt.Organisatorische BedenkenAußer inhaltlichen Bedenken zu der Formulierung der Fragen und ihrer Nähe zu den Wahlkampfslogans der Regierungspartei gibt es auch Bedenken organisatorischer Natur. Die Durchführung eines landesweiten Referendums am Tag der Parlamentswahlen beeinträchtigt die Transparenz des Wahlprozesses und die Integrität des Wahlkampfes. Die Regierungspartei verfügt sowieso über unverhältnismäßig hohe Wahlkampfmittel. Es geht dabei nicht nur direkt um das Geld, sondern u.a. um die politische Einstellung der öffentlich-rechtlichen Medien, die ganz klar die Regierung unterstützen und die Opposition in einem sehr schlechten Licht zeigen. Auch die Maßnahmen, die die staatlichen Konzerne ergreifen – getarnt als Kampagnen zur Erhöhung der Wahlbeteiligung –dienen am Ende der Regierungspartei.Am wichtigsten ist hier aber, dass es in der Praxis unmöglich sein wird, die Ausgaben für den Wahlkampf auf der einen und Informationsveranstaltungen rund um das Referendum auf der anderen Seite klar voneinander zu unterscheiden. Das ist insofern wichtig, weil die Ausgaben für den Wahlkampf eine klare Höchstgrenze haben und im Wahlkampfbericht sehr detailliert dargestellt werden müssen. Die Mittel, die für Informationsveranstaltungen rund um das Referendum ausgegeben werden, bleiben hingegen unbegrenzt.Außerdem kann die gleichzeitige Durchführung von Wahlkampf und Referendumskampagne zu Missbrauch führen und die Umsetzung des Gleichheitsgrundsatzes im Wahlprozess beeinträchtigen. Das Problem liegt in dem von der PiS angewandten Trick, eine Wahl mit einem Referendum zu verbinden, dessen Fragen eine Form der Unterstützung der PiS sind. Ein Wähler, der an der Wahl und nicht an dem Referendum teilnehmen möchte, muss die Annahme des Abstimmungszettels für das Referendum ausdrücklich ablehnen, und die Wahlkommission muss dies im Protokoll vermerken. Das soll theoretisch dazu dienen, die Zahl der verteilten Referendums- und Wahlzettel zu kennen. In der Praxis wird es aber durch die Abhaltung von Wahlen und Referendum am selben Tag schwieriger sein, die Geheimhaltung beider Abstimmungen zu gewährleisten, wie es die Verfassung vorsieht. Das Abgeben oder Nichtabgeben eines Referendumsstimmzettels ist vielen Experten zufolge am Ende ein Hinweis auf die politischen Ansichten des Wählers. Direkt gesagt – mit der auf die Wahlliste geschriebenen Anmerkung, dass man keine Referendumskarte nimmt, offenbart man sich als Oppositionsanhänger. Und diese Information kann, so viele Juristen, missbraucht werden. Das gilt natürlich eher für kleinere Orte, wo jeder jeden kennt, als für große Städte, wo der Wähler eher anonym bleibt.FolgenDas alles wird ganz konkrete Folgen haben. Falls doch weniger als die Hälfte der Wahlberechtigten am Referendum teilnimmt, ist das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung nicht bindend, und was bleibt sind "nur" die schlechte Atmosphäre und die Unklarheiten in der Abgrenzung der Referendums- und Wahlkampfgelder. Wenn es aber doch bindend ist, dann hat es rechtliche Konsequenzen. Wie erwähnt, muss dann diese Entscheidung, juristisch gesehen, in irgendwelche Vorschriften umgewandelt werden. Im Fall eines Sieges der PiS-Partei wird diese wahrscheinlich behaupten, ihre Regierung sei selbst der Garant dafür, dass der Wille der Wähler realisiert wird und keine weiteren Schritte notwendig seien. Wenn die Opposition die Macht übernimmt, muss sie theoretisch etwas unternehmen, falls sie die demokratischen Regeln beachten will. Aber wie gesagt – das ist bei so formulierten Fragen gar nicht möglich. So bekommt die PiS (als Opposition) ein Argument, der neuen Regierung einen Verstoß gegen die Demokratie vorzuwerfen. Und inwieweit diejenigen, die den Referendumszettel zurückgewiesen haben, in der Zukunft wirklich Konsequenzen zu gewärtigen haben, darüber kann man nur spekulieren.

