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In this study the author seeks to develop Historical Realism as a new approach to International Relations. Drawing on recent theoretical developments in International Relations and Historical Sociology it is argued, first, that a distinction between constitutive and causal theory is necessary and, second, that this distinction makes comparisons at a high level of abstraction across time and space possible. The explanatory focus of Historical Realism is the political reproduction of states. States are seen as constantly facing a double security dilemma: it is being threatened, or potentially threatened, by two sets of rivals for revenue. At the level of abstraction of Historical Realism, states have two possible responses, short of collapse, to this double security dilemma. They can either pursue a fortifying mode of political reproduction, whereby the essence of their strategy is to prevent rivals from gaining strength. Alternatively, they can pursue an alliance-building mode of political reproduction, whereby they cooperate with or co-opt rivals, turning them into allies instead. Which response states' choose depend on the constitutive context they exist in, and how this is changing. The constitutive context is conceptualised with four dichotomous dimensions. International systems, it is argued, can either be functionally differentiated or not, and political relations in these systems can either be embedded in economic relations or not. The societies from which states' extract revenue can, further, either be competitive or not, and either logistically closed or open. The second part of the study develops this conceptual framework in the contexts of Japanese political reproduction towards the end of the nineteenth century, the political reproduction, and failure, of the Roman Republic, and political reproduction in early medieval western Europe.

WHEN in the future historians examine the second half of the twentieth century, they will no doubt identify the accelerated inter-nationalization of production as a landmark comparable with the Industrial Revolution. In this process multinational enterprises have been leading actors in the past twenty-five years and are certain to continue to be so in the next quarter-century. In 1975 the sales of the Western multinational corporations represented one-fifth of the Gross National Product of all capitalist countries. If their growth is maintained at the same rate as over the period 195o-75, by the end of the century this share will be nearly one-half and the whole capitalist economy may very well be dominated by some 200 giant corporations of which three-quarters may be American-based.

German economic policy has been in flux since the supply chain shocks of the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Partners in Europe are keen for reassurance that they can rely on Germany in a geopolitical crisis, even when its commercial interests are at stake. Germany is aware of this but has been guarded about its intentions and has merely signalled what it thinks partners want to hear. This runs counter to Germany's reputation as a supporter of constructive business ties, an open and secure EU, global multilateral bodies, and its steadiness and reliability as a partner.

In this introduction, we situate 'gender and international relations in Britain'. We discuss our understandings of gender, I/international R/relations and GIR. In the second section we discuss the relationship of feminist to gendered IR, arguing that while intimately related, they are nonetheless not synonymous. We turn in the third section to a critical discussion of feminist IR's tendency to see itself as marginal to mainstream IR, a move that contributes to the marginalisation it laments. In the fourth section we compare the development of GIR with gender in Politics, which has been less concerned from the outset with issues of marginality. In the final section we argue that GIR has come into its own, introducing the articles in this issue as instances of self-assured gendered analyses of 'things international'.

International Relations theory does not distinguish enough between prediction and vision, and, as a result, retreats unduly from practice. This article argues for the importance of political vision in the study of international relations by complicating the standard social science distinction between fact and value. Using Nietzschean genealogy, it argues for a dual relationship between the normative and the empirical: the deduction of norms from the constraints of history; and the normative, proactive responses to this history within these constraints. This dual relationship underscores the importance of political vision and political leadership in the study of international politics. The article then analyses present historical challenges and suggests several normative responses to them that can be understood in the terms of 'political vision' in International Relations. It finally takes the example of the present absence of vision and leadership in the European Union and argues for a political Europe, the Union as a political power.