Suchergebnisse

Examines arguments before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on legality of use or threatened use of atomic weapons under international law. Hearings on questions posed by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN General Assembly.

Policing addiction in a new era of therapeutic jurisprudence -- Drug court paternalism and the management of threat -- Today is the first day of the rest of your life : therapeutic practice within TCS and the history of Synanon -- Control and agency in contemporary TCS -- Gender, sexuality and the "drugs lifestyle" -- Retrenchment and reform in the war on drugs -- Notes -- References -- Index.

Cited also as Royal commission on English and Irish law and chancery ; Sir John Romilly, chairman of commission ; At head of title, and running title: English and Irish law and chancery commission ; Mode of access: Internet. ; "Second report of Her Majesty's commissioners appointed to inquire into the superior courts of common law and courts of chancery of England and Ireland" ([Gt. Brit. Parliament. Papers by command. 3674]; xxxii, 243, [1] p.; published in 1866; Francis Blackburne, chairman of the commission) and "Copy of the separate report made to Her Majesty by the Right Honourable Sir Joseph Napier . as one of the commissioners of the English and Irish law and chancery commission . Ordered, by the House of commons, to be printed, 10 May 1867" (7, [1] p.) inserted

Students of European Union judicial politics have debated the credibility of legislative override as constraint on the behaviour of the European Court of Justice. Yet because of the high political hurdles for the passage of treaty amendments, treaty revision has been dismissed as the 'nuclear option', exceedingly effective but difficult to use. However, when treaties are being renegotiated, the ability of member state governments to pass treaty amendments to either punish or reward the Court is greater. We argue that this may induce the Court of Justice to display more leniency towards member states in cases coinciding with ongoing treaty negotiations. To test this hypothesis, we examine the outcome of all infringement cases adjudicated between 1961 and 2016. We find that the European Court of Justice is significantly less likely to render adverse rulings in cases concomitant with the final, most salient stage of treaty negotiations. Our analysis suggests that the relationship between treaty revision and judicial behaviour may be more nuanced than commonly assumed in the literature.

With the emergence of the Soviet menace after World War II, the United States has, for the first time in its history, found it essential to maintain, both here and abroad, a large standing armed force in what is technically peacetime. That has in turn brought to the fore important and novel questions concerning the jurisdiction which courts martial may constitutionally exercise. With millions of Americans serving and likely to serve in the armed forces, it is to be expected that the Supreme Court will scrutinize, with more care than ever before, legislation which purports to strip from these"citizen soldiers" fundamental rights guaranteed to civilians under the Constitution. One constitutional problem which seems never to have been squarely presented to the Court is whether Congress may authorize courts martial to try, in time of peace, a capital or non-capital crime committed by a serviceman within the United States, where the nature of the crime is exclusively "civil" in the sense that its commission does not have any substantial adverse effect upon the maintenance of military discipline. Before turning to that problem, however, it will be helpful to review the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in which it has refused to permit enlargement of the peacetime jurisdiction of courts martial over civilians.

"In October 1948-one year after the creation of the U.S. Air Force as a separate military branch-a B-29 Superfortress crashed on a test run, killing the plane's crew. The plane was constructed with poor materials, and the families of the dead sued the U.S. government for damages. In the case, the government claimed that releasing information relating to the crash would reveal important state secrets, and refused to hand over the requested documents. Judges at both the U.S. District Court level and Circuit level rejected the government's argument and ruled in favor of the families. However, in 1953, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and ruled that in the realm of national security, the executive branch had a right to withhold information from the public. Judicial deference to the executive on national security matters has increased ever since the issuance of that landmark decision. Today, the government's ability to invoke state secrets privileges goes unquestioned by a largely supine judicial branch. David Rudenstine's The Age of Deference traces the Court's role in the rise of judicial deference to executive power since the end of World War II. He shows how in case after case, going back to the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies, the Court has ceded authority in national security matters to the executive branch. Since 9/11, the executive faces even less oversight. According to Rudenstine, this has had a negative impact both on individual rights and on our ability to check executive authority when necessary. Judges are mindful of the limits of their competence in national security matters; this, combined with their insulation from political accountability, has caused them in matters as important as the nation's security to defer to the executive. Judges are also afraid of being responsible for a decision that puts the nation at risk and the consequences for the judiciary in the wake of such a decision. Nonetheless, The Age of Deference argues that as important as these considerations are in shaping a judicial disposition, the Supreme Court has leaned too far, too often, and for too long in the direction of abdication. There is a broad spectrum separating judicial abdication, at one end, from judicial usurpation, at the other, and The Age of Deference argues that the rule of law compels the court to re-define its perspective and the legal doctrines central to the Age."--

