We can distinguish different approaches to European identity in contemporary Lithuanian and European discourses. Western scholars, such as Jacque Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, Gerard Delanty, Soledad Garcia, Cris Shore and others, stress (and question) the political and economic basis of European identity. This approach is revealed in both normative discussions and actual policies of European identity, and is supported by public opinion surveys, which attest to the mostly pragmatic motivation of citizens of the European Union to identify with "Europeans." Traditionally, Lithuanian intellectuals tend to consider "Europeanness" more as a cultural, but not a political or economic phenomenon. This Lithuanian attitude is greatly influenced by the tradition of philosophy of culture, which thrived during the interwar period in Lithuania. The philosophers, among which the most important were Antanas Maceina, Stasys Salkauskis and Vytautas Alantas, created their definitions and visions of nation, state and culture. They shaped a whole framework of nationalist thinking and provided later generations with powerful rhetoric, strongly expressed in the Lithuanian debates in the last decade of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, this traditional approach to Lithuanian identity has been modified during the twentieth century. First, the debates about national identity continued abroad, mostly in the U.S., after the Soviet occupation where a liberal approach to national identity took shape. In the 1980s, the secession from the Soviet bloc facilitated the circulation of Western liberal ideas, developed both by Western scholars and Lithuanian emigrant intellectuals. These ideas, though contested by nationalist approaches, became more and more usual in Lithuanian "identity talk." Additionally, European integration influenced a more pragmatic attitude towards national identification, as well as acknowledgment of its situational character and relativist nature. This shift is well reflected not only in the writings of intellectuals, but also in the public opinion surveys. The cultural grounds of political identity gained a new meaning, yet continued to matter.It would be impossible to provide a thorough analysis of the extensive discussions during the century. Therefore I will concentrate on the debates that took place from the 1980s to the end of the decade. I have chosen this period for several reasons. First, these debates in a way encompass the ideas and problems that were formulated throughout all the previous years. The period is important also, since the entire Lithuanian tradition of both nationalistic thinking and thinking about nation starts being reconsidered, supported or criticized. Yet, paradoxically, the issue of Lithuanian national identity and its relation to other regional identities, and what is most important in my case, to European identity, has not gained proper attention among Lithuanian scholars. Identity studies, though extremely popular in the West, are only at the initial stage in Lithuania. Additionally, studies of the problems related to nationalism, which would stimulate to analyze the relation between national and supra-national identities, are still rare in Lithuanian academic discourse.Speaking about European identity is very complicated, since there is any consensus neither about its content nor functions. Scholars argue about it from very different and often contradictory perspectives. Some of them understand European identity as the factor that strengthens national feelings (Louis Snyder, Jennifer Welsh), others as a real supra-state identity, potential to diminish dangers of nationalisms (Jürgen Habermas, Jacque Derrida). The others see European identity as the utopian aim, created by elites (Cris Shore, Gerard Delanty). While some thinkers call for concrete policies of the promotion of European identity, which consist mostly of ideological revision of history and cultural policies, similar to those of nation states (Simon Mundy), others criticize the policies just because of the ideological dimension and accuse European identity of being manipulative (Antje Wiener, Cris Shore).The arguments try to solve the tension between economic, political and cultural grounds of European identity. All of them see European history as ambivalent, which may both support and undermine European integration. On the one hand, the history of Europe is the history of many nationalisms, of the fight between political and cultural units for the right of self-determination. Obviously, this "history of conflict" hardly could serve as the ideological glue for European integration. On the other hand, the history of Europe is the history of Western civilization that has developed on the basis of Christian religious and antique philosophical traditions, Renaissance's humanism, and Enlightenment's rationality. The aspects of a shared ethical system, rational reasoning and cultural heritage are often employed to create the illusion of inherited, long lasting "cultural" or "ethical" Europe. Many of the EU's programs stimulate this re-invention of a cultural European tradition, in Eric Hobsbawm terms, while emphasizing the presence of a common cultural heritage in all European countries. Nevertheless, many countries may still interpret that "common European heritage" not only as evidence of the mentality "we, Europeans," but also as a reminder of past conflicts, when that cultural tradition was imported or even coercively imposed. In this way a shared "European culture" is biased by the potential for completely different interpretations and may serve to absolutely different political and social goals.Since the beginning, the debates about European identity have been significantly stimulated by actual political and economic reality. European identity has been widely discussed, opposed and promoted during the last decades as related to the issues of the political legitimacy of the European Union. The problem of European identity gradually has become an object of the EU public policies. Discussions about European identity far transcend the boundaries of the Western Europe and are particularly important in Central East Europe. Namely, in this region, which witnessed late modernization, and late creation of modern nation states, Europeanness was a crucial question. Europe has always existed as a notion that reflected different countries in different periods. The "mirror" of Europeannes was one in which features of some nation were seen, or to put it into other words, Europeanness was one of the instruments in the creation of the notion of national identity.The question of Europeanness has been very significant in the understanding of Lithuanian identity. Because modernization entered Central East Europe as an imported phenomenon, most of the countries felt like smaller brothers of the bigger Europeans. Here Europeanness played an important role in the construction of the sense of national pride. To be Lithuanian has never been to be European, to be equal. In the nationalist discourse it was either to be "less than European," or "more than European."It is possible to distinguish two types of "European talk" among Lithuanians. While one "we, Europeans" means "we, non-Russians" and distinguishes Lithuanians as those of higher working morality and tolerance, the second "we, chasing the train of Europe" connotes continuous backwardness and a desperate need to transcend the "own" in order to overtake "them." In this talk we can note that Lithuanians see themselves positively as Europeans only in contrast to "non-Europeans," usually Russians. Meanwhile, Lithuanians do not conceive themselves as full-value Europeans when comparing themselves with Western Europeans. Paradoxically, this allows Lithuanians to think of themselves as "more Europeans," since then such national values as "spirituality" and the legendary history of the "pagan empire" is juxtaposed against rational and pragmatic, even de-spiritualized "Europeans of the EU."This often painful question of what does it mean to be European for a Lithuanian, sometimes tends to diminish the European dimension in general, and some different regional identity, for example, "Baltic" identification, comes to the fore. I will show how biased the question of Baltic identity is. While the future of the Baltic region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), shaped by a common sad past, is an object of a political skepticism, for the same reason it wins the hearts of people, of which about 80% identify themselves as Balts. Nonetheless, despite abundant manifestations of national victimization, considering the western Other was necessary to define Lithuanian national identity. As David Laitin (2000) puts it, "[t]o an important degree, then, it is the Eastern Europeans who have a stronger interest in a utopian vision of "Europe" as a well-defined (and easily mimicked) culture than culturally secure Europeans who are citizens of the West European states."
A strong link between citizen preferences and public policy is one of the key goals and criteria of democratic governance. Yet, our knowledge about the extent to which public policies on specific issues are in line with citizen preferences in Europe is limited. This article reports on the first study of the link between public opinion and public policy that covers a large and diverse sample of concrete public policy issues in 31 European democracies. The findings demonstrate a strong positive relationship and a substantial degree of congruence between public opinion and the state of public policy. Also examined is whether political institutions, including electoral systems and the horizontal and vertical division of powers, influence the opinion‐policy link. The evidence for such effects is very limited, which suggests that the same institutions might affect policy representation in countervailing ways through different mechanisms.