While the second
televised candidate forum for Louisiana governor on the was better executed,
it only marginally provided greater insight and information into the
candidacies.

Nextstar television stations produced this one
eight days after the first and featured two additional candidates to the first,
which had Republicans state Sen. Sharon
Hewitt, Treas. John Schroder,
and former gubernatorial official Stephen
Waguespack; Democrat former cabinet member Shawn Wilson, and independent trial
lawyer Hunter Lundy. Front
runner GOP Atty. Gen. Jeff Landry
joined this one, along with the candidate that polling shows drags the rear,
GOP state Rep. Richard Nelson.

As
opposed to the previous one, this forum perhaps even more sparsely viewed focused
more narrowly and more in depth on subjects, and the journalists asking
questions did a better job of removing themselves from the topics of debate.
Still, a minute for answers and rebuttals even shorter don't provide much, and some
decisions on questions were puzzling, such as spending almost a third of the entire
program on the issue of abortion, which in a recent
survey ranked as only the seventh-most important issue to state residents
while the debate ignored third-ranked education.

The two candidates with the most to lose in a
debate, Landry and Wilson which polling proclaims will head to a runoff with no
one else even close, played it safe by making the most general statements. However,
the format allowing for greater depth did have them going into more detail on
some issues, such as abortion. On this, Landry acquitted himself well by marshalling
facts to support his position that the law as written and regulations as issued
– allowing abortion only in the instance of the pregnancy endangering the
mother's life or futile survival of the unborn – merited no legal changes and
batted away assertions of inordinate enforcement. Wilson, by contrast, on this made
situational morality arguments that historically have been heard before from eugenicists
and totalitarians.

Only Wilson, who wants to legalize abortion on
demand, argued against the law. Only Nelson thought the issue of broadening exceptions
definitively needed revisiting.

Wilson more obviously foundered when asked about
his record at the Department of Transportation and Development that he headed
for seven years and that he worked in for 18. In trying to explain away a lack
of progress in infrastructure building, he whined that his hands were tied,by legislative
instruments and funding.

But that dodged the accusation that has haunted
his campaign that the department under his leadership did poorly in completing
what projects did get funded, such as finishing the flyover ramps in Kenner to
the new terminal at the New Orleans airport, still incomplete after four years,
or in planning and executing widening of Interstate 10 in Baton Rouge and a new
bridge across the Mississippi River there. Even Lundy, who throughout made the
most simplistic remarks of the bunch drawing upon a Manichean liberal populist worldview,
piled on by asserting Wilson escaped from the job just as a bridge failure near
that location came from Wilson's inadequate management.

Wilson also flubbed a question about Wuhan
coronavirus pandemic restrictions, saying government and people had to "follow
the science" – which continues to reveal that restrictions such as those
imposed far too long by Democrat Gov. John Bel Edwards were pointless,
if not harmful, as Wilson continued to defend in general those actions. All
others swore off such extreme government intervention.

But the most cringeworthy moment came for
Schroder, who kept trying to flog that a donor
to Landry's campaign under judicial and Insurance Department sanctions somehow
confirmed cronyism and devalued honesty in government. He was reduced to saying
this "appearance" was bad.

The forum also discussed the state police coverup
in the death of black motorist Ronald Greene, although it didn't really delve
into the most important issue cited by residents, crime. It discussed toll
roads about transportation funding, but didn't get into the larger issue
itself. And it corralled candidates into saying they likely would call a
special session to address insurance woes.

