Joint Tax Audits : Which Countries May Benefit Most?
In: In: World tax journal. - Amsterdam. - Vol. 8 (2016), no. 3 ; p. 306-355
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In: In: World tax journal. - Amsterdam. - Vol. 8 (2016), no. 3 ; p. 306-355
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In: H. M. Treasury Project Direct Taxation and Short Run Labour Supply, Working Paper 15
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15826
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In: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 4/1990
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In: Social research: an international quarterly, Band 44, S. 657-667
ISSN: 0037-783X
Intro -- U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM ANDGLOBAL COMPETIVENESS -- U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM AND GLOBAL COMPETIVENESS -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY -- THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM PRESENTSCHALLENGES TO U.S. COMPETITIVENESS -- A. INTRODUCTION -- B. BUSINESS TAX REFORM AND THE ECONOMY -- Taxation of Saving and Investment -- Taxation of Flow-through Businesses -- Risk of Standing Still -- C. HOW BUSINESS TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATESCOMPARES WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES'MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS -- International Comparison of Corporateand Investor-Level Taxes -- Worldwide vs. Territorial Systems -- Consumption Taxes -- D. SUMMARY -- REFERENCES -- REPLACING BUSINESS INCOME TAXESWITH A BUSINESS ACTIVITIES TAX -- A. INTRODUCTION -- B. DESCRIPTION OF A BAT -- Calculation of a BAT -- The BAT Base -- C. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A BROAD-BASED BAT -- Economic Gains from Replacing Business Taxeswith a Broad-Based BAT -- Inefficiencies and Distortions Createdby Replacing Business Taxes with a BAT -- Concerns about Growth of a BAT -- D. DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES -- E. BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTSAND INTERNATIONAL TRADE -- F. SIMPLICITY AND ENFORCEABILITY -- G. IMPLICATIONS FOR STATEAND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS -- H. VATS IN OTHER COUNTRIES -- REFERENCES -- BUSINESS TAX REFORM WITH BASEBROADENING/REFORM OF THE U.S.INTERNATIONAL TAX RULES -- A. INTRODUCTION -- B. BROADENING THE BUSINESS TAX BASE AND EITHERLOWERING THE BUSINESS TAX RATE ORPERMITTING FASTER WRITE-OFF OF INVESTMENT -- Lowering the Business Tax Rate on the Non-Corporate Sector -- Transition Issues -- Distributional Effects -- C. TERRITORIAL TAX SYSTEMS -- Worldwide Tax Systems -- Territorial Tax Systems -- Types of Territorial Approaches -- REFERENCES -- ADDRESSING STRUCTURAL PROBLEMSWITH THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM -- A.MULTIPLE TAXATION OF CORPORATE PROFITS -- 1. Corporate Capital Gains.
Blog: Cato at Liberty
David Boaz
I've written before about whether athletes take state taxes into account when they weigh competing offers. Here's another example: Grant Williams left the Boston Celtics for the Dallas Mavericks, at least partly because of Massachusetts' Millionaire's Tax:
Testing the market worked out for Williams, who will now make more money while living in Texas, which does not have state income tax. Williams reportedly turned down a four‐year, $48 million over offer from the Celtics last season.
Williams mentioned Massachusetts' Millionaire's Tax as one of the factors he was mindful of when considering the Celtics' offers. The Millionaire's Tax is a four percent tax on top of Massachusetts' five percent income tax, which raises the tax rate to nine percent for millionaires.
"I was thankful just because I feel like the way my agent and everybody talked about it was that this was our floor," Williams said. "In Boston, it's really like $48 million with the millionaire's tax, so $54 million in Dallas is really like $58 million in Boston and $63 million in L.A."