In October 1948-one year after the creation of the U.S. Air Force as a separate military branch-a B-29 Superfortress crashed on a test run, killing the plane's crew. The plane was constructed with poor materials, and the families of the dead sued the U.S. government for damages. In the case, the government claimed that releasing information relating to the crash would reveal important state secrets, and refused to hand over the requested documents. Judges at both the U.S. District Court level and Circuit level rejected the government's argument and ruled in favor of the families. However, in 1953, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and ruled that in the realm of national security, the executive branch had a right to withhold information from the public. Judicial deference to the executive on national security matters has increased ever since the issuance of that landmark decision. Today, the government's ability to invoke state secrets privileges goes unquestioned by a largely supine judicial branch. David Rudenstine's The Age of Deference traces the Court's role in the rise of judicial deference to executive power since the end of World War II. He shows how in case after case, going back to the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies, the Court has ceded authority in national security matters to the executive branch. Since 9/11, the executive faces even less oversight. According to Rudenstine, this has had a negative impact both on individual rights and on our ability to check executive authority when necessary. Judges are mindful of the limits of their competence in national security matters; this, combined with their insulation from political accountability, has caused them in matters as important as the nation's security to defer to the executive. Judges are also afraid of being responsible for a decision that puts the nation at risk and the consequences for the judiciary in the wake of such a decision. Nonetheless, The Age of Deference argues that as important as these considerations are in shaping a judicial disposition, the Supreme Court has leaned too far, too often, and for too long in the direction of abdication. There is a broad spectrum separating judicial abdication, at one end, from judicial usurpation, at the other, and The Age of Deference argues that the rule of law compels the court to re-define its perspective and the legal doctrines central to the Age. ; https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-books/1073/thumbnail.jpg

This article is devoted to the importance of improvement of the prosecutor's powers in court proceedings at the time of ongoing judicial and legal reforms, prosecutor's participation in court proceedings as a state representative generally supporting public accusation, as well as the impact of his knowledge, behavior, readiness for the trial, involvement in the examination of evidence and perceptions on the decision making stage, regarding the case. In addition, based on the observations on the functions, tasks and powers of the prosecutor attending the court proceedings as a public accuser, pragmatic recommendations and proposals are made for the improvement of the legislation, taking into accocunt the forign best practices.

The International Criminal Court's indictment against Sudanese President Omar al Bashir in 2009 provoked massive criticism from the African Union. The indictment of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta swelled those voices to a choir, demanding suspension of his trial and immunity from the ICC for serving heads of state. The African Union's criticism has two roots: Firstly, the wish for its efforts to establish peace and security in the continent to be taken seriously by the UN Security Council and the European Union. Secondly, the desire among the ruling political elites of many African states to dissuade the European Union and other Western states from focussing their political dialogues with African countries on human rights and rule of law, which the former increasingly regard as paternalistic. Although the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC, which met in The Hague from 20 to 28 November 2013, made concessions to Kenya by amending the rules of procedure, the underlying conflict between Africa and Europe over Article 27 of the Rome Statute and the African states' wish to exempt serving heads of state from the jurisdiction of the ICC was not defused. The two sides should use the lead-up to the next EU-Africa summit in April 2014 to bring their perceptions of international criminal justice closer together again.

This article presents an understanding of transparency that draws on the instrumentality and performativity of a series of public encounters between the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice and subjects affected by river pollution. An ethnographic examination of those encounters illustrates how judicial adjudication articulates with a larger discourse of change and transparency that mushroomed after the 2001–2002 economic crisis giving the Court a public face. This crisis had a negative impact on the credibility of political and legal institutions. A focus on the performative character of public hearings implies an appreciation of transparency that is more comprehensive than the one enabled by visibility. As I argue in this article, this is because public hearings entail displays of the self that unfold through a complex sensorial experience that has effects on audiences. In the context of the Argentine Supreme Court's practices that this article examines, such audiences may extend far beyond the courtroom. Ultimately, the study demonstrates how transparency can be perceived as the performance of social positions that provide means and ends for a multitude of intended and unintended actors.