Suchergebnisse

Il paesaggio forestale è al centro delle politiche europee di salvaguardia dell'ambiente e della biodiversità, in quanto contribuisce allo sviluppo sostenibile e al contrasto dei cambiamenti climatici. Ciò è riconducibile ai servizi ecosistemici che il suo capitale naturale fornisce alla società. La ricerca si dedica perciò all'individuazione dei principali fattori di rischio per la conservazione di questi ambienti sia a scala globale, ma anche soprattutto a scala locale dove si può constatare come specifici ecosistemi siano legati a forme storiche di paesaggio. Molti ambienti forestali del vecchio continente, infatti, si sono coevoluti con l'uomo, rispondendo a innumerevoli funzioni, ma tramandando, grazie alla loro resilienza paesaggistica, peculiari connotati identitari dei luoghi. Un caso emblematico di tutto ciò è lo storico paesaggio laurentino dell'Ager Laurens, tra Roma e il mare, conservatosi all'interno della Tenuta presidenziale di Castelporziano e assediato dalla città che vi si è sviluppata intorno. Studiare la storia e l'evoluzione paesaggistica dell'area, consentendo di attestare la resilienza di queste foreste negli ultimi tremila anni, grazie a fonti storiche e cartografiche che affondano le proprie radici nella mitologia classica, è stato il presupposto per affermare la necessità di interventi volti alla sua conservazione, in linea con gli obiettivi sanciti dai Presidenti della Repubblica nel 1999 e rinnovati nel 2020. A tal fine è stato condotto, per due anni e in una rete permanente, il monitoraggio dei fenomeni di rinnovazione naturale del querceto planiziale di caducifoglie, una delle componenti naturalistiche di maggior pregio e allo stesso tempo più minacciata nell'ambito costiero mediterraneo, ancor più se periurbano. Strumento fondamentale di approfondimento è stata inoltre la raccolta e l'analisi di dati storici presenti e quelli delle serie storiche meteo-climatiche. Dalle analisi dei dati è emerso uno stato di conservazione critico per il querceto, sia nella senescenza degli individui adulti che nella quasi assenza di rinnovazione naturale che sopravvive al secondo-terzo anno. Ciò è correlato in primo luogo alla numerosità della fauna selvatica, seguita dall'elevata densità della copertura arborea e infine al maggiore stress idrico e richiede interventi di gestione sostenibile integrata più incisivi e costanti nel tempo. ; The forest landscape is at the centre of European policies related to the protection of the environment and biodiversity, as it contributes to sustainable development and the fight against climate change. This is due to the ecosystem services that its natural capital provides to society. The aim of the research is to identify the main risk factors for the protection of the natural environments on a global scale and, above all, on a local scale where it can be seen how specific ecosystems are linked to historical landscape. Many forest environments of the old continent have undoubtedly co-evolved with man, responding to countless functions but simultaneously, thanks to their landscape resilience, handing down peculiar identity-related connotations of the places. A case in point is that of the historic Laurentian landscape of Ager Laurens, between Rome and the sea, preserved within the presidential estate of Castelporziano and under threat by the city that has developed around it. Studying the history and landscape evolution of the area, that has made it possible to attest the resilience of these forests over the last three thousand years, and thanks to historical and cartographic sources, which have their roots in classical mythology, was the prerequisite for affirming the need for interventions aimed at its conservation, in line with the objectives established by the Presidents of the Republic in 1999 and renewed in 2020. For that purpose, during two years and in a permanent network, was conducted the monitoring of the phenomena of natural renewal of the planitial deciduous oak forest, one of the most valuable naturalistic components and at the same time most threatened in the Mediterranean coastal area, even more if peri-urban. Furthermore, essential analyzing and study tools was the collection and analysis of historical data and climatic series. The analysis shows that the oak forest face a critical conservation status, both on the senescence of adult individuals and the almost total absence of natural renewal that survives the second-third year. This is attributable firstly to the abundance of wildlife, followed by the high density of the tree cover and finally to the greater water stress and requires more incisive and constant integrated sustainable management interventions over time. ; El paisaje forestal está en el centro de las políticas europeas de protección del medio ambiente y la biodiversidad, ya que contribuye al desarrollo sostenible y a la lucha contra el cambio climático. Esto se debe a los servicios ecosistémicos que su capital natural ofrece a la sociedad. La investigación, por tanto, se dedica a identificar los principales factores de riesgo para la conservación de estos entornos tanto a escala global, como a escala local, donde se puede ver cómo los ecosistemas específicos están vinculados a formas históricas de paisaje. De hecho, muchos ambientes forestales del viejo continente han co-evolucionado con los seres humanos, respondiendo a innumerables funciones y transmitiendo, gracias a su resiliencia paisajística, características peculiares identificativas de los lugares. Un caso emblemático es el histórico paisaje laurentino de los ager laurens, entre Roma y el mar, conservado dentro de la finca presidencial de Castelporziano y asediado por la ciudad que se ha desarrollado a su alrededor. Estudiar la historia y la evolución paisajística de la zona, que permita atestiguar la resiliencia de estos bosques durante los últimos tres mil años, gracias a fuentes históricas y cartográficas que tienen sus raíces en la mitología clásica, fue el requisito previo para afirmar la necesidad de intervenciones destinadas a su conservación, en línea con los objetivos establecidos por los Presidentes de la República en 1999 y renovados en 2020. Para ello, durante dos años y en una red permanente, se llevó a cabo el seguimiento de los fenómenos de renovación natural del robledal caducifolio llano, uno de los componentes naturalistas más valiosos y a la vez más amenazado del litoral mediterráneo, aún más si es periurbano. Una herramienta fundamental para el análisis fue la recopilación y análisis de los datos históricos y meteorológicos. Del análisis de los datos surgió un estado de conservación crítico para el robledal, tanto en la senescencia de los individuos adultos como en la casi ausencia de renovación natural que sobrevive al segundo-tercer año. Esto es atribuible en primer lugar a la abundancia de vida silvestre, seguida de la alta densidad de la cobertura arbórea y finalmente al mayor estrés hídrico que requiere intervenciones de manejo sustentable integrado más incisivas y constantes en el tiempo.

The article analyzes the dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic, measures to resist its spread in the world and Ukraine, and also considers its economic consequences. The concept of trust and its impact on the economy are considered in detail, and indicators of trust in state and local authorities in conditions of a pandemic are analyzed. The points of view of users of social networks on the economic consequences of the pandemic are determined. The sample of publications was collected for the April-May 2020 period using 360 unique searches at the crossroads of coronavirus and government topics, including 6,726 posts from Ukrainian Facebook users. The words used in the resulting corpus of texts turned out to be: coronavirus, epidemic, quarantine, mask, government, state, president. The semantic analysis of the corpus, carried out using the Word2Vec toolkit, showed that the posts about coronavirus often discuss the state budget, measures to combat the epidemic and the incidence rate, in connection with quarantine - fines and violations, infographics on anti-epidemiological measures. To analyze user sentiment, dictionaries of positive and negative words were built and analyzed, comparing which, it can be noted that, on average, words with an optimistic tone are used 30% more often than with pessimistic ones. Analysis of the reaction to publications by number and type showed that the word "coronavirus" evokes very contradictory emotions, "laughter" and "anger" are practically on the same level. At the same time, the mention of the words "government" and "quarantine" most often causes "anger" and "sadness", "president" and "economy" - "laughter" and "anger" ("contempt" and "aggression" according to Plutchik's methodology). The article suggests a method for assessing attitudes towards anti-epidemiological measures based on the analysis of the content of social networks, including: 1) collection of data on a selected topic from the Facebook network, 2) initial training and statistical analysis of the text corpus, 3) semantic analysis of the text corpus, 4) analysis of user attitudes. The assessment obtained by the proposed method is confirmed by the results of a survey in support of the government's work to counter the spread of coronavirus, according to which only about 10% of respondents speak positively about its actions, more than 60% negatively. Thus, the method for assessing attitudes towards anti-epidemiological measures based on the analysis of the content of social networks is implemented as a set of SQL and Python scripts. This method can be used for the regular monitoring of public opinion regarding the assessment of work to counter the spread of coronavirus. ; В работе проанализирована динамика развития пандемии COVID-19, меры по противодействию ее распространения в мире и Украине, уделено внимание экономическим последствиям. Подробно рассмотрено понятие доверия и его влияние на экономику, проведен анализ показателей доверия к государственной и местной власти в условиях пандемии. Определены точки зрения пользователей социальных сетей по экономическим последствиям пандемии. Выборка постов, была собрана за период апрель-май 2020 года с использованием 360 уникальных поисковых запросов на перекрестке тем по коронавирусу и государственной власти, включает 6726 публикаций украинских пользователей Facebook. Употребляемыми словами полученного корпуса текстов оказались такие как: коронавирус, эпидемия, карантин, маска, власть, государство, президент. Семантический анализ корпуса, проведен с использованием инструментария Word2Vec, он показал, что в постах о коронавирусе чаще обсуждается госбюджет, меры борьбы с эпидемией и уровень заболеваемости, в связи с карантином - штрафы и нарушения, инфографику по противо-эпидемиологическим мероприятиям. Для анализа настроений пользователей были построены и проанализированы словари положительных и отрицательных слов, сравнивая которые можно отметить, что в среднем слова с оптимистичным оттенком используются на 30% чаще, чем с пессимистичными оттенками. Анализ реакций на публикации по количеству и типам показал, что слово «коронавирус» вызывает очень спорные эмоции, «смех» и «злость» находятся почти на одном уровне. В то же время упоминание слов «правительство» и «карантин» чаще всего вызывает «злость» и «печаль», «президент» и «экономика» - «смех» и «злость» ( «презрение» и «агрессию» по методологии Плутчика). В работе предложен метод оценки отношения к проводимым антиэпидемиологическим мероприятиям на основе анализа контента социальных сетей, включая: 1) сбор данных по выбранной тематике из сети Facebook, 2) первичную подготовку и статистический анализ корпуса текстов, 3) семантический анализ корпуса текстов, 4) анализ настроений пользователей. Полученная по предложенному методу оценка подтверждаются результатами опроса по поддержке работы правительства по противодействию распространению коронавируса, согласно которому положительно к его действиям относятся только примерно 10% респондентов, отрицательно - более 60%. Таким образом, метод оценки отношения к антиэпидемиологическим мероприятиям на основе анализа контента социальных сетей, реализовано в виде набора SQL и Python скриптов. Этот метод может быть использован для регулярного мониторинга общественного мнения относительно оценки работы по противодействию распространению коронавируса. ; У роботі проаналізовано динаміку розвитку пандемії COVID-19, заходи з протидії її поширення в світі та Україні, приділена увага економічним наслідкам. Детально розглянуто поняття довіри та її вплив на економіку, проведений аналіз показників довіри до державної і місцевої влади в умовах пандемії. Визначені точки зору користувачів соціальних мереж щодо економічних наслідків пандемії. Вибірка постів, що була зібрана за період квітень-травень 2020 року з використанням 360 унікальних пошукових запитів на перехресті тем щодо коронавірусу та державної влади, включає 6726 публікацій українських користувачів Facebook. Найуживанішими словами отриманого корпусу текстів виявилися такі як: коронавірус, епідемія, карантин, маска, влада, держава, президент. Семантичний аналіз корпусу, проведений з використанням інструментарію Word2Vec, показав, що в постах про коронавірус найчастіше обговорюється держбюджет, заходи боротьби з епідемією та рівень захворюваності, у зв'язку з карантином – штрафи та порушення, коли говориться про уряд, йдеться про опір пандемії та інфографіку щодо проти-епідеміологічних заходів. Для аналізу настроїв користувачів було побудовано та проаналізовано словники позитивних та негативних слів, порівнюючи які можна відмітити, що в середньому, слова з позитивним відтінком вживаються на 30% частіше за песимістичні. Аналіз реакцій на публікації за кількістю та типами показав, що слово «коронавірус» викликає дуже спірні емоції, «сміх» та «злість» знаходяться майже на одному рівні. В той же час згадування слів «уряд» та «карантин» найчастіше викликає «злість» та «сум», «президент» та «економіка» – «сміх» та «злість» («презирство» та «агресію» за методологією Плутчика). В роботі запропоновано метод оцінки ставлення до державних антиепідеміологічних заходів на основі аналізу контенту соціальних мереж, що включає: 1) збір даних за обраною тематикою у мережі Facebook, 2) первинну підготовку та статистичний аналіз корпусу текстів, 3) семантичний аналіз корпусу текстів, 4) аналіз настроїв користувачів. Отримана за запропонованим методом оцінка підтверджуються результатами опитування щодо підтримки роботи уряду з протидії поширенню коронавірусу, згідно якому позитивно до його дій ставляться лише приблизно 10% респондентів, негативно – більш 60%. Таким чином, метод оцінки ставлення до антиепідеміологічних заходів на основі аналізу контенту соціальних мереж, що реалізовано у вигляді набору SQL та Python скриптів, може бути використаний для регулярного моніторингу громадської думки щодо оцінки роботи державних установ з протидії поширенню коронавірусу.

