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Most writers on international relations and international law still examine the relationship between international law and politics in terms of the assumption that law either should or does function only as a coercive restraint on political action. Textbook writers on general international politics like Morgenthau, and Lerche and Said, as well as those scholars who have specialized in international law like J. L. Brierly and Charles De Visscher, make the common assumption that international law should be examined as a system of coercive norms controlling the actions of states. Even two of the newer works,The Political Foundations of International Lawby Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach andLaw and Minimum World Public Orderby Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, in spite of an occasional reference to the non-coercive aspects of international law, are developed primarily from the model of international law as a system of restraint. Deriving their conception of the relationship between international law and political action from their ideas on the way law functions in domestic communities, most modern writers look at international law as an instrument of direct control. The assumption that international law is or should be a coercive restraint on state action structures almost every analysis, no matter what the school of thought or the degree of optimism or pessimism about the effectiveness of the international legal system. With an intellectual framework that measures international law primarily in terms of constraint on political action, there is little wonder that skepticism about international law continues to increase while creative work on the level of theory seems to be diminishing.

One of the asserted advantages and goals of the unification of substantive law lies in the prevention of 'forum shopping',1ie the lawyer's act of seeking the forum that is most beneficial to his client's interest.2This has been pointed out not only in discussions on unification of law in general,3but also in discussions on specific international uniform contract law conventions, such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods4(hereinafter CISG),5the Geneva Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road6(hereinafter CMR)7and the UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring8(hereinafter IFC).9

Branko Milanovic, Ökonom der Weltbank, kommt in seiner Veröffentlichung "Worlds Apart. Measuring International and Global Inequality" aus dem Jahr 2005 zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Entwicklung der Einkommensungleichheit in der Welt zu einer Konzentration auf zwei Pole, einem wohlhabenden Norden und einem zurückbleibenden Süden, geführt hat. Die Länder im mittleren Einkommensbereich seien in eine "no-win-Falle" geraten, aus der sie kaum entkommen können. Anhand von neueren Daten des Internationalen Währungsfonds und der UNO überprüfen die Autoren diesen Befund und zeigen, dass die jüngere Entwicklung der Weltwirtschaft der These von Milanovic diametral entgegenläuft: Zunehmend größere Bevölkerungsanteile der Welt gelangen in eine mittlere Einkommens- und Wohlstandslage. Abschließend werden die Beziehungen zwischen einer einzelgesellschaftlich, einer komparativ und einer global ausgerichteten Ungleichheits-Soziologie angesprochen. (GB)

The paper compares non-cooperative commodity taxation under the destination and origin principles under a variety of different assumptions about market structure. We consider a model of international duopoly with either quantity or price competition of firms and either segmented or integrated markets, and a monopolistic competition model with mobile firms. In each setting the international spillovers of tax policy are isolated and evaluated at the Pareto efficient tax rate. The sign of the net spillover, and thus the direction that commodity tax competition will take, depends critically on whether lump-sum taxes are available or commodity taxes must be used to finance the government budget.

The paper compares non-cooperative commodity taxation under the destination and origin principles under a variety of different assumptions about market structure. We consider a model of international duopoly with either quantity or price competition of firms and either segmented or integrated markets, and a monopolistic competition model with mobile firms. In each setting the international spillovers of tax policy are isolated and evaluated at the Pareto efficient tax rate. The sign of the net spillover, and thus the direction that commodity tax competition will take, depends critically on whether lump-sum taxes are available or commodity taxes must be used to finance the government budget.

The problem of replacing the dollar as the principal instrument of international fund transfers, both official and private, is becoming increasingly acute. In attempting to assess to what extent the potential « successors » to American currency - the Deutsche Mark, S.T.R., crown - can, claim to be able at least to support it if not to replace it, it would be appropriate to identify the conditions in which the « internationalization » of first, the Pound sterling, and secondly, the dollar, was accomplished. Such an analysis makes it possible to consider the advantages and disadvantages inherent upon the use of a national currency as an international currency both for the country issuing that currency as well as for the international community. Experience shows, in fact, that « international monetary power » is a two-edged sword which can, undoubtedly be used to promote the « imperialist » aspirations of a state but which can also be shown to be a potential fact or for weakening its economy and bringing about the eventual undermining of the lutter.
This state of affairs explains the reservations of the Germon, Japanese and Swiss monetary authorities with respect to sharing with the United States the burden of the « international monetary power » that the latter had exercised for several decades. These reservations however will likely not be sufficient to prevent the progressive internationalization of a currency such as the Deutsche Mark ... unless extensive measures are taken quickly to ensure the international growth of exclusively international instruments such as S.T.R. and the crown.