The provision of career information and guidance throughout a citizen's life has become an issue of great importance worldwide, as societies prepare themselves to meet the challenges that the transition to knowledge-based economies represents. An unprecedented research effort has in fact been initiated by the OECD, which has distributed a dedicated questionnaire to 14 countries internationally in order to create a baseline of information on the current state of policy development in career guidance. That same survey instrument has been used by CEDEFOP to gather data on the remaining EU countries, and by the ETF in relation to 11 ACCs . The World Bank has initiated a parallel review in a number of middle-income countries, again using the OECD questionnaire. The thematic review by these key partners will lead to the development of the most extensive harmonised international database ever on guidance policy and practice. This synthesis report summarises the state of play in the development of career information and guidance in both the education and labour market sectors in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Experts from each of these countries have written a report, structured around the OECD survey and on the basis of their own knowledge of the field, often following extensive consultation with key partners. The broad purpose of this exercise is, first of all, to provide an account of the most recent and most significant developments, trends, challenges and major issues, as well as the strengths and weaknesses, of national career information and guidance systems and policies, in such a way as to render the data susceptible to comparative analysis. Secondly, the synthesis report aims to facilitate the generation of benchmarks, enabling the countries that participated in the review to gauge how well they are doing in career information and guidance provision in relation to other comparable countries, and to facilitate the sharing of good practice. Thirdly, the report should prove to be a useful tool for the development of policy, particularly as ACCs have acknowledged the centrality of lifelong learning in their strategic response to the challenges of integration in the global economy generally, and in the EU more specifically, and the value of career information and guidance throughout life for citizens within that context. The synthesis report consists of six sections, which closely follow the OECD outline in order to facilitate comparison between the different reports once these become available. In the Annex, experts responsible for writing up the detailed country reports have contributed a summary providing an overview of the key elements of the national arrangements for careers information and guidance, outlining the strengths, weaknesses, issues and challenges for their systems. The first section provides a background to the Commission's involvement in the career information and guidance review. It also outlines briefly the geopolitical, economic and cultural contexts of the 11 countries surveyed, particularly in so far as these impact on career guidance provision. The second section focuses on the policy challenges for career information and guidance in terms of national objectives. The latter include the upgrading of the knowledge and skills base of the population, with a view to addressing unemployment, to meeting the demands of knowledge-based economies, and to ensuring that the labour supply and demand are in harmony. Another set of challenges arises from a social policy context that seeks to ensure equitable distribution of education and employment opportunities, with guidance services having a key role to play as active measures in combating early school leaving, facilitating the integration of at-risk groups in both education and the labour market, and reducing poverty. Governments in ACCs – and to a lesser extent, the private sector – have acknowledged the important contribution that career guidance can make in reaching these educational, employment and social objectives, and indeed have launched several initiatives to underscore their commitment to the cause. Nevertheless, while the discourse around career guidance has intensified, it appears that in some cases that discourse has outstripped practice, and plans tend to suffer from a lack of implementation. The third section constitutes the heart of the report, as it considers several aspects that contribute to the more effective delivery of career guidance. An initial focus is the services provided in the education sector. Here attention is given to the extent to which guidance is a stand-alone activity offered infrequently and at key transition and decision-making points, which seems to be the key modality of provision when compared to other models where guidance issues permeate the curriculum. Attention is also given to the initiatives that help to connect the school with the world of work; to the instruments used in delivering guidance; to the groups that are targeted; and to the education sectors where services are non-existent (namely primary schooling), or where they are most present (secondary level), or where they are on the increase (tertiary level, including universities). A second focus is on the employment sector, and the extent to which adults receive guidance as they negotiate occupational and further education and training trajectories in a lifelong learning society. The synthesis report highlights the fact that most adult guidance is offered in the context of public employment services, and that it tends to be remedial in nature, narrowly targeted at unemployed people, with the immediate goal of finding them employment. Other key trends noted are the lack of cross-sectorial collaboration, and the minor involvement of the private sector in the provision of adult guidance, where at best they function as job-brokerage services. One aspect of guidance that has witnessed a great deal of development in most ACCs is the use of ICT (Information and Communication Technology) to ensure more effective and widespread provision of education- and career-related information to the community. There is also a gradual trend to increased input and involvement by stakeholders, and to a shift in the modality of service whereby clients are provided with the resources to assess their needs and aspirations, and to match these with employment opportunities. A key issue cutting across the whole of this section is the lack of a sound evidence base that would permit the evaluation of the effectiveness of the guidance service in reaching its objectives. Section four considers the human and financial resources dedicated to career guidance. In most ACCs, staff involved in offering guidance services have a higher level of education – often in psychology or the humanities – though not all have had specialised pre-service training in the field. Trends include increased opportunities for in-service training, and the gradual professionalisation of career guidance through the specification of entry and qualification routes, the articulation of clearly defined occupational roles, the drawing up of a formal code of ethics, and the formation of associations and networks that may have a research and training function. Most ACCs report that the profession tends to attract women in the main, and that the qualifications and training routes for staff employed in the education sector tend to be different from those for staff engaged in the employment sector. The information about the financial resources allocated to career guidance is extremely sketchy and inconclusive. Most of the budget for careers information and guidance services comes from the state, with few ACCs reporting any substantial investment in the activity by the private sector. Section five synthesises the observations made by experts from the ACCs in terms of the strategic leadership that is exercised in the field of career guidance, and of how this could be strengthened. Despite the fact that there have been several noteworthy developments, a general conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a need for stronger mechanisms to provide coordination and leadership in articulating strategies for lifelong access to guidance within a national policy framework that is both dynamic and adequately resourced. As things stand at the moment, career guidance still tends to be seen by governments as a marginal activity. There is also much scope for a more vigorous role for the private sector and stakeholders, in a field where, curiously, trade union input seems to be particularly weak. Little evaluation is carried out to monitor quality in service provision, or to measure effectiveness, particularly in relation to specific performance targets and outputs. While examples of good practice exist in a number of the countries surveyed, a more robust evidence base is required if guidance is to be provided in a way that responds to the distinct needs of a differentiated clientele. Section six provides a concluding note identifying the main challenges as well as the way forward for career guidance in the countries surveyed. While none of the ACCs on its own holds the key for addressing the most pressing issues that are identified, collectively they certainly provide a rich thesaurus of good practice from which policy-makers and practitioners can draw inspiration. ; peer-reviewed
In: de Knegt , L 2013 , A multi-country approach for attributing human salmonellosis to animal reservoirs : Global perspectives and application of surveillance data from the European Union . Technical University of Denmark , Kgs. Lyngby .
