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The objective of the mission was to assess the debt management strengths and areas in need of reform through the application of the Debt Management Performance Assessment (DeMPA) methodology. DeMPA mission delivered technical assistance in evaluating the legal, institutional and regulatory framework in government debt management.The revised 2015 DeMPA methodology provides a comprehensive set of indicators spanning the full range of debt management (DeM) functions. The results of the DeMPA evaluation help the authorities to take stock of the current debt management situation and design medium term priority reforms. Overall, some improvements on DeMPA scores compared to the latest assessment in 2011 could be observed. Areas of strength include the publication and implementation of the debt management strategy 2017-19, staff capacity, and debt sustainability analysis (DSA). Further improvements include the completion of external financial audits, the elaboration of an annual borrowing calendar covering all government securities, the involvement of legal advisers throughout the negotiation of external borrowing and the elaboration of draft procedures manual.The publication of the debt management strategy 2017-19 is an important step towards strengthening debt management and is a main achievement that is fully recognized by the DeMPA assessment team. Since the strategy has only been published recently and it, therefore, is not possible to verify that the strategy is updated annually, this achievement is not reflected in the scores in this DeMPA.Challenges include the fragmented databases, delays in update of debt records, and lack of formalized procedures. Procedure manuals are in draft form and has not yet been validated and could not be fully reflected in the assessment. Procedures for accessing the international market, mobilizing domestic funding other than through security issuances, and issuing guarantees have not been elaborated.

This paper empirically investigates the relationship between the speed of buildup of private debt (household and corporate) and the depth of recessions. To do this, we differentiate between financial recessions and normal recessions on the basis of how quickly their private debt builds up. In addition to output recessions, we look at consumption and investment recessions. We find that financial recessions are deeper than normal recessions in advanced economies−and the differences become even more pronounced when emerging market economies are added to the sample. Our evidence suggests that a buildup in corporate debt is especially damaging for emerging markets during financial recessions. A higher ratio of debt to gross domestic product−in other words, less fiscal space− exacerbates recessions only beyond a certain threshold level, suggesting a nonlinear effect. We find that the buildup of corporate debt−and not just household debt−can worsen recessions, especially in emerging market economies.

This paper provides a consistent series for the Irish national debt since the foundation of the state in 1922. It also provides a continuous series for bond yields over the same period. The paper examines the factors behind the fluctuations in the debt burden over almost a century. The management of the debt burden by the Irish authorities has evolved over time, seeking to minimise both the burden on the economy and the risks which the debt represented to the state. The paper also examines how the cost of borrowing for the Irish government compared to that for the UK and, since the break with sterling, for Germany. This cost of borrowing was, in turn affected by developments in the domestic economy.

Governments, motivated by a desire to improve upon long-run laissez faire, routinely undertake enduring, productive expenditures, say, in public education, that generate positive externalities across cohorts but require investments be made up front. If everyone after the policy is initiated is at least as happy as before and there are some outstanding resources, the Hicks-Kaldor efficiency rule suggests that the present value of these resources could, hypothetically, be distributed to future generations creating the potential for generational Pareto improvement. The literature recognizes the challenge in constructing a policy that is actually Pareto-improving since the policy itself may generate general-equilibrium gains and losses spread across generations. The paper takes on this task. In a dynamically-efficient economy with an intergenerational human capital externality, it constructs an equilibrium path with public education financed by non-explosive debt and taxes that truly improves upon laissez faire, yet no generation is harmed along the transition, not even the current ones.

This report contains the names and contact information for CRS experts on policy concerns relating to the debt limit and legislative proposals to raise the debt limit.

From 1982 to 1986, the Third World paid out over $500 billion more than it received in debt service, capital flight, terms of trade loss, & remittance of profits & royalties. While capital flow has many historic transfer problem precedents, the % of debt relative to the gross national product of these countries is double or triple German reparations payments in the 1920s. Most proposals to deal with the debt crisis would increase Third World debt even more, when this outward flow of capital should now be stopped or reduced. Much of the now accumulated debt is due to interest rate increases, which were written into the debt contracts in "fine print," & whose significance was not understood by contracting parties. Also much of the debt was incurred privately & (its burden) was then socialized to prevent bankruptcy. It is argued that the same relief that would be provided under Western contract & bankruptcy law should be extended to Third World sovereign debtors. Modified AA