Questa ricerca ripercorre la vicenda del quotidiano palermitano «L'Ora» sotto la direzione di Vittorio Nisticò (1954-75), indagando, specificamente, il ruolo ch'esso ebbe nel dibattito sulla mafia. La prima parte delinea un quadro della convulsa situazione siciliana post-bellica, segnata, fra l'altro, dalla creazione della Regione autonoma e dalle lotte popolari per la terra. Fu in tale clima di mobilitazioni collettive e di innovazioni istituzionali che il gruppo storico del giornale svolse il proprio apprendistato politico e che il futuro editore, il Partito comunista, si attestò su una linea accesamente regionalista. Nel 1954 i comunisti acquisirono l'antico giornale dei Florio con l'intento di portare consensi alle sinistre, allora deboli e isolate sia a Palermo sia nelle altre città siciliane. L'idea era quella di impiegare l'istituto autonomistico come luogo d'interlocuzione politica, promuovendo larghe intese in nome del rinnovamento e dello sviluppo dell'isola, ovvero della difesa dei comuni interessi siciliani. È in quest'ottica che viene spiegata l'opzione "sicilianista" del quotidiano, venuta alla ribalta in concomitanza dell'Operazione Milazzo (ottobre 1958), quando in Sicilia si formò un governo anomalo che comprendeva dissidenti democristiani (a cominciare dal presidente Silvio Milazzo), la destra monarchica e quella neofascista, e che si reggeva sull'appoggio esterno di socialisti e comunisti. «L'Ora», che da sin dall'arrivo di Nisticò alla direzione propugnava soluzioni di unità autonomistica, sostenne con determinazione il milazzismo, assumendo un protagonismo politico senza precedenti. Contestualmente viene delineata la figura del direttore, Nisticò, il quale ebbe dai vertici del Pci il mandato di non uniformarsi al dogmatismo comunista, evitando dunque chiusure settarie e pregiudiziali. Nisticò si attenne all'incarico, muovendosi in verità con più autonomia di quanta il Partito volesse concedergli, reclutando giornalisti e collaboratori di vaglia in una logica professionale più che di appartenenza politica. Ne discese un rapporto non semplice con l'editore-partito, come testimonia l'esame dei carteggi tra Nisticò e il responsabile della stampa comunista, Amerigo Terenzi. La tesi traccia dunque una distinzione tra la linea "sicilianista", che ebbe modo di accentuarsi durante i governi Milazzo (1958-60), e quella propriamente antimafia che il giornale percorse con enfasi crescente a partire dalla prima inchiesta organica dell'autunno 1958. L'analisi permette di comprendere come la seconda si sia sviluppata in forza delle circostanze e, segnatamente, dell'escalation di violenza registratasi in quel periodo tra Palermo e provincia. L'elaborato tratteggia le figure dei giornalisti e intellettuali impegnati nel primo e più rilevante tentativo postbellico d'interpretazione del fenomeno mafioso; esamina, anche sulla base di documenti d'archivio, i reportage a puntate realizzati dal quotidiano, registrandone talora gli aspetti contraddittori e mitologici; si sofferma, fra l'altro, sulla pubblicazione di testimonianze d'eccezionale valore conoscitivo come la confessione del medico mafioso Melchiorre Allegra, rinvenuta dal cronista Mauro De Mauro, le memorie del capomafia italo-americano Nick Gentile, curate da Felice Chilanti, e il Rapporto del tenente dei carabinieri Mario Malausa. Ciò che emerge è un originale modello di giornalismo investigativo, imperniato sulla critica delle fonti, sul coraggio professionale e su una forte spinta etico-politica. La ricerca mostra come la circolarità di conoscenze promossa dal giornale e, più in generale, il suo appoggio ai reparti investigativi e alla Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sulla mafia – istituita nel 1963 – abbiano alimentato un virtuoso meccanismo di sensibilizzazione, concorrendo peraltro a fondare il concetto di "antimafia" nell'accezione che assunse nei decenni successivi: quella di un sostegno di gruppi politici e opinione pubblica alle forze dell'ordine e alla legalità. ; This research retraces the history of the Palermitan newspaper «L'Ora» under the Vittorio Nisticò's direction (1954-75) and investigates its role in the public debate on the Mafia. The first part outlines a view of the convulsive Sicilian post-war situation, distinguished, among other things, by the creation of the Autonomous Region and the popular struggles for the land property. In this season of collective mobilization and high expectations the newspaper's historical group carried out its political apprenticeship and the future publisher, the Italian Communist Party, lined up on a strong regionalist policy. In 1954 the Communists acquired the Florios' ancient newspaper, aiming to bring consensus to the left-wing parties, weak and isolated both in Palermo and in the other Sicilian cities. The goal was to use the Autonomous Region concept as a place for political dialogue and to promote crossing alliances in the name of the renovation and development of the island and in defence of the common Sicilian interests. In this perspective, the thesis explains the newspaper's distinct Sicilianist option. This policy particularly emerged in conjunction with the Operation Milazzo (October 1958), when an anomalous government, which included Christian Democrat dissidents (as the President Silvio Milazzo himself), the monarchist and the neo-fascist right-wings and which stood on the external support of Communists and Socialists, was formed in Sicily. «L'Ora», which had been advocating autonomist unity solutions since the beginning of Nisticò's direction, strongly supported the milazzism and took on a political role with no precedents. At the same time, a specific attention is dedicated to the figure of the director, Nisticò, who had the mandate from the PCI's leaders to not conform the newspaper policy to the communist dogmatism, to avoid detrimental closures. Nisticò complied with the assignment, acting with more autonomy than the Party wanted to grant him, and co-opted worthy journalists and collaborators in more professional than political logic. It resulted in a difficult relationship with the party-publisher, as highlighted by the correspondence with the head of the communist press, Amerigo Terenzi. Therefore, the thesis draws a distinction between the Sicilianist line, intensified during the Milazzo's governments (1958-60), and the properly anti-Mafia one that the newspaper had been following with increasing emphasis from the first organic investigation series in autumn 1958. The analysis allows us to understand how the anti-Mafia line evolved under the particular circumstances of the escalation of violence which occurred in that period in Palermo and its province, and especially in Corleone. The thesis outlines the figures of journalists and intellectuals involved in the first and most important post-fascism attempt to represent the Mafia phenomenon; it examines, evaluating archival documents too, the reports made by the newspaper, sometimes recording their contradictory and mythological aspects; it focuses on the publishing of impressive documents such as the confession of the mobster doctor Melchiorre Allegra found by the journalist Mauro De Mauro, the memories of the Italian-American Mafia boss Nick Gentile edited by Felice Chilanti and the Report of the lieutenant of the Carabinieri Mario Malausa. The research shows how the circularity of the knowledge promoted by the newspaper and, more generally, its support to the investigative departments and to the Parliament Commission of Inquiry on the Mafia – established in 1963 – fuelled a virtuous awareness-raising mechanism, contributing to set up the concept of anti-Mafia in the meaning that it would assume in the following decades: a support by the political groups and the public opinion to the forces of law and order.

The project aims to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the government's irrigation program with focus on the technical, physical, and institutional aspects of performance of communal irrigation systems (CIS). Cycle 1 involved the assessment of 66 communal irrigation systems (CIS) from 11 provinces in Luzon, while Cycle 2 covered 12 CIS from 4 provinces in the Visayas, and 12 CIS from 4 provinces in Mindanao. Provinces were selected based on the total FUSA served by CIS, while the selection of sample CIS per province were based on size category of service areas: small (50 ha and below), medium (between 50 and 100 ha), and large (above 100 ha). They were then characterized based on water source, type of extraction/ distribution technology (gravity, pump), FUSA, operational status and cropping intensity. Primary and secondary data were collected. Key informant interviews (KII) of the RIO or IMO Managers, as well as other key actors such as NIA-IDOs and the IA President, were conducted using a structured questionnaire. Focus group discussions with IA officers/ members were likewise carried out. Walkthroughs to gauge the physical conditions of the systems were conducted in 2 of the 6 selected CIS from the 11 provinces in Luzon for a total of 22, and in all the 24 CIS selected in Visayas and Mindanao. Majority of the selected CIS are gravity systems except in some provinces where there are more pump irrigation systems. Water sources of the CIS are lakes, rivers, creeks, springs, runoff and ground water. While some rivers tapped have adequate flows for irrigation even during the dry seasons, unreliable water supply is a major problem for majority of the CIS who tap water from less dependable small rivers and creeks, or rely on springs and runoff. In most of the CIS visited, farmers resort to conjunctive use of STWs with their CIS especially during long dry periods. Many CIS where found to be in slope greater that 3%, and as such, it is recommended to include all areas within 8% slope, minus the built-up and other protected areas as potential irrigable areas. The presence of a dependable surface water source and a good shallow aquifer, as well as the soil type and its suitability to different type of crops, should also be used as major criteria for irrigation development. On the problem of water supply sources, there should be a concerted and united effort on the part of concerned government agencies like NWRB, NIA, BSWM, and the academe to identify potential sites for diversion dams and storage reservoirs. The estimation of dependable (low) water supply and flood (high) discharges for rivers is very important. As such, the shelved proposal for the institution of the National Water Resources Management Office under the Office of the President should be revived and reformulated. The institution of Water Resources Centers in selected state colleges and universities (SCUs), who can continuously gather, analyze and manage water resources data would be significant in building hydrologic database. All accumulated water resources data should be housed in a database center within the proposed super body. There are a host of technical problems that confronts the IAs and the performance of their CIS. Most run-of-the-river type dams are old, and some with sediments almost at the crest level. Damaged sluice and intake gates are usually replaced with wooden flashboards, sand bags or stones, and defective lifting mechanisms are either left open or fitted with chain blocks. Sedimentation due to catchment denudation, mining, lahar, among others, is a major problem decreasing dam storage potential and canal carrying capacity. A positive aspect is that most CIS have concrete-lined main canals and laterals, and their conditions depend on the IA O&M and cleanup mechanisms. At any rate, sediment discharge estimation should be a prerequisite in feasibility studies and provision of silt control devices should be included in the design for sediment laden rivers. Control structures include simple cross regulators, check gates, drop structures, division boxes and farm turnouts most of which uses wooden flashboards for water level control. Most service roads are in bad conditions with some dams accessible only by walking or by motorcycles. As in most irrigation systems, flow measurements are not conducted and there are no specific drainage canals at the CIS leading to flooding problems in some systems during the rainy season. Water distribution is usually from paddy to paddy, with few farm ditches contributing to large application losses. Rehabilitation works have been performed through NIA's technical assistance and mostly done to correct damaged dams and headworks, lining of canals, and dredging of sediments. With the recent availability of low-cost HDPE pipes, the feasibility of using these materials for subsurface conveyance of irrigation to the fields, should be looked into. Most IAs believe that they receive adequate water at the right time though frequent delays and inequitable flow distribution still abound. The IAs also generally rate their systems high in terms of water delivery, flexibility, reliability and equitability, and themselves in terms of water distribution and canal maintenance, indicating the high relative impact of NIA to the farmers. There is no distinct pattern based on size of FUSA on the performance of CIS and functionality of IAs. Crucial is the capacity of each IA to harness its organizational capacity to build human, financial, social capital, thus, the need for continuous capacity building. CIS development remains dependent on government (i.e., NIA) assistance and the planned management transfer to LGUs based on AFMA is rarely implemented, if at all. Problems of sustainability of irrigation infrastructure loom due to persistent environmental problems (watershed degradation, siltation, extreme climate-related events). IAs apparently have none or limited role in watershed management but these can serve as partners in watershed management programs. The role of IDOs is very crucial but even with a heavy workload they are not getting adequate incentives (e.g. security of tenure and other benefits. Most often, IDOs are hired on job order basis with salaries drawn from CIS project budget. All of the IAs interviewed were grateful for the FISA since they are relieved from paying the cost of their CIS. The IAs continued to collect fees from their members for their O&M, referring to them as irrigation management fee (IMF) or association service charge (ASC). However, some IA members are reluctant to pay any fee citing the implementation of FISA. IA's concerns in O&M and inadequate funds are persistent. FISA declared that O&M cost shall be provided by the national government. Therefore, there should be clear guidelines or provisions on this. FISA maintains the significant role of NIA in providing technical support to IAs and in building IAs' capacity to sustain their functionality. Thus, linkage between NIA and IAs should be sustained.

