Suchergebnisse

Joseph Chinyong Liow ; Includes bibliographical references (p. [63]-64) ; Parallel als Buch-Ausg. erschienen

When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the 'worst-case' scenario is a social choice conÞguration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1−1/n is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d < n) linear map spans the possible candidates' platforms. These d 'ideological' dimensions imply some linkages between the n political issues. We randomize over these linkages and show that there almost surely exists a 50%-majority equilibria in the above worst-case scenario, when n grows to inÞnity. Moreover the equilibrium is the mean voter. The speed of convergence (toward 50%) of the super majority rate guaranteeing existence of equilibrium is computed for d = 1 and 2.

When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the 'worst-case' scenario is a social choice conÞguration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1−1/n is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d < n) linear map spans the possible candidates' platforms. These d 'ideological' dimensions imply some linkages between the n political issues. We randomize over these linkages and show that there almost surely exists a 50%-majority equilibria in the above worst-case scenario, when n grows to inÞnity. Moreover the equilibrium is the mean voter. The speed of convergence (toward 50%) of the super majority rate guaranteeing existence of equilibrium is computed for d = 1 and 2.

Economic theory advances various arguments in favor of and against privatizing education. In this paper we investigate the extent to which these arguments influence voters' opinions. We analyze two popular referenda in which some 400,000 voters in two Swiss cantons expressed their opinions on the issue of education vouchers and direct subsidies to private schools. We find that successful attempts to move towards a more privatized education system rest mainly on pure income effects, some other socio-economic determinants, ideological convictions, and possibly the perceived quality of the public schools. Peer-group and tax-burden effects, which play a prominent role in the theoretical literature, do not appear to significantly influence voting behavior.

THIS ARTICLE ARGUES THAT A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (GPE) APPROACH TO AIDS WOULD OFFER GREATER INSIGHTS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO THE DISEASE. THE ARTICLE ALSO SUGGESTS THAT THERE IS GROWING EVIDENCE THAT THE CURRENT WORLD ORDER HAS CREATED CONDITIONS WITHIN WHICH AIDS HAS SPREAD. IMPORTANTLY, THIS INCLUDES THE WAY IN WHICH IDEAS ABOUT WHAT CONSTITUTES THE "POLITICAL" AND THE "ECONOMIC" HAVE EMERGED HISTORICALLY, AND IT IS SHOWN THAT POLICY MAKING ON AIDS HAS BEEN STRONGLY CENTERED ON BIOMEDICAL AND NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC DISCOURSES. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES BY ARGUING FOR A MORE CRITICAL AWARENESS OF THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL LINEAGE OF THE EXISTING KNOWLEDGE ABOUT AIDS.