Renuncia de Pervez MusharrafEn medio de una grave crisis política y acorralado por la oposición, el presidente de Paquistán, Pervez Musharraf, anunció el pasado lunes su renuncia para evitar un juicio político.Después de derrocar al primer ministro Nawaz Sharif en octubre de 1999, Musharraf comenzó su presidencia con el apoyo de un público harto de una década de gobierno civil débil y corrupto.Estuvo nueve años frente a un gobierno cuya legitimidad democrática fue fuertemente cuestionada y, a pesar de eso, se convirtió en uno de los más férreos aliados de Estados Unidos en la "guerra contra el terrorismo". Varios medios informan al respecto:"New York Times":"Musharraf Announces His Resignation":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/19/world/asia/19pstan.html?ref=world"Musharraf Walked a Tightrope":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/19/world/asia/19assess.html?ref=world"Time":"Why Musharraf Failed":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1833820,00.html"Time" presenta página con fotografías: "The Rise and Fall of Pervez Musharraf":http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1833621_1752568,00.html"CNN":"Musharraf's resignation accepted":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/08/18/musharraf.address/index.html"Coalition charts Pakistan's future":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/08/19/pakistan.nextstep/index.html"Pakistan hospital bomb kills 23":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/08/19/pakistan.blast/index.html"La Nación":"La renuncia de Musharraf: Un arma de doble filo":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1041155"La India teme una escalada de terror en Cachemira: Advierten sobre un vacío de poder":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1041048"Musharraf dejó el poder en Paquistán: El mandatario, uno de los principales aliados de Bush, presentó la renuncia para evitar un juicio político; dudas sobre su sucesor":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1041046"Para EE.UU. un aliado crucial pero incómodo":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1041047"Times":"Pakistani coalition in crucial stability talks after Pervez Musharraf's resignation":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4563675.ece"Pervez Musharraf resigns as Pakistani President":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4555777.ece"After nine years in a dangerous job, where can Pervez Musharraf hide now?":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4561318.ece"Pervez Musharraf's speech: the key extracts. Key quotes from the emotional resignation speech of Pervez Musharraf, the former president and ally of the West":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4556726.ece"Q&A: what next for Pervez Musharraf and Pakistan?":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4556746.ece"El Mercurio":"Pakistán es el principal socio de Washington en esa región: Renuncia de Musharraf hace tambalear alianza con EE.UU.":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/19/internacional/internacional/noticias/A240D029-C057-4C2C-980D-518E43347867.htm?id={A240D029-C057-4C2C-980D-518E43347867}"Inestabilidad en Pakistán, aliado clave de EE.UU. contra el terrorismo: Tras caída de Musharraf, gobierno entra en crisis por disputa interna":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/20/internacional/internacional/noticias/7213839A-DFCD-4055-ADA1-E8424AF85CF5.htm?id={7213839A-DFCD-4055-ADA1-E8424AF85CF5"The Economist":"Exit Musharraf: Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, jumps before he is pushed":http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11950470&source=features_box2"Time's up, Mr Musharraf : Enemies of Pakistan's president smell blood":http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11921205"Miami Herald":"Week ahead may be key for Musharraf: President Pervez Musharraf and the Pakistan government are headed for a decisive showdown this week.":http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/story/646219.html"Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf resigns":http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/story/646341.html"Pakistan upheaval clouds future for U.S.: Pervez Musharraf bid a tearful farewell as Pakistan's president as the future of the country and its role as an ally in the U.S. war against terrorism remains unclear.":http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/story/647478.html"El País" de Madrid:"Musharraf deja el poder en Pakistán: El presidente intenta evitar el procesamiento impulsado por sus rivales políticos - La renuncia abre la transición en un país con bombas atómicas y muy inestable":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Musharraf/deja/poder/Pakistan/elpepuint/20080819elpepiint_1/Tes"El brazo ejecutor de Bush: Los paquistaníes dieron la espalda hace tiempo al hombre que se entregó de lleno a Washington en la lucha contra los grupos islámicos radicales":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/brazo/ejecutor/Bush/elpepuint/20080819elpepiint_3/Tes"El Gobierno indio teme una escalada de violencia en Cachemira: Nueva Delhi asegura que la marcha del general beneficiará a los radicales":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Gobierno/indio/teme/escalada/violencia/Cachemira/elpepuint/20080819elpepiint_2/TesAMERICA LATINA"El País" de Madrid informa: "Chávez expropia la filial de la cementera mexicana Cemex: El Gobierno venezolano nacionaliza también a las empresas Holcim y Lafarge":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/Chavez/expropia/filial/cementera/mexicana/Cemex/elpepueco/20080819elpepueco_1/Tes"El Universal" publica: "Reeditan jóvenes cubanos invasión de 1958 por 50 años de revolución: Jóvenes estudiantes, combatientes y trabajadores conformarán dos columnas como las que dirigieron los comandantes Ernesto Che Guevara y Camilo Cienfuegos":http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/531209.html"The Economist" analiza: "Evo's big win: A recall referendum strengthens the socialist president, but fails to knock out his opponents in a still-divided country": http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11920813"El Mercurio" anuncia: "Evo refuerza guarnición militar de Santa Cruz":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/19/internacional/internacional/noticias/96536F05-B06D-4101-9614-B4F693AF3951.htm?id={96536F05-B06D-4101-9614-B4F693AF3951}"CNN" publica: "Argentina grants gay couples partner pensions":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/08/19/argentina.gay/index.html"El Mercurio" de Chile anuncia: "Agrarios vuelven a las rutas y amenazan con un nuevo paro": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/19/internacional/internacional/noticias/7E786FA3-0DF3-45D1-A873-B96F2707386C.htm?id={7E786FA3-0DF3-45D1-A873-B96F2707386C} "El Universal" de México analiza: "Suspenden temporalmente construcción del 'muro virtual'. La instalación de varias torres de vigilancia en la frontera entre EU y México no recibió los permisos necesarios por parte del Departamento del Interior": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/531231.html"El Mercurio" de Chile informa: "Presidente de Paraguay inicia gestión de gobierno: Lugo firma cien decretos y se enfoca en problemas sociales":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/19/internacional/_portada/noticias/7E7DA240-2CB7-4F0D-8266-920F93222AEB.htm?id={7E7DA240-2CB7-4F0D-8266-920F93222AEB}"The Economist" publica: "Peru: Lessons from an earthquake": http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11920805"La Nación" publica informe de Andrés Oppenheimer: "La concentración de riqueza en la región":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1041051ESTADOS UNIDOS / CANADA"New York Times" informa: "Export Boom Helps Farms, but Not American Factories":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/18/business/economy/18export.html?_r=1&ref=business&oref=slogin"El País" de Madrid publica: "Obama entra en la hora de la verdad: El aspirante demócrata se ve presionado para concretar su oferta de cambio - La campaña se convierte en un referéndum sobre su aptitud para gobernar": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Obama/entra/hora/verdad/elpepuint/20080818elpepiint_1/Tes"Time" anuncia: "Obama Sharpens the Message":http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1833849,00.html"Time" informa: "McCain and Obama on Abortion":http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1833496,00.html"El Mercurio" de Chile analiza: "Obama crea consejo para latinos en búsqueda de votantes":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/19/internacional/_portada/noticias/A842100D-7376-4358-96E1-CD719EF5321F.htm?id={A842100D-7376-4358-96E1-CD719EF5321F}"Time" publica sitio con links a artículos sobre elecciones estadounidenses:http://thepage.time.com/"The Economist" analiza: "Technology and the campaigns: "Flickring here, twittering there":http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11920873EUROPAContinua conflicto entre Rusia y Georgia, varios medios informan al respecto: "El País" de Madrid:"Rice: "Rusia está jugando un juego muy peligroso".EE UU pretende que la OTAN reafirme hoy en una reunión extraordinaria en Bruselas su apoyo a Georgia": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Rice/Rusia/jugando/juego/peligroso/elpepuint/20080819elpepuint_5/Tes"El Kremlin incumple su compromiso de retirar las tropas. Los blindados rusos permanecen apostados a 40 kilómetros de Tbilisi":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Kremlin/incumple/compromiso/retirar/tropas/elpepiint/20080819elpepiint_9/Tes"La retirada que no llega. Georgia sigue denunciando que los rusos se resisten a abandonar el país.- Moscú sostiene que el repliegue llevará días.- Rusos y georgianos intercambian prisioneros":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/retirada/llega/elpepuint/20080819elpepuint_7/Tes"Moscú advierte que aplastará a todo el que ataque a ciudadanos rusos. "El crimen de Tbilisi no quedará impune", dice el presidente Medvédev - Rusia despliega misiles en Osetia del Sur, según el espionaje de EE UU": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Moscu/advierte/aplastara/todo/ataque/ciudadanos/rusos/elpepuint/20080819elpepiint_8/Tes"CNN":"NATO officials meet over Russia-Georgia crisis":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/19/georgia.russia.war/index.html"La Nación": "Rusia advierte que necesita más tiempo para retirar sus tropas: Dijo que necesita otros dos días para el repliegue en Georgia; se realizó un canje de prisioneros entre ambos países":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1041163"Rusia refuerza su despliegue militar en Osetia del Norte. La OTAN analizará hoy una respuesta":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1041087"El Tiempo" de Colombia:"La Otan endurece su postura y revisará sus relaciones con Moscú":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/home/la-otan-endurece-su-postura-y-revisara-sus-relaciones-con-moscu_4455099-1"Times":"Cross us and we will crush you, warns Medvedev":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4557369.ece"La France "très déçue" par l'absence de retrait russe":http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/08/19/l-otan-durcit-le-ton-face-a-la-russie_1085355_3214.html#ens_id=1036786"Time":"Wounded NATO Grapples with Russia":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1833830,00.html"The Economist":"NATO and Russia: No more business as usual?. NATO foreign ministers issue a warning to Russia, telling it to withdraw troops from Georgia":http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11955660&source=features_box_main"The week ahead: Seeking an end to the conflict in Georgia, and other news":http://www.economist.com/world/international/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11922405&source=features_box_main"El Mercurio" de Chile:"Conflicto en el Cáucaso: Rusia rechaza la propuesta de resolución francesa en el Consejo de Seguridad de ONU":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/20/internacional/_portada/noticias/F8364AC9-CEC5-4076-97BC-425406510D93.htm?id={F8364AC9-CEC5-4076-97BC-425406510D93}"Miami Herald":"NATO yet to enforce Russian withdrawal. An emergency meeting of NATO failed to come up with decisive action over Russia's continued occupation of Georgia.":http://www.miamiherald.com/news/world/story/649058.html"El Universal" de México:"Califica Rusia de 'inadmisible' declaración de la OTANPara el embajador ruso ante el organismo fue lamentable que las declaraciones de los aliados contra las acciones militares en Georgia fueran mal vistas":http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/531238.html"El País" de Madrid informa: "El terrorista más joven arrestado en el Reino Unido es declarado culpable: Hammaad Munshi, de 18 años, tenía 16 años cuando ingresó en prisión, acusado de un delito de terrorismo":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/terrorista/joven/arrestado/Reino/Unido/declarado/culpable/elpepuint/20080818elpepuint_9/Tes"El Mercurio" anuncia: "Diez soldados murieron en Afganistán: Sarkozy llega a Kabul tras ataque a tropas francesas":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/20/internacional/internacional/noticias/FC48E401-28D9-4629-94AD-6F53B246A964.htm?id={FC48E401-28D9-4629-94AD-6F53B246A964"El País" publica: "Francia propone un "respuesta coordinada" de la UE para salir de la crisis económica. Nicolas Sarkozy lanzará un plan en la reunión de los titulares de Finanzas de la UE del 11 al 13 de septiembre en Niza.- El PIB de la Eurozona retrocedió un 0,2% en el segundo trimestre.- El de Francia, cayó por primera vez en seis años":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/Francia/propone/respuesta/coordinada/UE/salir/crisis/economica/elpepuint/20080818elpepueco_6/TesAsia – Pacífico /Medio OrieNTE"El País" de Madrid informa: "Mueren 10 soldados franceses en una emboscada en Afganistán. Seis talibanes suicidas mueren en un ataque a una base estadounidense en Afganistán":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Mueren/soldados/franceses/emboscada/Afganistan/elpepuint/20080819elpepuint_6/Tes"Times" anuncia: "Ten French soldiers killed in Taleban ambush":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4564729.ece"CNN" publica: "10 French soldiers killed in Afghan fighting":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/08/19/afghan.attack/index.html"El País" de Madrid informa: "Sueños rotos: El abandono de Liu es un drama nacional porque el atleta representa el ascenso chino": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/deportes/Suenos/rotos/elpepidep/20080819elpepidep_6/Tes"La Nación" publica: "El terrorismo islámico amenaza a China: Grupos musulmanes separatistas lanzaron una ola de atentados para atraer la atención mundial":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1041049"The Economist" analiza: "Beijing's economy: Going for gold. The Olympics have not brought Beijing's businesses the boom they hoped for":http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11920899"Le Monde" informa: "Le Hezbollah amorce un rapprochement avec les salafistes sunnites au Liban":http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2008/08/19/le-hezbollah-amorce-un-rapprochement-avec-les-salafistes-sunnites-au-liban_1085407_3218.html"Time" publica: "Thailand, Cambodia Begin Talks":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1833857,00.htmlAFRICA"Al menos 43 muertos en un atentado suicida contra una escuela de la Gendarmería en Argelia. Un terrorista se ha inmolado entre los aspirantes a reclutas en una academia policial de Issers, a 55 kilómetros de Argel.- Hay numerosas personas heridas":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/43/muertos/atentado/suicida/escuela/gendarmeria/Argelia/elpepuint/20080819elpepuint_8/Tes"CNN" publica: "43 dead in Algerian suicide bombing":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/08/19/algeria.bombing/index.html"Times" informa: "Islamist bombing kills 43 in Algeria 'bloodbath'":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article4565997.ece"Le Monde" anuncia: "43 morts dans un attentat-suicide en Kabylie":http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2008/08/19/43-morts-dans-un-attentat-suicide-en-kabylie_1085371_3212.html"CNN" informa: "Zimbabwe inflation hits 11,200,000 percent":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/08/19/zimbabwe.inflation/index.html"CNN" publica: "Nigeria cedes disputed peninsula to Cameroon":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/08/14/nigeria.cameroon.ap/index.html "The Economist" analiza: "Uganda: Drums of war across the borders. Since peace talks with Uganda's rebels collapsed, some say war must resume": http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11921621ECONOMIA"The Economist" publica su informe semanal: "Business this week":http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11922152"New York Times" publica: "Wall Street Pulls Back as Financials Fall":http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/business/AP-Wall-Street.html?ref=business"CNN" informa: "Oil prices still sliding as storm fears ease":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/08/19/oil.prices.ap/index.html"CNN" anuncia: "The next wave of mortgage defaults: More borrowers with good credit are defaulting on their home loans, and that's going to make it even harder for the staggering housing market to recover.":http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/12/real_estate/prime_defaults_price_drops/index.htm?postversion=2008081616"The Economist" analiza: "Airlines: Still a bumpy ride. Falling oil prices have lifted airlines' share prices. Is the crisis over?":http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11920681OTRAS NOTICIAS"El País" de Madrid informa: "La ONU pide 40 millones de euros para asistir a las víctimas de la guerra en el Cáucaso: Los fondos serán destinados a nueve agencias del organismo y 16 ONG":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/ONU/pide/millones/euros/asistir/victimas/guerra/Caucaso/elpepuint/20080819elpepuint_2/Tes"CNN" publica: "Hurricane warnings dropped after Fay makes landfall":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/weather/08/19/fay/index.html"El Tiempo" de Colombia anuncia: "Fortalecida tormenta tropical 'Fay' causa destrozos e inundaciones en Florida":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/euycanada/home/fortalecida-tormenta-tropical-fay-causa-destrozos-e-inundaciones-en-florida-_4456556-1"El País" de Madrid informa: "Fay llega a Florida y amenaza con fortalecerse: La tormenta tropical viene acompañada de fuertes lluvias y vientos - Su paso por Cuba no ha causado víctimas ni destrozos": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Fay/llega/Florida/amenaza/fortalecerse/elpepuint/20080819elpepuint_1/Tes "The Economist" analiza: "Globalisation and health care: Operating profit . Why put up with expensive, run-of-the-mill health care at home when you can be treated just as well abroad?":http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11919622
The subject of this study – The Youth in Croatia and the European Integration – is the relationship of youth toward the European integration process, including the Croatian accession to the European Union, as well as their sociopolitical readiness for integration into a united Europe. The analysis is based on a section of data gathered in early 2004, on the entire Croatian territory, and conducted within the scientific and research project Youth and the European Integration Process. The basic sample of youth, aged 15 to 29, consisted of 2000 examinees, and the control sample of persons older than 30 consisted of 1000 examinees. The obtained findings on youth have been systematically compared to results from the previous research project, The Value System of Youth and Social Changes in Croatia, conducted in early 1999, on an identically structured sample of 1700 young examinees. Data on Croatian youth has also been compared to the corresponding findings of several European researches. European integration is a dynamic and multidimensional process, and in this research, the accent was on the political and normative dimensions of integration. The genesis of the political development of European Union has indicated that, in spite of the oscillations in the process of integration, there is a recognizable progress toward the construction of a Europe of values, where all the included countries meet with equally high democratic demands. The existing research into the European integration process has undoubtedly shown that the relationship of citizens toward the EU varies as a function of time, and depends on the specific situation in certain countries or societies. Croatia is a transitional country that has stepped into the process of democratic consolidation, and after the year 2000, it had also stepped out of a certain kind of international isolation. Today, Croatia is a country trying to join the united Europe, which has managed to obtain the status of a candidate country for accession into the EU, albeit with an uncertain date for accession negotiations. Even though the main obstacle for the start of negotiations is supposedly the lack of satisfaction of the EU with the Croatian cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, the existing tendencies and events in the country indicate that Croatia is not adequately prepared to join the Union: not at the political, nor the social, and especially not at the economic plain. The indicated findings are also the starting points in the research of the relationship of Croatian youth toward the European integration process. A valid analysis of this relationship demands a previous insight into some aspects of the political readiness of youth for European integration of Croatia. With that in mind, special attention was dedicated to political values, attitudes and participation of youth, whose longitudinal monitoring enables a detection of changes that took place during the past five years. The data comparison showed that during the observed period of time, the young people' s otherwise relatively high acceptance of almost all the constitutional values, as well as the harmonious perception of politics and institutional trust have increased, while the lack of hard work, discipline and responsibility are now perceived as a social problem to a greater extent than before. The recent data also indicates that today' s youth perceive the existence of educational, gender and age inequalities in the Croatian society to a larger degree, as well as the worsening of political representation of all marginal groups. On the other hand, the understanding of conflicts and democratic rules (especially the role of the opposition) has weakened, the perception of crime in ownership conversion and privatization as a problem has decreased, there is also a weaker perception of the existence of social and religious inequalities, the social activism and political participation have decreased, and the attitude about inclusion into youth organizations of political parties and the establishment of independent youth parties as forms of activities that might contribute to a more active participation of youth in the society has decreased. From hence comes the conclusion that certain changes tend to lead to further social, most of all political, (self)passivization and marginalization of young people. The continuity of tendencies established in the previous research projects, confirm the finding that the young are not a monolithic group when it comes to acceptance of political values, expression of political attitudes and the level of political participation. The greatest differentiation is present regarding the not so present tolerance toward most observed social phenomena and groups, the perception of unemployment as the most important social problem and the cause of existing difficulties, the perception of existence of political inequalities and the stated interest in politics, as well as the perception of the role of the " diaspora" in the Croatian political life. When these results are observed integrally, it is obvious that the young are mostly differentiated by the level of obtained knowledge and their socio-professional status, then party identification, social origin and the phase of maturity. All the mentioned differentiations of youth can simply be summarized by outlining two large, relatively polarized groups: one consists of socially more competent youth, inclined to the ideological and political options of the left center, and the other consists of a socially inferior youth, inclined toward the right pole of the ideological-political spectrum. The socially more competent youth is more liberal, more critical toward the social reality and the political actors, they manifest a greater respect for democratic institutions and procedures, which is an indicator of the importance of favorable circumstances in the process of political socialization. The recent data enabled us to establish the existence of inter-generational differences, which are not enormous but are significant. The comparative analysis of the attitudes of both the young and the older examinees, demonstrated that the young state a higher degree of trust in the media than the older examinees, that they are more tolerant toward a number of social phenomena and groups, which cause dispute both in the Croatian and the European public opinion arena, as well as more sensitive regarding ethnic inequalities. The young perceive war as the main cause of current difficulties to a greater extent than the elders, they have considerably more trust in their own generation as a social force that could initiate positive trends, they express a greater readiness for inclusion in different civil society activities, and believe more that television and youth organizations could mobilize them into active participation in social affairs. At the same time, the young are slower than the older examinees to accept the value of a democratic order, however, they are also less prone to have a harmonious understanding of politics, they are less socially sensitive, they express less trust in the institutions of power, the socioeconomic goals and the preservation of tradition are less often among their political priorities, they less often think immorality and criminal activities in the privatization process are the cause of current problems, they perceive a smaller level of corruption in all areas of social life (aside from education), they believe less in the positive contribution of experts and entrepreneurs to overcoming the trends of crisis, they are less interested in politics and participate less in political parties, and they have a smaller level of faith in the mobilization role of education for democracy, volunteer work, political parties and non-governmental organizations, as well as the contribution of the family and education system in the stimulation of the young people' s social engagement. The established inter-generational differentiation can be explained through the life cycle theory, meaning the mentioned differences are mostly the effect of differing social statuses and the complete experiences of the young and the older examinees. That means that most young people have not assumed some of the permanent social roles, and that their immediate experiences are limited only to some social areas among which politics do not have a prominent place. The existing inter-generational differences are also the result of the fact that most older examinees draw on their experience gained in a different social and political regime, which to a certain measure forms their existing system of political values that is, in certain elements, especially those related to the social dimension, different than the youth' s system of political values. On the other hand, the congruence of the young and older examinees is contributed to by a common experience of an era, that is, life in a specific socio-historic period. The absence of deep inter-generational ambiguities also indicates that, in spite of the radical changes that have appeared through the decomposition of the old and the set-up of a new social and political order, the mechanism for transposing political values from the older generations to the young ones, functions to a considerable degree, along with the transfer of the shortcomings that exist in the structured political awareness of the older generation. Even though it was established that the youth in Croatia accept the traditional values to a smaller degree compared to the elders, the young are at the same time somewhat more conservative in certain areas than their European counterparts. Pointing to this finding is the greater orientation of the Croatian youth toward the family and a smaller extent of tolerance of certain phenomena and groups in the contemporary society. At that, the social participation of the Croatian young generation is at a lower level than the participation of their European peers. The attitude toward human rights