In the armed conflicts of Guatemala, Peru and Colombia, paramilitary groups were created to fight the guerrillas and also to prevent the mobilization of the social sectors interested in transforming the established social order. In these countries, different circumstances led to the official deactivation of paramilitary structures.Guatemala's paramilitary groups (PAC) were established by the state in the early 1980s and were formally demobilized in 1996 after the signing of peace agreements between the government and the guerrilla group URNG. In Peru, the peasant rounds were created in the south-central cordillera during the 1980s. In 2003, after the fall of President Fujimori, the Peruvian state ceases to motivate the organization of these armed groups. In Colombia, paramilitary groups were promoted during the 1980s by various actors, including regional elites, militaries and drug traffickers. In 2003, these armed groups signed a peace agreement with the government of President Uribe, in which they pledge to surrender arms and begin a gradual process of demobilization.Despite the aforementioned processes to disable paramilitaries, those groups continue to exist. Thus, it is relevant to ask whether these structures are still a form of paramilitarism and to identify the reasons why they are still present. In order to answer these questions, the main research objective is to analyze, from a comparative perspective, the transformation processes of PAC, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitaries from the moment when the respective States took the official decision to disable these groups. This work is developed in three chapters.The first chapter compares the emergence of the paramilitary groups studied. From this comparative perspective and using certain elements of the systemic and the structuralist functionalist approaches, I propose a theoretical conceptualization of the paramilitary phenomenon. According to this conceptualization, the main function of paramilitarism in the three study cases is the protection of the threatened social order.The second chapter examines the processes that led to the official deactivation of paramilitarism in the three countries. To this end, we compare the conditions under which the respective armed conflicts ended, the context in which each State took the decision to disable the paramilitary and the different Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes.The third chapter compares the transformation of PACs, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitaries after their official deactivation.The research is based on the comparative method. For each chapter, comparison variables are constructed. The main sources of information are, first, a bibliographic review on the theoretical conceptualization of paramilitarism, the armed conflicts of the respective countries and the origin and evolution of the studied groups. Secondly, a study of the online press about the recent activities of the PACs, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitary groups to analyze the current characteristics these groups.Finally, the comparative analysis of the emergence of paramilitarism in Guatemala, Peru and Colombia leads to the conclusion that the existence of a social order perceived as threatened is the core element to explain the creation of those armed structures. The main objective is not to fight guerrilla, but to protect the social order. As a result, the persistence of a situation in which the social order or the status quo is still considered "in danger" explains the persistence of paramilitarism. Thus, the structures that currently exist in Guatemala and Colombia are, indeed, a form of paramilitarism, unlike Peru. ; Dans les conflits armés du Guatemala, du Pérou et de Colombie, des groupes paramilitaires ont été créés afin de lutter contre les guérillas et aussi d'empêcher la mobilisation des secteurs sociaux intéressés à transformer l'ordre social établi. Dans ces pays, différentes circonstances ont mené à la désactivation officielle des structures paramilitaires.Les groupes paramilitaires du Guatemala (PAC) ont été créés par l'État au début des années 80 et ont été officiellement démobilisés en 1996, après la signature des accords de paix entre le gouvernement et la guérilla URNG. Au Pérou, les rondes paysannes ont été créées dans la cordillère sud-centrale au cours des années 1980. En 2003, après la chute du Fujimori, l'État péruvien cesse de motiver l'organisation de ces groupes. En Colombie, les groupes paramilitaires ont été promus pendant les années 80 par différents acteurs, parmi lesquels figuraient les élites régionales, l'armée et les narcotrafiquants. En 2003, ces groupes armés ont signé un accord de paix avec le gouvernement du président Uribe, dans lequel ils s'engagent à remettre les armes et à commencer un processus progressif de démobilisation.Même si au Guatemala, au Pérou et en Colombie, des processus pour désactiver les groupes paramilitaires ont été mis en place, ceux-ci continuent d'exister. Ainsi, il est pertinent de se demander si ces structures sont encore une forme de paramilitarisme et d'identifier les raisons pour lesquelles elles sont toujours présentes. En vue de répondre à cette question, l'objectif principal de recherche est d'analyser depuis une perspective comparative les processus de transformation des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens à partir du moment où les États respectifs prennent la décision officielle de désactiver ces groupes. Ce travail est développé en trois chapitres.Le premier chapitre compare l'émergence des groupes paramilitaires étudiés. A partir de cette perspective comparative et en utilisant certains éléments des approches systémique et structurelle fonctionnaliste, nous élaborons une conceptualisation théorique du phénomène paramilitaire. Selon cette conceptualisation, la fonction principale du paramilitarisme dans les trois cas d'étude est la protection de l'ordre social menacé.Le deuxième chapitre étudie les processus qui ont conduit à la désactivation officielle du paramilitarisme dans les trois pays analysés. À cette fin, nous comparons les conditions dans lesquelles se sont terminés les conflits armés respectifs, le contexte où chaque État a pris la décision de désactiver le paramilitarisme et les processus de Désarmement, de Démobilisation et de Réintégration (DDR).Le troisième chapitre compare la transformation des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens après leur désactivation officielle.La recherche se base sur la méthode comparative. Pour chaque chapitre, des variables de comparaison sont construites. Les sources d'information principales sont, premièrement, une révision bibliographique sur la conceptualisation théorique du paramilitarisme, les conflits armés et l'origine et l'évolution des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens. Deuxièmement, l'analyse des caractéristiques actuelles des groupes étudiés se base principalement sur une étude de presse on line.L'analyse comparative de l'émergence du paramilitarisme au Guatemala, au Pérou et en Colombie permet de conclure que l'existence d'un ordre social perçu comme menacé est à l'origine de la création de structures armées dont la fonction principale n'est pas de lutter contre la guérilla, mais la protection de cet ordre social. En conséquence, la persistance d'un contexte dans lequel l'ordre social ou le statu quo sont toujours considérés en danger est l'élément qui explique la poursuite du paramilitarisme. Ainsi, les structures qui existent actuellement au Guatemala et en Colombie sont, en effet, une forme de paramilitarisme, à la différence du Pérou.

У статті викладено результати проведеного дослідження проблем законодавчого регулювання в Україні питань кримінальної відповідальності за незаконне збагачення.Автори публікації приділили особливу увагу аналізу змісту рішення Конституційного Суду України за конституційним поданням 59 народних депутатів України щодо відповідності Конституції України (конституційності) ст. 3682 (незаконне збагачення) Кримінального кодексу (далі – КК) України, а також хронології подій, що відбулися в Україні в зв'язку з криміналізацією та подальшою декриміналізацією незаконного збагачення. Вони звернули увагу на те, що судді Конституційного Суду України не були одностайними в ухваленні рішення про визнання зазначеної кримінально-правової норми неконституційною.Підтримуючи обґрунтовану належним чином правову позицію Конституційного Суду України щодо неконституційності положень ст. 3682 КК України, автори звернули увагу на те, що судді Конституційного Суду України могли прийняти рішення, яким зазначена норма була б визнана неконституційною тільки в редакції Закону від 16 жовтня 2014 р. № 1698-VII. Таке рішення Конституційного Суду України залишило б у силі диспозицію ст. 3682 КК України у редакції, яка відповідає конституційним вимогам, і запобігло би настанню небажаних для українського суспільства наслідків.У статті вказується, які юридичні наслідки можуть настати в Україні в зв'язку з фактичною декриміналізацією незаконного збагачення. У той же час, автори запропонували власне бачення того, як можна було уникнути настання цих наслідків. У зв'язку з цим вони висловили думку про бездіяльність суб'єктів владних повноважень (Президента України, народних депутатів України, суддів Конституційного Суду України), які в межах своєї компетенції не вжили необхідних правових заходів для врегулювання ситуації.Визначені причини і умови, які призвели до можливості настання негативних наслідків у зв'язку з визнанням ст. 3682 КК України неконституційною, а також найбільш оптимальні шляхи виходу з ситуації, що склалася. Зокрема, йдеться про законодавчі ініціативи в цій сфері новообраного Президента України і вказується на необхідність посилення парламентського контролю за процесами формування та реалізації державної антикорупційної політики як чинника, який суттєво впливає на стан забезпечення національної безпеки.Автори рекомендують Верховній Раді України до кінця 2019 р. провести парламентські слухання, на яких слід заслухати доповіді керівників антикорупційних органів про результати їхньої діяльності в 2018–2019 роках, дати оцінку результативності цих державних структур і визначити невідкладні заходи, які повинні вжити органи державної влади для підвищення ефективності реалізації антикорупційної політики. ; В статье изложены результаты проведенного исследования проблем законодательного регулирования в Украине вопросов уголовной ответственности за незаконное обогащение.Авторы публикации уделили особое внимание анализу содержания решения Конституционного Суда Украины по конституционному представлению 59 народных депутатов Украины относительно соответствия Конституции Украины (конституционности) ст. 3682 (незаконное обогащение) Уголовного кодекса (далее – УК) Украины, а также хронологии событий, произошедших в Украине в связи с криминализацией и последующей декриминализацией незаконного обогащения. Они обратили внимание на то, что судьи Конституционного Суда Украины не были единодушными в принятии решения о признании указанной уголовно-правовой нормы неконституционной.Поддерживая обоснованную должным образом правовую позицию Конституционного Суда Украины относительно неконституционности положений ст. 3682 УК Украины, авторы обратили внимание на то, что судьи Конституционного Суда Украины могли принять решение, которым указанная норма была бы признана неконституционной только в редакции Закона от 16 октября 2014 г. № 1698-VII. Такое решение Конституционного Суда Украины оставило бы в силе формулировку ст. 3682 УК Украины, которая соответствует конституционным требованиям, и предотвратило бы наступление нежелательных последствий для украинского общества. В статье указывается, какие юридические последствия могут наступить в Украине в связи с фактической декриминализацией незаконного обогащения. В тоже время авторы предложили собственное видение того, как можно было избежать наступления этих последствий. В связи с этим они высказали мнение о бездействии субъектов властных полномочий (Президента Украины, народных депутатов Украины, судей Конституционного Суда Украины), которые в пределах своей компетенции не приняли необходимых правовых мер для урегулирования ситуации.Указаны причины и условия, которые привели к возможности наступления негативных последствий в связи с признанием ст. 3682 КК Украины неконституционной, а также наиболее оптимальные пути выхода из сложившейся ситуации. В частности, речь идет о законодательных инициативах новоизбранного Президента Украины в этой сфере и указывается на необходимость усиления парламентского контроля за процессами формирования и реализации государственной антикоррупционной политики как фактора, который оказывает значительное влияние на состояние обеспечения национальной безопасности.Авторы рекомендуют Верховной Раде Украины до конца 2019 г. провести парламентские слушания, на которых следует заслушать доклады руководителей антикоррупционных органов о результатах их деятельности в 2018–2019 годах, дать оценку результативности этих государственных структур и определить неотлагательные меры, которые должны предпринять органы государственной власти для повышения эффективности реализации антикоррупционной политики. ; In the article results undertaken a study of issues of the day of the legislative adjusting are offered in Ukraine of questions of criminal responsibility for the illegal enriching.The authors of publication spared the special attention of maintenance of decision of Constitutional Court of Ukraine in business after constitutional presentation 59 deputies of people's of Ukraine in relation to accordance of Constitution of Ukraine (to constitutionality) of the article 3682 (illegal enriching) КК of Ukraine, and also chronologies of events, that took place in Ukraine in connection with criminalization and further decriminalization of the illegal enriching. Thus, they paid attention to that judges of Constitutional Court of Ukraine were not unanimous in a decision-making about confession of the indicated criminal law norm unconstitutional.The publication supports the duly substantiated legal position of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine regarding the unconstitutionality of the provisions of Article 3682 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. At the same time, the authors pointed out that the judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine could make a decision that would be unconstitutional only the latest version of this rule of October 16, 2014 No. 1698-VII. Such a decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine would leave in force the wording of Article 3682 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which complies with the constitutional requirements, and would prevent the consequences of undesirable consequences for the Ukrainian society.It is indicated, on some law consequences to that actual decriminalization of the illegal enriching led and can lead in Ukraine. Thus, authors offered own vision of that, how it was possible to avoid the offensive of these consequences. In this context they gave mind on inactivity of subjects of imperious plenary powers (President of Ukraine, deputies of people's of Ukraine, judges of Constitutional Court of Ukraine), that within the limits of the competense did not accept necessary legal measures for the settlement of situation.Reasons and terms, that resulted in the offensive of negative consequences in connection with confession of the article 3682 КК of Ukraine unconstitutional and such that lost an action, are adopted, and also the possible ways of exit are certain from a situation that in this connection was folded. In particular, speech goes about legislative initiatives of the newly elected President of Ukraine in the field of it and it is indicated on the necessity of strengthening of parliamentary control af-ter forming and realization of public anticorruption policy as by a factor that has considerable influence on the state of providing of national safety.Authors recommend Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the end of 2019 to con-duct the parliamentary listening during that to hear the lectures of leaders of anti-corruption organs about the results of their activity in 2018–2019, give the estimation of activity of these state structures and define urgent measures that must use public authorities for the increase of efficiency of realization of anticorruption politics of the state.

