Suchergebnisse

Aus jugoslawischer Sicht

von Ludwig Bernhard ; Inhaltsverzeichnis ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Cam. 515 z

El presente trabajo ha sido realizado con apoyo de la Coordinación de Perfeccionamiento de Personal de Nivel Superior - Brasil (CAPES) - Código de Financiación 001. ; En 2014 Suecia fue el primer país en afirmar que pasaría a desarrollar una política exterior feminista (PEF). Este anuncio suscitó varias especulaciones sobre lo que significaría la inserción del paradigma feminista como política exterior. Autores y centros de estudio fueron, a lo largo de estos años, definiendo que una PEF trataría de un cambio en la ética de la política internacional revisando actores, estructuras y narrativas que tienden a generar una desigualdad de género y que suma opresiones de raza, identidad, etnia, religión, entre otros. En este contexto, este estudio se considera importante al desarrollar un análisis en torno a la aplicación de la PEF sueca desde una perspectiva del Sur global, con el objetivo de observar las narrativas sobre las prácticas de cooperación sueca en el ámbito de la PEF. En este sentido, se ha optado por analizar la retórica sobre los resultados de la cooperación sueca en los tres primeros años de PEF de manera a observar si la narrativa sobre los resultados también presenta el mismo cambio propuesto por la definición de la cooperación, o si reproduce, en alguna medida, los discursos tradicionales. Este estudio fue realizado a partir del análisis de la narrativa presentada en documentos producidos por el gobierno sueco en el año de 2017. Se puede concluir que, a pesar de que Suecia ha avanzado en el tema al integrar las demandas de los movimientos feministas a sus políticas de estado y gobierno, aún se puede observar la reproducción de discursos tradicionales de la cooperación internacional al desarrollo. Puesto que en su retórica no se explotan las asociaciones con los estados del Sur receptores de la cooperación y mantiene actores de la cooperación tradicional del Norte, reforzando el uso de la categoría género como indicador en la ayuda al desarrollo y poco cuestionadora de las relaciones de poder existentes entre Norte y Sur. ; The announcement of Sweden's adherence to a feminist perspective on its foreign policy contributed to the gender agenda debate being broadened internationally. Therefore, it is considered important to analyze, from the South, how feminist foreign policy (FFP) has modified the discourses on traditional practices in foreign policy. In order to carry out this study, the Swedish International Cooperation agenda was selected as a case to be examined. This research takes into account that the debate on gender and development has been articulated at least since the 1970s, and several contributions have underlined the need to question the power patterns involving the cooperation policies of the countries from North to South (Aguinaga et al, 2011). Moreover, over the years countless alternatives to traditional and hierarchical practices of cooperation have been articulated by feminist women in both the South and the global North. Given that Sweden adopted, as part of the feminist paradigm, the habit of carrying out a review of its policies, this study is developed from an analysis of Swedish rhetoric in the document on FFP policy practices released in 2017. Taking into account the narrative of seven themes, the extent to which there has been an insertion of the debates developed by Southern Feminisms in discourses on practices is debated. In the first part of this article, a theoretical review is carried out on the debate around the construction of feminist solidarity in international politics (Mohanty, 2003; 2008). It is understood that the category of women was included in the cooperation programs and policies through the process of homogenization of differences; that is, it was based on a universal assumption about feminist demands, without including the perspectives of the states receiving policies. Thus, a process of naturalization and generalization on the discursive performance and international practice on North-South cooperation was established. This has resulted in an elaboration on women of the North and South in opposite directions, in which there is an idea that one has to teach the other how to achieve gender equality. The argument of this study is that an FFP pursues the goal of building a shared relationship, in which cooperation is an interaction without hierarchies between the states involved; that is, there is a feminist solidarity in the construction of policies. In other words, it seeks to identify the differences around gender issues and the category of women, adding them to political perspectives and thus developing more universal international approaches. While this should be an objective pursued by a FFP, and while there has also been discussion of what happens in traditional cooperation practices and discourses, northern countries tend to homogenize differences between women. This is done in line with neoliberal feminist perspectives, and does not include analyses of the patriarchal structure that promotes gender coloniality and generates subinclusive and superinclusive policies (Crenshaw, 2002). In the second part of the article, the Swedish context that contributed to the elaboration of a paradigmatic feminist policy is presented. The country's women's social movements have had the capacity to articulate with the state over the years, which has accessed the welfare state and encouraged governments to assume discourses and policies that provide gender equality. The basis of this action is the formulation of the Swedish welfare state, which has elaborated domestically movement towards gender equality, and included social feminist demands in the formulation of public policies. In 2014, this perspective was formally placed in international politics and, consequently, in the country's agendas, such as international development cooperation. With regard to this context of progress, the Swedish 2017 document was analyzed, seeking to identify elements that would point to a reproduction of the traditional perspective of cooperation in the country's rhetoric on the effectiveness of cooperation. This is where the actors of the North are the majority in the agreements, and where there is no discursive representation of the demands of the collectives of the South nor the processes of joint construction with the receiving countries. In the study, it was possible to verify, like Nylund (2017), that the feminist foreign policy of Sweden produces totally feminist discourses, but also post-colonial rhetoric. In the feminist sense, we highlight the articulation capacity of feminism between the Swedish state and the feminist movements of the country in order to recognize, as in Llistar (2009), that when a country has the capacity to absorb the demands of social collectives in its international agendas -in the case of cooperation- it can be said that it is a cooperation of solidarity with low selfish interests. On the other hand, when we argue that Sweden has postcolonial discourses, we mean that, although it points out in its FFP manual that it seeks to develop a horizontal and intersectional policy, with the inclusion of local participation, in its rhetoric about the practice of cooperation the country does not emphasize joint actions with receiving countries. A narrative was also observed that values the performance of the state itself as a donor and its traditional partners in the North, such as development banks and private actors. Nevertheless, it does not present the integration of the critical vision of the southern feminisms on this classic performance of international cooperation. In this way, it is argued that one side of feminist solidarity is missing. This means that, although there is recognition of the advance of Swedish feminisms in favoring the development of an FFP, the valorization and presentation of the performance of the southern actors is still lacking in the rhetoric in the results. So that, once again, they are not described as passive actors of cooperation, but that their different and critical perspectives contribute to the presentation of a more plural and universal discourse. Finally, this article concludes that the development of critical analyses from the global South contributes to FFP being articulated in pursuit of the goal of feminist solidarity. We do not propose this analysis as a way to deny the advances established by Swedish politics, but to integrate the other part of feminist solidarity: including the vision of the South in the formulation of the agenda. ; Coordinación de Perfeccionamiento de Personal de Nivel Superior - Brasil (CAPES) - Código de Financiación 001