is also one of the indicators of political preparedness of Croatian youth for integration into a democratic Europe, which promotes high standards in the protection of human rights and freedoms. The research results about the evaluation of individual human rights and freedoms, show that the youth accept the right to an education, the right to work and personal security, the right to privacy, the social protection of the elderly and those in other precarious situations, the equality before the law, the rights of women and the right to ownership the most. The analysis has shown that the preference of individual human rights and freedoms is not caused by the observed socio-demographic and socio-structural characteristics of the young, aside from education, which points to the significance of the education system as an agent of improvement of the state of human rights. Approximately a third of the young examinees were not satisfied with the respect for human rights in Croatia today nor were they satisfied five years ago, the percentage of the undecided has decreased in that period of time, and the number of those that think human rights in Croatia are mostly or completely respected has increased. The results of the analysis of social attributes of youth indicate that the ability of assessment and a higher degree of criticism toward the status of human rights in Croatia is related to life in economically more prosperous regions, a left ideological-political orientation as well as the female gender. The comparison of the evaluation of the contribution of institutions, organizations and significant individuals in the population of youth in 1999 and in 2004, established that the generation of youth today perceives a higher level of contribution of all observed participants (except for the opposition) to the protection of human rights and freedoms in Croatia. More precisely, most of the young assess that all the participants, completely or mostly, contribute to the realization of human rights in Croatia, which especially refers to the perception of the contribution of the highest institutions of power. The perception of the status of human rights in Croatia and the contribution of the observed actors to the realization of those rights, are considerably highly influenced by regional affiliation and party identification, followed by their social background, their gender and the religious self-identification of the young. The comparison of acceptance of the observed human rights and freedoms of the populations of young and older examinees in Croatia, indicates that the elders accept most individual human rights and freedoms more than the young, and that they also express less criticism toward today' s respect for those rights and freedoms in Croatia, while validating the contribution of all the observed actors to a higher degree. To summarize, the analysis has shown that the young accept human rights and freedoms very highly at the level of principle, but that there is a certain disagreement when it comes to concrete rights and practices in Croatia. Even though the degree of acceptance of the value of human rights and freedoms is high among the young, there are also deviations indicating an increased need for additional engagement of certain agents of socialization, especially the education system and the political actors. The national affiliation of youth is another indicator relevant to its relationship toward the European integration. The research has shown that the attitude most represented with the youth is one of moderate national identification, then the ones signifying an openness toward the world, while ethno-centric statements are at the back of the obtained hierarchy. The attitude that had demonstrated the highest representation of national identification is for the first time at the top of the rank in all our research projects, just as it is evident that nationally tinted attitudes, both moderate and extreme, are more represented now than in 1986 or in 1999. Such an increase of the national affiliation of the young can be interpreted by the fact that there is more emphasis on existential problems and that there is a higher uncertainty regarding the future, then the increase of differences between the rich and the poor, as well as a smaller degree of trust in the political leadership. The immediate confrontation with this type of social instability, results in a search for safer modes of relationships with other people, the society as a whole and some of its parts, where the nation represents one of the safe havens, much like family and church. However, it is necessary to emphasize that the attitudes of openness toward the world are quite stabile, and that they are often complementary instead of being opposite to attitudes of national identification. At the same time, this points to the complexity of the problem of national affiliation and the fact that it does not have to be exclusive, but can actually coexist with attitudes that enhance the process of European association. Regarding their national affiliation the young are, of course, not homogenous. The results of the analysis have shown that the nationally oriented youth is significantly more religious than the others, they prefer the conservative parties, live in Dalmatia, Central and Eastern Croatia, they originate more often from rural areas and families, where the father has a lower degree of education, they personally have a lower level of education and, within the youth sample, they belong to the youngest age cohort (age 15 to 19), and the groups of pupils and the unemployed. On the other hand, a significantly lower national affiliation is expressed by youth coming from the Istrian, Zagreb and Northern Croatia provenience, those indecisive about religion or atheists, youth of urban background and a higher family and personal education status. However, regarding cosmopolitism, the young demonstrate significantly more homogenous results. It is especially indicative that the more ethno-centric examinees and, to a smaller degree, those with a pronounced national identification, more often have a negative perception of the European Union, while the nationally more exclusive examinees refuse to even support the accession of Croatia into the European Union. The examination of the social (ethnic) distance toward certain nations has demonstrated that the young have put members of the former Yugoslav federation and Russians at the back of the scale, while, with an under-average evaluation, the center of the scale is occupied by members of certain Central and Eastern European nations (the Czech and the Hungarian). Inhabitants of the European Western and Southwestern territories, especially the Italians, which occupy the first position after form the Croats, and the Germans, demonstrate satisfactory results just by being evaluated by average grades. However, the degree of social closeness that the young citizens of Croatia feel toward other Croatian men and women, indicates a certain dose of self-criticism, because approximately one third of the young do not feel an especially high level of affinity toward, for the most part, their own nationals. The older examinees differ from the young in that they more pronouncedly represent attitudes at the center of the national affiliation scale, as well as indicate a higher ethnical distance on average. However, the fact is that, in spite of the existence of inter-generational differences when it comes to national affiliation where the older examinees dominate, there are also inter-generational differences that indicate a better position of the youngest examinees in our sample (aged 15 to 19). This phenomenon has already been described in literature by the so-called U-curve, which vividly illustrates a higher national affiliation of individuals at their earlier and later periods of life. Thus, the greater national affiliation, on the one hand, seems to appear as an expression of an adolescent transitional crisis, and on the other, as a consequence of a long-term perseverance of the perception and production of (most probably) negative experiences with a specific out-group. The relationship of the examinees toward the European integration and the European Union has been investigated via numerous indicators, where the emphasis was on the perception of the possible consequences of Croatian accession to the EU. However, other aspects of the relationship toward Europe and the EU have been the object of research, presenting a wider context for understanding the perception of consequences of joining the Union. The obtained results demonstrated that most of the young and of the older examinees in Croatia actually had a neutral image of the EU, even though those with a positive image exceed those that perceive the EU negatively. Actually, nine tenths of the examinees have in the beginning of 2004, supported the Croatian integration into the Union, but among those examinees, there is a highest number of euro-skeptics, that is, those that believe that too much is expected from the accession. At the same time, there were considerably less euro-enthusiasts (those that expect all-around benefits from the integration) and euro-realists (who believe that integration is inevitable for the survival of small countries). As for the difficulties standing in the way of the Croatian road to a united Europe, the examinees had equally addressed them to both Croatia and the European Union, however, the number of young emphasizing the accountability of the EU has increased from 1999 to 2004, and the number of those accenting Croatia' s responsibility has, in the same period of time, decreased. The finding that the young expect significantly more positive than negative consequences after the Croatian accession into the European Union, is especially important. However, in this regard, there has been a mild decrease in the expectation of the positive, and an increase of the negative consequences among the young during the last five years. The highest positive expectations have been registered at the individual and the socio-cultural planes, while the optimism regarding the socio-economic progress has decreased. Indeed, the lack of socio-economic preparedness of Croatia for the entrance into the developed European surrounding is expected to yield the most negative consequences. The research of the expected development of the EU in the coming ten years, has shown that only the possibility of easier travel, work, study and life in Europe is expected by most of the examinees, especially the young ones. The young are quite fearful of the costs Croatia might have from the integration and of the worsening position of the agricultural population. The negative conesquences expecting their own country are, however, less perceived by the youth in Croatia, than by their counterparts in Europe. Related to the fears from the construction of a united Europe and European Union, we have established that the youth in Croatia is most afraid of the abolition of the Croatian currency and the increase of crime, and its smallest fear has to do with the potential loss of social privileges. The fears of examinees in the enlarged Europe are somewhat different – the most expressed fear is that of labor transfer into other countries, the increase of crime and drug trade, the difficulties expecting the farmers and the price their country has to pay due to the development of the EU. Both the young and the old examinees in Croatia are less worried about the loss of national identity, language and their social privileges than the European examinees. All our examinees emphasize the multiple benefits of the EU enlargement, followed by the positive effects of that enlargement for Croatia, while the efforts of the Croatian government, regarding the accession to the Union, are valued quite poorly. The potential accession of Croatia into the European Union shall also signify a change in the decision-making process, meaning that some of those decisions will be reached at the national level, and some jointly with the EU. Our examinees have, in this regard, demonstrated a high level of readiness for integration, because more than half of them believes that four fifths of the observed areas should be the object of joint decision-making by the EU and Croatia. The only areas in which, in the opinion of the young examinees, Croatia should decide autonomously are the acceptance of refugees, the judiciary, culture, agriculture, fisheries and the police. The Europeans differ in their opinions on these issues from the Croats, and believe two thirds of the observed affairs should be decided on jointly by their country and the EU, while their country should be autonomous in deciding about education, basic rules about the media, health and social care and unemployment. Different social groups have, based on the perception of youth, been grouped into potential losers of the integration (farmers, the retired, workers, the unemployed), potential winners of the integration process (such as the inhabitants of the capital and certain regions, the young, as well as the Croatian population as a whole), and certain winners of the process of integration, which are also the best prepared for Croatian accession into the EU (experts, foreign language speakers, the political elite, managers, large companies). Actually, it was shown that the young consider the social groups which are in a relatively better position in the Croatian society today to be the greatest winners of EU integration, and those whose current status is unenviable, who are in the greatest need of a better future, were perceived as those that will potentially gain the least. The only encouraging fact is that the young are seeing themselves as the potential winners, meaning they believe the existing abilities and potentials of the young generation only need optimal circumstances in order to reach their peak. However, the data about the knowledge of foreign languages in Croatia are not very exhilarating, especially compared to the knowledge of foreign languages of the youth in the European Union countries. Within this research, we have also found that approximately three quarters of our examinees are proud of being Croatian citizens, while around half of the young, and somewhat less of the elders are proud to be European. The young are the ones to be more critical toward their national identity, and at the same time they lead in the positive validation of their European identity. However, the most interesting finding concerns the fact that all the Croatian examinees feel less national pride than the inhabitants of the European Union, while it is understandable that the examinees in the EU emphasize their pride of being European more. The answers of the examinees regarding the question about the contents of the concept " being a citizen of the European Union" indicate that neither the young, nor the older examinees posses a coherent understanding of the EU citizenship. Still, the right to work, live and study in any EU member, represents the key element for the understanding of EU citizenship, both with the young people in Croatia and with the youth in the Union. The young and the older Croatian examinees believe that active suffrage is the least important, regardless of whether the elections in question include the European Parliament, the national or the local representative bodies. Only one out of four Croatian examinees believes the Croatian membership in the EU might benefit them personally, while almost half of all the young and a third of the older examinees do not posses a defined opinion on this issue. It is clear that this feeling is closely related to the question of the personal meaning the European Union holds for the examinees, where neither the young nor the elders have a homogenous perception of the meaning of the EU. A single response appeared in an above-average number of cases – the EU is a way of creating a better future for the young – while the claim that the EU signifies a sort of " European government" , superimposed to the national states which are members of the Union, received a small level of support. Unlike that, the young from the Union countries emphasize the freedom of movement most often, while in time, the very concept of " European government" became more pronounced in the attitudes of the European youth. The young people in Croatia, as well as in the EU, express an equally small level of fear of the euro-bureaucracy, the loss of cultural diversity and the utopian idea of Europe. Considering the readiness of the young to live outside of Croatian borders, we have found that almost two fifths of them would like to live (and work and study) abroad for a while, while a quarter of the Croatian youth would like to leave the country forever. The older examinees, on the other hand, demonstrate a higher level of conservativeness toward the possible departure of their children into one of the countries of the Union, but they are, however, ready to accept their possible studying and training in the EU, while only one out of seven examinees would like his/her children to permanently live or spend their entire working life in one of the countries, which are members of the European Union. The analysis of the differentiation of the young in their relationship toward the European integration and the EU, has indicated that the used social characteristics have a limited influence. In other words, the young are relatively homogenous in their perception of a united Europe and the expectations from the Croatian accession to the European Union. However, certain differences do exist, and they are mostly caused by party identification, socio-professional status, regional affiliation and religious self-identification. This means that the most influential attributes, when it comes to attitudes toward the European integration process, are the ones consisting of ideological-political attitudes and the current social status along with the specifics of the wider environment. Thus, we have found that the sympathizers of parties that belong to the left center, then pupils and students, the inhabitants of the more developed regions and the non-religious examinees are more inclined toward the EU and the integration process, and at that, they emphasize the positive consequences and the potential gains from the Croatian accession into the Union, more than they express their concerns with the negative consequences. Hence, the concise conclusion would be that the greater social competence of the young is reflected in the establishment of a stable and more consistent pro-European orientation. Otherwise, the young differ from their older counterparts in their higher expectance of positive effects from the Croatian integration into the EU and, at the same time, in the lower perception of expected problems and undesirable consequences. Considering information sources and the level of information of the young in Croatia, the results show that the young follow the news in all the media outlets relatively often, but that they do lag behind the older examinees, and the examinees coming from the former EU candidate countries. This finding does not apply only to the use of the Internet as a source of information, where the young people are far superior to the older examinees. With that in mind, it is interesting that the young differ the most among each other, in the use of Internet and the reading of daily newspapers, where the socially more qualified young examinees (the more educated, coming from an urban environment and richer regions and averagely older ones) are the ones that use both media for obtaining information more often. As for the contents the examinees look for in the media, it is visible that the young are much more interested in events from the social and cultural life, and much less in issues related to politics. A comparison with the examinees from 13 countries that were EU candidates, demonstrated that they are far more interested in all the contents (aside from sports) than the Croatian examinees. Regarding the assessment of their own level of information about the EU, somewhat more than half of the young have stated that they are well informed about the European Union and events in it, compared to two thirds of the older examinees believing they are well informed. On the other hand, the results of both the young and the older examinees are surprisingly high, compared to the data on the level of information of the inhabitants in the 25 countries of the European Union, where three quarters of the examinees thought they were poorly informed about the issue. Closely related to the question of the level of information about the European Union itself, is the question about the general level of information about the Croatian accession to that association. The results demonstrate a somewhat different trend than the previous finding. In this case, less than half of the young consider themselves to be well informed about the process. It is interesting that the identically gathered data on this issue, from the former EU candidate countries, yielded a much lower evaluation by the examinees on their own level of information. Regarding issues and problems related to the EU that the examinees would like more information on, we have established that both the youth in Croatia and the examinees from the former EU candidate countries, find issues related to the Union' s policy on youth and education to be the most interesting, followed by the economy and social policy. Along with that, the issues regarding the enlargement of the EU, the cultural policy, the international relations, the regional policy and the EU budget are the ones the young find to be the least interesting. The manner in which the examinees gather information on the European Union mostly include the mass media outlets (the press, the television and the radio), and only then other forms of information gathering, such as discussions with their families and friends, surfing the Internet, specialized books and other published material, and the activities of non-governmental organizations. There are no significant differences in the use of the stated sources of information between the young and the older examinees, except in the case of the Internet. Considering the examinees from the 25 EU member countries, they use all of the observed sources as a way of getting information about the European Union, its policies and institutions, in a smaller amount. The examination of the objective knowledge of the examinees on specific issues related to the European Union has yielded devastating results. Thus, when asked about the phase Croatia was in, regarding the accession process into the EU, at the moment the research was being conducted, the correct answer was given by only a third of both the young and the older examinees. The second question asked, dealt with the familiarity of certain institutions of the European Union. The young and the older examinees do not differ very much from each other regarding their knowledge of this issue: the most familiar institution to both of them is the European Parliament, followed by the European Commission, then the EU Council of Ministers, then the European Central Bank, while all the other institutions were familiar to less than two fifths of the Croatian examinees. The examined citizens of the European Union are, understandably, more familiar with each of the observed institutions. The social attributes of the young, causing the greatest differences regarding their level of information, are mostly the ones connected to their level of socio-cultural qualifications (the socio-professional status and the level of education), followed by gender, and then provenience, regional affiliation and the age of the examinees. The highest level of information and knowledge belongs to men from the oldest age cohort of youth, those born and living in large cities, the inhabitants of the most developed regions, students and the employed examinees, as well as those with a higher education degree, the non-religious and examinees preferring liberal and left-wing parties. Along with all that, it is important to stress that a better level of knowledge and information about the European Union, its policies, institutions and enlargement process, correlates to positive attitudes about the different aspects of the European Union (the image of the EU, the following of issues related to it, the support for the Croatian accession to the Union, and so on), which, most probably, means that they are mutually determined. The inter-generational comparison has, on the other hand, indicated that the older examinees are more interested in most issues appearing in the media, especially politics, and that they assess their level of information to be better than do the young examinees. To put it shortly, the results of the research on the information level and knowledge of the Croatian citizens – both young and old – about the European Union, have indicated that they are not that interested in the European Union issues, as much as their level of presence in the media and the political agenda might imply, and the examinee' s knowledge about the relationship of Croatia and the EU is at an even lower level. Henceforth, it is necessary to conduct a strong and comprehensive public campaign directed precisely at the increase of the level of information and knowledge of the citizens about the European Union and what it represents, so that when the issue comes to the agenda, the Croatian inhabitants might make an educated decision about their country' s accession to that community of European states. The research results presented above may be summarized into a number of tendencies and statements of a wider nature. The political culture of the young testifies, in a number of aspects, to an approximation to the desirable democratic standards – especially regarding the acceptance of basic liberal-democratic values and the readiness for social engagement, at lease in principle – however, their social power and social capital are at a low level. At that, the young are aware of their own social and political marginalization, and recognize an entire plethora of measures that might help them gain a certain measure of power and become active citizens, as is desirable in a democratic society, but they do not use sufficiently the channels of social and political promotion, which are at their disposal. Today' s generation of youth expresses a lower level of social sensitivity and is more oriented toward individual efforts and family resources in the realization of life goals. At that, it seems that the young are not aware of the fact that an unequal access to existing social resources of the young generation today will have generated an unequal social status when they come of age. Hence, we can expect a widening and deepening of the process of social decomposition, that should be corrected through mechanisms that are supposed to ensure the highest possible equality of chances in the access to social resources (most of all, education). What we mean to say is that human capital is what Croatia, as a small and an insufficiently developed country, should deal with very thoughtfully. This, at the same time, signifies a maximum of investment into the development of human potentials, where the young generation certainly comes first. The inter-generational differences regarding the readiness of Croatia for accession into the European Union, and the relationship toward the European integration, are not of such a type and scale that there could be any mention of a generational gap, however, they are indicative. The most visible fact is that the young have demonstrated a more liberal, tolerant and flexible disposition, that they have a higher belief in the potentials of their own generation, and that they are consistent in their pro-European orientation, where they see their own generation as one of the certain winners of the Croatian accession into a united Europe. These trends suggest that the potentials of the young are a resource to be seriously reckoned with on the Croatian road into the EU. The process of the Croatian accession into the European Union is linked to different difficulties that affect the attitudes of citizens about the importance of Croatian entrance into the EU. Through this research, we have clearly detected that, unlike the Croatian political elite, both the young and the older citizens do not consider the Croatian integration into EU, to be the most important political goal. The political priorities of the citizens seem to be quite different, and their support to the project of European integration is weakening. It is, then, realistic to expect this trend to continue if the problematic events in the European Union persist, just as the difficulties in the relationship of Croatia and the EU, as well as the unfavorable economic and social trends in Croatia itself. This is why there are two equally important political tasks facing the ruling political elite: the initiation of the development of Croatia and an well-argumented explanation to the Croatian citizens why the country' s integration in the united Europe is purposeful.