As to a winner, Hewitt provided most often the
most direct and fearless answers. In discussing the Greene death without
mincing words she indicted Edwards' role in that. She dinged Wilson on failures
to maintain bridges as part of his general fumbling. And she called out by name
Edwards' policy failures on pandemic restrictions.

Despite the sporadic broadsides against Landry and
Wilson by all the other candidates, this exercise did little to change the dynamics
hurtling the pair to a runoff.

What a few candidates for Louisiana governor, as
well as state politicians and the public must understand, is that any
perception that the state's chief executive has a lot of power that needs
clipping really means curbing the formal powers of all of state government.

Because it is a stubborn fiction that Louisiana's
governor has a vast set of powers granted him by the Constitution. Instead, as
the latest if a bit dated (2009)
version of a long-running assessment of relative gubernatorial powers among the
50 states reveals, the Bayou State's chief executive at best comes in among the
middle of the pack. Among other things, term limits, widely dispersed executive
powers with many out of his hands entirely, limited budgetary authority, and an
elected judiciary circumscribe his ability to make policy in an extensive and unconstrained
fashion.

Thus, when
at a recent gubernatorial candidate forum Republicans state Rep. Richard Nelson, Treasurer John Schroder, and former gubernatorial
chief of staff Stephen Waguespack all
said they would try to circumscribe the power of the office, they traded on a
canard. Nelson and Waguespack mentioned the state's fiscal system that places
too much emphasis on centralized revenue sources and redistribution to local
governments, while Schroder targeted a related issue, the governor's ability to
veto state capital outlay funds to local governments as an enticement for legislator
cooperation with his agenda.

But these aren't examples of specific formal powers
only possessed by the governor. In the former instance, that indicts the entire
fiscal system and power relations among the different branches of government
and between its levels. For the latter case, that addresses checks and balances
formally written into the Constitution.

All the mythology about the Louisiana governor's
power has sprung up because the cult of personalistic politics and organizations
surrounding them acted as glue holding together, rather than having work independently
and potentially against each other, or checks and balances. Assigning so much
faith to leaders and conveying that power through machine politics historically
has been a defining feature of state politics since Reconstruction, and peaked
about a century ago.

Yet this has eroded immensely since, and particularly
in the past quarter century. The explosion of access to information and news,
partially as a result of rising education levels but mainly from the information
revolution magnified by the Internet, and this advance in educational attainment
with greater knowledge also has encouraged more ideological thinking among
voters. Now, it's not enough to be a good old boy preaching social conservatism
and generic liberal class warfare in a news environment that increasingly
interjects national issues into state and local politics; instead, voters want to
know where the money goes, why so much gets taken, who the favored constituencies
are to get it, and otherwise what special interests receive what privileges.

With a more independent electorate, governors have
lost the ability the exert authority over legislators. The greatest legacy of
departing Democrat Gov. John Bel Edwards
will be by his clinging so fiercely to the old way that he largely will have delegitimized
it, set against a legislative majority and other state executive officers elected
under the new norms. With a largely failed agenda over eight years – few of his
priorities became policy with the exception of growing government (and that
mainly because the Legislature the year before his election foolishly
authorized the governor to expand Medicaid) – because of legislative resistance
and from other quarters as well, such as GOP Atty. Gen. Jeff Landry (another gubernatorial
candidate) defeating him often in court and the Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education mostly refusing to reverse accountability measures, among other
things, this established a future model of constrained gubernatorial power
exertion when other institutions fight back rather than go along and get along.

Pushback likely will increase. For example, referring
to Schroder's complaint, legislators simply can start overriding line-item
vetoes, having under Edwards instituted an expectation that veto sessions will
occur – or with better regular session planning, can overturn vetoes then. And
one lingering source of gubernatorial power, appointment powers to the myriad
of boards in state government, has devalued in recent years as sources of campaign
cash become more varied and more tied to ideology rather than transactional
benefits.