Denne PhD afhandling beskriver udviklingen af en matematisk model, der estimerer det kvantitative bidrag fra fire husdyrreservoirer til forekomsten af Salmonella infektioner hos mennesker i den Europæiske Union. Med henblik på at ekstrapolere resultaterne til lande, hvor datatilgængeligheden er mindre, præsenteres desuden en alternativ og mere udforskende metode baseret på ekspertvurderinger. Sidstnævnte skal ses som et første skridt på vejen til at kvantificere betydningen af forskellige smitteilder for human salmonellose i et mere globalt perspektiv. Human salmonellose i EU blev ved hjælp af en matematisk model tilskrevet udlandsrejse, fødevarebårne udbrud samt de fire husdyrreservoirer: svin, slagtekyllinger, kalkuner og konsumægsproducerende høner. Modellen inkluderede data fra 24 lande. Metoden kræver data vedr. Salmonella forekomst og serotypefordeling i husdyr, rapporterede infektioner hos mennesker, oplysninger om mulig erhvervelse af infektionen i udlandet (herfra benævnt "rejseinformation"), forekomst af fødevarebårne udbrud samt kilderne til disse, samt mængden af kød eller æg fra husdyrreservoirerne pr. land, som er til rådighed for forbrugerne i de enkelte lande. Datahåndtering, -analyse og -validering vurderedes at være af stor betydning for resultaternes kvalitet, og der blev derfor lagt vægt på at beskrive, hvad der kræves for at frembringe et datasæt med standardiserede oplysninger for alle lande (Manuskript I). Data om rapporterede Salmonella infektioner hos mennesker blev skaffet fra det Europæiske Center for Sygdomsforebyggelse og Kontrol (ECDC) via Den Europæiske Fødevaresikkerhedsautoritet (EFSA). Salmonella forekomsten i de fire husdyrarter blev indhentet fra de EU-dækkende baseline undersøgelser (BS) rapporteret af EFSA og blev, når det var nødvendigt, suppleret med oplysninger fra EU's Zoonoserapport (EUSR) ligeledes publiceret af EFSA. Oplysninger om fødevarebårne Salmonella udbrud blev også leveret af EFSA. Mængden af animalske fødevarer til rådighed til forbrug blev estimeret på baggrund af data om fødevareproduktion og samhandel indhentet fra det europæiske statistisk kontor, EUROSTAT. Disse data blev suppleret med oplysninger fra sammenslutningen af fjerkræslagterier i EU, AVEC. Der var visse begrænsninger i data, som for nogle lande inkluderede manglende deltagelse i en af baseline undersøgelserne, manglende indberetning af fødevarebårne udbrud eller rejseinformation, manglende indberetning af serotype specifikke data, manglende indberetning af case-baserede data og manglende tilgængelighed af data i EUROSTAT. For at standardisere de foreliggende oplysninger, blev det antaget, at human tilfælde uden rejseinformation var indenlandsk erhvervede, og human tilfælde uden specifik serotype information blev tildelt en serotype i forhold til serotypefordelinger observeret i det samme datasæt eller fra andre referencedata. Manglende EUROSTAT data blev estimeret baseret på tidligere år, og manglende baseline data blev, hvor det var muligt, erstattet af data fra EUSR. For nogle lande var datamængden og – kvaliteten for ringe til, at de kunne indgå i modellen uden at kompromittere validiteten af resultaterne. Det endelige datasæt omfattede Østrig, Belgien, Cypern, Tjekkiet, Danmark, Estland, Finland, Frankrig, Tyskland, Grækenland, Ungarn, Irland, Italien, Letland, Litauen, Luxembourg, Holland, Polen, Portugal, Slovakiet, Slovenien, Spanien, Sverige og Storbritannien. Tre lande blev inkluderet i den indledende analyse, men ikke i det endelige datasæt. Det var Bulgarien, hvor 100% af de humane tilfælde ikke havde oplysning om serotype; Rumænien, som kun deltog i én baseline undersøgelse og ikke havde andre relevante data, og desuden havde en stor andel human tilfælde uden serotypeoplysning; samt Norge, der ikke er en del af EU og ikke rapporterer til EUROSTAT (Manuskript I). Den Bayesiansk model, som blev anvendt til den matematiske analyse, sammenligner serotypefordelingen i mennesker med serotypefordelingen i husdyrreservoirerne. Modellen estimerer antallet af tilfælde af human salmonellose i de 24 lande fra hvert af disse reservoirer, samt fra rejser og udbrud baseret på de ovennævnte data (Manuskript II). Konsumægsproducerende høner (dvs. æg) blev anslået til at være den vigtigste kilde til salmonellose hos mennesker i EU med 48,1% (95% Credibility Interval (CI) 47,5 til 48,8%) af tilfældene, efterfulgt af svin (29,6%, 95% CI 28,9-30,3%). Kalkuner og slagtekyllinger blev estimeret til at være mindre betydningsfulde kilder og bidrog med hhv. 4,4% (95% CI 4,2-4,7%) og 3,7% (95% CI 3,4-4,0%) af tilfældene. I alt blev 10,2% af alle Salmonella tilfældene rapporteret som værende rejserelaterede, og 3,9% af tilfælde blev rapporteret som værende en del af et udbrud med ukendt kilde. S. Enteritidis var den hyppigste serotype og ansvarlig for 95,9% af de tilfælde som blev tilskrevet æg, 56,9% af tilfældene tilskrevet slagtekyllinger, 30,4% af de kalkunrelaterede tilfælde og 28,3% af de svinerelaterede tilfælde. Den vigtigste serotype i svin var S. Typhimurium, som udgjorde 63,1% af de svinerelaterede tilfælde. Landespecifikke resultater viste, at æg var den vigtigste kilde til salmonellose i 13 lande (Østrig, Tjekkiet, Estland, Tyskland, Grækenland, Ungarn, Letland, Litauen, Luxembourg, Slovenien, Slovakiet, Spanien og Storbritannien), mens svin var den store bidragyder i otte (Belgien, Cypern, Finland, Frankrig, Irland, Italien, Polen og Sverige). I Finland og Sverige kunne hovedparten af salmonellainfektionerne relateres til udlandsrejse. Rejse var også en vigtig kilde i Irland, Storbritannien og Danmark om end i lavere grad. I Holland var andelen af infektioner fra æg og svin omtrent det samme. I Danmark blev den vigtigste fødevarekilde estimeret at være kalkun, mens slagtekyllinger var den største kilde i Portugal (Manuskript II). Danske strategier for risikohåndtering af Salmonella i jord-til-bord kæden omfatter anvendelse af en såkaldt smittekilderegnskabsmodel, det estimerer bidraget fra de vigtigste animalske fødevarekilder til infektioner hos mennesker i Danmark. Det danske modelkoncept dannede grundlag for EU-modellen beskrevet i Manuskript II. Som en del af valideringsprocessen af EU-modellen, blev resultaterne for Danmark i EU-modellen sammenlignet med dem, der opnås under brug af den danske model i samme periode (Manuskript III). Den danske model pegede på svinekød (9,3% af tilfælde), som den vigtigste kilde til salmonellose i perioden, efterfulgt af æg (7,5% af tilfælde) og slagtekyllinger (4,7% af tilfælde), mens EU-modellen til sammenligning tilskrev 15,6% af tilfælde til svin, 15,1% til kalkuner, 10,5% til æg og 2,8% til slagtekyllinger. Andelen af rejserelaterede tilfælde var 30,6% i den danske model mod 18,2% i EU-modellen. Infektioner, der ikke kunne henføres til nogen bestemt kilde, svarede til 16,7% af tilfældene i den danske model og 14,1% i EU-modellen. De observerede uoverensstemmelser kan forklares ved forskelle i modellernes struktur og de grundlæggende antagelser: a) en andel af tilfældene uden rejseinformation tilskrives rejse i den danske model, hvilket baseres på proportionen af rejsetilfælde observeret for tilfælde med fuld rejseinformation; i EU-modellen antages det, at ingen rejseinformation er lig med ingen rejserelation, da mange lande ikke skelner mellem "nej til rejse" og "ingen rejseinformation", b) den danske model anvender Salmonella typefordelinger baseret på både serotypning, fagtypning og resistensbestemmelse, mens EU-modellen kun anvender serotypefordelinger, fordi mere detaljerede typningsdata ikke var til rådighed for de fleste lande og/eller kilder; dette giver en mere specifik fordeling af tilfælde til de rigtige kilder i den danske model; c) et større antal smittekilder i den danske model giver flere muligheder for specifik fordeling af tilfælde, hvilket formentlig resulterer i en mere korrekt fordeling af kilder; d) den danske model anvender officielle data om mængden af dansk producerede og importerede fødevarer til rådighed til forbrug, men tager i modsætning til EU-modellen ikke hensyn til den mængde, der importeres specifikt fra hvert land, hvilket resulterer i at bidrag fra lande med høje Salmonella forekomster underestimeres i den danske model (manuskript III). Alt taget betragtning, så rangerer de to modeller tre ud af de fire kilder i samme rækkefølge, og mens EU-modellen må anses for at være nyttig for lande, som ikke umiddelbart har den datadetaljeringsgrad som findes i Danmark, vil Danmark kunne drage større nytte af at anvende landespecifikke importdata frem for at anvende resultaterne fra EU-modellen. Det sidste kapitel beskriver en alternativ metode til at estimere kilder til human salmonellose for Tjekkiet, Bulgarien, Norge og Rumænien, hvoraf de tre sidstnævnte ikke var inkluderet i EU modellen pga. manglende data. Ved hjælp af clusteranalyser blev 28 lande grupperet efter nogle udvalgte variable, som karakteriserer landenes sociale og økonomiske status, den animalske husdyrproduktion samt kostvaner. Hvis data var tilgængelige, blev variable som afspejler forekomsten af Salmonella hos mennesker og husdyr også inddraget. Resultaterne af analyserne blev fremlagt et panel af eksperter med ekspertise indenfor fødevaresikkerhed, epidemiologi og risikomodellering. Disse blev bedt om at komme med estimater for den relative betydning af Salmonella smittekilder for de førnævnte lande, baseret på disses lighed med lande, for hvilke resultater allerede forelå dvs. på baggrund af resultater fra EU-modellen. Eksperterne blev også bedt om at evaluere metodens egnethed og anvendeligheden af resultaterne. Eksperternes individuelle estimater blev evalueret dels ved en sammenligning med de tjekkiske resultater, som var til rådighed fra EU-modellen, men også i forhold til estimaternes ensartethed og usikkerhedsintervallerne mellem de forskellige estimater fra samme ekspert og imellem eksperterne i panelet. Evalueringen resulterede i, at svarene fra fem ud af de syv respondenter blev bibeholdt i de endelige analyser. Selv om panelet angav estimater for Tjekkiet som ikke var identiske med dem fra EU-modellen, var der enighed om rækkefølgen af betydningen af de animalske kilder, og der var enighed i panelet om samme rækkefølge. Det vurderes derfor, at metoden med nogle justeringer, kan være nyttig til at prioritere målrettet Salmonella kontrol i lande uden tilstrækkelige data til en mere datadrevet fremgangsmåde. På sigt kan metoden måske bruges til at identificere "surrogatlande," hvorfra prævalensdata kan "lånes" og anvendes i en matematisk model baseret på sammenligning af Salmonella typer. Dette PhD projekt har fremlagt resultater for et Europæisk smittekilderegnskab for Salmonella, samt evalueret de anvendte metoder og fremkommet med løsninger til, hvordan man kan håndtere manglende eller utilstrækkelige data i lignende undersøgelser. Projektet har også opnået resultater, som kan lægge grunden for fremtidige forsøg på at udarbejde Salmonella smittekilderegnskaber