У статті викладено результати проведеного дослідження проблем законодавчого регулювання в Україні питань кримінальної відповідальності за незаконне збагачення.Автори публікації приділили особливу увагу аналізу змісту рішення Конституційного Суду України за конституційним поданням 59 народних депутатів України щодо відповідності Конституції України (конституційності) ст. 3682 (незаконне збагачення) Кримінального кодексу (далі – КК) України, а також хронології подій, що відбулися в Україні в зв'язку з криміналізацією та подальшою декриміналізацією незаконного збагачення. Вони звернули увагу на те, що судді Конституційного Суду України не були одностайними в ухваленні рішення про визнання зазначеної кримінально-правової норми неконституційною.Підтримуючи обґрунтовану належним чином правову позицію Конституційного Суду України щодо неконституційності положень ст. 3682 КК України, автори звернули увагу на те, що судді Конституційного Суду України могли прийняти рішення, яким зазначена норма була б визнана неконституційною тільки в редакції Закону від 16 жовтня 2014 р. № 1698-VII. Таке рішення Конституційного Суду України залишило б у силі диспозицію ст. 3682 КК України у редакції, яка відповідає конституційним вимогам, і запобігло би настанню небажаних для українського суспільства наслідків.У статті вказується, які юридичні наслідки можуть настати в Україні в зв'язку з фактичною декриміналізацією незаконного збагачення. У той же час, автори запропонували власне бачення того, як можна було уникнути настання цих наслідків. У зв'язку з цим вони висловили думку про бездіяльність суб'єктів владних повноважень (Президента України, народних депутатів України, суддів Конституційного Суду України), які в межах своєї компетенції не вжили необхідних правових заходів для врегулювання ситуації.Визначені причини і умови, які призвели до можливості настання негативних наслідків у зв'язку з визнанням ст. 3682 КК України неконституційною, а також найбільш оптимальні шляхи виходу з ситуації, що склалася. Зокрема, йдеться про законодавчі ініціативи в цій сфері новообраного Президента України і вказується на необхідність посилення парламентського контролю за процесами формування та реалізації державної антикорупційної політики як чинника, який суттєво впливає на стан забезпечення національної безпеки.Автори рекомендують Верховній Раді України до кінця 2019 р. провести парламентські слухання, на яких слід заслухати доповіді керівників антикорупційних органів про результати їхньої діяльності в 2018–2019 роках, дати оцінку результативності цих державних структур і визначити невідкладні заходи, які повинні вжити органи державної влади для підвищення ефективності реалізації антикорупційної політики. ; В статье изложены результаты проведенного исследования проблем законодательного регулирования в Украине вопросов уголовной ответственности за незаконное обогащение.Авторы публикации уделили особое внимание анализу содержания решения Конституционного Суда Украины по конституционному представлению 59 народных депутатов Украины относительно соответствия Конституции Украины (конституционности) ст. 3682 (незаконное обогащение) Уголовного кодекса (далее – УК) Украины, а также хронологии событий, произошедших в Украине в связи с криминализацией и последующей декриминализацией незаконного обогащения. Они обратили внимание на то, что судьи Конституционного Суда Украины не были единодушными в принятии решения о признании указанной уголовно-правовой нормы неконституционной.Поддерживая обоснованную должным образом правовую позицию Конституционного Суда Украины относительно неконституционности положений ст. 3682 УК Украины, авторы обратили внимание на то, что судьи Конституционного Суда Украины могли принять решение, которым указанная норма была бы признана неконституционной только в редакции Закона от 16 октября 2014 г. № 1698-VII. Такое решение Конституционного Суда Украины оставило бы в силе формулировку ст. 3682 УК Украины, которая соответствует конституционным требованиям, и предотвратило бы наступление нежелательных последствий для украинского общества. В статье указывается, какие юридические последствия могут наступить в Украине в связи с фактической декриминализацией незаконного обогащения. В тоже время авторы предложили собственное видение того, как можно было избежать наступления этих последствий. В связи с этим они высказали мнение о бездействии субъектов властных полномочий (Президента Украины, народных депутатов Украины, судей Конституционного Суда Украины), которые в пределах своей компетенции не приняли необходимых правовых мер для урегулирования ситуации.Указаны причины и условия, которые привели к возможности наступления негативных последствий в связи с признанием ст. 3682 КК Украины неконституционной, а также наиболее оптимальные пути выхода из сложившейся ситуации. В частности, речь идет о законодательных инициативах новоизбранного Президента Украины в этой сфере и указывается на необходимость усиления парламентского контроля за процессами формирования и реализации государственной антикоррупционной политики как фактора, который оказывает значительное влияние на состояние обеспечения национальной безопасности.Авторы рекомендуют Верховной Раде Украины до конца 2019 г. провести парламентские слушания, на которых следует заслушать доклады руководителей антикоррупционных органов о результатах их деятельности в 2018–2019 годах, дать оценку результативности этих государственных структур и определить неотлагательные меры, которые должны предпринять органы государственной власти для повышения эффективности реализации антикоррупционной политики. ; In the article results undertaken a study of issues of the day of the legislative adjusting are offered in Ukraine of questions of criminal responsibility for the illegal enriching.The authors of publication spared the special attention of maintenance of decision of Constitutional Court of Ukraine in business after constitutional presentation 59 deputies of people's of Ukraine in relation to accordance of Constitution of Ukraine (to constitutionality) of the article 3682 (illegal enriching) КК of Ukraine, and also chronologies of events, that took place in Ukraine in connection with criminalization and further decriminalization of the illegal enriching. Thus, they paid attention to that judges of Constitutional Court of Ukraine were not unanimous in a decision-making about confession of the indicated criminal law norm unconstitutional.The publication supports the duly substantiated legal position of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine regarding the unconstitutionality of the provisions of Article 3682 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. At the same time, the authors pointed out that the judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine could make a decision that would be unconstitutional only the latest version of this rule of October 16, 2014 No. 1698-VII. Such a decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine would leave in force the wording of Article 3682 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which complies with the constitutional requirements, and would prevent the consequences of undesirable consequences for the Ukrainian society.It is indicated, on some law consequences to that actual decriminalization of the illegal enriching led and can lead in Ukraine. Thus, authors offered own vision of that, how it was possible to avoid the offensive of these consequences. In this context they gave mind on inactivity of subjects of imperious plenary powers (President of Ukraine, deputies of people's of Ukraine, judges of Constitutional Court of Ukraine), that within the limits of the competense did not accept necessary legal measures for the settlement of situation.Reasons and terms, that resulted in the offensive of negative consequences in connection with confession of the article 3682 КК of Ukraine unconstitutional and such that lost an action, are adopted, and also the possible ways of exit are certain from a situation that in this connection was folded. In particular, speech goes about legislative initiatives of the newly elected President of Ukraine in the field of it and it is indicated on the necessity of strengthening of parliamentary control af-ter forming and realization of public anticorruption policy as by a factor that has considerable influence on the state of providing of national safety.Authors recommend Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the end of 2019 to con-duct the parliamentary listening during that to hear the lectures of leaders of anti-corruption organs about the results of their activity in 2018–2019, give the estimation of activity of these state structures and define urgent measures that must use public authorities for the increase of efficiency of realization of anticorruption politics of the state.