Of course, reducing state government power by, for
example, deregulating many occupational qualifications that would render many
boards unneeded, points to the actual method of decreasing gubernatorial power:
reduce the power of state government in general and the governor's will follow.
Historically, governors have been "powerful" mainly through informal means because
other parts of government allowed them to be so. It's not a powerful governor
that should concern Louisianans, it's a powerful government that takes too much
and redistributes too much and dictates too much well beyond a need to protect individuals
vulnerable not from their own actions. Decentralization of and disempowering the
state is what needs desperately to change.

Democrat Gov. John Bel Edwards'
influence in Louisiana government is fading quickly, with the chances of
anybody in power emulating his policies in the future evaporating even more rapidly.

With fewer than six months remaining in his terms.
Edwards got a taste of how ephemeral his reach has become when Louisiana's Board
of Pardons and Committee on Parole rebuffed
over 50 applicants – essentially the entirety of death row – for clemency this
reduction of sentence to life earlier than usual. Normally, the Board requires
a time-consuming review of cases but can waive that, which in this instance
would have expedited case consideration for resolution prior to year's end.

This avalanche of requests Edwards triggered when,
after dodging the question for his whole political career because of the electoral
blowback his answer would invite, earlier this year he
proclaimed opposition to capital punishment, noting
its finality and calling it contrary to his religious faith (while he professes
a belief in Roman Catholicism, at the same time he selectively ignores others
of its imperatives, such opposition to abortion for any reason). In turn, this
begat an effort by legal services supporting appeals to capital cases to
organize inmates under capital sentences to make clemency requests to Edwards,
in the hopes of having him grant clemency in mass before leaving office early
next year.

However, the Constitution requires
all such requests first must gain assent from the Board of Pardons, a five-member
body comprised of gubernatorial appointees serving concurrently with a governor's
term. Statistically, this represents a commutation reducing sentence, and in 2022
the Board passed along 105 commutations and pardon requests, of which the governor
approved 95, so his appointees and he typically are in sync.

Yet the Board – with all five Edwards appointees –
in this instance refused to rush to process, saying that only following the
regular procedure would allow for the appropriate level of scrutiny. Thus, the
attempt to negate capital punishment in Louisiana through administrative fiat
failed because his own people wouldn't go along with it.

This demonstration of his diminishing power came
as Board members took seriously their duty, perhaps with an eye towards
reappointment by the next governor who will value members that don't bend to
the whim of political fashion. That Edwards successor appears less and less
likely to be his endorsed candidate, Democrat former Department of
Transportation and Development Sec. Shawn
Wilson.

In a recent
poll, Wilson corralled 28 percent of the vote. Problem is, that only put
him in second place to GOP Atty. Gen. Jeff Landry at 30 percent with
the rest of the field, all Republicans save a no party candidate, all in single
digits lapping up the remaining 22 percent that made a choice.

For Wilson, these are discouraging numbers, to say
the least. Given that 29 percent of the 20 percent undecided portion are black
like Wilson and he can be expected to capture roughly 90 percent of that if
they vote, and assuming among white and other voters he captures among the undecided
the same proportions as now, his ceiling for the general election is about 37
percent. He would need to go over 40 even to be competitive with Landry, who
the poll puts far ahead of his Republican rivals, in a runoff.

Wilson would have to pull off some considerable vote
intent conversion for that to happen, and it won't if news events continue to
work against him, the latest being the announcement that a new
Interstate 10 bridge in Lake Charles will have tolling. Wilson's record at
DOTD is uninspiring, to say the least, with a demonstrated inability to get
projects moving along; this one has dragged on for many years.

The I-10 bridge over the Calcasieu River has been
Wilson's baby for his nearly eight years at the helm of DOTD, and residents and
officials already have expressed their unhappiness that they will have to fork
over more than two bucks every trip over it. That's not exactly going to endear
them to him and voters statewide also will notice that this was the best Wilson
could do, which isn't much.