i et mere globalt perspektiv. ; This thesis presents a mathematical modeling approach to estimate the contribution of four animal reservoirs of the food chain to the occurrence of salmonellosis cases in humans in the European Union. In addition, an alternative and more explorative approach based on expert elicitation is attempted in order to extrapolate results to countries with less data availability, as a first step to perform source attribution of Salmonella in a more global perspective. Cases of foodborne salmonellosis in humans were attributed to travel, outbreaks and four animal reservoirs, namely pigs, broilers, turkeys and laying hens, using a Bayesian model based on microbial subtyping in 24 countries of the European Union. The chosen approach is recognized as data intensive, requiring numbers for Salmonella occurrence in food-producing animals, reported human cases, information on possibility of infection abroad (from here on referred to as "travel information"), human cases originating from outbreaks with and without a confirmed source and amounts of the meat or eggs of each animal reservoir originating from each country and available for consumption in each country. Thus, special data management, analysis and validation was required to produce a dataset containing standardized information for all countries (Manuscript I). Data on reported human cases were provided by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) through the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Salmonella prevalences in animals were obtained from the EU-wide baseline studies (BS) conducted by EFSA and complemented where necessary with information found in the European Union Summary Report (EUSR), as published by EFSA. Information on outbreaks was also provided by EFSA. The amount of food available for consumption was calculated based on trade data obtained from the European Statistical Office (EUROSTAT) and complemented with information from the Association of Poultry Processors and Poultry Trade in the European Union Countries (AVEC). Common limitations included non-participation in all BS, non-reporting of outbreaks or travel information, non-reporting of serovar-specific information, non-reporting of case-based data and non-availability of trade data on EUROSTAT. In order to standardize the information available, cases without travel information were assumed to be domestic; cases without specific serovar information were redistributed according to serovar proportions observed in the same dataset or other reference documents; missing trade information was estimated based on previous years, and non-participation in a BS was supplied, where possible, with data from the EUSR. When the lack of original data was considered too extreme to the point of compromising the attribution results, countries were excluded. The resulting dataset comprised Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Three countries were included in the initial analysis, but were excluded from the final dataset. Those were: Bulgaria, which presented 100% of human cases without serovar detailing; Romania, which only participated in one BS and had not enough surrogate data to be retrieved from the EUSR, besides reporting a large parcel of cases without serovar information; and Norway, which is not part of the EU and does not report to EUROSTAT (Manuscript I). A Bayesian modeling approach which compares the occurrence of serovars in humans with the occurrence of the same serovars in animals of the food-chain was used to estimate the contribution of each of these reservoirs, travel and outbreaks to the number of human cases of salmonellosis in the 24 countries present in the dataset previously described (Manuscript II). Laying hens (i.e. eggs) were estimated to be the most important source of human salmonellosis at EU level, with 48.1% (95% Credibility Interval (CI) 47.5 – 48.8%) of cases, followed by pigs (29.6%, 95% CI 28.9-30.3%). Turkeys and broilers were estimated to be less important sources of Salmonella, contributing with 4.4% (95% CI 4.2-4.7%) and 3.7% (95% CI 3.4-4.0%), respectively. A total of 10.2% of all salmonellosis cases were reported as being travel-related, and 3.9% of cases were reported as being part of outbreaks with unknown source. S. Enteritidis was the most important serovar in the study, being responsible for 95.9% of cases attributed to laying hens, 56.9% of cases attributed to broilers, 30.4% of turkeys and 28.3% of cases attributed to pigs, for which the main serovar was S. Typhimurium (63.1% of cases attributed to this source). Country-specific results show laying hens as the most important source of salmonellosis in 13 countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom), whereas pigs were the larger animal contributor in eight (Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Poland and Sweden). In Finland and Sweden the majority of Salmonella infections were estimated to be travel-related. Travel was also an important source in Ireland, the UK and Denmark, although to a lower extent. In the Netherlands, the proportion of disease attributed to layers and pigs were similar. In Denmark, the most important food-animal source was estimated to be turkeys, and broilers were the major source in Portugal. (Manuscript II). Danish strategies for risk management of Salmonella in the farm-to-fork continuum include the routine application of a source attribution model to estimate the contribution of the major animal-food sources to human infections by Salmonella in Denmark. This model concept formed the basis for the model described in Manuscript II. As part of the validation process of the EU model, results for Denmark in the EU model were compared with the ones obtained using the Danish model in the same period (Manuscript III).The Danish model points to pork as the main animal source of human salmonellosis in the period (9.3% of cases), followed closely by table eggs (7.5% of cases) and broilers (4.7% of cases), while the EU model attributed 15.6% to pigs, 15.1% to turkeys, 10.5% to eggs and 2.8% to broilers. Travel-related cases constitute 30.6% in the Danish model and only 18.2% in the EU model. Cases that could not be attributed to any source corresponded to 16.7% in the Danish model and 14.1% in the European model. Discrepancies in numbers are explained by differences in model structure and basic assumptions: a) cases with no travel information in the Danish model are redistributed according to proportions observed in cases with full information; in the EU model, as some countries did not provide any information regarding travel prior to sickness, it had to be assumed that no information means no travel; b) the Danish model uses data subtyped to phage-type level, while the EU model only uses serovar level, as phage-type data in humans and animals was not sufficiently available; this allows the more specific allocation of cases to the right sources; c) the larger number of sources in the Danish model allows more options for specific allocation of cases, presumably resulting in a more correct distribution of cases among sources; d) the Danish model uses official data on amount of domestic and imported food items available for consumption in the country, but does not as opposed to the EU model take into account the amount imported from each country specifically, which results in an underestimation of the contribution from high prevalence countries as compared to the EU model (Manuscript III). All facts considered, the two models rank three out of the four sources in a similar order and, while the EU model is considered useful for countries which cannot readily attain the level of detailing found in Denmark for monitoring and surveillance data, Denmark would benefit more from applying country-specific data than to adopt the results of the EU model. The last chapter presents an alternative approach to obtain results for the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Norway and Romania, the last three of which were excluded from the EU-model due to insufficient data. Using clustering techniques, 28 countries were grouped according to variables used to characterize them as to social and economic status, animal production characteristics and food consumption patterns. Where available, variables reflecting the occurrence of Salmonella enterica in humans and animals were also used. The results of the analyses were delivered to a panel of experts composed by foodborne disease epidemiologists and risk modelers, which were asked to provide attribution estimates for the aforementioned countries, based on their similarity to countries for which results were previously obtained. Experts were also asked to evaluate the method concerning its utility and applicability of results. Individual estimates were evaluated based on comparison with the Czech results, for which results based on the microbial subtyping model were available, but also in relation to uniformity of guesses and uncertainty intervals among different estimates from the same expert and among all experts in the panel. This evaluation resulted in five out of the seven respondents being maintained in the panel. Although the Czech Republic values obtained did not match the ones observed in the EU study, the order of importance of the animal sources was in agreement between the two studies and there was also a consensus in the panel concerning that order. It is, therefore, believed that with some adjustments, this method may be useful for prioritizing targeted actions for Salmonella control in countries without sufficient data for a traditional approach. Further on, this method may be used to identify "surrogate countries" from where animal prevalence data can be "borrowed" and applied in the traditional microbial subtyping approach in the aforementioned Member States. This PhD project has provided results for a European "source of infection account" for Salmonella, and has at the same time been evaluating the approaches attempted, raising questions and proposing solutions on how to deal with the lack of good-quality data for such studies. The project has also achieved results that may lay the groundwork for future attempts to develop Salmonella source attribution estimates in a more global perspective.