Labate, C. (2017). La televisión pública es el canal que nunca se ve. Estudio de las políticas de comunicación para Canal 7 de Argentina y TV Brasil (2003-2011). (Tesis de posgrado). Bernal, Argentina : Universidad Nacional de Quilmes. ; Esta tesis describe las políticas de comunicación para el servicio de radiodifusión pública en Argentina y Brasil entre 2003-2011. Se pretende determinar si el escenario político emergente en América Latina marcado por la llegada de gobiernos de tipo progresistas (de Moraes, 2009 y 2011; Waisbord, 2013; Mastrini, 2014) generó un nuevo modo de intervención estatal sobre el sector de la radiodifusión pública de alcance nacional. Para responder a esta cuestión se trabajará específicamente en un estudio de caso sobre el rol de los Estados como agentes emisores de Canal 7 de Argentina y TV Brasil durante los gobiernos de Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) y primero de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2011) en Argentina y, los mandatos de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2007 //2007-2010) en Brasil. En este sentido, esta investigación intentará aportar elementos para comprender los rasgos de las políticas sobre las emisorasde propiedad estatal de ambos países y las consecuencias de su aplicación, teniendo en cuenta el nuevo paradigma de políticas de comunicación surgido en la década del 80 (Van Cuilenburg y McQuail, 2003). En Argentina, Canal 7 cuenta con una tradición de casi 65 años mientras que TV Brasil, definida como una emisorade carácter nacional, fue lanzado por el expresidente Lula en 2007. Por ello, para el estudio de la televisión brasileña se abordará además el contexto y los debates que impulsaron su creación. En ambos casos, se buscará entender las lógicas de articulación entre los actores públicos, privados y sociales en las políticas de radiodifusión, a partir de las concepciones y conflictos de intereses en torno al campo público, con el fin de analizarcómo se concibieron las políticas para estas emisoras, en torno a su independencia, su modelo de gestión y los mecanismos de participación de la sociedad tanto en la administración como en la fiscalización del sistema. Por último, se reflexionará sobre el alcance territorial y las características de la programación. Se focalizará en una descripción de la televisión estatal de Argentina y Brasil desde la perspectiva teórica de la Economía Política de la Comunicación, dado que el sistema público de radiodifusión ocupa un lugar central en el ejercicio del derecho a la comunicación es asumido como un servicio estratégico para la gobernabilidad de los países. ; Esta tese descreve as políticas de comunicações para o serviço de radiodifusão pública na Argentina e no Brasil entre 2003-2011. Pretende-se determinar se o cenário político emergente na América Latina dado pela chegada dos governos de tipo progressistas (de Moraes, 2009 y 2011; Waisbord, 2013; Mastrini, 2014) gera um novo modo de intervenção estatal sobre o setor da radiodifusão pública, como consequência de políticas mais democráticas, inclusivas e pluralistas. Para responder a esta questão se trabalhará especificamente no estudo do caso sobre o rol dos Estados como agentes emissores de Canal 7 da Argentina e TV Brasil durante os governos do Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) e o primeiro da Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2011) na Argentina e, os mandatos de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2007 //2007-2010) no Brasil. Neste sentido, esta pesquisa tentará aportar elementos para compreender as características das políticas estatais sobre as televisões da propriedade estatal de ambos países latino-americanos e as consequências de suas aplicações, tendendo em conta o novo paradigma de políticas de comunicação surgido na década do 80 (Van Cuilenburg y McQuail, 2003). No caso da Argentina, Canal 7 conta com uma tradição de quase 65 anos enquanto que no Brasil este sistema de caráter nacional foi criado pelo ex-presidente Lula a partir dos 2007. Por isso, para o estudo da televisão brasileira abordar-se-á, além do contexto e os debates que empuxaram sua criação. Procurar-se-á entender as lógicas de articulação entre os atores públicos, privados e sociais nas políticas de radiodifusão, a partir das concepções e conflitos de interesses em torno ao campo público, com o fim de analisar se as televisões públicas sofreram alterações em sua estrutura política, seu modelo de gestão e nos mecanismos de participação da sociedade tato na administração quanto na fiscalização do sistema. Por último, reflexionar-se-á sobre o alcance territorial das emissoras e as características da programação. Se folizará na descripção da televisão estatal na Argentina e no Brasil desde a perspectiva teórica da Economia política das comunicações, devido que o sistema público de radiodifusão ocupa um lugar central no exercício do direito à comunicação e é assumido como um serviço estratégico para a governabilidade dos países. ; This thesis focuses on communication policies in communication for public broadcasting services in Argentina and Brazil between 2003 and 2011. Its aim is to determine if the emerging of new scenarios in Latin America with progressive government leaders (de Moraes 2009 y 2011; Waisbord 2013; Mastrini 2014) has boosted a new way of State intervention on nationwide broadcasting. To develop this topic, study will be done to study the role of the State as broadcasting agent in "Canal 7" in Argentina and "TV Brasil" during Néstor Kirchner's (2003-2007) and the first one of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's (2007-2011) Governments in Argentina and the terms of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2007 //2007-2010) in Brazil. Accordingly, the thesis will aim to provide tools to understand the features of the policies of state broadcasting stations in both countries and the effects of their applications. This analysis will be done taking into account the new paradigms of communication emerged in the eighties (Van Cuilenburg y McQuail, 2003). In the case of Argentina, "Canal 7" has been a tradition for almost seventy five years. Unlike "TV Brazil, which has been launched as a national system by the former President Lula in 2007. For this reason, in order to study the Brazilian television it is necessary to understand the background and the debates that have pushed for the creation of the public broadcasting service. This thesis seeks to show the relationship between public, private and social actors in broadcasting policies, as from the concepts and conflicts of interest of the public sphere. Also, it will try to conclude if as a public television suffered alterations in terms of its management system and participation of civil society. Finally, it will research the territorial reach of broadcasting stations and the characteristics of the programation. This thesis will focus on the situation of television in Argentina and Brazil based on the theory of the Political Economy of Communication. The reason is that the statebroadcasting system is an essential right of communication and a strategic way of governance process.

The notion of Kresy Wschodnie till nowadays remains one of the most arguable matter and is not clearly determined among historians and politicians, that's why has a reflection in present and influences public and political life in modern countries.In the article the meaning of this territory is analised as well as its perception in collective conscience, use of Kresy Wschodnie in political plans by Polish parties, also in Polish public and political opinion in times of World War I and at the beginning of formation of independent Poland.Polish socio- political opinion during the World War I and at the beginning of formation of independent Poland, namely Second Polish Republic, reflected main views, concepts, plans of Polish parties and had practical value for determination of Polish borders.Kresy Wschodnie was considered by Poles as ancient Poland and according to them this native land was full of strong-willed, talented people, who glorified Poland. The Poles who lived on eastern lands and belonged to Russia after the division of Poland kept trying to restore the Polish state system. November and January uprisings in XIX century, intense work and formed political parties implied to join these lands to the future state of Poland.World War I gave hope to Poles for gaining autonomy and independence. Authority appeals to the Polish nation in Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary were referred to Poles to support ruling establishment. Different foreign policy: pro-Russia and pro-Austria- Hungary; different ideological attitudes and directions did not stop Polish political forces from joining for creating their own state after Germany and Austria-Hungary made a Declaration of Independence for Kingdom of Poland in November 5, 1916, as well as Russian Provisional Government Appeal of acknowledgement of independent united Poland in March 1917.The appearence of independent Poland after World War I forced topical issues to be solved: to define eastern borders, status of Kresy Wschodnie, political attitude towards people on these lands. This matter had two main directions. Endecja was pro-Russia and considered Russia to be an ally in future war with Germany. The National Democracy programme meant restoration of Polish lands from 1772. This included western Ukrainian lands (Kiev region, Volyn, Podil, Galicia), some part of Lithuania and Belarus. However, proclamation of new rules of international life by American President Woodrow Wilson, which were supported by Entente countries, the policy of Left governments put conditions that Endecja agreed to the part of eastern territory defined by Treaty of Riga. The policy of land incorporation was aimed at making a country nationally similar and could become an ally to Russia. This explains why Endecja did not suggest maximum territorial programmer at the east and could compromise with Russia. Lots of scientists a political figure explained such position for negotiation at international level.According to Lefts forces regarding Kresy Wschodnie, namely Polish Socialist Party, and thier leader J. Pilsudski, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians could form their own independent states, which would become a buffer between Poland and Russia. This would make an utmost interest of Poland. One more acceptable variant would work for Lefts if Poland created a federation with Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus. Although, in theory it implied work within political parties. In practice first Left government wanted to preserve Polish state interests and provide rights for national minorities on eastern lands. Right forces that came to rule in 1923, changed the policy according to their point of view. ; The notion of Kresy Wschodnie till nowadays remains one of the most arguable matter and is not clearly determined among historians and politicians, that's why has a reflection in present and influences public and political life in modern countries.In the article the meaning of this territory is analised as well as its perception in collective conscience, use of Kresy Wschodnie in political plans by Polish parties, also in Polish public and political opinion in times of World War I and at the beginning of formation of independent Poland.Polish socio- political opinion during the World War I and at the beginning of formation of independent Poland, namely Second Polish Republic, reflected main views, concepts, plans of Polish parties and had practical value for determination of Polish borders.Kresy Wschodnie was considered by Poles as ancient Poland and according to them this native land was full of strong-willed, talented people, who glorified Poland. The Poles who lived on eastern lands and belonged to Russia after the division of Poland kept trying to restore the Polish state system. November and January uprisings in XIX century, intense work and formed political parties implied to join these lands to the future state of Poland.World War I gave hope to Poles for gaining autonomy and independence. Authority appeals to the Polish nation in Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary were referred to Poles to support ruling establishment. Different foreign policy: pro-Russia and pro-Austria- Hungary; different ideological attitudes and directions did not stop Polish political forces from joining for creating their own state after Germany and Austria-Hungary made a Declaration of Independence for Kingdom of Poland in November 5, 1916, as well as Russian Provisional Government Appeal of acknowledgement of independent united Poland in March 1917.The appearence of independent Poland after World War I forced topical issues to be solved: to define eastern borders, status of Kresy Wschodnie, political attitude towards people on these lands. This matter had two main directions. Endecja was pro-Russia and considered Russia to be an ally in future war with Germany. The National Democracy programme meant restoration of Polish lands from 1772. This included western Ukrainian lands (Kiev region, Volyn, Podil, Galicia), some part of Lithuania and Belarus. However, proclamation of new rules of international life by American President Woodrow Wilson, which were supported by Entente countries, the policy of Left governments put conditions that Endecja agreed to the part of eastern territory defined by Treaty of Riga. The policy of land incorporation was aimed at making a country nationally similar and could become an ally to Russia. This explains why Endecja did not suggest maximum territorial programmer at the east and could compromise with Russia. Lots of scientists a political figure explained such position for negotiation at international level.According to Lefts forces regarding Kresy Wschodnie, namely Polish Socialist Party, and thier leader J. Pilsudski, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians could form their own independent states, which would become a buffer between Poland and Russia. This would make an utmost interest of Poland. One more acceptable variant would work for Lefts if Poland created a federation with Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus. Although, in theory it implied work within political parties. In practice first Left government wanted to preserve Polish state interests and provide rights for national minorities on eastern lands. Right forces that came to rule in 1923, changed the policy according to their point of view.