Additionally, that the same survey showed the
majority of Louisianans saw the state headed in the wrong direction and fewer
than a quarter thought the opposite, which voters will blame on Edwards and
anybody attached to him. Given that Edwards has shown close to zero electoral
coattails – in his two elections the GOP has tacked on three senators and ten
representatives to achieve supermajorities in both legislative chambers – expect
that his backwards-looking, revanchist era of liberal populism likely will end
up as the last in Louisiana for a very long time.

The Swedish Residence hasa better view than Sparks St.I was hanging out on Sparks Street yesterday with a former government official, and I had an epiphany.  No, it was not about how underwhelming Sparks Street is.  It was about the affinity Canada and I have for each other.  I have long had a chronic case of FOMO: fear of missing out.  I attribute it to being the youngest of four kids.  I distinctly remember only hearing about how wonderful the first few years of Saturday Night Live were, but not being able to stay up late enough to watch for myself.  Had I know that years later I would be able to consume heaps of old SNL via videotapes and repeats, maybe I wouldn't feel so left out?Canada, similarly, has a deep and abiding case of FOMO. Hey, folks, there's a small club of folks buying nuclear subs, but you can't join since you have no plans!  Oh noes, no C in AUKUS, the Australia/UK/US group of advanced weapons tech sharing.  Yeah, it may be more than subs, but it is mostly about subs.  In talking to my friend yesterday, we talked a bit about AUKUS, that the FOMO was mostly coming from outside of government among the pols and the pundits.  It was not the first time  I sensed Canada's FOMO panic about various things.And I have internalized it.  When folks talk about transatlantic relations, emphasizing US-Europe in NATO-adjacent stuff, I am quick to remind folks that Canada is in NATO, too.  Pre-CANSEC reception at Swedish residenceSo, Canada and I both identify with Rudolph, who was left out of various reindeer games.  Which leaves us both trying to get into various collaborations even if they don't always make sense.  For Canada, that is AUKUS.  For me, it could be CANSEC.  I am spending tomorrow at the annual tradeshow of the Canadian defence industry.  Yes, I will be hanging out with arms dealers.  Ok, not the exotic ones, but those carrying business cards bearing BAE, Saab, General Dynamics, Lockheed, whatever (I lead with the Swedes since I was at a nice reception last night that was the pre-CANSEC party hosted by the Swedish embassy).  Will I be in the market for some fancy new artillery?  Anti-aircraft weapons?  A helicopter?  No, of course not.  I will be in the room, which is all I need.  I have seen pics and tweets in previous years and felt left out.I do think I will get some benefit from being inside the room besides assuaging my FOMO--meeting both government and industry folks and hearing them complain about each other.  Last night, one rep from a company I will not name suggested that all of the requirements that are piled onto a defence contract by the government of Canada almost make it not worthwhile to do business here.  He was speaking of the offsets--that each contract needs to be way more expensive because they have to pay for jobs in Canada.  Which reminded me of my fave campaign graphic--the cover of the Liberal Defence Platform of 2015: Notice that the promise eight years ago was not to buy ships to defend Canada but to create jobs by investing in the Navy--which nicely omits .... ships.  Just spending money on jobs where shipbuilding might be happening but ships actually being finished ... not so much.  I go to these things because I never know will the networking will lead.  That I have met a lot of folks over the years, and I was never very strategic about who I needed to meet--but that enough of those connections paid off in unexpected ways.  For example, there was a dinner where I sat next to a pollster which lead to inviting that pollster's firm to join the CDSN, which happened to mean that the Chancellor of Carleton at that moment was a key participant in a CDSN organiational meeting since Nik Nanos of the Nanos survey firm was also heading Carleton's Board of Governors.  Completely unintentional on my part, but super handy ultimately.  So, yeah, the times I have been in the room have been sufficiently beneficial that my FOMO has not been sated--that I might miss something if I am left out.  And thus I understand why Canadian punditry and media get into conniptions about being left out of AUKUS and other groups even when Canada is not going to buy any subs anytime soon.  So, the irony is that I fit really well in Canada, that I don't feel left out, because I always fear being left out.