Author's introductionThe media landscape has changed dramatically in recent decades, from one predominated by traditional mass communication formats to today's more personalized communications environment. Mobile telephony plays a central role in this transition, with adoption rates that surpass even those of the Internet. This article attempts to situate the role of mobile communication technology in the changing media environment by examining key areas of social change associated with its widespread diffusion and use. These areas include symbolic meaning of technology, new forms of coordination and social networking, personalization of public spaces, and the mobile youth culture. Drawing from these areas of change, we advance the argument that mobile telephony is iconic of a larger socio‐technological shift toward a new 'personal communication society.'Author recommendsRheingold, Howard 2002. Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Basic Books.From Tokyo to Helsinki, Manhattan to Manila, Howard Rheingold takes us on a journey around the world for a preview of the next techno‐cultural shift – a shift he predicts will be as dramatic as the widespread adoption of the PC in the 1980s and the Internet in the 1990s. The coming wave, says Rheingold, is the result of super‐efficient mobile communications – cellular phones, personal digital assistants, and wireless‐paging and Internet‐access devices that will allow us to connect with anyone, anywhere, anytime. From the amusing ('Lovegetty' devices in Japan that light up when a person with the right date‐potential characteristics appears in the vicinity) to the extraordinary (the overthrow of a repressive regime in the Philippines by political activists who mobilized by forwarding text messages via cell phones), Rheingold gives examples of the fundamentally new ways in which people are already engaging in group or collective action. He also considers the dark side of this phenomenon, such as the coordination of terrorist cells, threats to privacy, and the ability to incite violent behavior. Applying insights from sociology, artificial intelligence, engineering, and anthropology, Rheingold offers a penetrating perspective on the brave new convergence of pop culture, cutting‐edge technology, and social activism. At the same time, he reminds us that, as with other technological revolutions, the real impact of mobile communications will come not from the technology itself but from how people use it, resist it, adapt to it, and ultimately use it to transform themselves, their communities, and their institutions.Katz, James E. and Mark A. Aakhus (eds.) 2002. Perpetual Contact: Mobile Communication, Private Talk, Public Performance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.This edited volume contains a landmark collection of chapters from researchers all over the world. The book offers a multi‐national perspective on some of the key themes that were identified at the outset of the emergent new field of mobile communication studies, ranging from the private sphere of interpersonal relations to the public performance of social groups and structures. In their conclusion, the editors advance the theoretical orientation of Apparatgeist (translation: 'spirit of the machine') to explain cross‐cultural consistencies in how people conceptualize and use personal communication technologies such as the mobile phone.Ling, Rich 2004. The Mobile Connection: The Cell Phone's Impact on Society. San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.This book, based on worldwide research involving tens of thousands of interviews and contextual observations, looks into the impact of the mobile communication on our daily lives. Areas of impact include accessibility, safety and security, coordination of social and business activities, use of public places, and the social emancipation of youth.Ito, Mizuko, Daisuke Okabe, and Misa Matsuda (eds.) 2005. Personal, Portable, Pedestrian: Mobile Phones in Japanese Life. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.This edited volume explores how Japan's enthusiastic engagement with mobile technology has become part of its trendsetting popular culture. The chapters document the emergence, incorporation, and domestication of mobile communications in a wide range of social practices and institutions. The book first considers the social, cultural, and historical context of keitai (i.e., mobile phone) development in Japan, including its beginnings in youth pager use in the early 1990s. It then discusses the virtually seamless integration of keitai use into everyday life, contrasting it to the more escapist character of Internet use on the PC. Other essays suggest that the use of mobile communication reinforces ties between close friends and family, producing 'tele‐cocooning' by tight‐knit social groups. The book also discusses mobile phone manners and examines keitai use by copier technicians, multitasking housewives, and school children.Castells, Manuel, Mireia Fernandez‐Ardevol, Jack Linchuan Qiu and Araba Sey 2007. Mobile Communication and Society: A Global Perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.This book looks at how the possibility of multimodal communication from anywhere to anywhere at any time affects everyday life at home, at work, and at school, and raises broader concerns about politics and culture both global and local. Drawing on data gathered from around the world, the authors explore who has access to wireless technology, and why, and analyze the patterns of social differentiation seen in unequal access. They explore the social effects of wireless communication – what it means for family life, for example, when everyone is constantly in touch, or for the idea of an office when workers can work anywhere. The authors consider the rise of a mobile youth culture based on peer‐to‐peer networks, with its own language of texting, and its own values. They examine the phenomenon of flash mobs, and the possible political implications. And they look at the relationship between communication and development and the possibility that developing countries could 'leapfrog' directly to wireless and satellite technology. Drawing from a global body of research, the book helps answer the key questions about our transformation into a 'mobile network society'.Ling, Rich 2008. New Tech, New Ties: How Mobile Communication Reshapes Social Cohesion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.In New Tech, New Ties, Rich Ling examines how the mobile telephone affects both mobile‐mediated and face to face interactions. Ling finds that through the use of various social rituals the mobile telephone strengthens social ties within the circle of friends and family – sometimes at the expense of interaction with those who are physically present – and creates what he calls 'bounded solidarity'. Ling argues that mobile communication helps to engender and develop social cohesion within the family and the peer group. Drawing on the work of Emile Durkheim, Erving Goffman, and Randall Collins, Ling shows that ritual interaction is a catalyst for the development of social bonding. From this perspective, he examines how mobile communication affects face‐to‐face ritual situations and how ritual is used in interaction mediated by mobile communication. He looks at the evidence, including interviews and observations from around the world, which documents the effect of mobile communication on social bonding and also examines some of the other possibly problematic issues raised by tighter social cohesion in small groups.Katz, James E. (ed.) 2008. Handbook of Mobile Communication Studies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.This edited volume offers a comprehensive view of the cultural, family, and interpersonal consequences of mobile communication across the globe. Leading scholars analyze the effect of mobile communication on all parts of life, from the relationship between literacy and the textual features of mobile phones to the use of ringtones as a form of social exchange, from the 'aspirational consumption' of middle class families in India to the belief in parts of Africa and Asia that mobile phones can communicate with the dead. The contributors explore the ways mobile communication profoundly affects the tempo, structure, and process of daily life around the world. They discuss the impact of mobile communication on social networks, other communication strategies, traditional forms of social organization, and political activities. They consider how quickly miraculous technologies come to seem ordinary and even necessary – and how ordinary technology comes to seem mysterious and even miraculous. The chapters cut across social issues and geographical regions; they highlight use by the elite and the masses, utilitarian and expressive functions, and political and operational consequences. Taken together, the chapters demonstrate how mobile communication has affected the quality of life in both exotic and humdrum settings, and how it increasingly occupies center stage in people's lives around the world.Ling, Rich and Scott W. Campbell (eds.) Forthcoming in Fall/Winter 2008. The Reconstruction of Space and Time: Mobile Communication Practices. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.Mobile communication enables us to call specific individuals, not general places. This advancement had changed, and continues to change, human interaction. It also alters the ways people experience both space and time. This edited volume explores these changes through a collection of studies from some of the top mobile communication researchers from around the world. Collectively, the contributions highlight nuanced changes in coordination and cohesion across space and time, the ways people manage mobile communication and mobility in new spatio‐temporal realms, and how individuals relate to their co‐present surroundings while using mobile communication technology.Online materials Resource Center for Mobile Communication Studies http://www.scils.rutgers.edu/ci/cmcs/ The Center for Mobile Communication Studies is the world's first academic unit to focus solely on social aspects of mobile communication. Established in June 2004 at Rutgers University's School of Communication, Information and Library Studies, the Center has become an international focal point for research, teaching, and service on the social, psychological, and organizational consequences of the burgeoning mobile communication revolution. International Journal of Mobile Communication Studies https://www.inderscience.com/browse/index.php?journalID=40 The International Journal of Mobile Communication (IJMC), a fully refereed journal, publishes articles that present current practice and theory of mobile communications, mobile technology, and mobile commerce applications. The objectives of the IJMC are to develop, promote, and coordinate the development and practice of mobile communications. The IJMC aims to help professionals working in the field, academic educators, and policy makers to contribute, to disseminate knowledge, and to learn from each other's work. The international dimension is emphasised in order to overcome cultural and national barriers and to meet the needs of accelerating technological change and changes in the global economy. IJMC is an outstanding outlet that can shape a significant body of research in the field of mobile communications and in which results can be shared across institutions, governments, researchers, and students, and also industry. Wi: The Journal of Mobile Media http://wi‐not.ca/ Wi publishes the latest in Canadian mobilities research, encompassing disciplines such as design, engineering, computer science, communications, and media studies. MobileActive.org http://mobileactive.org/ MobileActive.org is an all‐volunteer community of people and organizations using mobile phones for social impact. They are committed to increasing the effectiveness of NGOs around the world who recognize that the 3.5 billion mobile phones provide unprecedented opportunities for organizing, communications, and service and information delivery. They work together to create the resources NGOs need to effectively use mobile phones in their work: locally relevant content and services, support and learning opportunities, and networks that help MobileActives connect to each other. With these things on hand, tens of thousands of NGOs will be in a better position to enrich and serve their communities. The MobileActive.org community includes grassroots activists, NGO staff, intermediary organizations, content and service providers, and organizations who fund mobile technology projects. Mobile Society http://www.mobilesociety.net/ Mobile Society is an academic research website focusing on social aspects of the mobile phone. The site includes links and information about news, events, publications, and other related sites pertaining to the social consequences of mobile communication. SmartMobs: The Next Social Revolution http://www.smartmobs.com/ A Website and Weblog about topics and issues discussed in the book 'Smart Mobs' by Howard Rheingold.Select sample syllabus topics and readings for course on 'the social consequences of mobile communication' History and adoption of the mobile phone
Ling, Rich. 2004. 'The Mobile Connection' Chapter 1: Introduction. Castells et al. 2007. 'Mobile Communication and Society' Chapter 1: The Diffusion of Wireless Communication in the World.
Theoretical perspectives on the relationship between technology and society: Part 1, social and technological determinism
Ling, Rich. 2004. 'The Mobile Connection' Chapter 2: Making Sense of Mobile Telephone Adoption. Campbell, Scott W. and Tracy C. Russo 2003. The Social Construction of Mobile Telephony. Communication Monographs 70: 317–34.
Theoretical perspectives on the relationship between technology and society: Part 2, the 'network' perspective
Castells, Manuel. 2000. 'The Rise of Network Society' Opening Chapter: The Network is the Message. Castells et al. 2007. 'Mobile Communication and Society' Chapter 5: The Space of Flows, Timeless Time, and Mobile Networks.
Mobile communication in everyday life: Part 1, safety and security
Ling, Rich. 2004. 'The Mobile Connection' Chapter 3: Safety and Security.
Mobile communication in everyday life: Part 2: new forms of coordination
Ling, Rich. 2004. 'The Mobile Connection' Chapter 4: The Coordination of Everyday Life.
Mobile communication in everyday life: Part 3: new social networking practices
Ling, Rich and Birgitte Yttri. 2002. 'Hyper‐coordination via Mobile Phones in Norway' in Katz & Aakhus (eds.) Perpetual Contact. Licoppe, Christian. 2003. 'Two Modes of Maintaining Interpersonal Relations through Telephone: From the Domestic to the Mobile Phone' in J. Katz (ed.) Machines that Become Us. Campbell, Scott. W. and Michael Kelley. 2006. Mobile phone use in AA networks: An exploratory study. Journal of Applied Communication Research 34: 191–208.
Apparatgeist: 'Spirit of the machine' and the fashion and function of the mobile phone
Katz, James E. and Mark Aakhus. 2002. 'Conclusion: Making meaning of mobiles – a theory of Apparatgeist' in Katz & Aakhus (eds.) Perpetual Contact. Campbell, Scott W. 2008. 'Mobile Technology and the Body: Apparatgeist, Fashion and Function' in J. Katz (eds.) Handbook of Mobile Communication.
SMS and the language of wireless communication
Ling, Rich. 2004. 'The Mobile Connection' Chapter 7: Texting and the Growth of Asynchronous Discourse. Castells et al. 2007. 'Mobile Communication and Society, Chapter 6: The Language of Wireless Communication.
Use of mobile technology in public settings
Ling, Rich. 2004. 'The Mobile Connection' Chapter 6: The Intrusive Nature of Mobile Technology. Okabe, Daisuke and Ito, Mizuko. 2005. 'Keitai in public transportation' in Ito, Okabe, & Matsuda (eds.) Personal, Portable, Pedestrian. Ito, Mizuko, Daisuke Okabe and Ken Anderson 2008. 'Portable Objects in Three Global Cities: The Personalization of Urban Places' in Ling & Campbell (eds.) Reconstruction of Space and Time: Mobile Communication Practices. Campbell, Scott W. 2006. Perceptions of mobile phones in college classrooms: Ringing, cheating, and classroom policies. Communication Education 55: 280–294.
M 10/22 Use of the technology around co‐present others and the challenge of 'absent presence'
Cumiskey, Kathleen. 2007. 'Hidden meanings: Understanding the social‐psychological impact of mobile phone use through storytelling' in Goggin & Hjorth (eds.) Mobile Media Proceedings. Gergen, Kenneth. 2002. 'The challenge of absent presence' in Katz & Aakhus (eds.) Perpetual Contact.
The mobile youth culture
Ling, Rich. 2004. 'The Mobile Connection' Chapter 5: The Mobile Telephone and Teens. Castells et al. 2007. 'Mobile Communication and Society' Chapter 4: The Mobile Youth Culture.
Mobile communication in the socio‐political sphere
Castells et al. 2007. 'Mobile Communication and Society Chapter 7: The Mobile Civil Society: Social Movements, Political Power, and Communication Networks. Rheingold, Howard. 2002. 'Smart Mobs' Chapter 7: Smart Mobs – The Power of the Mobile Many. Campbell, Scott W. and Nojin Kwak. 2008, May. Mobile communication and the public sphere: Linking patterns of use to civic and political engagement. Paper presented at the ICA pre‐conference, The Global and Globalizing Dimensions of Mobile Communication: Developing or Developed?, Montreal.
W 11/7 Mobile communication in the developing world
Castells et al. 2007. 'Mobile Communication and Society' Chapter 8: Wireless Communication and Global Development: New Issues, New Strategies. Donner, Jonathan. 2008. Research approaches to mobile use in the developing world: A review of the literature. The Information Society 24: 140–159. Donner, Jonathan. 2008. The rules of beeping: Exchanging messages via intentional 'missed calls' on mobile phones. Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication, 13(1). Available: http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/donner.html.
M 11/12 Mobile communication and work
Andriessen, Erick and Mattai Vartianen. 2006. Emerging Mobile Virtual Work in Andriessen & Vartianen (eds.) Mobile Virtual Work: A New Paradigm? Perry, Mark and Jackie Brodie. 2006. Virtually Connected, Practically Mobile in Andriessen & Vartianen (eds.) Mobile Virtual Work: A New Paradigm? Chesley, Noelle. 2005. Blurring boundaries? Linking technology use, spillover, individual distress, and family satisfaction. Journal of Marriage and Family 67: 1237–1248.
OptionalFocus questions
To what extent does mobile communication lead to changes in family dynamics? On the one hand, mobile communication empowers youth to carry out their social relations 'under the radar' of parental supervision. In the 'old days', kids had to share a domestic landline phone and had less privacy, or had to shut themselves up in their room when on the phone to get privacy. The mobile phone is anytime/anywhere and it a personal object (not shared), so users have much more control over their private relations. Text messaging is an especially effective way of having private communication. Because of all this, young people have more autonomy to live out their social lives as they see fit. On the other hand, the mobile phone also gives parents more control by being able to better keep tabs on their kids and their kids' whereabouts. In some respects, it can actually be considered as an 'umbilical cord' keeping kids accountable to their parents. This is an interesting dichotomy for discussion. To what extent and how does the mobile phone support 'perpetual contact' among social ties? There seems to be a continual flow of communication now, which some refer to as 'perpetual contact'. Follow‐up questions could be: how is this a good thing? Are there negative aspects of perpetual contact? How is the mobile phone used for boundary management (i.e., demarcating in‐group members from out‐group members)? This can be seen in names kept in contact lists, who people text with, whose calls they screen, and even the style or brand of a phone ... some groups of friends get the same types of phones. What are the effects of taking/placing a phone call when interacting with physically co‐present others? What are norms for doing this? How can people mitigate the intrusion? On a related note to the questions above ... to what extent does the mobile phone lead to 'absent presence?' The notion of absent presence refers to being physically present, but socially absent. To what extent is this problematic? To what extent might mobile communication lead to 'tele‐cocooning?' Some are concerned that people are getting so wrapped up in their tight little social networks now, that they are less engaged with others who are weak social ties. If this is true, then it begs the question about whether there are benefits to having weak social ties. Most feel there are benefits, like being exposed to a diversity of perspectives and ideas. With regard to the changing media landscape, where else do we see increased 'personalization' in our uses of traditional mass media? In this sense, 'personalization' can refer to personalized content, interactivity, control, etc.
Research project idea (note this approach can be taken with any of the topics recommended above)Description of the paperMobile communication technology has become a common artifact in public settings, offering a means for social connection for its users and unsolicited melodies, chirps, and half conversations for co‐present others. Because social norms for behavior around others often conflict with those for phone conversations, mobile communication can present as many challenges as it does opportunities for maintaining social order. In class, we will discuss numerous perspectives on this topic, such as absent presence, symbolic fences, front stage‐back‐stage dynamics, and cocooning through mobile media. The purpose of this paper is to conduct an original investigation of the use of mobile communication technology around others. Each student will select a particular aspect of this phenomenon to explore in depth by collecting data first‐hand, analyzing those data, and drawing conclusions to shed new light on this topic. Students may choose to examine mobile communication in a particular setting, compare mobile communication in different social contexts or across different users, examine or compare the use of certain types of mobile technologies, observe reactions of and effects on non‐users of the technology, or select some other such 'angle' for the project that sheds light on this topic.Paper guidelinesYour paper should contain the following sections: (1) An introduction that justifies the importance of your topic and provides a clear explanation of the purpose of the paper, (2) a review of relevant literature/theory/key concepts to frame your particular project followed by specific research questions, (3) a method section explaining how you collected data (observation, interviews, questionnaires, and/or otherwise) and how you analyzed your data, and (4) a discussion section that develops conclusions based on the findings. Each paper should have at least 10 scholarly citations, of which at least half should come from readings other than those assigned for class. Use American Psychological Association (5th edition) to format citations and reference list. Papers should be about 10 pages in length, double‐spaced. In addition to meeting these guidelines, the writing should be clearly organized within each section and (of course) well‐written. Students will present their papers in class at the end of the semester.