The background and prospects for the reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Donbass (ORDLO) are analyzed. The author proves that the introduction of a full-scaled effective policy of reintegration of temporarily occupied territories is complicated by the armed phase of the ethnopolitical conflict, as well as by the lack of combatants' desire except Ukraine to settle it within the framework of the peace negotiation process. The reintegration component of all political and legal mechanisms concerning ORDLO is pointed out.Neither the authorities nor the scientific expert community have not yet worked out a system of clear understanding of reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories. This includes strategies, tactics, basic principles of ethnic and political integration process, which has become another challenge for internal and external ethnopolitics of Ukraine, the result of ethnopolitical conflict and loss of territory. The President calls the return of occupied territories under Ukrainian sovereignty a priority, but Ukraine has a completely different tactics of behavior to restore the sovereignty over Donbas and Crimea because the periods of reintegration of these areas are different. The status of two different areas are quite different.ARC has been annexed - illegally incorporated into another state, it became its part in the political and economic sense. While occupied territories of Donbass has been separated - illegally left the independent state, becoming a self-proclaimed formations, which are not recognized and not supported by the international community. The situation is complicated by the fact that the armed phase of the conflict in eastern Ukraine is still going, armed clashes and shelling are continued, which significantly complicates reintegration.But let's look more attentively at ethnic and political situation in the Donbass, the position of the illegal DNR and LNR and evaluate prospects to return these territories to the Ukraine. Manifestations of separatism that resulted in disintegration, formation of unrecognized states supported by the Russian Federation could not occur in other regions except the Southeast of Ukraine. The all population of this region has been in constant propaganda and informational pressure from the side of Russian Federation aimed at discrediting Ukraine as a state and was properly prepared for separatist sentiments.As part of Donetsk and Lugansk regions were occupied by Russian troops and militias and terrorist organizations DNR, LNR, they were offered a special status that takes into account the situation of the region where military operations are conducted. The Law on special status contains a number of reintegration initiatives and reconciliation aimed to facilitate, encourage the reunification process of separatizated areas of Ukraine. Terrorist organizations LNR and DNR do not appear in the Law, therefore, do not get recognition from the Ukrainian authorities in this way. The Law applies to the territory of Donbass itself controlled by armed separatists.The question of the political settlement of ethnopolitical conflict in the Donbas and local elections remain open. The self-proclaimed states tried to set a date for local elections on their own, demanding from Ukrainian government to accept them and take law on local elections in Donbas. The date of local elections set by leaders of terrorist organizations have repeatedly transferred.The settlement of ethnopolitical conflict in the Donbass mostly complicated by the position of the Russian side, which does not recognize its participation. The Russian side insists that the conflict will stop if Ukraine gives special status of Donbass, conducts constitutional reform. That is selective realization of the Minsk agreements - those the political commitments of Ukraine without implementation of security part concerning Russia and de-facto states. ; The background and prospects for the reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Donbass (ORDLO) are analyzed. The author proves that the introduction of a full-scaled effective policy of reintegration of temporarily occupied territories is complicated by the armed phase of the ethnopolitical conflict, as well as by the lack of combatants' desire except Ukraine to settle it within the framework of the peace negotiation process. The reintegration component of all political and legal mechanisms concerning ORDLO is pointed out.Neither the authorities nor the scientific expert community have not yet worked out a system of clear understanding of reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories. This includes strategies, tactics, basic principles of ethnic and political integration process, which has become another challenge for internal and external ethnopolitics of Ukraine, the result of ethnopolitical conflict and loss of territory. The President calls the return of occupied territories under Ukrainian sovereignty a priority, but Ukraine has a completely different tactics of behavior to restore the sovereignty over Donbas and Crimea because the periods of reintegration of these areas are different. The status of two different areas are quite different.ARC has been annexed - illegally incorporated into another state, it became its part in the political and economic sense. While occupied territories of Donbass has been separated - illegally left the independent state, becoming a self-proclaimed formations, which are not recognized and not supported by the international community. The situation is complicated by the fact that the armed phase of the conflict in eastern Ukraine is still going, armed clashes and shelling are continued, which significantly complicates reintegration.But let's look more attentively at ethnic and political situation in the Donbass, the position of the illegal DNR and LNR and evaluate prospects to return these territories to the Ukraine. Manifestations of separatism that resulted in disintegration, formation of unrecognized states supported by the Russian Federation could not occur in other regions except the Southeast of Ukraine. The all population of this region has been in constant propaganda and informational pressure from the side of Russian Federation aimed at discrediting Ukraine as a state and was properly prepared for separatist sentiments.As part of Donetsk and Lugansk regions were occupied by Russian troops and militias and terrorist organizations DNR, LNR, they were offered a special status that takes into account the situation of the region where military operations are conducted. The Law on special status contains a number of reintegration initiatives and reconciliation aimed to facilitate, encourage the reunification process of separatizated areas of Ukraine. Terrorist organizations LNR and DNR do not appear in the Law, therefore, do not get recognition from the Ukrainian authorities in this way. The Law applies to the territory of Donbass itself controlled by armed separatists.The question of the political settlement of ethnopolitical conflict in the Donbas and local elections remain open. The self-proclaimed states tried to set a date for local elections on their own, demanding from Ukrainian government to accept them and take law on local elections in Donbas. The date of local elections set by leaders of terrorist organizations have repeatedly transferred.The settlement of ethnopolitical conflict in the Donbass mostly complicated by the position of the Russian side, which does not recognize its participation. The Russian side insists that the conflict will stop if Ukraine gives special status of Donbass, conducts constitutional reform. That is selective realization of the Minsk agreements - those the political commitments of Ukraine without implementation of security part concerning Russia and de-facto states.

The notion of Kresy Wschodnie till nowadays remains one of the most arguable matter and is not clearly determined among historians and politicians, that's why has a reflection in present and influences public and political life in modern countries.In the article the meaning of this territory is analised as well as its perception in collective conscience, use of Kresy Wschodnie in political plans by Polish parties, also in Polish public and political opinion in times of World War I and at the beginning of formation of independent Poland.Polish socio- political opinion during the World War I and at the beginning of formation of independent Poland, namely Second Polish Republic, reflected main views, concepts, plans of Polish parties and had practical value for determination of Polish borders.Kresy Wschodnie was considered by Poles as ancient Poland and according to them this native land was full of strong-willed, talented people, who glorified Poland. The Poles who lived on eastern lands and belonged to Russia after the division of Poland kept trying to restore the Polish state system. November and January uprisings in XIX century, intense work and formed political parties implied to join these lands to the future state of Poland.World War I gave hope to Poles for gaining autonomy and independence. Authority appeals to the Polish nation in Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary were referred to Poles to support ruling establishment. Different foreign policy: pro-Russia and pro-Austria- Hungary; different ideological attitudes and directions did not stop Polish political forces from joining for creating their own state after Germany and Austria-Hungary made a Declaration of Independence for Kingdom of Poland in November 5, 1916, as well as Russian Provisional Government Appeal of acknowledgement of independent united Poland in March 1917.The appearence of independent Poland after World War I forced topical issues to be solved: to define eastern borders, status of Kresy Wschodnie, political attitude towards people on these lands. This matter had two main directions. Endecja was pro-Russia and considered Russia to be an ally in future war with Germany. The National Democracy programme meant restoration of Polish lands from 1772. This included western Ukrainian lands (Kiev region, Volyn, Podil, Galicia), some part of Lithuania and Belarus. However, proclamation of new rules of international life by American President Woodrow Wilson, which were supported by Entente countries, the policy of Left governments put conditions that Endecja agreed to the part of eastern territory defined by Treaty of Riga. The policy of land incorporation was aimed at making a country nationally similar and could become an ally to Russia. This explains why Endecja did not suggest maximum territorial programmer at the east and could compromise with Russia. Lots of scientists a political figure explained such position for negotiation at international level.According to Lefts forces regarding Kresy Wschodnie, namely Polish Socialist Party, and thier leader J. Pilsudski, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians could form their own independent states, which would become a buffer between Poland and Russia. This would make an utmost interest of Poland. One more acceptable variant would work for Lefts if Poland created a federation with Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus. Although, in theory it implied work within political parties. In practice first Left government wanted to preserve Polish state interests and provide rights for national minorities on eastern lands. Right forces that came to rule in 1923, changed the policy according to their point of view. ; The notion of Kresy Wschodnie till nowadays remains one of the most arguable matter and is not clearly determined among historians and politicians, that's why has a reflection in present and influences public and political life in modern countries.In the article the meaning of this territory is analised as well as its perception in collective conscience, use of Kresy Wschodnie in political plans by Polish parties, also in Polish public and political opinion in times of World War I and at the beginning of formation of independent Poland.Polish socio- political opinion during the World War I and at the beginning of formation of independent Poland, namely Second Polish Republic, reflected main views, concepts, plans of Polish parties and had practical value for determination of Polish borders.Kresy Wschodnie was considered by Poles as ancient Poland and according to them this native land was full of strong-willed, talented people, who glorified Poland. The Poles who lived on eastern lands and belonged to Russia after the division of Poland kept trying to restore the Polish state system. November and January uprisings in XIX century, intense work and formed political parties implied to join these lands to the future state of Poland.World War I gave hope to Poles for gaining autonomy and independence. Authority appeals to the Polish nation in Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary were referred to Poles to support ruling establishment. Different foreign policy: pro-Russia and pro-Austria- Hungary; different ideological attitudes and directions did not stop Polish political forces from joining for creating their own state after Germany and Austria-Hungary made a Declaration of Independence for Kingdom of Poland in November 5, 1916, as well as Russian Provisional Government Appeal of acknowledgement of independent united Poland in March 1917.The appearence of independent Poland after World War I forced topical issues to be solved: to define eastern borders, status of Kresy Wschodnie, political attitude towards people on these lands. This matter had two main directions. Endecja was pro-Russia and considered Russia to be an ally in future war with Germany. The National Democracy programme meant restoration of Polish lands from 1772. This included western Ukrainian lands (Kiev region, Volyn, Podil, Galicia), some part of Lithuania and Belarus. However, proclamation of new rules of international life by American President Woodrow Wilson, which were supported by Entente countries, the policy of Left governments put conditions that Endecja agreed to the part of eastern territory defined by Treaty of Riga. The policy of land incorporation was aimed at making a country nationally similar and could become an ally to Russia. This explains why Endecja did not suggest maximum territorial programmer at the east and could compromise with Russia. Lots of scientists a political figure explained such position for negotiation at international level.According to Lefts forces regarding Kresy Wschodnie, namely Polish Socialist Party, and thier leader J. Pilsudski, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians could form their own independent states, which would become a buffer between Poland and Russia. This would make an utmost interest of Poland. One more acceptable variant would work for Lefts if Poland created a federation with Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus. Although, in theory it implied work within political parties. In practice first Left government wanted to preserve Polish state interests and provide rights for national minorities on eastern lands. Right forces that came to rule in 1923, changed the policy according to their point of view.

"México tuvo intentos para cambiar el marco legal energético, el más reciente caso fallido fue el de Felipe Calderón, con una reforma que soluciono parcialmente los problemas en el 2008. La lucha de poder entre partidos fue la razón principal por la que por mucho tiempo se relego una solución definitiva a la problemática que tenía atados sobre todo en inversión privada al sector. Fue hasta el 2012 donde un acuerdo se empezó a gestar entre los políticos mexicanos y terminó con un exitoso "Pacto por México" con Enrique Peña Nieto de presidente llevándonos a las actuales reglas del juego. La reforma energética en México es una iniciativa que fue presentada por el presidente de la República, el 12 de agosto de 2013. Aprobada por el Senado de la República el 11 de diciembre de 2013 y por la Cámara de Diputados un día después. El 18 de diciembre de 2013, fue declarada constitucional por el Poder Legislativo Federal y promulgada por el Ejecutivo el 20 de diciembre de 2013 y publicada al día siguiente en el Diario Oficial de la Federación (CGEUM, 2013) . Presidencia de la Republica, (2015) menciona que la reforma tiene 10 puntos clave: 1. Los hidrocarburos en el subsuelo son propiedad de la Nación. Se mantiene la prohibición de otorgar concesiones en materia de minerales radioactivos, transmisión y distribución de energía eléctrica, así́ como petróleo y demás hidrocarburos. Se establece que son actividades estratégicas exclusivas del Estado la exploración y extracción del petróleo y demás hidrocarburos, los minerales radioactivos, la generación de energía nuclear, la planeación y el control del sistema eléctrico nacional y el servicio público de transmisión y distribución de electricidad. El Estado podrá realizar las actividades de exploración y extracción de petróleo y demás hidrocarburos a través de asignaciones otorgadas a PEMEX y de contratos con PEMEX y/o con particulares. Los contratos podrán ser de: servicios, utilidad compartida, producción compartida, de licencia o cualquier combinación de las anteriores. La Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos se encargará de realizar las licitaciones, así́ como de suscribir y administrar los contratos. 3. Las empresas estatales o particulares podrán reportar, para efectos contables y financieros, sus beneficios esperados de asignaciones y contratos. En dichos instrumentos se deberá́ afirmar que los hidrocarburos que se encuentren en el subsuelo son propiedad de la Nación. 4. Se crea el Fondo Mexicano del Petróleo para la Estabilización y el Desarrollo, el cual recibirá́ y administrará los ingresos petroleros de la Nación para procurar la estabilidad de las finanzas públicas de México. Asimismo, canalizará recursos para: ahorro de largo plazo, Sistema de Pensión Universal, ciencia y tecnología, infraestructura para el desarrollo nacional, becas, entre otros destinos. 5. Se permitirá́ la inversión privada en el tratamiento y refinación de petróleo, así́ como en transporte, almacenamiento y distribución de petróleo, gas natural, gasolina, diesel y demás derivados. Asimismo, privados podrán participar en toda la cadena petroquímica y realizar actividades de generación y comercialización de energía eléctrica. Los particulares podrán realizar actividades de transmisión y distribución, bajo contrato con la CFE. La Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos y la Comisión Reguladora de Energía se fortalecerán para el mejor desarrollo del sector energético nacional. Ambas comisiones se constituirán como organismos reguladores coordinados, con personalidad jurídica propia, autonomía técnica y de gestión, así́ como autosuficiencia presupuestaria. El nombramiento de los comisionados corresponderá́ al Senado a partir de una terna propuesta por el Ejecutivo Federal. 7. PEMEX y CFE se transformarán en empresas productivas del Estado, cuyo objeto será la creación de valor económico, con sentido de equidad y responsabilidad social. Contaran con una mayor autonomía técnica, de gestión y presupuestal. Los trabajadores son y continuarán siendo el principal activo de estas empresas, por lo que sus derechos laborales serán respetados en todo momento. PEMEX también se fortalecerá́ mediante la "ronda cero", a través de la cual podrá́ escoger los campos más productivos y las áreas de exploración más prometedoras. 8. Se crea el Centro Nacional de Control del Gas Natural como organismo público encargado de operar de forma eficiente el sistema nacional de ductos de transporte y almacenamiento de gas natural. Por su parte, el Centro Nacional de Control de Energía, saldrá́ de la CFE y se convertirá́ en un organismo público encargado del control operativo del sistema eléctrico nacional. 9. El Estado procurará la protección y cuidado del medio ambiente a través de criterios de sustentabilidad, el fomento de energías y combustibles más limpios, así́ como de medidas para propiciar la reducción de emisiones contaminantes en la industria energética. Asimismo, se creará un organismo desconcentrado para regular y supervisar las actividades del sector hidrocarburos en materia de seguridad industrial y protección al medio ambiente. 10. Se establece una convivencia ordenada entre las distintas actividades en la superficie, en la que el sector energético tendrá́ prioridad sobre otras actividades. Se mantiene la posibilidad de que los mineros exploten el gas asociado a la mina de carbón. Asimismo, se protege el derecho de mineros y agricultores, como dueños de la superficie, para recibir un justo pago por la ocupación o afectación superficial que haga la industria energética en su propiedad. Aunque ha habido difusión sobre las ventajas de la reforma, la mayoría de la gente sigue pensando que el petróleo en el país es de su propiedad, como si estuviera recibiendo participación accionaria, la realidad es que estos excedentes que alguna vez existieron por un sobreprecio internacional que subsidiaban infraestructura y programas sociales ha mermado su valor, debido en gran manera porque nunca se reinvirtió, dejando obsoleto y en un círculo vicioso la estructura técnica y laboral de PEMEX. Hay muchas cosas que distinguen la situación actual en México con la Reforma Energética en comparación a su implementación, por ejemplo, la certidumbre en el pago de derechos a los dueños de la tierra, la posibilidad y certidumbre en las reglas del juego a los posibles inversionistas y con esto la apertura al libre mercado generando esto mayor competencia en los precios finales al cliente. Sin embargo, falta mucho camino por recorrer, existe poca claridad en el marco legal, las reglas del juego son confusas incluso para los principales actores que participan en la implementación y cumplimiento de las nuevas políticas, llega a haber incluso inconsistencias y huecos entre las Leyes, los reglamentos y los Lineamientos que no han sido solventados a la fecha. Esto ha causado inconformidad dentro de las empresas, donde ellos defienden su postura y las autoridades basan los pocos resultados con un escaso presupuesto, falta de capital humano capacitado y Leyes enredadas."