The creation of a Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development could be seen as the mere 'collateral damage' of an election campaign put by candidate Sarkozy under the traditional themes of the nationalist right. While the effects of competition within the political field may explain the electoral promise, they cannot be sufficient to explain how it could be so easily and quickly put into action. Sylvain Laurens shows here that, in addition to the so-called "hyperpresident", this new ministry is mainly a continuation of forty years of restrictive and reshareholder public immigration policies. ; International audience ; The creation of a Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development could be seen as the mere 'collateral damage' of an election campaign put by candidate Sarkozy under the traditional themes of the nationalist right. While the effects of competition within the political field may explain the electoral promise, they cannot be sufficient to explain how it could be so easily and quickly put into action. Sylvain Laurens shows here that, in addition to the so-called "hyperpresident", this new ministry is mainly a continuation of forty years of restrictive and reshareholder public immigration policies. ; La création d'un ministère de l'Immigration, de l'intégration, de l'identité nationale et du co-développement pourrait être perçue comme le simple « dommage collatéral » d'une campagne électorale placée par le candidat Sarkozy sous l'étendard des thèmes classiques de la droite nationaliste. Si les effets de concurrence au sein du champ politique peuvent expliquer la promesse électorale, ils ne peuvent suffire à expliquer comment celle-ci a pu être aussi facilement et rapidement mise en actes. Sylvain Laurens montre ici qu'au-delà du soi-disant volontarisme d'un « hyperprésident », ce nouveau ministère s'inscrit surtout dans la continuité de quarante ans de politiques publiques restrictives et réactionnaires en matière d'immigration.