The High Level Group of Experts on Literacy was established by the EU commission in order to give advice how to reduce the high number of children, adolescents and adults in the European countries who do not possess adequate reading competence. In this final report the group defined 3 key issues for European literacy policies that all Member States should focus on as they craft their own literacy solutions: Creating a more literate environment; improving the quality of teaching; increasing participation, inclusion and equity. Good practice examples from various countries are provided. (Authors) ; Die Gruppe hochrangiger Sachverständiger für Schriftsprachkompetenz wurde von der EU-Kommission einberufen, um Maßnahmen zu erarbeiten mit dem Ziel, die hohe Zahl der Kinder, Jugendlichen und Erwachsenen, die in den europäischen Ländern nicht über eine angemessene Lesekompetenz verfügen, zu verringern. In ihrem Abschlussbericht hat die Expertengruppe drei Schlüsselthemen für die europäische Bildungspolitik definiert, auf die sich alle Mitgliedstaaten konzentrieren sollten, wenn sie ihre eigenen Lösungen für die Förderung von Schriftsprachkompetenz erarbeiten: Schaffung einer schriftreichen Umgebung; Verbesserung der Qualität des Unterrichts; Erhöhung von Partizipation, Inklusion und Chancengerechtigkeit. Es werden Beispiele für bewährte Maßnahmen aus verschiedenen Ländern vorgestellt. (Autoren)
Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärgiks oli hinnata Eesti piimatoodete konkurentsivõimet ilmutatud suhtelise eelise meetodil Euroopa Liidus aastatel 2000-2011. Uurimistöö alguses püstitatud hüpotees, et piimatöötlemine on Eesti toiduainetööstuses rahvusvaheliselt konkurentsivõimeline valdkond, leidis kinnitust töö analüütilises osas. Konkurentsivõime määratlemisel samastati konkurentsivõimet tootlikkuse ja oskustega, ning ekspordivõimega ehk laiemalt eduga väliskaubanduses. Käesoleva töö empiirilises osas keskenduti majandusharu ja riigi tasandile. Tootlikkuse ja oskuste puhul vaadeldi töös piimalehmade produktiivsust, toodangumahtu, toorpiima kvaliteeti jne. Väliskaubanduse puhul analüüsiti väliskaubandusbilansi, ekspordistruktuuri ja ekspordipartnerite muutumist. Konkurentsivõimet hinnati ilmutatud suhtelise eelise meetodil tuues välja vastavad kaubanduse edukust mõõtvad indeksid. Viimastel aastatel on lehmade arv Eestis vähenenud alla 100 000 isendi, mille tulemusena on hakanud langema ka piimatoodang. Kui suudetakse piimalehmade arvu vähenemine peatada või arvukust mõnevõrra suurendada, siis on eeldust oodata ka mõningast piimatoodangu kasvu. Paralleelselt piimalehmade arvu vähenemisega on piimatoodang lehma kohta pidevalt suurenenud läbi investeeringute uute ja vanade karjalautade rekonstrueerimisse, seadmetesse ning põlluharimistehnikasse, samuti on hakatud rohkem tähelepanu pöörama loomade pidamis- ja söötmistehnoloogiale. Seega on oluline pöörata tähelepanu investeeringutoetustele ning teadus- ja arendustegevusele. Kogu Eestis toodetud piim vastab praktiliselt tervenisti EL-i nõuetele, piima kokkuostuhinnad on perioodil 2003-2011 kokkuvõttes tõusnud, kuid seda suhteliselt ebastabiilselt. Hetkel on piima kokkuostuhinnad tõusnud kõigi aegade kõrgeimale tasemele. Piimatööstuse osakaal on 2010. aastal töötlevas tööstuses ja toiduainetööstuses väärtuseliselt tõusnud, kuid kogu vaadeldava perioodi jooksul (2005-2010) langenud. Sama on toimunud piimatoodete osakaaluga töötleva tööstuse toodangu ekspordis ja piimatoodete osakaaluga toiduainete ekspordis. Koguseliselt tähtsamateks toodetavateks piimatoodeteks olid 2010. aastal joogipiim, jogurt ja juust. Eestis toodetakse piima rohkem, kui ise suudetakse tarbida, mis muudab võimalikuks piimatoodete ekspordi. Seetõttu on piimandussektor Eesti toiduainetööstuses kõige rohkem orienteeritud ekspordile. Eesti siseturul on piimatoodete tarbimine ühe elaniku kohta järjepidevalt vähenenud. Eesti piimatoodete väliskaubandusbilanss on positiivne, mida on suurendanud viimastel aastatel piimatoodete ekspordi väärtuse kasv seoses piimatoodete hindade tõusuga maailmaturul. Perioodil 2000-2011 on piimatoodete ekspordikasv ületanud impordikasvu kolmekordselt. Seega on piimatööstusel täita tähtis roll Eesti majanduse jätkusuutlikkuse tagamisel. Kuna piimatoodete eksport on suurenenud, tuleks senisest enam tähelepanu pöörata turuarendustoetustele ning ekspordigarantiidele. Tähtsamad ekspordiartiklid rahalises väärtuses 2011. aastal olid juust ja kohupiim ning kontsentreerimata piimatooted. Ka koguseliselt eksporditi kõige enam konsentreerimata piimatooteid, teiste piimatoodete osas on ekspordimahud püsinud enam-vähem samal tasemel. Eesti piimatoodete väliskaubanduspartneritest moodustavad 2/3 EL-i riigid ning 1/3 kolmandad riigid. EL-i riikidest olid peamisteks piimatoodete kaubanduspartneriteks Leedu, Soome, Läti ja Itaalia; kolmandatest riikidest moodustas enamuse piimatoodete eksport Venemaale. Kuna Venemaa on selline riik, kus vaatamata erinevatele rakendatud meetmetele pole suudetud kohalikku piimandussektorit madalseisust üle aidata, siis on Venemaa erinevate prognooside kohaselt keskpikas perspektiivis endiselt piimatooteid importiv riik. Seda peaks Eesti kindlasti tulevikus rohkem ära kasutama. Ilmutatud suhtelise eelise indeksi (RCA) põhjal on Eesti konkurentsieelis vähenenud piimapulbri ning või ja muude piimrasvade osas – konkurentsivõime on langenud mahtkaupade puhul, mille lisandväärtus on madal. Kõrgema lisandväärtusega piimatoodete eksport ja konkurentsivõime Eestis suureneb. Suhtelise impordi asendamise indeksi (RMP) analüüsi tulemuste põhjal saab väita, et EL-iga liitumise järgselt on paljude piimatoodete puhul saavutatud konkurentsieelis, mis on jäänud enamike piimatoodete osas ka püsima. Konkurentsieelis on vähenenud madalama lisandväärtusega piimatoodete osas. Kaubavahetuse suhtelise eelise indeksi (RTA) alusel omab Eesti enamike piimatoodete puhul suhtelist eelist. Konkurentsivõime on puudunud vaid mõne väiksema piimatoote kaubagrupi osas. Terviklikult omab Eesti konkurentsieelist kõigi kolme suurema piimatoodete kaubagrupi lõikes, milledeks on: (1) piim, koor ja muud piimatooted; (2) või ja muud piimrasvad; (3) juust ja kohupiim. Konkurentsivõime puudub vaid kolme kitsama tootegrupi puhul: (1) petipiim, keefir, kalgendatud piim ja koor; (2) sulajuust; (3) sinihallitusjuust. Eesti konkurentsivõime on oluliselt suurenenud piima ja koore, jogurtite, jäätiste, vadaku ja riivjuustude tootmisel. Eelnevalt loetletud toodete konkurentsivõime suurenemine on toimunud piimapulbrite, või ja muude piimrasvade konkurentsivõime vähenemise arvelt. Põhiliselt on konkurentsivõime suurenemine toimunud mahtkaupadelt kõrgemat lisandväärtust omavate piimatoodete suunas. Seega võib väita, et pikemas perspektiivis on Eesti majandusele kasulikum väärindada kogu Eestis toodetav piima kohapeal ning eksportida väärindatud tooteid. Autori arvates tuleb piimandussektori puhul Eestil olla konkreetne, jätkata ühtset põllumajanduspoliitikat ja määratleda nii missioon kui ka visioon tulevikuks. Tuleb propageerida kodumaiste piimatoodete tarbimist, ettevõtete omavahelist koostööd, parandada tööviljakust, mis tagaks sektori stabiilsuse. Seetõttu on autori arvates viimaste aastate ainuõige samm olnud Eesti piimanduse strateegia väljatöötamine, kus on konkreetselt määraltletud kuhu ja kuidas tahetakse jõuda. Eesti riigil peab olema selge nägemus piimandussektori tulevikust, sest piimatöötlemine on hetkel Eesti toiduainetööstuses rahvusvaheliselt üks konkurentsivõimelisemaid valdkondi. ; The present MA thesis has been written in Estonian. The thesis consists of 87 pages and includes 30 figures and 4 tables. A total of 84 literary sources were used in the compilation of the thesis. The focus of the thesis is a topical issue due to the fact that dairy products constitute approximately one third of the total production of the food industry and more milk is produced than consumed in Estonia, which in turn makes the export of dairy products possible. Therefore, the dairy industry has an important role to play in providing the sustainable development of the Estonian economy. This also highlights the importance of estimating the competitiveness of dairy products as well as making suggestions in order to enhance it. The aim of the present MA thesis is to estimate the competitiveness of Estonian dairy products in the European Union during the years 2000-2011 using revealed comparative advantage. The thesis presents the hypothesis that dairy processing within Estonian food industry is an internationally competitive sphere. The hypothesis is proved to be correct in the analytical section of the thesis. During recent years, the number of cows in Estonia has fallen below 100 000, resulting in a gradual decrease in milk production as well. However, milk production per cow has continuously grown due to an increase in productivity and effectiveness. Milk produced in Estonia conforms to the requirements by the European Union almost entirely; the purchase prices of milk have increased during the observed period of time, yet in a relatively unstable manner. The purchase prices of milk have currently reached their absolute peak. In terms of its monetary value, the dairy industry has increased its proportion in both the manufacturing and the food industry in 2010; however, during the entire period under observation (2005-2010), the proportion has decreased. This is also the case with the proportion of dairy products in the export of the manufacturing as well as the food industry. In 2010, the most important dairy products in terms of the production amount were milk, yogurt, and cheese. Estonia's foreign trade balance of dairy products is positive due to an increase in the export of dairy products in recent years, which, in turn, has been influenced by the rising prices of dairy products in the global market. During 2000-2011, the export growth of dairy products was three times bigger than the import growth, suggesting that the dairy industry has an important role in providing the sustainable development of the Estonian economy. In 2011, the most important export goods in terms of monetary value were cheese, curd, and non-concentrated dairy products. The latter was the most important also in terms of quantity. The export quantity of other dairy products has roughly remained the same. Members of the European Union constitute 2/3 of Estonia's foreign trading partners in terms of dairy products, whereas 1/3 is held by third countries. The main trading partners within the European Union were Lithuania, Finland, Latvia, and Italy; out of the third countries, the majority of dairy products were exported to Russia. Comparing the previous two years, the export of dairy products to Russia has decreased; instead, Estonia has increased its export to Lithuania, Finland, Italy, and to other EU and third countries. The analysis showed that Estonia has a competitive advantage in all three major product groups: milk, cream