Le relazioni tra gli Stati Uniti d'America e la Repubblica Islamica dell'Iran hanno infiammato la scena della politica internazionale degli ultimi anni. Sono ancora fresche le parole dichiarate dal presidente Bush nel 2002 che includeva l'Iran nel famigerato "Asse del male", mentre il Dipartimento di Stato americano classifica lo stato dell'Iran al primo posto nella lista dei paesi sostenitori del terrorismo a partire dai primi anni ottanta del XX secolo1. A dieci mila chilometri di distanza da Washington, a Teheran, città in cui i poster dell'ayatollah Khomeini si trovano ad ogni angolo di strada, echeggia ancora l'attacco del leader spirituale della rivoluzione che definiva gli USA come il "Grande Satana, il nemico numero uno dei popoli oppressi, che succhia il sangue dei popoli indifesi". E mentre i media occidentali da qualche anno considerano probabile l'ipotesi della preparazione di un piano di attacco militare americano nei confronti dell'Iran come reazione al suo programma nucleare, niente meno che davanti all'Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite, il presidente iraniano Ahmedinejad tuonava nel 2012 dichiarando al mondo che "nessuno può farci prediche sul nucleare"2. Indubbiamente si tratta di un antagonismo tra due stati che hanno un enorme peso politico ed economico nell'arena mondiale. Degli Stati Uniti d'America e del suo ruolo di superpotenza globale ormai si conosce quasi tutto. Nei giorni nostri gli USA si trovano in una situazione politica ed economica che, di fatto, garantisce a loro il ruolo di assoluta superpotenza mondiale. Tale posizione risulta rafforzata negli ultimi anni, e viene giustificata da molti fattori, tra i quali la posizione di paese vittorioso nelle due guerre mondiali, il ruolo di leader del blocco occidentale durante la Guerra Fredda, l'espansione dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino e lo scioglimento dell'URSS con successiva sparizione della ex- superpotenza in contrasto costante con gli USA. Per capire il peso e l'importanza degli Stati Uniti d'America, basterebbe prendere in considerazione due dati; quelli economici e militari. L'economia degli USA si considera la più grande economia statale del pianeta in termini di Prodotto Interno Lordo (PIL). Il PIL degli Stati Uniti nel gennaio del 2014 era pari a 15.684,80 miliardi di dollari americani, rappresentando così più di un quarto dell'intera economia globale, (esattamente il 25.30 percento3) pari a circa la somma totale del PIL combinato di tutti i paesi dell'Unione Europea. Mentre il budget americano dedicato alle spese militari nel 2013 era pari a 612,50 miliardi di dollari, considerato un budget tanto grande quanto l'intera somma delle spese militari affrontata da tutti gli altri stati del mondo messi insieme4. Il peso politico degli USA si riflette anche nel ruolo determinante che svolgono all'interno delle istituzioni internazionali. Forti del loro status di superpotenza, gli USA svolgono il ruolo di leader nell'Organizzazione delle Nazioni Unite, in qualità di membro permanente del Consiglio di Sicurezza. Hanno una stimata posizione all'interno dell'Organizzazione Mondiale del Commercio (WTO) e dell'Organizzazione per la Cooperazione e lo Sviluppo Economico (OSCE), sono il principale contribuente della Banca Mondiale e del Fondo Monetario Internazionale5, e partecipano in tantissime altre organizzazioni internazionali. Nella loro politica estera storicamente gli Stati Uniti guidano il blocco dei paesi occidentali, hanno come alleati i più importanti stati dell'Europa, avendo una relazione speciale con la Gran Bretagna, ma l'influenza americana si sente in tutto il globo, inclusi i paesi in via di sviluppo. La leadership statunitense viene difesa e alimentata dall'incredibile potenza militare. Gli USA guidano attualmente l'alleanza nordatlantica dell'Organizzazione del Trattato dell'Atlantico del Nord (NATO) ed hanno una presenza militare in quasi tutte le parti del globo. La loro capacità militare è stata continuamente dimostrata in vari conflitti globali, tra i quali l'intervento nell'ex - Yugoslavia, le guerre contro Saddam in Iraq e il recente conflitto in Afganistan. Dall'altro lato, anche l'Iran si profila come uno stato molto importante, ma che si trova in una situazione del tutto diversa. Si tratta indubbiamente di un paese con una storia antica e gloriosa, ma che nei giorni nostri si colloca in una posizione internazionale alquanto difficile e isolata. L'Iran possiede grandi risorse energetiche di petrolio e di gas, risorse che lo mettono al centro d'interessi economici globali, anche in considerazione del fatto che l'Iran è uno degli stati membri dell'Organizzazione dei Paesi Esportatori di Petrolio (OPEC). Tuttavia queste risorse energetiche, che hanno contribuito per anni al mantenimento dell'economia interna, sono la fonte quasi esclusiva di entrate per l'economia del paese, la quale non è stata mai in grado di svilupparsi adeguatamente anche in settori alternativi. L'Iran è un paese con alcune particolarità, un paese che fa parte del Medio Oriente ma che da questo differisce in quanto persiano e non arabo; islamico sì, ma non sunnita come la maggioranza dei mussulmani, ma bensì sciita; legato alla civiltà occidentale ma comunque orgoglioso della propria cultura. Come afferma Riccardo Redaelli; "L'Iran è sempre imprevedibile. In positivo e in negativo, si tratta di un paese e di un popolo che hanno la capacità di stupire storici, analisti e semplici appassionati di quella cultura"6. La sua posizione politica di peso in Medio Oriente è riconosciuta da tutti, anche in considerazione del fatto che è l'unico paese nel Golfo Persico in cui domina l'islam sciita, esercitando così una influenza notevole su quasi un quarto della popolazione musulmana. Dalla rivoluzione islamica del 1979 ad oggi, l'Iran si trova in una posizione di estremo antagonismo politico con gli USA e in rapporti difficili non solo con l'Europa e l'Occidente, ma anche con gli stessi paesi arabi limitrofi. L'Iran ha combattuto una guerra lunga e sanguinosa con l'Iraq, ha rapporti tesi con l'Arabia Saudita, e sicuramente viene considerata una serie minaccia da parte di Israele. Tuttavia in politica estera il paese ha cercato di trovare partner alternativi, stringendo nuove relazioni con Russia, la Cina, la Turchia e l'India. L'Iran ha discreti rapporti economici con alcuni paesi dell'Unione Europea, soprattutto con Italia e Germania. Nonostante questo, in precedenza gli USA e l'Iran per molti anni hanno avuto delle ottime relazioni politiche. Prima della rivoluzione islamica del 1979 l'Iran era considerato uno dei migliori alleati degli USA uno dei pilastri della politica americana in Medio Oriente, al quale erano riservati ingenti e continui aiuti economici e forniture militari da parte di Washington. Durante il regno dell'ultimo Scià della dinastia Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, a Washington e Teheran atterravano aerei presidenziali con a bordo i leader dei due paesi. Dal 1979, invece, le relazioni diplomatiche si sono del tutto interrotte e la politica tra i due paesi è diventata infuocata. Lo scopo di questa tesi, è quello di riuscire a sintetizzare un'analisi completa dei rapporti tra USA e Iran, attraverso uno studio storico e politico delle situazioni che si sono verificate sopratutto dalla seconda metà del XX secolo, sino ai giorni nostri. Naturalmente, una tale analisi non può concentrarsi esclusivamente sui meri rapporti bilaterali tra questi Stati, ma deve includere nelle sue considerazioni anche l'esame dettagliato di altri fattori rilevanti e complementari. Tra questi fattori si possono annoverare lo sviluppo della politica estera americana nel globo ed in particolare nel Medio Oriente, il rapporto dei due paesi con gli stati arabi e le altre "potenze" del mondo, il fattore Israele, il peso economico del petrolio e le risorse energetiche dell'Iran nel mercato globale nonché aspetti legati alla religione e alle differenze culturali.