Abstract. The miracle of compound interest normally works against ordinary people, now it works for us - Once the savings policies outlined in this paper are fully mature, 95% plus of all New Zealanders will retire with 4-5 million dollars in their super fund accounts. No longer will New Zealanders get less out in pensions than the government takes in taxes. Old age will never be a reason for poverty again. Vets don't have waiting lists, nor will New Zealanders when every New Zealander has a comprehensive catastrophic health policy ever year of their life. Patients with private insurance rarely have to queue. The policy outlined in this paper, gives you back your tax dollars, in a way that enables you to purchase your own insurance policy. Will once again become the route to advancement, when we cut out the middleman and let parents pay the school direct, then the school will get a dollar for every dollar spent on education. Real equality of opportunity gives the same spending power to everyone- and lets them choose their education. Choice in the educational system will raise our standards of achievement. Choice will give low-income families the same options as everyone else. Our shared home ownership model of housing will bring home ownership within the reach of everyone who works. Residential section development will be pushed to the maximum extent possible, and at reasonable prices. Being out of work for any reason an accident, being sick or unemployed, will all be covered by the same out of work welfare policy framework, ending any future attempts to fiddle the system. New Zealand's one trillion dollars of unfunded welfare debt for health and pensions will disappear over time. Those years of living beyond our means will be behind us and taxes will drop as a consequence. The superannuation and health policies outlined in this paper will ensure that old age will never be a cause of poverty in New Zealand again. Far lower taxes allow workers to keep more of what they earn, much better incentives for people to work, better education and health policies will all help to lower poverty and keep it there. The lowest personal taxes in the world. That makes us one of the most attractive countries in the world. Taken together the policies in this paper will produce a strong and sustainable economic surge in New Zealand, and as a result our opportunities in life will be transformed.Keywords. New Zealand, Funding our future, Self determination.JEL. G02, G10, G20.

Sve je više podataka koji ukazuju da je politička ideologija važna determinanta poštovanja pravila i preporuka za borbu protiv korona virusa. Ovaj rad analizira ulogu samopozicioniranja u odnosu na levičarsku ili desničarsku ideologiju u podržavanju vladinih mera za borbu protiv pandemije COVID-19 i sprovođenju preporuka za održavanje fizičke distance u Srbiji. Istraživanje je sprovedeno onlajn, na uzorku od 656 ispitanika. Testirana su dva hijerarhijska regresiona modela u kojima su uzrast, iskustvo sa COVID-19, percepcija opasnosti koju korona virus predstavlja i politička ideologija bili prediktori: (1) podrške politici (vlade, za borbu protiv pandemije, prim. prev.) i (2) (praktikovanja, prim. prev.) fizičkog distanciranja. Rezultati pokazuju da se stepen podrške politici (vlade za borbu protiv pandemije, prim. prev.) može predvideti na osnovu rastuće percepcije rizika i izraženije desničarske ideologije. Percepcija rizika predviđa održavanje fizičke distance, a predviđaju ga i uzrast i iskustvo sa COVID-19. Rezultati takođe pokazuju da je politička ideologija moderator povezanosti između percepcije rizika s jedne strane i podržavanja politike (vlade za borbu protiv pandemije, prim. prev.) i održavanja fizičke distance s druge strane. Opažanje pandemije kao veće pretnje je povezano sa snažnijim podržavanjem politike (vlade za borbu protiv pandemije, prim. prev.) i fizičkom distancom samo kod desničarski orijentisanih osoba. Čini se da su oni naročito osetljivi na opaženu pretnju. ; There is growing research evidence that political ideology is an important determinant of complying with the rules and recommendations aimed at fighting the coronavirus. This paper analyses the role of the left-right ideology self-positioning in supporting the government measures in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and practicing the physical distancing guidelines in Serbia. The study was conducted online on a sample of 656 respondents. Two hierarchical multiple regression models with age, the COVID-19 experience, the perception of risk posed by the coronavirus, and political ideology predicting: (1) policy support and (2) physical distancing were tested. The results show that policy support was predicted by increasing risk perception and the right-leaning ideology. Risk perception predicted physical distancing practices, and so did age and the COVID-19 experience. The results also indicate that the relationship between risk perception and both policy support and physical distancing is moderated by political ideology. Perceiving the ongoing pandemic as a greater threat is related to higher policy support and physical distancing among the right-leaning persons only. They seem especially sensitive to the perceived threat.