and other milk products; butter and other fats and oils derived from milk; cheese and curd. However, Estonia is not competetive in three narrow product groups: buttermilk, kephir, curdled milk and cream; processed cheese and blue-veined cheese. Estonia's competitiveness has substantially increased in the production of milk and cream, yogurt, ice cream, whey and grated cheese. However, this has resulted in a decrease in Estonia's competitiveness in the production of milk powder, butter and other fats and oils derived from milk. The results show that Estonia's competitiveness has decreased in the production of low value-added products. Instead, the focus is on the production and export of dairy products which have higher added value. Estonia is facing important decisions on several issues: it needs to choose certain product groups in which the country wants to enhance competitiveness as well as find a way to enhance the competitiveness of the entire dairy industry to its maximum extent. As far as the dairy industry is concerned, Estonia needs to continue firmly with its uniform agricultural policy. A clear mission and vision for the future should be stated. In addition, Estonia should propagate the consumption of domestic dairy products and cooperation between enterprises. It is also important to enhance labour productivity and ensure the stability of the industry. An important step has been the compilation of the "Estonian Dairying Strategy 2012-2020", which states the future goals of the country. Estonia needs to have a clear vision of the future of its dairy industry. Furthermore, active support should be provided for the industry, because dairy processing is currently one of the most internationally competitive spheres of the Estonian food industry
En 1903, durante un discurso en Glasgow, Joseph Chamberlain –comprometido para ese entonces en una campaña para convencer a sus conciudadanos que las dificultades político-económicas de Gran Bretaña debían ser tomadas muy en serio- argumentaba lo siguiente: "I have been in Venice…which at one time had a comercial supremcy quite as great in proportion as anything we have ever enjoyed. Its glories have departed…When I was there last I saw the great tower of Campanile…The other day, in a few minutes, the whole structure fell to the ground…I do not say to you, gentleman, that I anticipate any catastrophe so great or so sudden for the British trade; but I do say that I see signs of decay; that I see cracks and crevices in the walls of the great structure…Now, do I do wrong, if I know this –if I even think I know it- do I do wrong to warn you?"(1)Chamberlain no estaba solo en la difusión de una sincera preocupación por el estado de una Gran Bretaña golpeada por crisis financieras, la guerra de los Boer, la presión de estados ascendentes, un imperio cuya administración se hacía cada vez más insostenible, etc. Los problemas británicos de principio de siglo generaron un debate nacional en torno a las estrategias económicas (libre comercio vs. proteccionismo), de política exterior (consolidación del imperio vs. repliegue ordenado), entre otras, que puso en tela de juicio las convenciones que acompañaban a Gran Bretaña desde hacía un largo tiempo. La Historia muestra que no es extraño que las crisis económico-políticas impongan reflexiones profundas sobre asuntos de fondo, donde suelen ser cuestionados paradigmas previamente establecidos.(2) El caso de la Unión Europea de hoy ilustra el punto. Como señala The Economist: "When Europeans fear for their jobs and their savings, when their governments and companies cannot easily borrow money, when banks fail and the single currency trembles, then the European Union is facing not just an economic crisis, but a political crisis, as well." La crisis ha dado pie a un importante debate en la disciplina de las relaciones internacionales sobre el futuro de ese complejo experimento político que es la UE.Las caras más visibles del debate han sido aquellos que se plantan en una postura crítica a la viabilidad de la UE como actor en el sistema internacional –o que siendo críticos de antes, se vieron impulsados por la problemática coyuntura que actuó en forma de publicidad y, en cierta medida, aval de sus argumentos.Sebastian Rosato descuella en este primer grupo: "The more likely outcome, however, is the end of the European dream. Eventually, the Europeans are going to acknowledge what they have known for some time: there's no reason to keep the union together. This is not to say that European Union members will stop cooperating, but they will do so as independent nation states. To the extent that the EU survives, it will be a union in name only." Como señala Terradas en su artículo, para estos autores "el futuro de la UE está ligado a las condiciones de seguridad iniciales, y dado el actual entorno internacional, su futuro es incierto y problemático."Por otro lado, el grupo de los optimistas, no sin cierta razón, apela al record histórico de la UE. Andrew Moravcsik comenta: "In the 1960s, when France's President Charles de Gaulle vetoed British entry and withdrew from the Common Market, bringing European decision making to a halt for six months, some believed the experiment was finished. In the early 1980s, journalists used the phrases 'Euro-sclerosis' and 'Euro-pessimism' to describe the mood in Brussels. A few years later, Europe launched the single-market program. Economists uniformly rejected the euro as unworkable. Now it is reality. Just five years ago, in the wake of referendum defeats in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland, the European Constitution seemed moribund. Now it is law." Para este grupo el desarrollo de la interdependencia y la generación de intereses que sólo pueden ser satisfechos a través de la preservación y profundización de los lazos institucionales que conforman a la UE indica que el futuro debe ser más promisorio de lo que se argumenta desde las trincheras realistas. Ahora bien, los debates forjados en tiempos de crisis son por definición borrosos. En el corto plazo (con la excepción de que la UE sufra un colapso total y repentino -escenario por demás improbable-) no parece viable dilucidar el poder explicativo de las posturas pesimistas y optimistas. Sin embargo, es por esa misma razón que estas discusiones teóricas se llevan adelante. El estudioso de la política internacional debería poder "clarificar y dar sentido a fenómenos complejos," como bien señala Terradas, pensando en escenarios a mediano y largo plazo. En este sentido, la disciplina hace bien en recorrer estos caminos en momentos en que el proyecto europeo se encuentra cubierto por la incertidumbre.Pero más allá de los interesantes argumentos teóricos que destilan dichas posiciones, habría que preguntarse hasta donde llegan los beneficios de un debate conducido por estos carriles. En efecto, poco es lo que las posiciones pesimistas y optimistas contribuyen en el corto plazo. Los pesimistas, con Rosato a la cabeza, parten de un complejo epistemológico que entiende a la UE como un animal político concebido en, y a causa de, condiciones muy particulares que ya no existen -i.e. el mundo de Guerra Fría y la amenaza de la URSS. Por ende, no sería plausible otro corolario que no sea la obsolescencia política y el fin de la Unión como tal. Un discurso de carácter realista que siempre tuvo mucho que decir sobre este experimento político, y así también, mucho tiene para decir sobre su futuro. Sin embargo, poco lugar tiene en ese cuerpo de ideas la coyuntura de la crisis europea. La crisis, en esta cosmovisión, no es más que una pequeña muestra del fin aproximándose: un paso más hacia el abismo. "Regardless of how the EU navigates the current mess, the dream of a United States of Europe -- a political, military, and economic union from Lisbon to Latvia and the Baltic to the Balkans -- is over. What most people don't realize is that this has been the case for almost twenty years."Para los optimistas la UE no puede ser entendida desde las herramientas clásicas de la Realpolitik. Europa sería un actor que ha demostrado tener sus propios incentivos y objetivos, y que para sobrevivir no depende de amenazas de seguridad sino del grado de interdependencia inescapable que han desarrollado los países miembros. Según Moravcsik: "The EU is succeeding because its policies are not based on idealism but on the recognition that a union of diverse nations can find realistic ways to work together. Those who bet against the economic self-interest of European governments are likely to lose."Tanto siendo un artificio temporario de países otrora amenazados por el oso soviético o siendo una entidad con vida propia y determinada a consolidarse incrementalmente, la UE está en medio de una severa crisis. Como remarcara recientemente la Canciller alemana, Angela Merkel: "[If the Euro fails] then Europe and the idea of European union will fail." Los problemas financieros inmediatos y la fragilidad del euro ponen en riesgo la noción de una Europa unida y, consecuentemente, la potencial capacidad de esta de influir en el sistema internacional.Quizás, y por el momento, el debate debería asumir una dosis mayor de pragmatismo. En ocasiones, aún si no es posible soslayar totalmente la influencia de la estructura internacional sobre las unidades, el determinismo de algunas teorías deja de lado el rol que tiene para cumplir la voluntad humana. Es el devenir de tal voluntad política lo que seguramente tenga más para decir en el futuro inmediato de la UE.En un mundo complejo in crescendo, donde las normas del orden van a ser cada vez más cuestionadas por poderes ascendentes, la UE tiene un rol importante para cumplir. Particularmente porque sigue siendo el primer mercado económico a escala global y el segundo poder militar (aunque más que nada en potencia, ya que los problemas de entender a Europa como un actor a la par del formato tradicional de los estados son ciertamente muchos). El refortalecimiento de Europa debería ser el deseo de todo aquel interesando en la estabilidad del orden y la paz internacional (aún si en el largo plazo el proyecto europeo está destinado a permanecer lejos de la panacea de "los Estados Unidos de Europa", eventualidad que en mi opinión es la más probable de no surgir una amenaza o fenómeno internacional semejante a las condiciones de la Guerra Fría).Las crisis son siempre momentos de reflexión, que en algunos casos, y repito: sólo en contados casos, generan mejorías. Esperemos que el presente debate ayude a forjar tales mejorías en la UE.(1) Citado en: Friedberg, Aaron, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, Princeton UP, 1988, p.23.(2) Véase el artículo de Nicolás Terradas en este número de Enfoques para un fascinante estudio de las consecuencias de la crisis sobre los cuerpos teóricos formados en torno a la Unión Europea. *Profesor Universidad ORT.Maestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Tesista).