This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. ; Winner of the 2021 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Graduate category. ; CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY "Trafficking for a Cause": Cuban Drug Trafficking Operations as a Foreign Policy Alan Chase Cunningham Norwich University Advisor: Gamze Menali 01 June 2021 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ABSTRACT A capable intelligence service and military force is immensely integral to the national security policy of any nation, regardless of their political ideology or international activity. Cuba's national security apparatuses have proven themselves time and again to be exceptional at accomplishing the Republic's foreign policy goals. From the nation's early beginnings, in the 1960s and 70s, elements of the Cuban government were involved in the drug trade, either on an official or unofficial basis, utilizing drug trafficking as a form of aiding likeminded non-state actors, acquiring small arms and other weaponry, gaining U.S. currency, and making war against the United States. In the 1980s, following increased international outcry, multiple members of Cuba's military and intelligence forces were arrested, tried, and either executed or sentenced to prison for their roles in the drug trade. Many international observers, alongside defectors from Cuba's military and intelligence services and foreign governments, claimed that these trials were for show designed to protect the Castros. This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would first like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Gamze Menali, at Norwich University. She provided exceptional advice and support that was highly integral to the completion of this thesis and my degree. Her comments were always well-received and significantly bolstered my paper's overall effect and allowed my research to take on a professional quality. A better advisor could not have been provided nor found. I additionally must thank those persons who sacrificed their time and allowed themselves to be interviewed for my final project. Bobby Chacon of the FBI, Fulton Armstrong of the Intelligence Community, Harry Sommers of the DEA, Mike Powers of the DEA, Pierre Charette of the DEA, Richard Gregorie of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, Mike Waniewski of the DEA, Harry Fullett of the DEA, and Seth Taylor of the U.S. Customs Service. This work is intended to honor them and their years of service and dedication to the U.S. government. I would also like to thank two professors whom were of immense importance in my academic career; Professor Jonathan Brown and Assistant Professor Joshua Frens-String of the University of Texas. Both sparked my interest in Latin American affairs and guided me on how to conduct historical research. They were inspirations and role models for me as a historian. Finally, I would like to offer special thanks to both my mother and father who supported me in more ways than one through my entire educational career. My family, importantly Kaytlynn Lopez, were a source for comfort, relaxation, and support throughout this endeavor. I could not have done this without any of them. I hope this work looks well upon all of those who helped and inspired me and allows a new generation of researchers and scholars to better understand this period in Cuban history. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham Table of Contents Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….01 A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services……………………………….03 Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s…………………………………………….07 A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s………………………………………….16 The Cocaine Boom: Cuba and Drugs in 1980s……………………………………………….21 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros…………………………………….52 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………61 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham1 Introduction Cuba's intelligence and military services are among the best in the world. They have been described in laudatory terms by intelligence professionals, national security theorists, and academics alike. Brian Latell, a former National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America and career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, agrees and recounts how veteran counterintelligence officers from all areas of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) would, "stand in awe of how Cuba, a small island nation, could have built up such exceptional clandestine capabilities and run so many successful operations against American targets".1 The CIA's former Chief of Counterintelligence, James M. Olson, agrees, writing, "no foreign intelligence service rankled me more than [Cuba's]…It was ruthless, it was devious, and worst of all, it was very, very good".2 Analysts from the research and analysis think tank CNA agree with Latell, writing, "[Cuba's] intelligence services are widely regarded as among the best in the world – a significant accomplishment given the country's meager financial and technological resources".3 The longtime lead historian of Cuban affairs, Jorge I. Dominguez, wrote in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, "Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)…have been among the world's most successful military".4 Longtime attorney and the Chief of Narcotics for the U.S. 1 Brian Latell, Castro's Secrets: The CIA and Cuba's Intelligence Machine (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 01, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/733231302. 2 James M. Olson, To Catch A Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2019), p. 31, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/1055568332. 3 Sean Durns, "Castro's dead, but his spies live on," The Hill, Capitol Hill Publishing, published 05 December 2016, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/308811-castros-dead-but-his-spies-live-on. 4 Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Military and Politics," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, published 29 May 2020, https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1810. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham2 Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (USAO-SDFL) during the early 1980s, Richard Gregorie, has said that Cuba's intelligence services "is better than the CIA in Miami".5 It is apparent that, across multiple fields and specialties, Cuba is a well-regarded foreign power with a highly effective intelligence apparatus and robust military force. Not only that, but Cuba has been able to maintain effective relationships with like-minded state and non-state actors. Throughout the Cold War, Cuba maintained effective relationships with Latin American states by encouraging leftist revolutions amongst foreign populaces and aligning with foreign political parties6, becoming a benefactor to various regimes, political parties, and revolutionary groups in places like Venezuela, Angola, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. These relationships were maintained in a variety of ways from the providing of covert financial and military aid to the physical commitment of Cuban troops to ground warfare. It is well documented that, one of these relationships included the providing of security to drug traffickers and the usage of Cuba as a weigh station for drug traffickers. Through this almost three decade long covert operation, Cuba was heavily entrenched in building up beneficial relationships with non-state actors like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and legitimate nation states like Manuel Noriega's Panama, finding a steady source of income, and being able to make war against their age old adversary, the United States of America. By efficiently coordinating these operations and working to traffic illicit substances abroad, Cuba was able to improve their standing in Latin America and assist in the making of revolution abroad, essentially using the trafficking of drugs and other narcotics as a form of positive foreign policy. 5 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 6 "Castro and the Cold War," American Experience, Public Broadcasting Service, published 2005, republished November 2015, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/comandante-cold-war/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham3 Despite the fact that this incident offers a great deal of information as to how Cuba has conducted themselves in a foreign policy sense and has made war against the United States, it has been only minimally studied. In researching this area, one can find only a few academic papers and books written from the late 1990s which covers this issue in depth, with other books on Cuban history or drug trafficking in Latin America failing to cover this area or devoting only a paragraph or two to the entire ordeal. By examining this issue in depth, one can be able to determine just how intricate and involved Cuba's foreign policy endeavors were in addition to better understanding Cuba and the Castro's commitment to the exportation of revolution. This research chronologically catalogs how Cuba engaged in the drug trade, where they expanded and how they altered plans to most effectively suit their own needs. This research also intends to determine the level of knowledge Fidel and Raul Castro, Cuba's most well-known and high ranking officials, had of the operation and show how Cuba's drug trafficking efforts either succeeded or failed in bringing about the results desired by the island nation. A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services To fully and best understand Cuba's involvement in the drug trade, one must first come to understand the nation's intelligence and military infrastructure. The history of the FAR began when Fidel Castro and the military arm of his 26th of July Movement (M26) returned to the nation in December of 1956.7 Though soundly crushed by Fulgencio Batista's forces, Castro's rebellion was able to persevere by launching successful guerilla raids upon important military targets and acquiring a devoted following of students and lower to middle-class Cuban citizens, eventually becoming militarily superior to Batista's forces and claiming the country in January of 1959.8 The rebel army, under the command of Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, 7 Marc Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), p. 111. 8 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham4 purged the military corps of Batista's regime, executing, exiling, or simply discharging various officers before officially creating the FAR in October of 1959.9 The FAR was initially under the control of the Ministry of Defense, yet this was renamed to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) and was headed by Raul Castro, Fidel's brother and later Vice President.10 Between 1959 and 1961, Castro populated the FAR with officers and enlisted personnel who would remain loyal to the new government, implemented educational programs which served to expose the military to Communist and Marxist teachings, and established militias which bridged the gap between Cuba's military and societal structures.11 Cuba's intelligence service, the Dirección General de Inteligencia (until 1989, the service went by the acronym DGI, before being changed to DI; the acronym DGI will be used when referring to this service), was created sometime in 1961, the actual date being unclear, as placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (MININT).12 What is clear with the DGI, however, is their connections to the Soviet Union and the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezposnosti (KGB). Immediately following the Bay of Pigs crisis, the KGB assisted Cuba in infiltrating Cuban exile groups in Florida and New York to determine if the Kennedy administration would try and oust Castro from power again.13 In March of 1962, the KGB set up an "operations base in Havana to export revolution across Latin America,"14 while later beginning an information 9 Damián J. Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Miami, FL: University of Miami Graduate School of International Studies, 1989), p. 05. 10 Ibid. 11 Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro ed. Jaime Suchlicki, p. 07-08. 12 "Cuba, Intelligence and Security," in Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security, ed. K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Wilmoth Lerner (Farmington Hills, MI: The Gale Group, 2004), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/55960387. 13 Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West (United States of America: Basic Books, 2009), p. 51-53. 14 Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (United States of America: Basic Books, 2001), p. 184, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/727648881. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham5 sharing operation with the Cubans and even putting in place a KGB liaison officer within the DGI.15 Since the beginning of Cuba's foray into the world of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection, the KGB has been heavily invested and taken a special interest in Cuban intelligence operations. Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s Stratfor, a private geopolitical intelligence firm based in Austin, Texas, wrote in 2008 that, "While seeking refuge from Batista forces in the hills outside Havana, the future dictator was sheltered by marijuana farmers. Castro promised the growers protection for their hospitality".16 While trying to corroborate this claim about Castro's promise is difficult, it is well-documented that the Sierra Maestra mountain range, where Castro and his 26th of July Movement carried out guerilla attacks against the Batista regime, "had been traditional outlaw country long before Castro – rife with smuggling, marijuana growing…".17 Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade seemingly sometime shortly after the DGI was founded in 1961. A declassified Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD – the precursor to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)) document details how, in 1961, a meeting was held between Che Guevara (then the President of Cuba's National Bank and head of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA)18), Ramiro Valdes (Che's deputy during the revolution and now head of the "[state's] security and intelligence apparatus"19), a Captain from Valdes' outfit, and Salvador Allende, then a Senator from Chile.20 The meeting first revolved 15 Ronald Young, "Cuba," in Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 186, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/436850527. 16 "Organized Crime in Cuba," Stratfor, Rane Corporation, published 16 May 2008, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/organized-crime-cuba. 17 Gil Carl Alroy, "The Peasantry in the Cuban Revolution," The Review of Politics Vol. 29, No. 01 (1967), p. 97, https://www-jstor-org.library.norwich.edu/stable/1405815?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents. 18 Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2010), p. 424. 19 Anderson, Che Guevara, p. 368. 20 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1990), p. 24. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham6 around Chilean politics, "but soon Comandante Valdes turned the talk to setting up a cocaine-trafficking network in order to raise money to help finance Allende…Valdes…suggested that Roberto Alvarez, chief of Cuban espionage, head the new organization".21 While attempts were made to gain access to this document via a FOIA request to the DEA, the DEA was unable to provide the document by the time of publication. This is not the only document which alleges Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade during the early 1960s. Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN - the precursor to the BNDD and therefore the DEA) Henry Giordano specified in multiple letters and internal memoranda that the FBN and BNDD had located, "a "pattern of Cuban nationals," who were "suspected Castro sympathizers . . . dominating the traffic" and "operating in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile to distribute large quantities of cocaine throughout the United States",".22 This mirrors what Giordano's predecessor, Harry J. Anslinger, seemed to believe in early 1961, that "the island nation [was] trying to subvert the United States with drugs".23 The BNDD too apparently, "investigated a purported Cuban government operation to sponsor marijuana and heroin crops in Cuba's Oriente province, using a secret department within the country's National Institute of Agrarian Reform".24 While both these incidences mention drug trafficking/production on the part of INRA and within Chile, seemingly backing up what the defector alleged to the BNDD, Giordano and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury David Acheson both changed their opinions in the mid-1960s. The two officials believed that while individual Cubans were involved in the drug trade, this was not government 21 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 24-25. 22 William L. Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine: How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America (Chicago, IL: Chicago Review Press, 2010), p. 92, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/592756109. 23 William O. Walker III, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Cultures in Conflict (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996), 171, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/33132446. 24 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 91. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham7 sanctioned and was of such a tiny scale that it would be "too small to have much of an effect on the supply of dollars to that country".25 Naturally, for a government official to change their personal opinion (especially those with the highest access to sensitive documents), they must have been exposed to some form of information which detailed to them that their previously held notion of Cuban involvement was faulty. This being said, evidence collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), individual FBN agents, and allegations by Soviet defectors, seem to corroborate the investigations by federal agencies, pointing to drug trafficking endeavors sanctioned by the Cuban government. According to a letter penned by J. Edgar Hoover, the longtime director of the FBI, "several Colombian airplanes taken to Cuba in 1967 were hijacked on behalf of the Cuban government for the purpose of obtaining the cargo—smuggled heroin".26 The Federal Bureau of Narcotics also agreed with the FBI's assessment and even estimated the total worth of the heroin was in the twenty million dollar range.27 Also in 1967, "a Cuban trained Venezuelan intelligence officer established…Cuban link of drugs for guerrilla weapons in the hemisphere," detailing this information before the Organization of American States (OAS), "providing a major connection between Havana, the guerilla movements, and narcotics".28 Acting Federal Narcotics Commissioner and long-time FBN agent Charles Siragusa also claimed in March of 1962 that six Cuban drug traffickers arrested in Miami and New York were transporting cocaine from Cuba to the U.S. for the purposes of "raising money [and] 25 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 92. 26 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 93. 27 Ibid. 28 Ralph E. Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A., Ralph E. Fernandez, P.A., published 22 January 2003, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham8 demoralizing Americans and discrediting Cuban exiles in Miami".29 An FBN agent involved in the investigation and raid also confirmed this.30 A 2003 historical assessment focusing on the Cuban government's involvement in the drug trade and terrorism published by the law offices of Ralph E. Fernandez in Tampa, Florida indicated that Juvenito Pablo Guerra, the Miami group's ringleader, was an intelligence officer.31 Among the evidence that this cell was linked to the Cuban government and that Guerra was an intelligence officer includes "a supply of Communist literature and pictures of Cuban premier Fidel Castro in Guerra's apartment".32 While this piece of information is highly circumstantial in trying to link Castro to the drug ring, it does indicate that this cell was most likely not a grouping of exiled Cubans, ones who fled following Castro's claiming power in 1959, but rather were supporters of the Castro regime. Upon being sentenced in June of 1962 to "fifteen years in prison [for] narcotics conspiracy and assault with intent to kill a Federal officer…an undercover narcotics agent testified that Guerra was closely associated with Premier Castro and has been a member of a ring that had smuggled cocaine into this country from Cuba to obtain arms for Dr. Castro during the revolution".33 Also in the early 1960's, a FBN agent named Salvatore Vizzini was involved in the arrest of, "two Cuban agents…in Miami with large amounts of cocaine in their possession".34 29 "Cuba Plot Is Cited in Narcotics Raids," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 31 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/31/archives/cuba-plot-is-cited-in-narcotics-raids.html?searchResultPosition=78. 30 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/30/archives/big-cocaine-seizure-held-cuban-in-origin.html?searchResultPosition=106. 31 Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A, p. 02. 32 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times. 33 "U.S. Jails 2 in Narcotics Case; One Reported Close to Castro," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 June 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/06/02/archives/us-jails-2-in-narcotics-case-one-reported-close-to-castro.html?searchResultPosition=12. 34 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 25. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham9 Recounting the arrest in a 1978 letter to Morley Safer of CBS' 60 Minutes, Vizzini detailed that the subsequent investigation proved conclusively that the arrestees (Ramon Diaz and Jose Barrel) were both working for the Cuban government and were either selling the cocaine for profit or were involved in trading the coke for weapons.35 Throughout Vizzini's law enforcement career, this would not be the only time he would encounter evidence of Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade. Writing in his 1972 memoirs, Vizzini recounted one undercover operation in which he was sent to San Juan, Puerto Rico and received a teletype by HQ. The teletype contained "a lot of unconfirmed rumor" which included headquarters' suspicion, "that Castro and his boys were secretly involved in the smuggling [of narcotics]," while also including the names of two Cuban expats, Luis Valdez and Caesar Vega.36 Eventually being able to infiltrate the Puerto Rican underworld and meet with Valdez and Vega, Vizzini bought $750.00 USD for an ounce of cocaine. While the eventual arrests of those involved failed to capture both Valdez and Vega, the San Juan Police Department's Narcotics Squad seemed to believe the two had already fled back to Cuba.37 While the FBN seemingly was never able to confirm their suspicions about Valdez and Vega's relationships to the Castro government, it is worth pointing out that, in early Summer 1959, a Cuban Major similarly named Cesar Vega was in charge of a Castro sanctioned operation to overthrow the Panamanian government.38 Vizzini it seems held that, "there was reason to believe the operation was being carried on with the knowledge of Fidel Castro, that his supporters were running it, and that the profits were getting back to shore up the dictator's shaky 35 Sal Vizzini, letter to Morley Safer, 27 February 1978. 36 Sal Vizzini, Vizzini: The Secret Lives of America's Most Successful Undercover Agent (New York, NY: Pinnacle Books, 1972), p. 284. 37 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 309. 38 Robert L. Scheina, Latin America's Wars: The Age of the Professional Soldier Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2003), p. 56. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m0 government".39 In an extension of remarks placed in the Congressional Record in May of 1965, the CIA's view of these allegations and claims comes through. DeWitt S. Copp, a CIA analyst, detailed additional evidence concerning Castro and the Cuban government's culpability in the drug trade in a paper titled, "Castro's Subversion in the United States". Copp writes, "In December 1964, three Castro agents were arrested at Miami Airport – one of them a Cuban, Marlo Carabeo Nerey…On January 15, 1965, Oscar H. Reguera and Elidoro Martinéz were taken into custody in a New York motel with $3 million worth of cocaine in their luggage. Martinéz is believed to be a Cuban agent," while also making the claim that Cuba was engaging in narcotics trafficking in order "to finance an insurrection in Puerto Rico".40 The CIA, while any comment on the arrests of Juvenito Guerra's cell or the other arrests listed was unable to be found, certainly seemed to investigating that Cuba was, on some level, involved in the trafficking of narcotics to better support their own desires and machinations. This would also not be the last time that a group of drug traffickers would be alleged to be aligned with Cuba in the 1960s as well. In September of 1967, it was reported that, following an investigation conducted by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and Queens District Attorney's Office, six persons were arrested for their involvement in a drug ring which brought in, "$2.88 million [of cocaine]…from Cuba to Montego Bay, Jamaica and then to New Orleans for the flight to New York".41 According to law enforcement officers, Cuban governmental officials knew about this drug trafficking ring yet, "did not interfere in the 39 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 282. 40 Representative Craig Hosmer, Extension of Remarks, on 25 May 1965, "Castro's Subversion in the United States – Part I," 89th Cong., Congressional Record, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100003-7.pdf. 41 "6 Are Seized Here With Cocaine Worth Nearly $3-Million," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 September 1967, https://www.nytimes.com/1967/09/10/archives/6-are-seized-here-with-cocaine-worth-nearly-3million-cuban-did-not.html?searchResultPosition=156. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m1 narcotics ring's activities and, in return, ring members supplied the Cuban government with information about anti-Castro elements in the United States," with members posing, "as fundraisers for anti-Castro elements," and then transmitting the contributor's information back to Cuba.42 Attempts to access the NYPD's files or interview detectives with relevant knowledge of the case were unsuccessful. In the late 1960s as well, it appears that some measure of involvement by the Cuban military in the drug trade was occurring within South Florida. Around 1969, two agents from the FBN/BNDD's Miami Field Office (FO) went undercover as local drug dealers to meet with a Cuban contact at a dock behind the Playboy Club in Miami at 7701 Biscayne Boulevard. According to former DEA Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAC) Pierre Charette, "the two agents did meet with a Cuban general and had discussed using Cuba as an entry point [for drugs]".43 Charette, who was not himself involved in the meeting but was close with one of the agents who was present, also confirmed that the Cuban general was an "active-duty [officer] with Castro's forces" and that the conversation was audio recorded by one of the agents.44 What one can see here is Cuba utilizing drug trafficking, not as a way of gaining an upper hand against the United States or to gain a better financial standing, but rather as a form of information gathering and intelligence collection on potential political and national security threats. By aligning themselves with a non-state actor able to work abroad in foreign land without arising suspicion from counterintelligence organizations, the Cuban government was able to better defend from foreign threats by Batista supporters and anti-Castro groups. In the form of gaining the upper hand on adversaries and gathering intelligence, this is an ingenious 42 Ibid. 43 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 44 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m2 tactic. In the late-1960s, a defector alleged that "Raúl Castro and/or his associates within the Cuban Defense Ministry actively discussed the issue of drug trafficking as an ideological weapon to be used against the United States [and that] Czech intelligence operatives trained Cuban agents to produce and distribute drugs and narcotics into the United States".45 This claim was made by Major General Jan Sejna, a military officer in the Czechoslovak People's Army and, "chief of the political wing of the Czech Defense Ministry and…member of the Communist Party's General Staff and the National Assembly, the country's legislative body".46 Sejna defected in 1968 following the "Prague Spring" under allegations of embezzlement by reformist Communists led by Alexander Dubček, a political opponent of Sejna's "patron, Antonin Novotny".47 Following Sejna's defection, both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) kept Sejna on their payroll as a counterintelligence analyst and consultant.48 Throughout the 1960s, it is apparent that Cuba was, at the least, a way station for drug traffickers to resupply before heading on into the United States (as the island nation had served since the mid-1500s)49 or, at the most, was officially sanctioning the trafficking of narcotics into the U.S. for profit. Given the fact that Cuba was a newly created country and was in dire need of economic stability, it makes sense that Castro's regime would engage in some form of drug 45 Emilio T. González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 01-02, https://scholarship.miami.edu/discovery/delivery?vid=01UOML_INST:ResearchRepository&repId=12355424610002976#13355471490002976. 46 Louie Estrada, "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech Defector, Dies," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1997, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1997/08/27/gen-jan-sejna-czech-defector-dies/0aa7916b-1005-4595-9a2e-5dc51012dbf5/. 47 David Stout, "Jan Sejna, 70, Ex-Czech General and Defector," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 August 1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/30/world/jan-sejna-70-ex-czech-general-and-defector.html. 48 "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech defector, dead at 70," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 26 August 1997, https://apnews.com/article/395f04eda00526846fb4d3cfff44f726. 49 T.J. English, The Corporation: An Epic Story of the Cuban American Underworld (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2018), p. 04, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/990850150. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m3 production and trafficking to provide a certain level of income. Additionally, it also would allow the new nation to craft strong foreign ties to non-state actors and individual governmental officials abroad who could prove valuable in other, more legitimate matters. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April of 1961, in which the United States and the Cuban governments became more antagonistic towards one another, one can see (based upon U.S. documents and defector testimony) that Cuba began taking further actions of trafficking narcotics into the U.S. as a method of covert action, "those activities carried out by national governments or other organizations…to secretly influence and manipulate events abroad".50 Sejna's allegations, if true, corroborate a great deal of what the FBN/BNDD and FBI found during the course of their criminal investigations, that the Cuban government was involved in the creating of narcotics and the trafficking of drugs throughout the Latin America region. Given the abundance of evidence surrounding Cuba and the drug trade in the 1960s, it would be logical to believe that some elements of the Cuban government (either individual ministers, agency heads, etc.) or Fidel and Raul Castro themselves, were involved in the trafficking or shipping of narcotics to the United States from Cuba. While the amount of evidence conclusively linking the Castros to the drug trade in the 1960s is minimal (with perhaps the most concrete evidence being the undercover agent's testimony during the Guerra trial), given the fact that Castro exerted a tight grasp upon the daily functions of the government and was heavily involved in minute details of military operations, foreign policy endeavors, and domestic matters, it is hard to envision that Castro was not aware of these operations or was completely oblivious to them. These operations to traffic drugs, throughout the 1960s, do not appear to be a large scale 50 Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz, "Part IV: Covert Action," in Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An Anthology, ed. Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 237. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m4 policy stance. It did not appear to be organized nor a prominent feature of the Cuban government's foreign policy or income. The usage of drug trafficking by governmental entities and the allowing of drug traffickers to ply their trade within the island nation indicates this was done in an effort to garner additional currency, gather intelligence on threatening groups, or temporarily assist foreign allies. These operations do not seem to be large scale or integral to the overall conduct of the Cuban government, but are instead minor and almost done in a tentative way, perhaps out of fear of reprisal from the U.S. or the Soviet Union had their activities been uncovered. A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s Throughout the 1970s, the solidifying of the relationship between the Cuban state and non-state actors became more apparent. It was at this time that the Cuban government began making more long-lasting and profitable strides into the global drug trade while also greatly increasing their alignment with non-state actors and strengthening their foreign policy goals. At this time in Cuban history, Cuba was involved in a variety of foreign policy endeavors and military conflicts. Having failed in the 1960s to become self-sufficient economically, the island, "turned to the Soviet Union for support…[increasing] its subsidies for the Cuban economy through running trade deficits with the island and paying above-market prices for its sugar", further cementing the Soviets' presence in the nation-state.51 Given the fact that Cuba was in need of hard currency and did not desire to be too reliant upon the Soviets, Cuba can be seen as somewhat increasing their drug trafficking and security operations significantly in the mid to late-1970s. Evidence of Cuban involvement in the 1970's drug trade came through in the early-mid 51 Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions, p. 127. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m5 1980s and onward, with multiple defectors and arrested drug traffickers from Cuban military/intelligence organizations and Latin American cartels respectively offering this information to the U.S. government. Cuban defectors and drug cartel associates arrested in the 1980s indicated "in late 1975, some of Colombia's best-known and biggest cocaine kingpins met secretly in Bogotá…with the Cuban ambassador Fernando Ravelo-Renendo…Havana not only was prepared to ignore drug-laden mother ships operating in its waters but also to provide fueling and repair services to its ports…Havana also offered to escort the narcotics boats upon leaving Cuban ports, as well as provide Cuban flags to disguise their origin all the way to feeder vessels stationed off the Florida Keys," in return for roughly "$800,000 per vessel".52 In her book Narco-Terrorism, Rachel Ehrenfeld, then a research scholar at New York University School of Law, claims that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative from the Departamento América53, a "parallel intelligence apparatus"54 headed by Manuel Piñeiro Losada. It does seem that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative of sorts as, upon his death in July of 2017, a former Cuban Army officer wrote a detailed obituary documenting Ravelo-Renendo's services to Cuba, mentioning his entry into Cuba's intelligence service and his tenure during the 1970s as Cuba's Ambassador to Colombia.55 According to Dirk Krujit, professor emeritus of development studies at Utrecht University, the Departamento América was a unit which, "conducted Cuba's secret foreign 52 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 29-30. 53 Ibid. 54 Nora Gámez Torres, "He now hunts Cuban human-rights abusers in the U.S. Was he one himself?" Miami Herald, The McClatchy Company, published and updated 12 July 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article214754450.html. 55 Alfredo García, "Cuban internationalist veteran Fernando Ravelo dies," Colarebo, Colarebo, published 04 July 2017, https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=https://colarebo.wordpress.com/2017/07/04/fallece-veterano-internacionalista-cubano-fernando-ravelo/&prev=search&pto=aue. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m6 relations under the direct supervision of, and access to, Fidel Castro"56 with these secret foreign relations techniques coming in the form of "[supplying] arms, money, intelligence, guidance, and a rear base to a variety of leftist guerilla movements in Latin America that wanted to duplicate the Cuban model".57 Manuel Piñeiro Losada too was a close friend of both Fidel and Raul Castro, having solidified his position as a loyal intelligence officer during the revolution.58 An interview with retired Resident Agent-in-Charge (RAC) of the DEA's Tampa office, Mike Powers, also was able to shed some light on how important Cuba was in the Colombian drug trade. He relayed an incident detailed to him by a smuggler arrested sometime in the 1980s who later became an informant. According to the smuggler, in the early 1970s, "he was flying a load of marijuana from Colombia to Florida…As he was almost across [Cuban airspace], a Cuban MiG came up, flew next to him and signaled to follow him and land. At that point, he [the smuggler] held up a bale of marijuana and the pilot laughed and signaled [him to] go ahead [through Cuban airspace]".59 While this incident does not indicate official government sanctioning of the drug trade nor some larger effort by the Cuban government to enter into the drug trade, this piece of information is indicative of how important Cuban airspace was in the drug trade and also how individual Cuban military officers or officials may have begun engaging in the drug trade to attain either larger foreign policy goals or as an extra source of income. This information is all quite interesting as this is the first time there is some form of evidence, albeit tangentially, in which Cuban officials and members of drug cartels met to 56 Dirk Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America: An Oral History (London, UK: Zed Books, 2017), p. 05, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/964892858. 57 Larry Rohter, "Manuel Pineiro, Spymaster For Cuba, Is Dead at 63," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 13 March 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/13/world/manuel-pineiro-spymaster-for-castro-is-dead-at-63.html. 58 Dirk Krujit, "Cuba and the Latin American Left: 1959-Present," Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina Vol. 28, No. 02 (2017), p. 32, http://eial.tau.ac.il/index.php/eial/article/view/1519/1623. 59 Mike Powers (retired Resident Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 20 December 2020. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m7 discuss a potential relationship revolving around the drug trade. However, this information must be treated with care in that these come from the mouths of defectors who must be listened to warily and have their claims treated with suspicion given the facts they, on occasion, will say anything in order to be given a lesser sentence or protection. Attempts to try and access CIA or other IC members' files were largely unsuccessful. However, declassified files were able to shed some light on the area. According to a declassified November 1983 document from the CIA, the Agency documented a series of claims revolving around Cuba and the drug trade, including one which mentioned how "Cuban officials, including Fidel Castro, has considered a scheme in 1979 to deal with narcotics smugglers in order to obtain hard currency for Cuba and contribute to the deterioration of US society".60 The CIA did mention as well that "not all of [these reports] have been corroborated", though were comfortable enough with the totality of the reports that they did endorse the belief that Cuba was involved, in some measure, with drug traffickers.61 The American non-profit, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba (FHRC), produced a historical work in 2019 documenting Cuba's involvement in Venezuela, including a section on Cuba's alleged involvement in the international drug trade. They allege that Cuba's official entry into the narcotics trade began in 1978, "with the creation of a department for [MININT] operations inside the Cuban corporation CIMEX [Corporación de Industrias Mixtas de Exportación], for money laundering and marijuana trafficking".62 The FHRC cites Norberto 60 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Drug Trafficking: The Role of Insurgents, Terrorists, and Sovereign States (Langley, November 1983), p. 05-06, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00283R000300010008-6.pdf. 61 Ibid. 62 Juan Antonio Blanco, Rolando Cartaya, Luis Domínguez, & Casto Ocando, "Cubazuela: Chronicle of a Cuban Intervention," Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, published April 2019, p. 87, https://www.fhrcuba.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CUBAZUELA-CUBAN-INTERVENTION-English.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m8 Fuentes, an original member of the Cuban Revolution and Castro historian, as the source for the claims. While Fuentes' exact statements were unable to be accessed, it is known that a defector from Cuba's Ministry of the Interior, Major Jose Rodriguez Antonio Menier, too claimed that CIMEX was "linked to the drug trade" while even going a step further and stating that Castro had knowledge of general drug trafficking and CIMEX operations, using the profits to "support and opulent lifestyle [and fund] off-budget projects".63 Maria C. Werlau, an independent scholar and Cuban human rights activist, speaking to other anonymous defectors from the DGI, confirmed that CIMEX had a department entirely under the control of MININT in addition to making the allegation that, "100% of their revenue went into Fidel Castro's accounts".64 In testimony before Congressional subcommittees during the late-1980s, two convicted drug traffickers provided similar statements on Cuban involvement in the drug trade. One of them, Luis Garcia, testified that, in either "late-1979 or early-1980, Cuban officials offered him use of airstrips for refueling drug flights" and though he did not accept, "he was aware of other smugglers who did".65 Another trafficker named George Morales claimed that during a 1979 meeting in Cuba, he was sold planes which were seized by the Cuban government (presumably, Morales either stripped these planes for parts or would use them in his own drug trafficking endeavors) before eventually getting the Cubans to agree "to allow his pilots overflight rights through Cuban airspace".66 Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 63 Don Podesta, "Ex-Cuban Officer Says Castro Profited from Drug Trafficking," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 26 August 1989, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/26/ex-cuban-officer-says-castro-profited-from-drug-trafficking/5f7a23ba-b4ad-4bc6-b8ec-fbea4470bac5/. 64 Maria C. Werlau, "Fidel Castro, Inc. A Global Conglomerate," Cuba in Transition Vol. 15 (2005), p. 379, https://ascecuba.org//c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v15-werlau.pdf. 65 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., December 1988, p. 64. 66 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m9 Narcotics, and International Operations, did however call Morales' statements "obviously incomplete", indicating that Morales' assertions required additional substantiation either through federal investigations, informants, or defectors.67 Attempts to find further evidence of Cuban involvement in the Western Hemispheric drug trade during the 1970s was minimal. It does appear that a top-secret, interagency, criminal investigation, initially codenamed "Operation Delta", was being conducted by the FBI, DEA, NYPD, and Chicago Police Department with the stated goal of "[digging] into the burgeoning Cuba-to-Florida narcotics trade and the distribution of drugs out of Miami".68 The details of this operation, however, are incredibly marginal, with attempts to access the records of this operation failing, despite multiple FOIA requests to the relevant agencies. It is possible that Cuba was not as active in the drug trade during this time due to the other foreign policy endeavors the nation-state was undertaking at that time (extensive military operations in Angola, South Africa, and Ethiopia). Due to the immense pressures going on with the nation, it is highly possible and logical even that Cuba toned down any drug trafficking activities that may have been going on. However, with the Soviet Union's death becoming more imminent and Cuba's foreign policy becoming more Latin American focused in the 1980s, Cuba seems to have significantly increased their ability at trafficking and providing security for drugs shipments as the crack epidemic swept into the U.S. during that time. The Cocaine Boom: Cuban and Drugs in the 1980s The 1980s saw a boom of drug trafficking and use throughout the Western Hemisphere. During the late 1970s, cocaine "[surged] in popularity…[being] associated with celebrities, high 67 Joan Mower, "Witness Claims Contra Drug Smuggling, Payoffs To Cuban, Bahamian Officials With," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 15 July 1987, https://apnews.com/article/5f5dd485a6d6825e88496281a2b1711c. 68 "Drugs gangs here, terrorist linked," Chicago Sun-Times, Sun-Times Media Group, published 16 April 1979, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/faln-drugs.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m0 rollers and glamorous parties" with this continuing into the 1980s before peaking in 1985 and being declared a nationwide epidemic.69 Throughout this time period, cocaine (and the even more popular derivative crack cocaine) was trafficked into the United States predominantly by organized criminal elements utilizing "a distribution system that imported cocaine from South America into the U.S. market using sea and air routes via the Caribbean and the South Florida coast" in addition to trafficking drugs through Mexico.70 While these trafficking routes are now largely managed and controlled by Mexican cartels like the Gulf Cartel or the Los Zetas, in the 1980s, the Colombians were the largest drug traffickers in the Western Hemisphere. The Medellín and Cali Cartels were the two largest players in the drug trade, with the Medellín Cartel being the dominant organized criminal element until 1993 with the death of Pablo Escobar.71 While both the Medellín and Cali Cartels are now extinct, they were incredibly powerful at the time, with the Medellín Cartel raking "up to $60 million daily in drug profits"72 and the Cali Cartel, by 1992, being "responsible for seventy percent of the cocaine sold in the United States, as well as for the extraordinary growth of the cocaine market in Europe".73 Because of the massive influence these organizations had and their wide area of operations throughout Central and North America, these cartels, mainly the Medellín, also joined forces with legitimate state enterprises such as Manuel Noriega's Panama to drastically increase their 69 Jason Ferris, Barbara Wood, & Stephanie Cook, "Weekly Dose: cocaine, the glamour drug of '70s, is making a comeback," The Conversation, The Conversation, published 08 March 2018, updated 12 March 2018, https://theconversation.com/weekly-dose-cocaine-the-glamour-drug-of-the-70s-is-making-a-comeback-88639. 70 Deonna S. Turner, "Crack epidemic," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 08 July 2016, updated 04 September 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/crack-epidemic. 71 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Strategic Intelligence Section, The Cocaine Threat to the United States (Springfield, VA, 19 July 1995), p. 04, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/154678NCJRS.pdf. 72 Sara Miller Llana, "Medellín, once epicenter of Colombia's drug war, fights to keep peace," The Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Publishing Society, published 25 October 2010, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2010/1025/Medellin-once-epicenter-of-Colombia-s-drug-war-fights-to-keep-the-peace. 73 Juan E. Méndez, Political Murder and Reform in Colombia: The Violence Continues (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, April 1992), p. 82. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m1 drug trafficking abilities.74 During the 1980s, many organized elements utilized the Caribbean to traffic narcotics either into Europe or into North America. It is without question that Cuba was one of these locations in which both air and sea craft landed to refuel and resupply before continuing on their way with payloads of narcotics.75 The first instance of Cuban involvement in the drug trade came in 1982 and 1983, with the apprehension and subsequent investigation of three persons with firsthand knowledge of these operations. These persons were Mario Estebes Gonzalez, an associate of Cuban intelligence, Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian weapons and drug smuggler, and Johnny Crump, a Colombian lawyer and drug smuggler. Mario Estebes' story was first reported on in the New York Times in April of 1983. According to Selwyn Raab, Estebes "was arrested by the Coast Guard on Nov. 29, 1981, while he was transporting 2,500 pounds of marijuana in a speedboat off the Florida coast. He was indicted on a charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and faced a maximum prison term of 15 years".76 Facing many years in prison, Estebes decided to turn state's evidence and inform, in returning for immunity from some criminal charges, delivering rather explosive testimony. Estebes' testified that his mission priorities included, "disrupting Cuban exile groups and performing economic espionage, but that his principal mission was the distribution of cocaine, marijuana, and methaqualone[sic] tablets in New York, northern New Jersey, and 74 Mimi Yagoub, "How Panama's Criminal Landscape Has Changed Since the Days of Narco-Dictator Noriega," InSight Crime, InSight Crime, published 30 May 2017, https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/how-panama-criminal-landscape-changed-since-narco-dictator-noriega/#. 75 Robert Filippone, "The Medellin Cartel: Why We Can't Win the Drug War," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 17, Iss. 04 (1994), p. 332, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576109408435960. 76 Selwyn Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 April 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/04/nyregion/a-defector-tells-of-drug-dealing-by-cuba-agents.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m2 Florida" and returned multiple millions of dollars back to Cuba.77 He also testified that "heroin and other narcotics were shipped to the New York area inside vans with concealed compartments to hide the drugs" in addition to claiming "he saw Vice Admiral [Aldo] Santmaria give orders permitting the unloading of narcotics at Paredon Grande [a small island off the Northern Coast of Cuba] brought in by a reputed international narcotics trafficker, Jaime Guillot Lara".78 In May of that same year, Estebes spoke before the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control in a joint hearing, testifying that the Cuban government, "used the 1980 Mariel boatlift to send as many as 7,000 spies to the United States, some of whom were ordered to help drug smugglers ''flood'' this country with illegal narcotics [and that] some agents were in this country for propaganda purposes and others were to create ''chaos'' in the event of war".79 Estebes expanded upon his earlier allegations and stated, "one scheme [involved] 23,000 pounds of marijuana and 10 million methaqualone tablets [being] shipped from Cuba to Florida," the profits of which were to be split between Cuban officials and the smugglers themselves.80 Jaime Guillot Lara is perhaps the most important of the three. Guillot Lara was a well-known drug/arms smuggler in Colombia who also happened to be "a close personal friend of the leader of the M-19 guerilla group, Jaime Bateman".81 As far as his smuggling habits, Guillot Lara, according to the DEA who had been keeping tabs on him as far back at 1975, "he was delivering over 400,000 pounds of marijuana, more than 20 million illicit methaqualone pills and 77 Alex Larzelere, Castro's Ploy-America's Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift (Fort. Lesley J. McNair: National Defense University, 1988), p. 229-230, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/23/2002287258/-1/-1/0/LARZELERE_MARIEL_BOATLIFT.PDF. 78 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 79 "Cuban Ties Boatlift To Drug Trade," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 01 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/01/us/cuban-ties-boatlift-to-drug-trade.html. 80 Ibid. 81 LT. Timothy J. Doorey, "The Cuban Interventionary Forces: The Growing Strategic and Regional Threat to the United States and NATO" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1986), p. 115, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a180123.