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Why do we have so many ethnic partisans in the world ready to die as suicide bombers? Does a rational calculus lie beneath the nationalist pride & passions? Can it be discovered if only we apply our understanding of rationality more creatively? This article seeks to answer these questions by focusing on the nationalism of resistance. It argues that a focus on dignity, self-respect, & recognition, rather than a straightforward notion of self-interest, is a better prism for understanding ethnic & nationalist behavior, although self-interest is not entirely absent as a motivation in ethnic conflict. In the process of developing this argument, a distinction once made by Max Weber -- between instrumental rationality & value rationality -- is recovered & refined further. 75 References. Adapted from the source document.

Political conflicts have been extensively studied by political scientists, but criminal conflicts have received much less attention, especially by theorists in the field. Focusing on the latter type of conflict, we address why an individual crime across an ethnic or tribal border can lead to large-scale violence. Building on rational choice theory, we present three hypothetical mechanisms which may account for criminal conflicts: (1) Avengers penalize suspects in the culprit's social group because they cannot identify the culprit; (2) avengers inflict vicarious punishment because such punishment can be more severe for the culprit than a penalty on the culprit himself; (3) by demanding collective responsibilities, avengers urge the target group to police itself and to suppress deviant behavior against outsiders. Drawing on historical incidents and recent case studies, our third mechanism appears the most compelling.

Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explore if a ringing cell phone could impact cognitive performance as well as being agitating to provoke aggressive reactions. The study investigated variables that could impact a participant's willingness to aggress and retaliate, such as sensitivity to arousal and dark personalities (DRPs), Machiavellianism, narcissism, and subclinical psychopathy and sadism.


Design/methodology/approach
There were 128 participants (77 women and 51 men). The cognitive load task consisted of forming anagrams while being in a high or low provocation condition. Participants were subsequently asked how willing they would be to allow one out-group member to be harmed in favor of saving several in-group members. Three personality measures were used: two measuring DRPs and one measuring arousal sensitivity.


Findings
The authors discovered that older age and subclinical psychopathy were significant predictors for the willingness to aggress. Those in the high provocation condition retaliated the most against the experimenter, and a participant's English ability was the only variable that predicted good performance on the cognitive task.


Originality/value
The results warrant further research into how personality types, aggression, and everyday, multiple arousal sources intertwine to inform personalized evidence-based interventions. Organizational and educational psychologists could also use this research to in form how offices and schools are run.

Using a dictator game, we examine the other‐regarding behavior of allocators, who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making an allocation decision without consultation on behalf of a two‐person group between their group and another group. We then contrast the behavior of the same individuals in an analogous interindividual situation. We also explore other‐regarding perceptions of passive recipients, who are asked to give behavioral forecasts of how they would behave if assigned the allocator role and how they think their allocators would behave. Gender differences are found in both behavior and perceptions. Males are significantly more self‐interested and less other‐regarding when they are responsible for a group, while females behave similarly under both conditions. Female recipients' forecasts of their own behavior are significantly higher than both their expectations of allocators and the actual female behavior observed in the experiment. Both male and female recipients underestimate the other‐regarding behavior of allocators.

A / Ethics and Welfare Economics -- I. Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking -- II. Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility -- III. Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives -- IV. Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory -- V. Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: Do Welfare Economists Have a Special Exemption from Bayesian Rationality? -- B / Rational-Choice and Game Theoretical Models of Social Behavior -- VI. Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior -- VII. Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories -- VIII. Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflicts -- IX. Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games -- X. Measurement of Social Power in n-Person Reciprocal Power Situations -- XI. A Bargaining Model for Social Status in Informal Groups and Formal Organizations -- C / Scientific Explanation -- XII. Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social Science -- XIII. Popper's Improbability Criterion for the Choice of Scientific Hypotheses.

Regime type is an important variable in international relations. Numerous scholars have theorized its effects on actors' crisis behavior and outcomes. Despite regime type's importance, the literature has not focused on the role its uncertainty might play in interstate politics. This is in stark contrast to the scholarly attention given to uncertainty about other similarly important variables like actor capabilities, intentions, or fighting costs. In this paper, we aim to address this gap in the literature by providing a theory of regime uncertainty's effects on conflict and developing a novel measure of uncertainty about regime type in interstate relations to test our hypotheses. We find that regime uncertainty breeds caution rather than conflict: higher uncertainty about the opponent's regime type makes conflict initiation and escalation less likely in disputes, and dyads with more uncertainty are less likely to experience conflict onset.

PurposeThis paper aims to use the theory of planned behavior to evaluate factors that influence openness to participating in a victim-offender conference (VOC).Design/methodology/approachConsistent with theory of planned behavior recommendations, the study uses a vignette-based design to assess participation openness as willingness to participate in a VOC if they were victims of a property crime. It evaluates the goodness of fit of a hypothesized structural model of participation openness to the data and the utility of a theory of planned behavior model as opposed to simply an outcome-driven model.FindingsFindings from a hierarchical linear regression illustrate that a theory of planned behavior model explains a greater percentage of participation willingness than does an outcome-driven model. Analysis using structural equation modeling suggests that participation openness is largely a function of subjective norms, anticipated affect and anticipated outcomes.Research limitations/implicationsLimitations spring largely from sampling method and research design. Research implications pertain to the utility of theory of planned behavior in expanding research of VOC participation openness to include not only outcomes but also relational and contextual factors.Practical implicationsThe manuscript identifies several implications for training facilitators, talking with prospective VOC participants and advocating for restorative justice programs.Originality/valueUse of the theory of planned behavior as a lens for understanding openness to VOC participation gives researchers and practitioners a wider and more nuanced understanding of why people would generally be willing to participate in a VOC if they were the victim of an offense.