We can distinguish different approaches to European identity in contemporary Lithuanian and European discourses. Western scholars, such as Jacque Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, Gerard Delanty, Soledad Garcia, Cris Shore and others, stress (and question) the political and economic basis of European identity. This approach is revealed in both normative discussions and actual policies of European identity, and is supported by public opinion surveys, which attest to the mostly pragmatic motivation of citizens of the European Union to identify with "Europeans." Traditionally, Lithuanian intellectuals tend to consider "Europeanness" more as a cultural, but not a political or economic phenomenon. This Lithuanian attitude is greatly influenced by the tradition of philosophy of culture, which thrived during the interwar period in Lithuania. The philosophers, among which the most important were Antanas Maceina, Stasys Salkauskis and Vytautas Alantas, created their definitions and visions of nation, state and culture. They shaped a whole framework of nationalist thinking and provided later generations with powerful rhetoric, strongly expressed in the Lithuanian debates in the last decade of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, this traditional approach to Lithuanian identity has been modified during the twentieth century. First, the debates about national identity continued abroad, mostly in the U.S., after the Soviet occupation where a liberal approach to national identity took shape. In the 1980s, the secession from the Soviet bloc facilitated the circulation of Western liberal ideas, developed both by Western scholars and Lithuanian emigrant intellectuals. These ideas, though contested by nationalist approaches, became more and more usual in Lithuanian "identity talk." Additionally, European integration influenced a more pragmatic attitude towards national identification, as well as acknowledgment of its situational character and relativist nature. This shift is well reflected not only in the writings of intellectuals, but also in the public opinion surveys. The cultural grounds of political identity gained a new meaning, yet continued to matter.It would be impossible to provide a thorough analysis of the extensive discussions during the century. Therefore I will concentrate on the debates that took place from the 1980s to the end of the decade. I have chosen this period for several reasons. First, these debates in a way encompass the ideas and problems that were formulated throughout all the previous years. The period is important also, since the entire Lithuanian tradition of both nationalistic thinking and thinking about nation starts being reconsidered, supported or criticized. Yet, paradoxically, the issue of Lithuanian national identity and its relation to other regional identities, and what is most important in my case, to European identity, has not gained proper attention among Lithuanian scholars. Identity studies, though extremely popular in the West, are only at the initial stage in Lithuania. Additionally, studies of the problems related to nationalism, which would stimulate to analyze the relation between national and supra-national identities, are still rare in Lithuanian academic discourse.Speaking about European identity is very complicated, since there is any consensus neither about its content nor functions. Scholars argue about it from very different and often contradictory perspectives. Some of them understand European identity as the factor that strengthens national feelings (Louis Snyder, Jennifer Welsh), others as a real supra-state identity, potential to diminish dangers of nationalisms (Jürgen Habermas, Jacque Derrida). The others see European identity as the utopian aim, created by elites (Cris Shore, Gerard Delanty). While some thinkers call for concrete policies of the promotion of European identity, which consist mostly of ideological revision of history and cultural policies, similar to those of nation states (Simon Mundy), others criticize the policies just because of the ideological dimension and accuse European identity of being manipulative (Antje Wiener, Cris Shore).The arguments try to solve the tension between economic, political and cultural grounds of European identity. All of them see European history as ambivalent, which may both support and undermine European integration. On the one hand, the history of Europe is the history of many nationalisms, of the fight between political and cultural units for the right of self-determination. Obviously, this "history of conflict" hardly could serve as the ideological glue for European integration. On the other hand, the history of Europe is the history of Western civilization that has developed on the basis of Christian religious and antique philosophical traditions, Renaissance's humanism, and Enlightenment's rationality. The aspects of a shared ethical system, rational reasoning and cultural heritage are often employed to create the illusion of inherited, long lasting "cultural" or "ethical" Europe. Many of the EU's programs stimulate this re-invention of a cultural European tradition, in Eric Hobsbawm terms, while emphasizing the presence of a common cultural heritage in all European countries. Nevertheless, many countries may still interpret that "common European heritage" not only as evidence of the mentality "we, Europeans," but also as a reminder of past conflicts, when that cultural tradition was imported or even coercively imposed. In this way a shared "European culture" is biased by the potential for completely different interpretations and may serve to absolutely different political and social goals.Since the beginning, the debates about European identity have been significantly stimulated by actual political and economic reality. European identity has been widely discussed, opposed and promoted during the last decades as related to the issues of the political legitimacy of the European Union. The problem of European identity gradually has become an object of the EU public policies. Discussions about European identity far transcend the boundaries of the Western Europe and are particularly important in Central East Europe. Namely, in this region, which witnessed late modernization, and late creation of modern nation states, Europeanness was a crucial question. Europe has always existed as a notion that reflected different countries in different periods. The "mirror" of Europeannes was one in which features of some nation were seen, or to put it into other words, Europeanness was one of the instruments in the creation of the notion of national identity.The question of Europeanness has been very significant in the understanding of Lithuanian identity. Because modernization entered Central East Europe as an imported phenomenon, most of the countries felt like smaller brothers of the bigger Europeans. Here Europeanness played an important role in the construction of the sense of national pride. To be Lithuanian has never been to be European, to be equal. In the nationalist discourse it was either to be "less than European," or "more than European."It is possible to distinguish two types of "European talk" among Lithuanians. While one "we, Europeans" means "we, non-Russians" and distinguishes Lithuanians as those of higher working morality and tolerance, the second "we, chasing the train of Europe" connotes continuous backwardness and a desperate need to transcend the "own" in order to overtake "them." In this talk we can note that Lithuanians see themselves positively as Europeans only in contrast to "non-Europeans," usually Russians. Meanwhile, Lithuanians do not conceive themselves as full-value Europeans when comparing themselves with Western Europeans. Paradoxically, this allows Lithuanians to think of themselves as "more Europeans," since then such national values as "spirituality" and the legendary history of the "pagan empire" is juxtaposed against rational and pragmatic, even de-spiritualized "Europeans of the EU."This often painful question of what does it mean to be European for a Lithuanian, sometimes tends to diminish the European dimension in general, and some different regional identity, for example, "Baltic" identification, comes to the fore. I will show how biased the question of Baltic identity is. While the future of the Baltic region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), shaped by a common sad past, is an object of a political skepticism, for the same reason it wins the hearts of people, of which about 80% identify themselves as Balts. Nonetheless, despite abundant manifestations of national victimization, considering the western Other was necessary to define Lithuanian national identity. As David Laitin (2000) puts it, "[t]o an important degree, then, it is the Eastern Europeans who have a stronger interest in a utopian vision of "Europe" as a well-defined (and easily mimicked) culture than culturally secure Europeans who are citizens of the West European states." ; Vakarų Europos akademiniame ir politiniame diskursuose europinio identiteto analizė dažniausiai siejama su ES politinio teisėtumo, nusakančio dalyvavimo demokratijos stygių, problema. Tuo tarpu Lietuvoje europinio identiteto problema dažniau diskutuojama pasitelkiant tautinės identifikacijos problematikos prizmę. Abiem atvejais itin pabrėžiama tautinio identiteto politinės ir kultūrinės reikšmės apmąstymo būtinybė kaip neišvengiama europėjimo ir globalėjimo procesų pasekmė. Pagrindinis dėmesys kreipiamas į paskutiniojo dešimtmečio diskusijas, jas analizuojant tarpukario ir pokario laikotarpiais plėtotų idėjų kontekste. Pirmojoje straipsnio dalyje pateikiama Vakarų Europoje vykstančių diskusijų, politinių programų ir viešosios nuomonės apklausų rezultatų analizė siekia suformuoti konceptualinį ir istorinį pagrindą tolesnei Lietuvos situacijos studijai. Pirmiausia apibrėžiamos pagrindinės sąvokos ir nustatomi kertiniai, problemiški intelektinių diskusijų taškai. Nubrėžus šią konceptualinę koordinačių ašį, pereinama prie viešosios nuomonės apklausų rezultatų analizės. Apklausų rezultatai analizuojami ir lyginami su intelektualų ir politikų įvardintomis aprašomosiomis ir normatyvinėmis vizijomis. Šitaip pamėginsiu patikrinti, kiek diskusijose ginamos identifikacijos versijos sutampa ar skiriasi nuo viešojoje nuomonėje funkcionuojančių sampratų.