Esta sección contiene los siguientes documentos: Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) Informe Anual 2013. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation- Key Trends and Developments relating to Trade and Investment. Measures and their Impact on the APEC Region. Grupo de los 20 (G20) Communiqué Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Washington, 18-19 April 2013. Communiqué Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Moscow, 15-16 February 2013. Anti-Corruption Action Plan. Banco Mundial Informe Anual 2012. Doing Business 2013. Economic Mobility and the Rise of the Latin American Middle Class. Global Economic Prospects. BRICS Joint statement of the BRICS Business Forum 2013 Durban, 26 March 2013. The Third Meetinf of the BRICS Trade Ministers Durban, 26 March 2013 Joint Communique. BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation Durban: 27 March 2013. Foreign Ministers' Meeting (Russia) on May 16, 2008. The BRICS Leaders- Africa Dialogue Forum Durban on 27 March 2013 (retreat). Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA) Convención Interamericana Contra el Racismo, la Discriminación Racial y Formas Conexas de Intolerancia (2013). Escenarios para el problema de drogas en las Américas 2013 – 2025. Informe Anual del Secretario General 2012. El problema de las drogas en las Américas 2013. Tendencias en la seguridad cibernética en América Latina y el Caribe y respuestas de los gobiernos. Informe anual del Comité Jurídico Interamericano (CJI) al cuadragésimo tercer período ordinario de sesiones de la Asamblea General. Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) Informe sobre la estabilidad financiera mundial – abril 2013. Resumen ejecutivo. Nota de prensa del capítulo 3 de perspectivas de la economía mundial, abril de 2013. Perspectivas económicas. Las Américas: Tiempo de reforzar las defensas macroeconómicas. República de Guinea Ecuatorial. Consulta del artículo IV correspondiente a 2012. Repunte gradual del crecimiento mundial en 2013. Unión Europea-Consejo Europeo Consejo Europeo, 7 y 8 de febrero de 2013. Conclusiones (Marco Financiero Plurianual). Consejo Europeo, 7 y 8 de febrero de 2013. Conclusiones. Consejo Europeo, 14 y 15 de marzo de 2013-Conclusiones. Consejo Europeo, 22 de mayo de 2013-Conclusiones. El Consejo Europeo en 2012 Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU)- Convención Marco sobre el Cambio Climático Aplicación de todos los elementos de la decisión 1/CP.17. Disposiciones para las reuniones intergubernamentales. Informe de la 23ª reunión del Grupo de Expertos para los países menos adelantados. Informe de síntesis sobre la aplicación del marco para el fomento de la capacidad en los países en desarrollo. Informe de síntesis sobre la aplicación del marco para el fomento de la capacidad en los países en desarrollo-Adición. Informe de síntesis sobre la labor de fomento de la capacidad realizada por órganos establecidos en el marco de la Convención y su Protocolo de Kyoto. Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change. Proyecto de presupuesto por programas para el bienio 2014-2015. Proyecto de presupuesto por programas para el beinio 2014-2015-Corrección. Grupo de los 8 (G8) Chancellor's closing remarks at the G7 meeting. G8 Factsheet: Social Investment and Social Enterprise. June 3, 2013. G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting Chair's Progress. Report March 14, 2013. G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting Chair's Progress. Report March 14, 2013. G8 Political Directors' Statement on Mali. London, January 15, 2013. Plans for the 2013 G8 Lough Erne Summit. June 17-18, 2013. PM Letter to the EU on Tax Evasion and Aggressive Avoidance. April 25, 2013. The UK's G8 Agenda: Increasing Trade, Fairer Taxes and Greater Transparency David Cameron, prime minister, United Kingdom, May 13, 2013. Prime Minister's Letter to G8 Leaders David Cameron, prime minister, United Kingdom January 2, 2013. David Cameron's Speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos . David Cameron, prime minister, United Kingdom January 24, 2013. The UK's G8 Priorities . Right Honourable David Cameron, prime minister January 1, 2013. Argentina Memorándum de Entendimiento entre el Gobierno de la República Argentina y el Gobierno de la República Islámica de Irán sobre los temas vinculados al ataque terrorista a la sede de la AMIA en Buenos Aires el 18 de Julio de 1994. Proyecto de declaración sobre la cuestión de las Islas Malvinas. Declaración conjunta del Sr. Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de la República Argentina y del Sr. Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la Federación de Rusia. Intervención del ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto de la República Argentina, Héctor Timerman, ante la XLIII Asamblea General Ordinaria de la OEA "Cuestión de las Islas Malvinas". Jueves 06 de Junio de 2013. Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) Comunicado conjunto de los Estados Partes del Mercosur y Estados Asociados. Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes del Mercosur. Decisión de los Estados Partes del Mercosur de respaldo al Presidente Evo Morales. Decisión sobre el cese de la suspensión del Paraguay en el Mercosur en aplicación del Protocolo de Ushuaia sobre compromiso democrático. Decisión sobre el Reconocimiento Universal del Derecho de Asilo Político. Declaración de San Salvador. La unidad Latinoamericana y el desarrollo de los pueblos. Decisión sobre el rechazo al espionaje por parte de los Estados Unidos sobre los países de la región. Procedimentos para atualização de listas positivas harmonizadas. Anexo X. XCI Reunión Ordinaria del Grupo Mercado Común, junio 2013. Guía metodológica para estudios de evaluación económica de tecnologías sanitarias. Requisitos mínimos para elaborar planes de contingencia para Emergencias de Salud Pública de Importancia Internacional (ESPII) en puntos de entrada designados por los Estados Partes según el RSI (2005) Régimen de carrera de los funcionarios Mercosur (modificación del anexo de la Decisión CMC Nº 04/12). XCI Reunión Ordinaria del Grupo Mercado Común, junio 2013 - Lista de participantes. Anexo I. XCI Reunión Ordinaria del Grupo Mercado Común, junio 2013 - Agenda. Anexo II. Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) Tratado sobre el comercio de armas 2013. A new global partnership: eradicate poverty and transform economies through sustainable development. The report of the high-level panel of eminent persons on the post-2015 development agenda. Resolución 2086 (2013) Resolución 2087 (2013) Resolución 2088 (2013) Resolución 2089 (2013) Resolución 2090 (2013) Resolución 2091 (2013) Resolución 2092 (2013) Resolución 2093 (2013) Resolución 2094 (2013) Resolución 2095 (2013) Resolución 2096 (2013) Resolución 2097 (2013) Resolución 2098 (2013) Resolución 2099 (2013) Resolución 2100 (2013) Resolución 2101 (2013) Resolución 2102 (2013) Resolución 2103 (2013) Resolución 2104 (2013) Resolución 2105 (2013) ; Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales (IRI)

Luego de casi 70 años de división entre Corea del Sur y Corea del Norte, resulta difícil creer que el fin de la tensión depende de los nombres que gobiernen cada país. Este año habrá elecciones presidenciales en el Sur y el desarrollo económico será el principal tema a debatir antes de los comicios del 19 de diciembre. El Gran Partido Nacional del actual mandatario surcoreano Lee Myung Bak (quien no podrá presentarse para una segunda administración) enfrentará al Partido Democrático de Unificación y a ciertos sectores independientes. Si bien las tensiones con su vecino país también son parte de la discusión, los posibles cambios en la cúpula del gobierno surcoreano no significarán una alteración en la situación con Corea del Norte. Las señales deben venir desde el país comunista, donde la muerte de Kim Jong Il el 17 de diciembre del 2011 y la sucesión en la administración norcoreana, abrieron una puerta de esperanza que no se concreta.Una frontera provisoriamente definitivaNadie imaginó que la partición temporal en el famoso Paralelo 38, que desde la rendición de Japón en la Segunda Guerra Mundial en 1945 y hasta hoy divide ambas Coreas, se mantendría tantos años inmóvil. La separación fue la solución a las diferencias existentes entre los que buscaban un modelo más liberal y los grupos de tendencia comunista. Solamente dos años duró la resolución de la Conferencia de El Cairo de 1943, en la que los líderes aliados plantearon el futuro de Corea como una nueva nación libre e independiente de la ocupación japonesa. Cabe destacar que desde comienzos del siglo XX Japón había anexado ese territorio e imponía un régimen autoritario.A partir de 1948, el tiempo sólo aumentó la rivalidad. En ese año, lo transitorio se volvió definitivo y se proclamó la República de Corea del Sur, con Seúl como capital, y la República Popular de Corea del Norte, con Pyongyang como su ciudad principal. Los apoyos de la Unión Soviética al régimen comandado por Kim Il Sung (Corea del Norte) y de Estados Unidos al de Syghman Rhee (Corea del Sur) no hicieron más que acelerar un conflicto armado que comenzó en 1950 y finalizó con la firma de la paz en julio de 1953. Desde ese momento, cada país comenzó su desarrollo: el norte lo hizo bajo una dictadura comunista, mientras que el sur llevó a cabo un proceso político que alternó dictaduras con transiciones que desembocaron en gobiernos democráticos desde la década de 1980.El acercamiento y la cuestión nuclearLa desaparición de la Unión Soviética y la llegada de fuerzas democráticas a Seúl cambiaron el panorama. La política exterior denominada "Sunshine Policy" llevada adelante por Kim Dae Jung, presidente de Corea del Sur, provocó un acercamiento y alivió las tensiones. En julio de 2000 se produjo una histórica entrevista en Pyongyang, entre el presidente surcoreano y Kim Jong Il (líder de Corea del Norte que sustituyó a su padre Kim Il Sung tras su fallecimiento en 1994). Los desfiles bajo una sola bandera en los Juegos Olímpicos dieron señales al mundo de una recomposición en la relación de ambas Coreas y el nuevo siglo comenzó con perspectivas de apertura.Sin embargo, años después la situación volvió a deteriorarse. A fines del 2002, Corea del Norte se retiró del Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear y reanudó su programa atómico, lo que provocó una crisis diplomática. Las operaciones militares en 2006 y en 2009 acentuaron las tensiones entre los países. El bombardeo en 2010 de la isla de Yeonpyeong fue otro de los acontecimientos que marcaron el último tiempo, causando la muerte de soldados surcoreanos y una alerta máxima en la administración de Lee Myung Bak.La sucesión en Corea del Norte y la incertidumbreEl fallecimiento de Kim Jong Il, a finales del año pasado, abrió un compás de incertidumbre sobre el futuro y la relación entre ambos países. Los pronósticos en el mundo mostraron variadas perspectivas. Un golpe de estado, un endurecimiento del régimen, el desmoronamiento del país y el alzamiento de la multitud para derrocar al gobierno fueron algunos de los presagios de los académicos.Las conversaciones entre los vecinos se estancaron por una cuestión primordial: la transición de poder hacia Kim Jong Un. A fines de febrero, Corea del Norte anunció que suspendería las pruebas de misiles de largo alcance y las actividades de enriquecimiento de uranio, a cambio de ayuda humanitaria por parte de Estados Unidos. A pesar de ello, Pyongyang informó en marzo el futuro lanzamiento de un nuevo cohete, que puso nuevamente en alerta a la comunidad internacional. Con motivo de la celebración del centenario del nacimiento de Kim Il Sung, se lanzó un cohete de largo alcance que falló a los pocos minutos de haber despegado.Las actividades en el recinto de Punggye-ri despertaron sospechas de una nueva prueba nuclear y provocaron reuniones de altos representantes de los países occidentales. En las últimas semanas los enviados especializados de Japón y Estados Unidos (aliado principal de Seúl desde la separación de la península) que llegaron a Corea del Sur, instaron a la comunidad internacional a enviar un mensaje hacia Corea del Norte, para que este país renuncie a su programa nuclear, respete los Derechos Humanos y mejore la vida de sus ciudadanos. La última novedad fue en los primeros días de junio, cuando el Ejército Popular de Corea del Norte amenazó a los medios de comunicación de Corea del Sur por la cobertura que realizaron sobre un festival infantil organizado por el gobierno de Pyongyang.Cambios que no modifican la situaciónAl igual que en 1994, tras la muerte de Kim Il Sung, la asunción de un nuevo líder en Corea del Norte no parece traer demasiadas transformaciones. El bloque militar burocrático parece establecido y la última sucesión no ha confirmado ninguno de los pronósticos de los académicos. El statu quo parece inamovible. El cambio de nombres al mando de los gobiernos, tanto en Corea del Sur (que tendrá elecciones en diciembre) como en Corea del Norte (que cambió su dictador a comienzos de año), no modifica el estado de tensión y crisis diplomática que viven ambos países. Mientras tanto el turismo crece, la frontera terrestre entre las Coreas es un vivo recuerdo de la Guerra Fría y aproximadamente seis millones de personas por año visitan la Zona Desmilitarizada en busca de una explicación al conflicto.*Licenciado en Estudios Internacionales. FACS, Universidad ORT Uruguay