The main goal of the paper is to reveal, to compare and to summarize the essence of Russian political approaches toward particular cases of states with limited recognition and also to define in global scale whether the stance undergoes transformation or it could be considered as an attitude unique in each special matter when Moscow simultaneously supports independence of South Caucasian Republics and does not recognize Kosovo. The authors believe that there is strong need for Russia of an elaborated strategy based on a robust academic research. The authors outline two de facto approaches to secessionist formations practically applied by contemporary members of international society: international law approach and geopolitical approach. Summing up all the peculiarities of Russian position they assert that Moscow mostly keeps to geopolitical approach towards factual secessions rather international law approach, but in case of Kosovo, Palestine, South Ossetia and Abkhazia it resorts to international law approach. The authors also provisionally divide all contemporary secessionist formations in Russian policy into three groups according to priority ranking and provide results of a detailed content-analysis of Russian foreign policy formal documents and politicians statements that reveal a wide range of appellations concerning secessionist formations. The characteristics testify the fact that Russia strictly keeps to the position of territorial integrity principle respect. Finally, the authors produce two forecasts of further Russian policy towards factual secessions and conclude that Russian policy of consideration each factual secession should continue being individual as fruitful, consistent, deliberate and ensuring more profitable conditions in the context of international cooperation and security. ; Для полноценного участия в мирополитических процессах, в том числе, в мирном урегулировании конфликтов, российской дипломатии необходимы собственные критерии взаимодействия с государствами, имеющими ограниченное признание. В данной статье выявляются основные российские подходы к данному феномену, выясняется, означает ли признание Москвой независимости Южной Осетии и Абхазии при одновременном непризнании Косово трансформацию российской внешнеполитической позиции, или же ее можно рассматривать как уникальную в каждом отдельном случае. Выделяя два типа реализуемых на практике членами мирового сообщества подхода к сецессионистским образованиям, правовой и геополитический, авторы приходят к выводу о преобладании в российской внешней политике второго из них. В отношении Косово, Палестины, Южной Осетии и Абхазии Москва придерживается первого подхода. Учитывается также приоритетность того или иного сецессионистского образования в политике Кремля. Официальные внешнеполитические документы и заявления свидетельствуют о строгой приверженности Москвы принципу территориальной целостности и нерушимости государственных границ. В заключении авторы приходят к выводу о необходимости гибкого рассмотрения Москвой каждого сецессионистского образования в индивидуальном порядке как наиболее продуктивного варианта.

Статья посвящена введению в качественное исследование состояния индийской научно-технологической сферы, политики в этой сфере и ее результатов с позиции системного подхода. Некоторые показатели приведены в сравнении с таковыми в Китае и Пакистане странами, военно-политическое противостояние с которыми самым существенным образом влияет на научную политику Индии. Главной движущей силой индийской науки было и пока остается государство. В связи с задачами противостояния с другими, прежде всего региональными силами, основным направлением научно-технической политики было ракетно-ядерное. Поскольку это направление находится под международным контролем, получение большого количества технологий было невозможно. Это предопределило опору на собственные силы в исследованиях, длительный период развития индийских научных исследований и разработок (НИР) в условиях существенной изоляции. Недостаток ресурсов, тем более отвлекаемых из экономики на военные цели, потребовал жесткой экономии и постоянного сильного государственного контроля. В основном задачи, поставленные в оборонной области, были решены, однако отдача науки для экономики пока невелика. Ситуация изменилась в 1990-е гг. с началом масштабной либерализации, и этот рост может ускориться в случае реализации научной политики нового политического руководства Индии. ; The article presents introduction into qualitative study of the state of the Indian scientific and technological sphere, of the policy in this area and its results from the position of system approach. Some indicators are compared with those in China and Pakistan countries, the military-political confrontation with which has the most significant influence on the science policy of India. The state has been and still remains the main driving force for the Indian science. The main direction of science and technology policy were nuclear and missiles, because of the confrontation with the other forces, primarily regional ones. As this area is under the international control, obtaining a wide range of technologies was not possible. This predetermined self-reliance in research, and a long period of development of Indian research and development (R& D) in international isolation. Lack of resources, especially when these are taken from the civil economy to military purposes, required austerity and continued strong state control.In the course of time the main defense tasks were solved, but the back effect of science for the economy is still low. The situation changed in the 1990s with the beginning of a large-scale liberalization and this prospective growth may accelerate in the case of implementation a new science policy by the new political leadership of India.