Die European Values Study (EVS) und die World Values Survey (WVS) sind zwei groß angelegte, länderübergreifende und längsschnittliche Umfrage-Forschungsprogramme. Sie umfassen eine große Anzahl von Fragen zu moralischen, religiösen, gesellschaftlichen, politischen, beruflichen und familiären Werten, die seit Anfang der achtziger Jahre repliziert wurden.
Beide Organisationen vereinbarten, ab 2017 bei der gemeinsamen Datenerhebung zusammenzuarbeiten. Der EVS war verantwortlich für die Planung und Durchführung von Umfragen in europäischen Ländern unter Verwendung des EVS-Fragebogens und der methodischen Richtlinien des EVS. Der WVSA war für die Planung und Durchführung von Umfragen in Ländern außerhalb Europas verantwortlich, wobei der WVS-Fragebogen und die methodischen Richtlinien des WVS verwendet wurden. Beide Organisationen entwickelten ihre Entwürfe für Master-Fragebögen unabhängig voneinander. Die gemeinsamen Items definieren den gemeinsamen Kern beider Fragebögen.
Der Gemeinsame EVS/WVS wird aus den beiden Quellendatensätzen des EVS und des WVS erstellt: - European Values Study 2017 Integrated Dataset (EVS 2017), ZA7500 Data file Version 5.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.13897 (https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13897). - World Values Survey: Round Seven–Country-Pooled Datafile. Version 5.0.0, doi: 10.14281/18241.20
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There is never a boring year for a scholar of international relations, but, wow, this year was something. The invasion of Ukraine was eclipsed by the Hamas attack and Israel's response. The former created much consensus and unity except for the random tankie. The latter has been incredibly divisive. It was a year of expectations unmet and exceeded. And it was an incredibly angering year as so much could have been avoided, and so much awful has been amplified. I am lucky and privileged, so Musk turning twitter into a far right hellscape was annoying to me but only hurt my hit rate here at the spew. For others, it was quite destructive with death threats and actual violence. Seeing folks start to flee Substack due to tech billionaire greed -- hey, the Nazis pay! -- makes think I was right never to move, and then I have to remember that blogger is owned by google, and google has done a fair amount of evil via gaming its algorithms to get more hits via anger--youtube sending folks to the extremes.Anyhow, that is part of the context for this review. The rest of the context: I blog far less than I once did, averaging a bit more than 2 posts a month, when I used post several times a day. I theoretically have more time to blog as I have been on sabbatical since July, but I haven't. Why not? Partly I write on other social media--bluesky now instead of twitter. Partly because my first reaction is to write something ... that I have written before. I don't need to write a "GOP is the Party of Bad Faith" post since I have already written it. Unto the year in review, which has at least one enthusiastic reader ;)One of the basic rules of legislative politics is not to hold a vote if you think you are going to lose it. Yet Kevin McCarthy held how many rounds of votes to get to be Speaker of the House.... for a while? It made me ponder the Humiliation Index--comparing various actors in how much humiliation they tolerate/encourage.One of my favorite parts of blogging is taking ideas from one place and adjusting them to apply elsewhere. Also one of my fave parts of poli sci-ing and professing. One reason I do media stuff and encourage the sharp people I know to do so is that, well, they and I are, in my not so humble opinion, better than the average pundit. This idea was in my head for sometime, but unlike most such ideas, I hadn't written about it before--value over replacement pundit.Speaking of media stuff, I vented my spleen about a particular journalist who considered himself above the fray, able to judge who is pure of heart (himself) and who isn't (pretty much everyone else).One of the consistent themes of this year, more than any except perhaps the year I went to Israel, was struggling with my Jewish identity as a non-believer. In May, I realized that at least I remember the cardinal lesson of the Holocaust: never again. Which makes me a better Jew than Republican Jews who align with white supremacists.The biggest change in my life this year was the absence of ultimate. I stopped playing in 2022 due to aging out--I can still run, but changing speed or direction or both quickly pull one tendon or muscle too much. So, I had chatgpt wax poetically about the end of my ultimate career and a summer sans ultimate.Another milestone was my first defence trade show! I went to CANSEC thanks to a former participant of the CDSN Summer Institute. No, I didn't buy anything, but I met sharper Carleton students who were part of the sales teams of various producers. The amazing thing was the diversity of products from ammo and artillery and drones to food and clothing and cable (yes, the wires between things) and more. Did going compromise my ability to criticize the defence industry and the government's messed up procurement system since I am a card carrying member of the military-industrial-academic complex? I don't think so, but read my stuff to judge.Speaking about hanging out with the military, I joined a junket (does it count as a junket if my grant money pays and not the hosts?) to Latvia to see what was going in with Canada and with NATO and with the latest in Strategic Communications. I had been there before so it was interesting to see what had changed both in the NATO setup and the base itself. The Latvians were mostly open about stuff, and we all were waiting to be disappointed by the Canadian government (and it did disappoint) as the expected defence review didn't happen. I did write about what I wanted to see in the review, so I got to be extra-disappointed.The highlight of the year was the trip to Spain. First time Mrs. Spew and I euro-tripped! Great food, amazing sights seen. Oh, and a lot of sangria.One of the bigger disappointments of the year was the replacement of Anita Anand as the Minister of National Defence by Bill Blair. Yes, Blair has made some progress on some of the important files, but the more people I talk to in the CAF and DND and the more my first impression was right--this was a hell of a bad signal to send. And then the budget cuts, including those imposed by Anand from her new spot at Treasury Board, helped to demoralize folks further. The P-8 decision--buying an existing plane rather than the vaporware that Bombardier was trying to flog--was the right one and surprising given the temptation to pander to Quebec voters. But overall, people are pretty miffed about how sidelined DND/CAF are now in Canadian priorities at a time where the world is, yes, more threatening. The CDSN highlight of the year is always the Summer Institute, which keeps getting better. It is a great chance to hangout with sharp people from all over the Canadian defence and security community as we had both speakers and participants from the military, from DND, from academia, and from other parts of the government. I get a lot out of it even as we tend to cover similar material from year to year. Just a terrific group this year in large part due to the recruiting efforts of last year's visiting defence fellow--Colonel Cathy Blue.One of the strangest things of 2023 was how politicization of the military became all about ... me? I get accused of thinking everything is about me, which is why I used to joke here about how I am a narcissist, but on this matter, well, oy. It started by my writing about politicization of the US military, as analyzed by Michael Robinson, a very sharp military officer who is a hell of a social scientist (and with whom I have a long lingering project on Japanese public opinion and the Self-Defense Force). It then led to an op-ed where I argued the Conservative Party of Canada should not give a platform at its convention to a cranky retired general. The cranky retiree, Michel Maisoneuve then wrote an op-ed of his own, which was directly aimed at ... moi! Because it was such a crappy argument, I could not resist the temptation to grade it. Oh, and other folks responded as well so I discussed what could not fit into the op-ed.The other strange thing, consistent with the larger theme of "it didn't have to be this way" was the Musking of Twitter. I finally had to leave--too much far right shit from the very top and too much empowering of the same bullshit from other folks. So, I looked back and the moved on to bluesky.One of the best parts of the year was the new kitchen!! The counters took much longer to arrive, but they look great and are easy to clean. The rest of the kitchen was operational in June thanks to our great contractor--Ron. My fave parts are the island with heaps of deep drawers for appliances and baking stuff and its shelves for Nigella and the rest; the double oven so I can make pitas and fillings for the pitas at the same time; the corners that now stow a heap of pots and pans in one and reserves of flour/sugar/chocolate/etc in the other; and the huge sink. And the lighting! Really thrilled with how it worked out with the planning and buying dominating the winter of 2023. Oh, and it made the ever-growing cookiefest so much easier to execute, perhaps encouraging the madness.Heaps of travel towards the end of the year with only short breaks at home. The biggest trip was Seoul and then Copenhagen. First time one trip took me around the world as I flew across Asia from Korea to Denmark. The research in Seoul was challenging--getting people to identify who is really running the military was not easy. The case study remains only partially written due to the difficulty plus heaps of distractions--professional (Year Ahead conference, etc) and personal (skiing with my sister in Utah!). The South Korea research definitely made it clear to me that we are onto something--a relevant, interesting topic.While surveys have shown that academics are censoring themselves about Israel-Palestine, my initial reluctance to write/talk about it was more about confusion/ambivalence/anger. So, when I saw references by both sides to "From the River to the Sea," s, building on my old work on irredentism. And then I just wrote angry.Another recurring theme for the past few years but especially this one: maybe there are two sides to the political spectrum, but one side is where the danger is coming from. It is not close.The year ended with a special anniversary--30 years of being a PhD. I am increasingly aware of how long I have been doing this. Earlier in the year, I was very conscious of how lucky I have been, how much I owe people, and just being grateful. And, with a great ski trip crashing my sister's ski clinic and heaps of cookies, the year ended well and I am very, very grateful. The next year will also be full of travel and skiing and three months of Europe. Hopefully, a book contract too. Enjoy your holidays and happy new year!