Here's what I wrote in 2019 when Bryce Harper chose Philadelphia over San Francisco:
Has California lost another centi‐millionaire because of its high tax rates? Washington Nationals superstar Bryce Harper just signed a 13‐year, $330 million contract with the Philadelphia Phillies, the largest contract in the history of major North American sports. (Though not the largest when adjusted for inflation.) Some reports say that the San Francisco Giants came very close in the competition but lost out because of California's taxes. Alex Pavlovic of NBC tweeted:
"I'm told Giants made a 12‐year, $310 million offer to Bryce Harper. They were willing to go higher but would have had to go well over $330 million to get it done because of California taxes."
If taxes did keep Harper on the East Coast, he wouldn't be the first sports star to make such a decision. Trevor Ariza, a member of the Los Angeles Lakers' 2009 NBA championship team and by 2014 "a key part of the Wizards' playoff run," decided to leave Washington and join the Houston Rockets. Why?
"Washington was disappointed but hardly shaken when Ariza chose to accept the same four‐year, $32 million contract offer in Houston, where the 29‐year‐old could pocket more money because the state doesn't tax income."
As I wrote then, yes, a $32 million salary – or indeed a $32,000 salary – goes further in Texas than in the District of Columbia. What economists call the "tax wedge" is the gap between what an employer pays for an employee's services and what the employee receives after taxes. It causes some jobs to disappear entirely, as employees and employers may not be able to agree on a wage once taxes are taken out of the paycheck. It causes some employees to flee to lower‐tax countries, states, or cities. The Beatles, the Rolling Stones, Bono, and Gerard Depardieu are some of the better‐known "tax exiles." It isn't just entertainers and athletes, of course. A 2018 study found that 138 millionaires left California after a 2012 tax increase. Millionaires have also been seen leaving Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey. Last fall Chris Edwards wrote about the impact of taxes on interstate moves. As taxes rise in many states, no‐income‐tax states like Texas, Florida, Washington, Tennessee, and Nevada may become increasingly attractive to athletes, entertainers, and other high‐income producers.
In: IBFD Doctoral Series; Vol. 14. IBFD, 2008.
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* Save for College * Maximize Your Retirement Savings What do the new tax laws mean to you and your money?Keeping up with changing tax laws and rules is always hard. Now it's more complicated than ever. There's the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2002, the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, and more. Some new tax rules will be "phased-in" and "phased-out" for years to come. How can you make sense of it all?PricewaterhouseCoopers Guide to the New Tax Rules answers your most frequent questions about the tricky new
In: U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 20-030
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In: The Army Lawyer, 2019
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In: Fiscaoeconomia: FSECON : international journal of political economics, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 161-197
ISSN: 2564-7504
The aim of the study is to make an historical and social analysis of the Physiocrat approach and its predecessors and try to understand the arguments focusing on taxes. The study tries to understand the social conditions of the period through the features and contradictions of the absolute monarchy. The predecessors of the Physiocratic theory, Vauban and Boisguilbert, and then the fundamental theses of the Physiocratic theory were evaluated by considering the contradictions of the absolute monarchy. Consequently, the theoretical responses of all three approaches regarding tax type, tax payer, tax object, tax rate and tax collection were evaluated by taking into consideration the social conditions of the period.
This paper compares the effects of taxes and pollution permits when a pollution-reducing innovations in prospect. When the government is the pre-committed into a fixed environmental policy but can freely adjust the level of taxes and permits after the innovation has been obtained, taxes and permits are fully equivalent. The equivalence breaks down, however, when the government can pre-commit. In this case, taxes give a higher incentive to invest in R&D than permits when the post-innovation output level is sufficiently high. The welfare ranking of taxes and permits is then analyzed. Loosely speaking, taxes are superior when the social damage associated with pollution is not too high.
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This paper compares the effects of taxes and pollution permits when a pollution-reducing innovations in prospect. When the government is the pre-committed into a fixed environmental policy but can freely adjust the level of taxes and permits after the innovation has been obtained, taxes and permits are fully equivalent. The equivalence breaks down, however, when the government can pre-commit. In this case, taxes give a higher incentive to invest in R&D than permits when the post-innovation output level is sufficiently high. The welfare ranking of taxes and permits is then analyzed. Loosely speaking, taxes are superior when the social damage associated with pollution is not too high.
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