Imposition of sanctions for violations of competition law rules is an important instrument of the European Union (EU) and Lithuanian competition enforcement authorities and is an inevitable part of the EU and Lithuanian competition law policy. The fining policy of the Lithuanian Competition Council for breaches of the Lithuanian and EU competition rules has recently been changed by the new 2012 Government resolution and has been aligned with the 2006 Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines. The new Lithuanian fining rules set exactly the same basic principles for setting the amount of fines and are very similar to the Commission's Guidelines, however some peculiarities may and shall be distinguished. The new Lithuanian fining rules in some aspects are even stricter than the EU fining rules established in the Commission's Guidelines. The aim of the article is to analyse the main changes in the Competition Council's fining policy and identify the discrepancies in national and EU fining rules, analyse advantages and disadvantages of the new fining policy. ; Straipsnyje yra nagrinėjama nauja baudų, skiriamų už Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos įstatymo pažeidimus, dydžio nustatymo tvarka, patvirtinta Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybės nutarimu ir įsigaliojusi 2012 m. sausio 27 d. Priimti naują baudų dydžio nustatymo tvarką paskatino kelios priežastys – senos tvarkos netobulumas, Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos tarybos praktikos kritika, naujos Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos įstatymo pataisos, įpareigojusios Konkurencijos tarybą skiriant baudas atsižvelgti į pajams, gautas iš prekių ar paslaugų, susijusių su pažeidimu, pardavimo. 2006 m. ES Komisijos priimtos gairės dėl baudų dydžio nustatymo neabejotinai tapo naujosios baudų dydžio nustatymo tvarkos pagrindu, tačiau nepaisant akivaizdžių esminių panašumų (pvz., dėl baudų dydžio nustatymo metodo, bazinio baudos dydžio nustatymo taisyklių, pagrindų bazinei baudai didinti ar mažinti), nacionalinės Lietuvos baudų dydžio nustatymo taisyklės turi ir tam tikrų ypatumų. Straipsnyje analizuojami naujosios Lietuvos baudų dydžio nustatymo tvarkos ir 2006 m. Komisijos gairių panašumai bei skirtumai, naujosios tvarkos privalumai ir trūkumai. Autoriai laikosi nuomonės, jog naujoji Lietuvos baudų dydžio nustatymo tvarka tam tikrais aspektai yra griežtesnė nei 2006 m. Komisijos gairės (pvz., nustatant bazinės baudos dydį karteliniams susitarimams, dėl bendrojo pakartotinumo koncepcijos), o tam tikrais aspektais palieka Konkurencijos tarybai daugiau laisvės sumažinti baudą arba kitaip ją apriboja dėl skirtinos baudos dydžio (pvz., per "tarpinio teisinio maksimumo" baziniam baudos dydžiui, senaties pakartotiniams pažeidimams nustatymą). Galiausiai autoriai daro išvadą, jog naujoji Lietuvos baudų dydžio nustatymo tvarka tikėtina, jog sukurs bent tokias pat pasekmes kaip ir 2006 m. ES Komisijos gairių priėmimas, tai yra tikėtina, kad padidins bendrą baudų lygį.

The measure of the regional disparities in the European Union was widely approached on the literature. Recent years have seen a spate of studies taking into account the spatial aspect of data in the analysis of convergence from an empirical viewpoint, or integrating spatial interdependencies from a theoretical viewpoint. In this scientific context, this proposition aims to understand the spatial discontinuities at the origin of an uneven process of integration and convergence in the EU with the two last enlargements. In a methodological point of view, we hypothesize that sigma-convergence should be calculated not only at the global level (beta and sigma convergence) but also at the local level. Thus, local measurements obtained will provide additional information on the nature of the convergence and on the forms of regional growth. Local convergence is an indicator measuring the reduction (or increase) in economic disparities within a group of adjacent regions. In other words, there is local convergence when GDP per capita of regions included in the delimited area tend to the average level of GDP per capita of the zone concerned. The results (and their cartography) shows that there are local phenomena of both marked convergence, or conversely divergence, underlying a process of uneven integration. The multipolarization of the convergence, and therefore the unequal integration process of the regions, calls for differentiated policy responses. These responses should take into account different factors behind the convergence of regions, including the Structural Funds (although in the literature there is an ambiguity regarding the impact of the Structural Funds), the effects of inheritance and the effects of context. Faced with the inability of the cohesion policy to reduce interregional disparities within each country, our study on local convergence provides points to reflect regarding how to rethink future EU regional policy after 2013 in order to make it more effective. It emphasizes the value of taking into account geographical location and the structure of the neighborhood of each of the European regions in order to develop the cohesion policy. The highlighting of a multipolar convergence and the joint presence of areas of convergence and divergence within the European area underlines the differentiated effectiveness of the Structural Funds. Thus, some regions considered as marginalized peripheries (due to their geographic location, the fact that many discontinuities run through them and their being characterized by a situation of local divergence) deserve special treatment in terms of European aid if the aim is to make the integration process less unequal.