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m3 thousands of pounds of cocaine to U.S. markets each year" while also acquiring an impressive fleet of ships for trafficking purposes.82 Guillot Lara first became introduced to the Cuban ambassador to Colombia, Ravelo-Renendo, through their mutual friend, Johnny Crump, during a meeting (conducted at Gonzalo Bassols' apartment, the number two at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia) which resulted in a profitable relationship between Guillot Lara and the Cubans. While Crump would also corroborate this meeting between the following members, Guillot Lara's girlfriend, who was there when the meetings took place, corroborated many aspects, while also testifying that Bassols "told Mr. Guillot-Lara that the drug scheme had been cleared by a high Cuban official" which Bassols then identified was Fidel Castro.83 Either during or immediately after this introduction, according to Congressional testimony from Francis M. Mullen, Jr., the Administrator of the DEA in the early 1980s, Guillot Lara "began to receive official Cuban protection for the movement of his drug-ladened[sic] vessels to the United States…[in addition to transporting and delivering] arms which were ultimately destined for the Colombian terrorist group, M-19" on Cuban behalf.84 Not only did Guillot Lara traffic weapons to Cuban aligned rebels and allow the Cubans in on his drug trafficking endeavors, it appears he "also transferred funds to the guerillas through an employee of a Panamanian bank" acting as something of a go-between.85 From 1980 to 1981, Guillot Lara 82 Nathan M. Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest, Reader's Digest Association, Inc., published July 1982, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/drugs.htm. 83 Extensions of Remarks, Cuba's Active Role in Drug Trafficking to the United States, 98th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 130, pt. 24B: 10400, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8-2-3.pdf. 84 Leslie Maitland Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 November 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/10/us/us-officials-link-castro-and-drugs.html. 85 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 12 March 1982), p. 02, https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QafYFT9344IVwbKAk5KG_OJydGlr3Q7oZPpK8WHGSx3JeWsUS431ZZwaW55TaMUk3UvHW4jiCHRb9Utgv1_TsoAFZD6FOi8njL3jjxp8gSVFo2zCTKSLLP0KOTaXLPl9ZdycsUgqn7e8ud91hnk09ZPGbYZ0QYrbwbNypMoakmWoqtvZNPGG0e9cQ33AwwDL7jITmBXQF CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m4 and the Cubans entered into a cozy relationship, though one that quickly became fraught with complications. In March of 1981, Colombian authorities found a "cache of M-19 weapons" and, with captured M-19 fighters implicating Cuban involvement, the Colombian government "[broke] off diplomatic relations with Havana and [expelled Ambassador Ravelo] and his staff".86 From midsummer to November of 1981, two Guillot Lara operated boats and one aircraft (the aircraft and one of the boats carried weapons for M-19) were apprehended by both the Colombian Coast Guard and United States Coast Guard; the capture of three M-19 rebels by the Colombian military also resulted in smuggling operations being significantly damaged.87 Guillot Lara fled Colombia, facing criminal charges, before being arrested by Mexican authorities.88 Awaiting extradition by the Mexicans to either the United States or Colombia, Guillot Lara revealed to both Mexican and U.S. investigators that he had "been involved in trafficking operations to Colombia for the M-19 on behalf of the government of Cuba. The latter provided the funds for the purchase of the arms".89 Following his revelations, however, Guillot Lara was released from Mexican custody and disappeared; according to the Colombian daily newspaper El Tiempo, Guillot Lara died in early April 1991 in Cuba of a myocardial infarction having "been detained on the island for twelve years".90 xujwOix6ni7j0-eT0RVti430wKPH9bicd8LdzulTZPXR8JDPGMTsyF2guKz20_HFjQkKlW8r6xpBfdR4TEC5SqWHYuetwHCl4rS7YWkCl0. 86 Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest. 87 John Dorschner & Jim McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine, The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 20 November 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/crump.htm. 88 Edna Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald, Knight Ridder, published 24 January 1982, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00552R000303490005-9.pdf. 89 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 90 "Guillot Died of a Infarction," El Tiempo, Casa Editorial El Tiempo S.A., published 13 April 1991, https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-61284. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m5 Johnny Crump is where the public first became aware of a Cuban connection to the drug trade, though the last defector to be arrested by U.S. authorities. Crump, according to investigative reporter Ernest Volkman, was a Colombian lawyer of American descent who "went into the narcotics racket, running a large-scale cocaine and marijuana-smuggling operation" following the failing of his family's ranch in the late-1970s.91 Being politically well-connected, he was asked to serve as a guide for the newly appointed Cuban Ambassador to Colombia, the aforementioned Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, in 1975, the two quickly becoming friends.92 The two became so close that Crump even asked Ravelo to be his newborn daughter's godfather.93 At one point in 1979, in both federal testimony and statements made to Miami Herald journalists John Dorschner & Jim McGee, Crump detailed a meeting he had between Ravelo in which the ambassador detailed, "was dealing with some Chileans who needed help…seeking American weapons, not traceable back to Cuba, to use in the fight to overthrow Augusto Pinochet," to which Crump agreed and offered assistance.94 Following this, Crump tried to arrange a deal in which a plane would transport marijuana into the country, however, few pilots were willing to enter Cuba's Camaguey airport where Ravelo had arranged for refueling.95 In a previously mentioned meeting between Ravelo, Crump, 91 Ernest Volkman, "The Odd Couple: Castro and Vesco: The Cocaine Alliance," The Gadsden Times, Edward Marsh, published 29 April 1984, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1891&dat=19840428&id=jKkfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=etYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5242,6122535. 92 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 93 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript, NBC Network, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01070R000100380010-3.pdf. 94 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 95 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, transcript, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/archive/cubaandcocaine.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m6 and Guillot Lara, the four agreed to transport the drugs via boat to Cuba with protection from Cuban Navy and Coast Guard forces.96 In a 1991 interview with PBS Frontline, Crump detailed the finalization of the first watercraft drug shipment to Cuba, discussing how he disembarked from "the plane to a Cuban government car that was waiting for us in the airport. I mean, there's no way that you can go to any country with no passport, with nothing like that, landing from another country in an international airport and have a car waiting for you right there in the field. It has to be with the OK of that government, that country… Everything was paid by the Cuban government. The hotel, you had to sign, like, you are a guest from the Cuban government because they don't let me pay for the hotel"; while Crump left the country before he personally could see any drugs entering the country, he was reassured by Ravelo that the drugs indeed touched down on Cuban soil.97 From that point onward, Crump became very involved in trafficking narcotics and arms with the Cubans, doing so via air and seacraft and aiding the Cubans larger foreign policy goals in aiding left-wing insurgent groups through Central and South America. In January of 1982, however, Crump was arrested in a joint Customs-DEA operation "at the Omni Hotel in Miami…on drug trafficking charges".98 At the time, Crump was acquiring arms and other weaponry "to be sent to an unspecified group in Bolivia" via his friend Jaime Guillot Lara.99 Much like Estebes, Crump was facing heavy prison time and began cooperating with federal 96 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 97 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, accessed through vault, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/cuba-and-cocaine/. 98 Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald. 99 U.S. Department of State. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m7 authorities, providing them "with details of his meetings and alleged drug dealings with Cuban government officials in Bogota and Havana".100 Much of Estebes, Guillot Lara, and Crump's claims are astounding, however, it must be kept in mind that these persons are convicted drug traffickers and defectors from Colombian drug cartels or are in some way associated with Cuba's military respectively. Despite this, many prosecutors and U.S. government agencies found some, if not a sizeable portion of their claims, credible. In Estebes' case, Richard Gregorie commented at the time on Estebes' validity as a witness describing how his comments were "very credible" and had been "independently corroborated".101 In an interview with Gregorie, the former attorney stressed he "found him credible because of that [outside and additional] corroboration".102 The Senate Chair of one committee also stated that Estebes' credibility was "checked out…with the Justice Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration".103 As far as Guillot Lara's credibility goes, the CIA's opinion of him seems to be rather high. According to a CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate from 1983, "[t]he Guillot Lara case…is proof that Cuba has used Colombian drug smuggling networks move arms to Colombian insurgents. In this case, Cuban officials and Colombian drug traffickers were clearly associated in facilitating narcotics shipments to the United States. Guillot paid the Cubans in hard currency and used his vessels and smuggling networks to move arms to Colombia for the insurgents. On the other hand, Cuba rather routinely searches some drug-smuggling ships found 100 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript. 101 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 102 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 103 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m8 in Cuban waters, confiscates drugs found and often imprisons the crew".104 Through this excerpt, the CIA seems to endorse the view that the overall claims about drug traffickers smuggling weaponry and drugs in collusion with Cuban figures and through Cuban waters is true and based in fact. While the CIA did seem to treat the accounts and his entire involvement with legitimacy, the agency was careful to note they were unsure of "the extent to which Cuba has continued to facilitate drug trafficking, either for money or arms".105 While the following document is not exactly an intelligence estimate or official analysis, an August 1982 conference report conducted by the CIA and the National Intelligence Council (NIC) stated, "Given the involvement of senior Cuban officials and at least two Cuban embassies, we believe this activity was approved at the highest levels of the Cuban Government. It almost certainly was not a case of corruption by mid- or low-level Cuban officials…Given the level of Guillot's Cuban contacts and the political implications of the arrangements, the operation was almost certainly approved at the highest levels of the Havana government" though the document was clear in stating that the U.S. government was uncertain as to who was behind the operation.106 These three witnesses were able to corroborate a great deal of information that the U.S. federal government, mainly the DEA and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), had been investigating since the late 1970s. With this testimony from defectors and arrested drug traffickers who were seemingly vetted and verified, the U.S. government finally was able to bring forth official charges against certain members of the Cuban government and military. 104 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Implications for the United States of the Colombian Drug Trade Vol. II (Langley, 28 June 1983), p. 02, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00302R000600990002-9.pdf. 105 Ibid. 106 U.S. Intelligence Community, National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics and Terrorism (Langley, August 1982), p. iii, 3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00851R000100160008-1.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m9 On 05 November, 1982, an indictment brought by the USAO-SDFL in Miami, Florida charged that certain drug traffickers and members of the Cuban government did "knowingly, willfully and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree, together with each other, and with diverse other persons who are both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit certain offenses against the United States" in the importation and possession of methaqualone tablets and marijuana and "used and caused to be used facilities in interstate and foreign commerce, including the telephone, and traveled and caused others to travel in interstate and foreign commerce between the Southern District of Florida, Colombia, Cuba and elsewhere, with the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on and facilitate the promotion, management, establishment and carrying on of an unlawful activity, said unlawful activity being a business enterprise involving controlled substances".107 The persons charged in this indictment brought forth by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida included Jaime Guillot Lara, Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, Gonzalo Bassols-Suarez, Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, Rene Rodriguez-Cruz, and David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. alongside multiple other, predominantly, Miami-based drug traffickers.108 Neither Crump or Estebes were charged as both had testified for the prosecution and received either partial or full immunity in addition to new identities and federal protection. The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, Cuba's foreign policy arm operating as an independent section of the Czechoslovakian Embassy, commented that the charges against Ravelo, Bassols, Santamaria, and Rodriguez-Cruz were "all lies"109; a January 1982 letter from 107 United States v. Jaime Guillot Lara et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 05 November 1982), http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/indictment-82.htm. 108 Ibid. 109 George Volsky, "U.S. Drug Charges Cite 4 Cuban Aides," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/06/us/us-drug-charges-cite-4-cuban-aides.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m0 Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Relations (MINREX) denied Cuba ever utilized drug traffickers to transport arms to rebels in Latin America, never gave arms to guerillas in Colombia, and denied that Guillot Lara had ever set foot in Cuba or received any monies from the Republic of Cuba.110 The denial by Cuba of having never gave arms to Colombian guerillas was roundly criticized, most notably in a 1990 interview with former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Thomas Boyatt.111 Among those charged were high level Cuban officials, some of whom have already been discussed including the Cuban Ambassador to Colombia Ravelo-Renendo and his "minister-counsel" at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia Bassols-Suarez.112 In addition to these figures, the indictment also charged Vice Admiral (VADM) of the Cuban Navy Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado and Rene Rodriguez-Cruz a "member of the Cuban Community Party Central Committee and president of the Cuban Institute of Friendship With The Peoples [ICAP]" with the same charges.113 It is worth noting that the ICAP was described by the CIA in a 1984 brief as being an organization which, in addition to bringing in foreign youths interested in Communism, Socialism, or Cuba also "provided Cuban intelligence services with a registry of aliens who might prove useful for intelligence collection efforts and operations in their homelands".114 110 "Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs," Minister of Foreign Affairs Isidoro Malmierca Peoli (28 January 1982), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America Report, Cuba, JPRS L/10334, 18 February 1982, p. 03-04, heading: Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs, Republic of Cuba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Latin America Report, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030043-6.pdf. 111 Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt (Ret.), interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 08 March 1990, p. 48, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Boyatt,%20Thomas%20D.toc.pdf?_ga=2.264396167.981542772.1592939617-1066174783.1588020094&_gac=1.137161348.1589401103.EAIaIQobChMIgqnAwtSx6QIVSx-tBh2tGgsJEAAYASAAEgKALvD_BwE. 112 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba (Langley, October 1979), p. 224, https://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/07/66/14/00003/AA00076614_00003.pdf. 113 Mary Thornton, "Four Cuban Officials Indicted in Drug Smuggling," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/11/06/four-cuban-officials-indicted-in-drug-smuggling/d70ed042-0adc-42d2-971b-23475f7adc83/. 114 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba: Castro's Propaganda Apparatus and Foreign Policy (Langley, November 1984), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000972183.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m1 David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. is an interesting figure within this legal case as he, in December of 1982, pled guilty to the first count of the criminal indictment.115 In his plea, Lorenzo Perez indicated culpability on Guillot Lara's part to "purchase, receive, store, and possess with intent to distribute approximately eight and one-half million methaqualone tablets" while indicating "that Jaime Guillot-Lara would provide ships to transport methaqualone tablets from Columbia[sic] with the knowledge of the Cuban governmental officials".116 Lorenzo Perez admitted he assisted Guillot Lara in all of these actions while also admitting he "traveled by private vessel from the Southern District of Florida to Paredon Grande, Cuba [and] met with Cuban government officials" including Santamaria and Rodriguez-Cruz.117 In Congressional testimony, Lorenzo Perez also testified that that "Cuban government was also to receive one-third of the profit of the marihuana[sic] sale" yet this did not go through as it appears Guillot Lara kept the profits [just under half a million USD] to himself.118 This case was the most significant development in the long standing allegations against Cuba on the area of narcotics trafficking. However, it is incredibly important to note that there was no evidence linking the Castros to the drug trade. The lead attorney who personally handled the case for the DOJ, Richard Gregorie, stated "Was Fidel Castro involved? At this point, no…[I] can't honestly say I saw that open Cuban involvement [and] did not come up with anyone who spoke directly to Fidel in those early cases".119 115 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 09 December 1982), p. 01, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr.htm. 116 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE, p. 02, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr-1.htm. 117 Ibid. 118 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 30 April 1983, p. 33. 119 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m2 Also around this time, many officials from the DOJ and U.S. Department of State (DOS) changed their previously emphasized opinions on the extent of Cuban involvement in the drug trade. In an October 1983 hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, DEA Administrator Mullen stated, "I moved very cautiously at first wanting to have evidence before publicly stating I was convinced that the Cuban Government was involved in drug trafficking. I am now convinced, as I have stated in prior sessions, that there is Cuban Government involvement in drug trafficking", bringing forth the above indictments and other "[classified and confidential] information" to support his reasoning.120 The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, James H. Michel, stated before Congress also in May of 1983 "the evidence clearly indicates more than a case of corruption by local or mid-level security officials in Cuba…Narcotics trafficking has apparently been sanctioned by Cuba as a means to finance subversion in Latin America".121 These comments were found by the Washington Post to, "fit in with a Reagan administration campaign to rally public and congressional support for its Central American policies, including more aid for El Salvador's army".122 Michel was not the only State Department official to make this claim either. The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger stated in May of 1983 that he "would find it very difficult to believe that the Cuban Government itself is not 120 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Impact of the South Florida Task Force on Drug Interdiction In The Gulf Coast Area, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 October 1983, p. 16, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/97516NCJRS.pdf. 121 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 30 April 1983), p. 02, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Cuban_Involvement_in_Narcotics_Trafficki/NItKAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0. 122 Edward Cody, "Castro Ties To Drugs Suggested," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 01 May 1983, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/05/01/castro-ties-to-drugs-suggested/242170fe-a930-4bc4-b30c-18016f794497/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m3 involved… [The evidence is] really quite clear that there is major Cuban involvement in the drug traffic in this country", while also accusing the Castro government of playing a role in this.123 However, this appears to be more Eagleburger's own personal opinion as a more senior State Department official stated later that no agency had been able to prove "personal involvement by Fidel Castro".124 A spokesman for the Cuban Interests Section responded to the comments by Mullen and Michel by stating, "[This is] propaganda against the Cubans…We [the Cuban government] are refusing this accusation. We have consistent fighting against drug traffic. There are many American people who are put in Cuban jails for drug trafficking".125 At this stage, in relation to the Guillot Lara/Crump case, these definitive comments that Castro or the Cuban government officially was involved seemed to an extreme jump and other officials protested against this characterization. Stanley Marcus, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida and the attorney whose office brought forth the indictments against the four Cuban officials, stated before Congress "I think it is a fair and accurate statement to say some of the major organs and institutions of the Cuban state and some high-ranking officials of those organs and institutions of the state are involved in drug-running to the United States".126 William H. Webster, then Director of the FBI, also spoke about this in a television interview, stating the majority of the evidence currently being used by some officials to make judgements "[came] from one set of 123 Kenneth B. Noble, "Official Ties Cuba to U.S. Drug Traffic," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/02/world/official-ties-cuba-to-us-drug-traffic.html. 124 Ibid. 125 Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times. 126 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Security, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 30 April 1983, p. 15. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m4 sources and should be viewed with care".127 At this juncture, there was a great deal of conflicting views upon the established evidence, some most likely based upon political and individual biases based upon preconceived notions on both the nature of Communism and Latin America in general. While the evidence linking Castro or the Cuban government as a whole is very minimal (mostly relegated to evidence that would be considered hearsay in a U.S. court of law), it is undeniable that sections of the Cuban government, including areas of Cuba's diplomatic and intelligence services, were utilizing drug traffickers to achieve larger foreign policy goals within the Latin American region. As the 1980s progressed, additional evidence of Cuban involvement in the drug trade became even more apparent with defectors from Noriega's Panama, Cuba's DGI, and the arrests of multiple drug traffickers all speaking to U.S. officials. During this time as well, many criminal investigators of the U.S. federal government found or came across evidence of drug trafficking on Cuba's part along with the U.S. IC coming to a more solid conclusion on the matter. Prior to these November 1982 indictments, an FBI investigation into Cuban involvement in the drug trade was underway. In October of 1982, a U.S. Customs plane near Corpus Christi, Texas intercepted a Cessna aircraft that was having a mechanical malfunction and tracked it to Cleburne, Texas. The pilot, an American, "was arrested with 877 pounds of marijuana onboard" with "Chemical analysis [showing the marijuana] almost certainly was grown in Cuba".128 Following the pilot's conviction in April of 1983, federal investigators detailed "the ring operated for two years in violation of government embargoes on trade with Cuba by shipping computers and other equipment. Some of the return flights carried high-grade Cuban 127 Ibid. 128 "Did Cuba get computers in return for marijuana?" The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 02 April 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/computers.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m5 marijuana".129 The evidence necessary to make the claim that this ring was operating with the explicit approval of Cuban government officials or the Castros themselves is very lacking, however, what this does indicate is that there were individual smugglers beyond large metropolitan centers who were found to have ties to Cuba and that Cuba seemingly was involved in producing drugs in some quantity. In December of 1984, the CIA released an interagency intelligence memorandum stating outright, "Cuba is currently supporting drug trafficking…We judge that Fidel Castro is fully cognizant of and condones the drug-related activity that is taking place with the support of Cuban officials…The key Cuban participants are officers of the Interior Ministry or America Department of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee…Their participation strongly indicates a sanctioned government policy, rather than an arrangement for personal gain".130 While a good portion of this document is redacted, this is the first time in which an intelligence agency, or the CIA at least, has openly accused the upper echelon of the Cuban government and Castro himself of playing some role or in some way supporting the activities occurring. During this period, many criminal investigations uncovered more information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade, with additional evidence of Castro involvement becoming more apparent. In addition to this, many Congressional hearings and panels were convened with the goal of exploring the Latin American drug trade, during which many witnesses were called. Among these witnesses was Diego Viafara Salinas, an M-19 physician who infiltrated an armed civilian group with ties to members of the Medellín Cartel.131 Salinas held the belief he would be 129 Ibid. 130 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Government Involvement in Drug Trafficking (Langley, December 1984), p. 03, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87T00217R000700140002-5.pdf. 131 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 September 1989, p. 70, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/146771NCJRS.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m6 killed due to his past association with M19 and began providing evidence to the Colombian government, which eventually resulted in the deaths of many prominent Medellín Cartel leaders.132 In testimony before the U.S. Congress, Salinas recalled that, "[on November 22, 1988] two pilots flying a Commander 1000 aircraft were planning to stop and refuel in Cuba. They were leaving from an estate [in the Department of Cordoba] …When the seats of the plane were removed to load the cocaine, I saw the navigation charts, which indicated they were flying over the southern coast of Cuba. These pilots commented that they had to be sure to carry some amount of U.S. dollars with them to leave in Cuba as prearranged payment for the stopover".133 While the pilots Salinas spoke with never identified who gave them clearance to fly over Cuba with drugs, Salinas did testify "that it [the drug trafficking operation] was all the way up to Fidel Castro" with this information apparently coming from Fidel's spokesman.134 It is worth noting that this piece of testimony would effectively qualify as hearsay in a U.S. court of law. Many informants also came forward with information that would prove to be incriminatory to many persons with ties to the drug trade, including certain high-ranking Cuban leaders. On such source, a confidential informant for the DEA, who, after being arrested in 1985 on conspiracy charges, provided information on much of the Medellín's drug trafficking activities to the U.S. government.135 In a request for payment from the DEA's Asuncion Country Office, the agency noted the source's decades of service to the United States, describing him as having led "successful 132 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 73. 133 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 71-72. 134 Ibid. 135 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Asuncion Country Office, REQUEST for PAYMENT under 28 U.S.C. 524 (C)(1)(B) for CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE (CS #####) (Asuncion, post-2009), p. 01. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m7 negotiations for landing rights and refueling operations in [among other countries] Cuba…[the source] purchased a birthday surprise (an airplane bought in the U.S.) for Fidel CASTRO's[sic] birthday, which he personally handed over to Castro's brother Raúl (then Cuba's Minister of Defense) during lunch".136 This information is quite damning to the Castro regime and, if true, would prove that, at the least, Raúl Castro did have knowledge of Cuban involvement in the drug trade and condoned those operations. While it cannot be emphasized enough that this confidential source pled "nolo contendere to the conspiracy charges in 1986", it does speak volumes that the DEA found him an essential and trustworthy source to continue using well into the 21st century.137 At this same time, another development implicated an American fugitive with close ties to the Castro regime in the drug trade. In April of 1985, appearing "before the Senate subcommittee on children, family, and drugs" (which was investigating Nicaraguan governmental involvement in the drug trade) were two convicted smugglers who provided further information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade.138 One of them was smuggler James A. Herring, Jr. who, while insisting he never transported drugs for the Cubans or Nicaraguans, detailed his smuggling activities with the Cubans in an interview with PBS Frontline, saying, "When I would go into Varadero with boatloads of equipment, we would be received by marked vessels that the Cuban navy, so to speak, utilized, their military gunboats. They would escort us into the gunboat dockage there at Varadero. From there they would offload. We would stay as long as we felt necessary to refuel us, wined and dined us. And when we were ready to return to 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 "Witnesses Testify on Vesco Link to Drug trafficking in Nicaragua, Cuba," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 19 April 1985, https://apnews.com/article/09e42836a8f58d76da155fa155da7847. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m8 the Keys, they would take and escort us out".139 In addition to this, Herring also claimed that the DGI, "would even offer drugs in lieu of the cash. [They] had the availability of enormous amounts of drugs that they had warehoused through seizures that they had made in their country on drug operations that weren't paying protection for their air space or their waterways. So they had a readily available amount of drugs in the form of cocaine, Qualudes[sic] and marijuana".140 Herring also testified that "he worked with Cuban Government officials and [Robert Vesco] to help the Nicaraguan government build a cocaine-processing laboratory near Managua".141 Vesco had been a successful businessman in the United States, creating a hundred-million-dollar manufacturing empire by 1970 before being twice indicted on federal charges for "defrauding thousands of investors [of $224 million USD]" and "for making illegal contributions totaling $250,000" to Richard Nixon's re-election campaign in 1972 and 1976 respectively.142 Following this, Vesco fled to numerous Latin American countries (including Nicaragua) before settling in Cuba around 1984.143 In a March 1996 profile for Vanity Fair, Vesco's immediate family indicates a friendly relationship to Fidel and Raul Castro in addition to a partnership to traffic narcotics with Col. Antonio De La Guardia, a high-ranking figure in the DGI and an important part of Cuba's overall foray into the drug trade.144 Eventually, however, Vesco attracted the eye of U.S. federal law enforcement for his 139 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 140 Ibid. 141 Joel Brinkley, "Panel Hears Details Linking Managua and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 20 April 1985, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/20/world/panel- hears-details-linking-managua-and-drugs.html. 142 Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Robert L. Vesco," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 20 July 1998, updated 30 November 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Robert-L-Vesco. 143 Ibid. 144 Ann Louise Bardach, "Vesco's Last Gamble," Vanity Fair, Condé Nast, published March 1996, https://archive.vanityfair.com/article/1996/3/vescos-last-gamble. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m9 alleged participation in drug trafficking and, though some convicted drug traffickers and Cuban intelligence defectors implicated him in criminal acts, the "FBI and [DEA] denied he had any role" in certain elements of the drug trade, disproving these traffickers and defectors' claims.145 Ultimately, Vesco was arrested and sentenced to prison in Cuba in 1996 "for economic crimes against the government of Fidel Castro".146 Since at least April of 1987, the DEA's Miami Office was actively pursuing an investigation against Cuban government and military officials. Harry Sommers, a newly minted DEA agent to the Miami FO and later Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of the Atlanta FO, was the lead investigator on the case and detailed his investigation in an April 1990 academic work for Florida International University. According to Sommers, in April of 1987, "two pilots [an American and Cuban national] flew approximately 480 pounds of cocaine from Colombia to [Varadero Military Base, Cuba]…where the cocaine was transferred to Cuban military officers".147 According to Sommers, the pilots were both questioned by U.S. officials and, in this interview, both pilots claimed they had stopped in Cuba to make "emergency repairs" and "presented documentation from the Cuban government confirming their story".148 The drugs were then placed upon a boat named the "Flerida" and, while attempting to enter Florida waters that April, was intercepted by the DEA. In the ensuing interviews with the boat's operators (all Cubans who were "residing in 145 Jim McGee, Pierre Thomas, Guy Gugliotta, & Jerry Knight "Vesco Held In Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 09 June 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/09/vesco-held-in-cuba/874c16d3-81a5-4700-84ce- 6a4e8300fdab/. 146 Douglas Farah, "Vesco Gets 13-Year Sentence in Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1996, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/08/27/vesco-gets-13-year-sentence-in-cuba/77271414- 9219-4efe-b68c-5d30b0f9b11b/. 147 Harry Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," (graduate paper, Florida International University, 23 April 1990), p. 07. 148 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m0 Miami"), the DEA found the boat was "[initially] met at sea by a Cuban Coast Guard vessel and escorted to the military base in Varadero [where the] crew members were housed and fed until the cocaine was loaded onto the vessel" upon which the boat was escorted out of Cuban waters by a Coast Guard ship.149 Additional evidence showing U.S.-based drug traffickers of Cuban descent docking and landing at Varadero and interacting heavily with Cuban military officers was uncovered through further investigations in May and November of 1987.150 This investigation led to the federal indictments of various figures in late 1988, including Reinaldo and Rueben Ruiz, a Cuban father and son drug trafficking team operating out of the South Florida.151 Reinaldo Ruiz, facing a sentence of life imprisonment, agreed to make a deal with the government in return for a lighter sentence.152 In a television interview with PBS Frontline before his death, Ruiz detailed his involvement in the drug trade and his associations with the Cuban government. According to Ruiz, he would transport a boat from Florida to Varadero where "everything had been arranged in advance [by Colonel Pardo, Chief of Command of Naval Operations in Varadero]" while his son, Rueben, would fly the cocaine from Colombia to Varadero which, upon landing, would be transferred to Ruiz's boat by members of the Cuban military and MININT.153 In this interview, Ruiz also stated "Every time that I went over there, I was completely sure that I was a 100 percent backing[sic], all the way to the top, otherwise I never, ever touch a thing out there". 154 149 Ibid. 150 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08-10. 151 Buddy Nivens, "Jury Links Cuba To Drug Smuggling," South Florida Sun Sentinel, Tribune Publishing, published 27 February 1988, https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1988-02-27-8801120759-story.html. 152 Richard Cole, "Prosecutors: Trafficker Implicated More Top Cuban Officials," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 21 August 1989, https://apnews.com/article/348da22ca41fd9a7e77c7ab9226c504e. 153 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 154 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m1 Despite Ruiz's comment, he never once indicated to federal investigators he met Fidel or Raul Castro; the closest Ruiz got to implicating either senior leader was a secret recording made by a DEA informant in which Ruiz claimed "The [payoff] money went in Fidel's drawer".155 Again, Ruiz never identified this person as being Fidel Castro and, if he did, the information would have come from someone who had heard this information from someone else, effectively being inadmissible evidence. What is quite serious about Ruiz's allegations and testimony however are his connections to Cuban intelligence. According to Harry Sommers and confirmed by other federal investigations, Ruiz was a "cousin of Miguel Ruiz-Poo…a Cuban captain in the Ministry of the Interior" who was working in Panama when he met Reinaldo Ruiz.156 While they initially began transporting U.S. goods and products to circumvent the embargo, Reinaldo Ruiz eventually floated the idea of trafficking cocaine through Cuba which resulted in Ruiz-Poo informing his superior Major Amado Padrón Trujillo and Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia, both members of the Moneda Convertible (MC) Department, a division meant to "circumvent the United States embargo and earn Cuba hard currency".157 This is where Ruiz's involvement in shipping boats and aircraft filled with cocaine and other narcotics to Cuba and then on to Florida began. According to esteemed journalist Andres Oppenheimer, shortly after de la Guardia and Ruiz initially met, Ruiz asked de la Guardia if Fidel Castro was aware of their arrangement to traffic narcotics to which de la Guardia replied in the affirmative. Oppenheimer writes however 155 "Secret Drug Case Tape Talks of 'Fidel' Payoffs" Associated Press, Associated Press, published 09 March 1988, https://apnews.com/article/0800e600293914df73901e1fe452316b. 156 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 11. 157 González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m2 "It is unclear whether Tony de la Guardia had personally discussed his cocaine-trafficking plans with Castro. The Commandante, with his instinctive revulsion for money matters, seldom got involved in dirty business deals. That was Interior Minister Abrantes's job…De La Guardia's statement to Reinaldo Ruiz may have reflected the colonel's assumption that Abrantes never would have okayed something as hot as a drug operation without Fidel's blessing".158 Also around this time was the federal indictment against Manuel Noriega, the dictator of Panama who had become an increasing annoyance to the U.S. government. Despite having initially been friendly to the U.S., providing information to the CIA and DEA159, his involvement in substantial drug trafficking and racketeering efforts (in addition to the significant corruption and general abuses of his regime) had made him a liability.160 Among the witnesses who provided information against Noriega was Jose Blandón Castillo, a former key member of Noriega's intelligence service and a "consul general in New York".161 Blandón provided first-hand knowledge of incidences, confirming some of what was already suspected by American officials and investigators on Noriega's activities, but also claimed Fidel Castro mediated a dispute between Noriega and the Medellín Cartel in the Darién Province of Panama. According to Blandón, he "met with Castro in Havana on June 21 or 22, 1984 [and] Castro recommended that Noriega return the $5 million in protection money and return the plant, personnel, and equipment to the Cartel" and on either June 27th or 28th, "Noriega and Castro met 158 Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour: The Secret Story Behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 29. 159 Robert L. Jackson, "Noriega Gave DEA Limited Aid for 5 Years, Officials Say," Los Angeles Times, Times Mirror Company, published 16 December 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-12-16-mn-517-story.html. 160 Philip Shenon, "Noriega Indicted by U.S. For Links to Illegal Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 February 1988, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/06/world/noriega-indicted-by-us-for-links-to-illegal-drugs.html. 161 Stephen Engelberg with Elaine Sciolino, "A U.S. Frame-Up of Nicaragua Charged," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 February 1988, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90M00005R001100160023-3.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m3 directly" and Noriega agreed to go forward with Castro's suggestions, resulting in the release of numerous prisoners.162 While this information was used in indictments against senior Cuban officials and Manuel Noriega, some have found reason to doubt Blandón's claims. John Dinges, a noted investigative journalist and current Professor Emeritus of International Journalism at Columbia University, documented Blandón's claims in his 1991 book Our Man in Panama, stating, "There was no independent corroboration for the story…No other witnesses, including [Floyd Carlton Caceres, Noriega's personal pilot], had any knowledge of the Cuban meeting. If investigators had checked flight records and even press clips in Panama, they might have discovered that Blandón had gotten some basic facts of the Darién incident wrong: the dates for the trip to Cuba were wrong, and the prisoners supposedly released at Castro's urging had been freed more than one month before Blandón and Noriega went to Cuba".163 Richard Gregorie, who met with Blandón, disagrees with Dinges' assertions, saying, "Blandón provided the US government with valid evidence that was corroborated, but Blandón volunteered his cooperation and no one knew his true motivation. He was caught, prior to trial, recording his interviews by agents… The photos and information he provided were valid, but whether this was a lure by some foreign intelligence service or an attempt to sell his story for personal gain made him untrustworthy as a witness".164 Castro was interviewed around this time by Maria Shriver of NBC News and wholeheartedly rejected "José Blandón's charge" while also "[inviting] the Congressional committee [which heard Blandón's claims] to visit Cuba to receive evidence that Blandón was 162 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66. 163 John Dinges, Our Man in Panama: The Shrewd Rise and Brutal Fall of Manuel Noriega (New York, NY: Random House, 1991), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/232993288. 164 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m4 lying to Congress".165 In this interview, he also "[denied] that the Medellín drug cartel has ever trafficked drugs through Cuba to the United States".166 Despite Castro's invitation to the committee, subcommittee chairman Senator John Kerry approached the Cuban Interests Section in D.C. and requested to visit Cuba on the conditions that "staff [be] permitted to advance the trip and…the Cubans agreed to discuss the drug trafficking problem in general" along with being able to meet Robert Vesco; the trip never materialized as "The Cubans never replied to any of these requests and never made any further arrangements for the visit".167 The concentrated U.S. criminal investigations, Congressional hearings, and federal indictments, the intense media speculation and reporting, along with seeming pressure from the Soviet Union168 forced the Cuban government's hand. On 12 June, 1989, multiple high-ranking members of Cuba's military and intelligence services were arrested. These members included General Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez,169 Brigadier General Patricio de la Guardia, Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia (twin brother to Patricio), Colonel Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan, Captain Jorge Martinez Valdes, Lieutenant Colonel Alexis Lago Archoa, and Major Amado Padrón Trujillo.170 Also charged were Captain Leonel Estevez-Soto, Captain Antonio Sanchez-Lima, First Lieutenant Jose Luis Pineda-Bermudez, Captain Miguel Ruiz-Poo, Captain Rosa Maria Abierno-Gobin, and Captain Eduardo Diaz-Izquierdo.171 165 Jane Franklin, Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History (New York, NY: Ocean Press, 1992), p. 239, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/944186211. 166 Ibid. 167 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66-67. 168 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, International Narcotics Situation Report (Langley, VA: May 1989), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91M01043R002200150004-9.pdf. 169 Robert Pear, "Cuba Arrests Top General on Corruption Charges," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 16 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/16/world/cuba-arrests-top-general-on-corruption-charges.html?searchResultPosition=8. 170 Robert Pear, "Cuba Seizes 6 More Officers Amid Signs of Big Shakeup," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 17 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/17/world/cuba-seizes-6-more-officers-amid-signs-of-big-shakeup.html. 171 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 14. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m5 The majority of these persons were members of Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and intelligence services, though Estupinan and Martinez were both former aides-de-camp to General Ochoa.172 Save for Archoa and Trujillo, who were not charged with any crime, the other persons were charged with a variety of public corruption crimes, including money laundering, drug trafficking, and treason. As well, though all were arrested rather simultaneously, there were two separate cases going on which involved the drug trade in Cuba. The first involved, "[Antonio "Tony"] de la Guardia, Major Padrón, and six other officers who worked at [the MC Department] … The Cuban government charged that de la Guardia's group arranged for six tons of cocaine to be sent from Colombia through Cuba to the United States in the two years after April 1987, and that they were paid $3.4 million for doing so".173 The second case involved primary Ochoa and his aide-de-camp Martinez (in addition to "several others") in which the Cuban government charged that "[Ochoa] enriched himself in black-market trading, using army resources, when he was stationed in Angola in 1988, and to have neglected his military duties…[stole] $161,000 from Nicaragua's Sandinista army through a failed weapons deal…[and] was said to have conceived of a scheme to send major cocaine shipments to the United States, and for that purpose to have sent Martínez secretly to Medellín, Colombia, in 1988 to meet with Pablo Escobar Gaviria, a magnate of the drug cartel".174 The charges against Ochoa did not allege he was involved in de la Guardia's operations nor ever took part in a drug deal, alleging only he engaged in treason and efforts to gain private funds for either independent military operations or for personal use. 172 Ibid. 173 Julia Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books, NYREV, Inc., published 07 December 1989, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1989/12/07/the-trial-that-shook-cuba/. 174 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m6 The trial (which aired on public television throughout Cuba) began on 25 June, 1989, thirteen days after Ochoa had initially been arrested, with the first hearing beginning on the 26th of June.175 Throughout the course of the trial, numerous witnesses were called who testified in regards to the charges, in some cases admitting culpability and accepting responsibility for individual actions which were illegal while also implicating others such as Ochoa and the de la Guardia brothers in the illegal activities they had been charged with. Both Patricio and Tony de la Guardia and Arnaldo Ochoa admitted their involvements in drug trafficking and treasonous activities, respectively, before the trial had commenced.176 At the trial's conclusion, the prosecutor for the government recommended to the Honor Tribunal, a board of 47 high-ranking Cuban military officers (one of whom was Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, who had been charged with drug trafficking by the U.S. in 1982)177, that "Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, Antonio de la Guardia Font, Jorge Martinez Valdez, Amado Bruno Padron Trujillo, Antonio Sanchez Lima, Alexis Lago Arocha, and Eduardo Diaz Izquierdo [receive] the death penalty…[for] the most serious crimes in this indictment, which are drug trafficking and treason against the fatherland".178 The prosecutor also recommended "30 years imprisonment for defendants Patricio de la Guardia Font and Rosa Maria Abierno Gobin, 25 years imprisonment for defendants Gabriel Prendes Gomez, Leonel Estevez Soto, Miguel Ruiz 175 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 03, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a347578.pdf. 176 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 07, 154, 164. 177 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 44. 178 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 187. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m7 Poo, and Luis M. Pineda Bermudez, and 15 years imprisonment for defendant Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan".179 The Honor Tribunal agreed unanimously on 11 July 1989, with the stripping of ranks coming later on 12 July 1989.180 On 13 July 1989, Ochoa, Tony de la Guardia, Valdez, and Trujillo were all executed by way of firing squad.181 During and following the trial, Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and the Cuban government as a whole was revamped; Diocles Torralba Gonzalez, Cuba's Minister of Transportation "was dismissed [on 14 June 1989] for "improper conduct" – suggesting he may have been engaged in corruption"182 while Cuba's Minister of the Interior, Brigadier General Jose Abrantes Fernandez, "was dismissed [on] June 26" and then arrested on 31 July 1989 alongside "Brig. Gen. Roberto Gonzalez Caso, a former head of immigration; Oscar Carreno Gomez, former customs chief; Lt. Col. Rolando Castaneda Izquiero, and Hector Carbonell Mendez, director of a state-owned company that dealt in foreign currency".183 Five more Brigadier Generals of the Cuban military, presumably aligned with the Ministry of the Interior, were also "demoted to colonel and retired".184 Both Abrantes and Torralba would later receive twenty year prison sentences, with Abrantes dying in 1991 of a heart attack.185 Replacing Abrantes in the MININT was "trusted four-star general Abelardo Colomé Ibarra" who quickly revamped much of MININT's capabilities.186 179 Ibid. 180 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 208-209. 181 Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour, p. 01-03. 182 Jim Anderson, "U.S.: High-level shakeup may be under way in Cuba," United Press International, United Press International, published 14 June 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/06/14/US-High-level-shakeup-may-be-under-way-in-Cuba/4954613800000/. 183 Isaac A. Levi, "Five Senior Cuban Officers Arrested in Drug Scandal," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 31 July 1989, https://apnews.com/article/0782d185225919535cf3aa518ed550a9. 184 Ibid. 185 Richard Gott, Cuba: A New History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 285. 186 Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America, p. 183. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m8 During and after the trial, the charges and convictions were heavily criticized. Some cast doubt on the trial's veracity in regards to having a military officer who had allegations of drug trafficking leveled against him187, while others (Cuban human rights activities, American journalists, and international human rights advocacy and monitoring groups) took offense to the lack of questions asked by the defendants' military appointed prosecutors (in addition to the rather loaded way in which some questions were asked).188 Jaqueline Tillman, a member of the National Security Council, was quoted as saying, "The evidence of Cuban involvement in narcotics trafficking was becoming so abundant that the regime moved to protect Fidel Castro by dissociating him from those activities" while Frank Calzon, a member of the human rights group Freedom House stated that either of the Castros, either Fidel or Raul, "had to approve of this activity, or at least [look] the other way".189 Even civilians of the island nation, according to former diplomat Wayne Smith, were "questioning the official explanation and arguing that there has to be a lot more to this than what is contained in the official announcement".190 Following the trials and into the 1990s, however, Cuba seemingly became more committed to halting drug traffic in Cuba. Fulton Armstrong, a former NIO for Latin America and two-time Director for Inter-American Affairs for the NSC, has stated that "Since Ochoa, collaboration has been good" mentioning that, since 1997, a formal relationship between the United States and Cuba exists, with both the U.S. and Cuba "[identifying] this as a matter of 187 Richard Cole, "Admiral's Role Calls Cuba Drug Crackdown Into Question," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 29 June 1989, https://apnews.com/article/9ef279d0c5de07e958d53e9c1a7bea5b. 188 Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books. 189 Robert Pear, "Cuba Discloses A Drug Network Of Top Officials," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 24 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/24/world/cuba-discloses-a-drug-network-of-top-officials.html. 190 Larry Rohter, "Castro Is Anxious About His Military," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 25 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/25/weekinreview/the-world-castro-is-anxious-about-his-military.html?searchResultPosition=10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m9 national interest".191 Pierre Charette, the ASAC for the DEA's Caribbean division during the late-1980s, identified that into the early-1990s, cooperation with the Cuban government has been "fantastic [with] drug trafficking through go-fast boats dropping significantly" and that this productive relationship remains in place today.192 In 1991, the U.S. Customs Service detailed to Frontline that "[drug, arms, and other illicit] trafficking had declined since the trial, but…not stopped".193 The DEA's Administrator194 and Chief of International Operations195, in 1996 and 1999 respectively, both testified before Congress that, despite large profile cases in the media, the Cuban government itself nor senior officials were not involved in drug trafficking. Also in 1996, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs "recognized cuban[sic] counter-drugs efforts, stating that the cuban[sic] government was giving anti-narcotics policies higher public profile in the face of growing narcotics transshipments and consumption".196 General Barry McCaffrey, who served as Commander of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and was President Clinton's Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ODNCP) from 1994 to 2001, recalled in 2015 "Cuba's a police state, and I don't believe the Cuban government wants to be a hub for drug smugglers. They saw it as a 191 Fulton Armstrong (retired National Intelligence Officer for Latin America with NSC) in discussion with the author, 13 January 2021. 192 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 193 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 194 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Statement by: Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, 104th Cong., 06 June 1996, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/h960606c.htm. 195 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Statement by: William E. Ledwith, Chief of International Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, 106th Cong., 17 November 1999, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1999_hr/ct111799.htm. 196 Isabella Bellezza-Smull, "Will Cuba Update its Drug Policy for the Twenty First Century?," Igarapé Institute, Igarapé Institute, published 29 December 2017, https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/08-11-2017-NE-29-Cuba-Drog-Policy.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m0 threat to their children, the workforce, their economy, their government" while noting that though cooperation was imperfect, there was constant communication with the Cubans throughout his time in terms of combating drug trafficking.197 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros The involvement on the part of Fidel and Raul Castro in the drug trade is something that has long been debated and speculated. Since the 1960s, individual criminal investigations, U.S. federal government memorandums, Cuban intelligence defectors, convicted criminals, and congressional hearings have included testimony that has tried to implicate Fidel, Raul, or both Castros in the drug trade. With the 1989 trials, these speculations have increased and, in some cases, due to the handling of the trials, been given more credence. At least two U.S. Congressional hearings have been conducted since 1989, both of which focused on continuing drug traffic in Cuba.198 199 Into the 1990s, more evidence of possible involvement by the Castro regime was revealed. First were the allegations of Carlos Ledher, an experienced drug trafficker and pilot and co-founder of the Medellín Cartel.200 Ledher, upon his arrest and extradition in 1987, was "convicted…on charges of conspiracy and running a criminal enterprise as well as other charges related to the importation and sale of cocaine" in May of 1988.201 Due to this, Ledher began 197 Joshua Partlow & Nick Miroff, "In fight against drugs, Cuba and U.S. on same team," The Washington Post, Nash Holdings, LLC., published 05 January 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-fight-against-drugs-cuba-and-us-on-same-team/2015/01/05/6416305a-90fc-11e4-a66f-0ca5037a597d_story.html. 198 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Cuba's Link to Drug Trafficking, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 November 1999, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=2027. 199 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean: Do Traffickers Use Cuba and Puerto Rico As Major Transit Locations For State-Bound Narcotics?, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3-4 January 2000, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg69521/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg69521.pdf. 200 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 45, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/45086854. 201 Patricia Bauer, "Carlos Ledher," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 18 June 2018, updated 03 September 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Carlos-Lehder. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m1 cooperating with the U.S. government for a lesser sentence. In federal testimony during the Noriega trial, Ledher claimed "that Castro mediated a bitter 1984 dispute between Noriega and Colombia's Medellin cartel that saved Panama's strongman from probable assassination…and bribed Cuban government officials to ship tons of cocaine into the United States".202 Lieutenant Colonel Luis del Cid, a close aide to Manuel Noriega, alleged during Noriega's trial that he "accompanied Noriega on a flight to Cuba and met Castro following the raid [in which Panamanian troops raided a cocaine lab in Darién province Colombia]" though specified he did not attend the meeting in question.203 While both Ledher and del Cid's testimonies seem to corroborate what Blandón had previously testified in regards to Castro's connections to Noriega and the Medellín Cartel, it must be noted that both del Cid and Ledher testified in exchange for reductions in their sentences (which numbered into the hundreds of years for each of them) and also could easily have become aware of Blandón's testimony in any of the three years prior to their providing evidence to the U.S. government. Two former officials who defected from Cuba two years before the trials, Oscar Valdes from the Ministry of Trade and Manuel de Beunza from the Ministry of the Interior, offered their insights on the trial, claiming the trials were for "show" and were more politically motivated as Castro desired to remove opponents whom he saw as a threat to his power.204 This allegation that the drug trials were a show trial meant to snub out political opponents of Castro's hold on Cuba has become a very prominent. 202 Robert L. Jackson, "Cartel Leader Reveals Secrets of Drug World," The Los Angeles Times, Time Mirror Company, published 21 November 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-11-21-mn-404-story.html. 203 Richard Cole, "Former Aide Tells of Drug Cash, Castro, and Prostitutes," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 24 September 1991, https://apnews.com/article/0b7fcac1c0842630af2d1cc758ab1acd. 204 Jim Anderson, "Defectors: Cuba trials about politics, not drugs," United Press International, United Press International, published 27 July 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/07/27/Defectors-Cuba-trial-about-politics-not-drugs/2648617515200/?spt=su. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m2 Other defectors, including those from the DGI who defected, also voiced their views on the trial. Jorge Masetti, a DGI officer and Tony de la Guardia's son-in-law who defected from Cuba in 1990, claimed in an interview, "If this operation really existed, it could only have existed if Fidel and Raúl Castro knew about it. They made these accusations, which were supposed to make the case against Ochoa. Arnaldo Ochoa was never proven to have smuggled drugs. The direct evidence does not exist, but they accused Ochoa, and why? Because Fidel wanted to send a message to all the officials with high authority".205 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez, a seemingly credible defector206 from Cuba's MININT who was the personal bodyguard to Castro for seventeen years, wrote in his book The Double Life of Fidel Castro that Castro had knowledge of subordinates' involvement in the drug trade and sanctioned it. Sánchez recalls overhearing a conversation in 1988 between Minister of the Interior Jose Abrantes and Castro in "centered on a Cuban [drug trafficker] living in the United States" who wanted to travel to Cuba to visit his parents; Castro approved the trip along with allowing the trafficker to, as a cover, say he was a Cuban intelligence operative while also requesting that Tony de la Guardia handle "the logistics of the trip".207 This conversation, while innocuous, seems to indicate that Castro did maintain a friendly relationship with some drug traffickers, yet reveals no legitimate information of Castro's involvement in the drug trade. Into the 1990s, working off the indictments against the Ruiz Family in 1988 and the 1992 Noriega trial, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida began investigating senior level members of the Cuban government. In 1993, the USAO-SDFL "drafted a [proposed 205 The Cuba Libre Story, season 1, episode 7, "Secrets and Sacrifices," directed by Emmanuel Amara, Kai Christiansen, & Florian Dedio, aired 11 December 2015, https://www.netflix.com/title/80109535. 206 Edward A. Lynch, "All Socialists Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal Than Others," Military Review (November-December 2019), p. 124, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/ND-19/ND-19-Book-B.pdf. 207 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez with Axel Gyldén, The Double Life of Fidel Castro: My 17 Years as Personal Bodyguard to El Líder Máximo (New York, NY: St. Martin's Griffin, 2015), p. 230. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m3 indictment that] would have charged Raul Castro and 14 other top Cuban officials [including Manuel Piñeiro, head of the Departamento América] with conspiracy and racketeering for allegedly providing safe passage for Medellin cartel cocaine loads, including permission to fly over Cuba and use its waters".208 Among others allegedly involved in this large enterprise was Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, the Minister of the Interior who replaced Jose
South Sudan is a fragile country beset by conflicts. The oil shutdown accompanied by a border closure in 2012 was resolved, but ongoing military clashes between factions of the ruling party have affected livelihoods since December 2013. Before the onset of these conflicts, large parts of the population were food insecure (2 out of 3 people) and lived in poverty (1 out of 2 people). This note estimates and juxtaposes the impact of the oil shutdown and the ongoing military conflict on livelihoods based on food price changes, predicted harvest losses and displacement. The resulting poverty estimates help to understand the structural implications of these conflicts. But to validate these numbers, test the underlying modeling assumptions and inform a policy response, new data needs to be collected urgently.
From the introduction: 'The more you know about the Olympics, the less it is about sport'. (Bob Perry, Design director of Olympic Projects at Scott Carver Pty. Ltd, http://www.infolink.com.au). The Olympic Games as a mega sports event attracts millions of people from all over the world. New records, fascinating performances, scandals or gigantic celebrations are just some of the attractions provided by this event. One attraction for urban planners is the fact that the Games imply opportunities to promote urban development. From an urban planning perspective, the Olympic Summer Games in Barcelona 1992 set a new standard in defining success of an event of this scale. The city used the Games to promote urban development and planning strategies, profiting from the event in a long-term perspective. Furthermore, the city took another opportunity to find again a place on the 'global map" through the Olympic Games. The case of Barcelona is one of the mostly cited successful urban development initiatives connected with a mega sports event. Olympic Cities have taken the opportunity to promote urban development with the event very differently in the history of the Olympics. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) as the event-owner sets some requirements giving only a few cities the right to stage the event. These requirements are checked in the bidding process ending with the decision which city succeeds in getting the right of staging the event. Integrating the success of an Olympic City in terms of urban development and in terms of the bidding process, the main question from an urban planning perspective is: What is the relevance of Urban Development in the Bidding Process for Olympic Games? To answer the definition of the city's success in terms of urban development and the Olympic Games bidding process, it is helpful to investigate the role of Olympic Infrastructure with a view towards urban sustainability. As such, it is believed that respecting specific planning principles in the bidding process can help to (1) ensure sustainable urban development and (2) enhance the quality of the bid. - The first aspect is relevant for the success of the city in terms of urban development to benefit from the Games in a long time perspective. - The second aspect is relevant for the city's success in the bidding process to acquire the right for staging the Games. The aim of this thesis is to examine how the quality of the bid may respond to principles of sustainable urban development. Two main objectives are identified to reach the aim: 1. Identifying opportunities and threats connected to Olympic Infrastructure in the history of the Olympics in order to formulate six main principles of sustainable urban development for the Olympic Games. 2. Analyzing official bidding documents of the IOC connected with these principles in order to understand how sustainable urban development can be considered in the bidding process. The thesis will conclude with recommendations which can be realized in the bidding process striving to ensure the defined success for the city. Abstract: This thesis is structured in four major parts. Part I consists of chapter 2 and 3 and includes the theoretical framework and methodology of the thesis. Chapter 2 describes the character of mega-events and mega sports events in specific. Based on a concept of sustainable urban development, it will place mega sports events in the context of such a development, forming a theoretical approach for the thesis. Chapter 3 presents the methodology used. Part II consists of chapter 4 and 5 and provides an overall understanding of the Olympic Games in the context of urban development. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the characteristics of the Olympic Games in order to understand the event and its background. Chapter 5 examines the relationship between urban development and the Olympic Games. A model will be presented in order to define 'Olympic Urban Development" for the following sections of the chapter. The chapter will then continue with an historical overview of Olympic Urban Development and present the decisions determining the scale of development. Finally, chapter 5 concludes with the summary of opportunities and threats identified in a literature review of the Olympic Games. The research questions of Part II can be defined as follows: - What are the significant characteristics of the Olympics in terms of mega-event factors? - How can Olympic Urban Development be defined and modelled? - Which are the opportunities and threats for the built, natural, economic and social environment related to Olympic Urban Infrastructure? An intermediate result re-structures the identified opportunities and threats putting them in connection with the concepts presented in the theoretical part. Chapter 6 will conclude with a definition of six principles of sustainable urban development for planning the Olympic Games. The research question leading to the intermediate result can be defined as follows: - Which kind of principles may respond to a sustainable Olympic Urban Development? The second part ends with Chapter 7 in which relevant IOC documents about sustainable urban development will be presented. Part III sets the bidding process in connection with sustainable urban development. Chapter 8 provides relevant information to understand the bidding process, its different phases and the selection procedure. Chapter 9 finally analyses the official bidding documents of the IOC for the defined principles of sustainable urban development. Summaries and recommendations will introduce the main findings for each principle and respond to three main research questions: - Which parts in the bidding documents deal with the principle? - How relevant is the principle in the evaluation of the bid? - Which strategies support the quality of the bid and contribute to meet the objectives of the principle? Part IV includes the conclusion of the thesis and summarizes the main findings of the analysis.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: Preface0 Index1 List of Figures and Tables4 1.INTRODUCTION5 1.1Aim and purpose of the thesis5 1.2Structure of the thesis6 PART I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 2.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK9 2.1Mega Events9 2.2Factors of mega-events11 2.3Mega Sports Events12 2.3.1Phases of Mega Sports Events13 2.3.2Bidding14 2.3.3Impacts of Mega Sports Events14 2.4Physical Impact: Mega sports event Infrastructure18 2.5Sustainable Urban Development20 2.6Sustainable Urban Development in the context of a mega sports event22 2.7Definitions and Limitations23 3.METHODOLOGY25 PART II: UNDERSTANDING THE OLYMPIC GAMES IN THE CONTEXT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT 4.Olympic Games Characteristics29 4.1History of the Olympic Games29 4.2The Olympic Movement30 4.3Olympic Games Factors31 4.4Olympic Games Phases35 5.Olympic Urban Development37 5.1Definition37 5.1.1Olympic Infrastructure38 5.1.2Urban Infrastructure38 5.1.3Modelling an Olympic City40 5.2History of Olympic Urban Development42 5.3Decisions determining Olympic Urban Development47 5.3.1Local distribution of Olympic Infrastructure48 5.3.2Funding Model50 5.3.3Expenditure on Olympic Infrastructure51 5.3.4Use of existing Olympic Infrastructure53 5.4Opportunities and Threats54 5.4.1Built environment54 5.4.2Natural Environment57 5.4.3Economic Environment60 5.4.4Social Environment61 5.4.5Summary64 6.Intermediate Result: Defining Principles of Sustainable Urban Development for Planning Olympic Infrastructure66 6.1Principles66 6.2Objectives68 7.Relevant IOC Documents on Sustainable Urban Development70 7.1Olympic Charter70 7.2Olympic Agenda 2170 7.3IOC Manual on Sports and the Environment72 7.4Olympic Games Study Commission73 PART III: THE BIDDING PROCESS IN THE CONTEXT OF SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT 8.Olympic Games Bidding Process74 8.1History of the Olympic Games Bidding Process74 8.2The process78 8.2.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure (CAP)78 8.2.2Evaluation of the Working Group Report79 8.2.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure83 8.3Selection of the Host City85 8.3.1Election Procedure85 8.3.2Decision Making in the Electing Procedure for a host city86 8.4Summary88 9.Analysing Principles of Sustainable Urban Development in the Bidding Process90 9.1Principle 1: Integrate Olympic Infrastructure in urban development plans92 9.1.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure92 9.1.2Evaluation in the Working Group Report92 9.1.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure94 9.1.4Summary95 9.1.5Recommendations96 9.2Principle 2: Ensure Post-Event Use for Olympic Infrastructure97 9.2.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure97 9.2.2Evaluation in the Working Group Report98 9.2.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure99 9.2.4Summary100 9.2.5Recommendations101 9.3Principle 3: Maximise the use of existing infrastructure by respecting the city's budget104 9.3.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure104 9.3.2Evaluation in the Working Group Report105 9.3.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure107 9.3.4Summary107 9.3.5Recommendations108 9.4Principle 4: Ensure environmental standards for Olympic Infrastructure and accessibility to environmental goods109 9.4.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure109 9.4.2Evaluation in the Working Group Report109 9.4.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure111 9.4.4Summary112 9.4.5Recommendations113 9.5Principle 5: Integration of citizens in the planning process of Olympic Infrastructure114 9.5.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure114 9.5.2Evaluation in the Working Group Report114 9.5.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure115 9.5.4Summary116 9.5.5Recommendations117 9.6Principle 6: Stimulate improvement of Urban Infrastructure through Olympic Infrastructure118 9.6.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure118 9.6.2Evaluation in the Working Group Report119 9.6.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure120 9.6.4Summary121 9.6.5Recommendations122 PART IV: CONCLUSION126 10.Conclusion126 10.1Conclusion of the analysis126 10.1.1Relevance of Sustainable Urban Development in the Bidding Process126 10.1.2How to respond to principles of sustainable urban development in the bid127 10.2General Conclusions130 10.2.1The interest of the IOC in Sustainable Urban Development130 10.2.2The real winner of a bidding process130 10.2.3Outlook on the future of the Games131 11.Appendix133 11.1References133 11.2Abbreviations137 11.3Extracts from Bidding Documents138 11.3.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure (CAP)138 11.3.2Evaluation: Working Group Report140 11.3.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure142Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 5.4, Opportunities and Threats: This section study provides a discussion on opportunities and threats related to Olympic Infrastructure. Potential effects are presented and ordered according to the different environments of a city (section 2.4). The IOC officially uses the term 'Legacy' for potential post-event effects preferably underlining positive ones. The sources used in this literature review (Cashman, 2002; Essex Chalkley, 2003; Furrer, 2002; Matos, 2006; Liao Pitts, 2006; Preuss, 2006; Centre On Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), 2007; Ward, 2007; WWF, 2004) reflect the potential effects of the Olympics critically from different perspectives (researchers, NGOs, IOC related person). If applicable, the opportunities and threats are illustrated with examples. A summary is given in the end of this section as a basis for developing principles of sustainable urban development. As the potential effects have a multidimensional character, two selection criteria limit their number: - Time: The potential effect might occur at any period of the event but must have a relevance for the city in a long-time perspective. - Space: The potential effect might occur at a micro (e.g. dislocation) or macro (e.g. polycentric development) level but is relevant mainly for a city (not a region or nation). 5.4.1, Built environment: - Boost for urban development projects and urban renewal. Locational decision on Olympic Infrastructure opens the opportunity for a city to boost its urban development projects in favour of the city. There is a chance to connect a city's urban development strategy with Olympic Infrastructure projects. History of the Olympics shows that cities have dealt very differently with this opportunity (see section 4.1). Some have used the Olympics to reinvent the city while others have concentrated solely on the successful organization of the event itself. In many cases, Olympic Infrastructure is also used to trigger massive urban regeneration projects and the idea to create new centralities within the city. Development corridors can be focused through Olympic Infrastructure and stimulate urban development nearby. Strategic positioning of Olympic Infrastructure in specific urban areas may contribute to a polycentric development. This is especially true for the positioning of key Olympic Infrastructure represented by the Olympic Main Stadium, the main indoor halls and the aquatic centre. Barcelona 1992 is probably the most successful Olympics regarded to large-scale urban development. Urban planners of the city saw the Olympic Games as an useful instrument to achieve the objectives of development plans which had been the improvement of transport system, creation of new facilities, definition of central space and balancing the city. The initial authorized to make the first draft of the Olympic from an urban perspective was part of the Olympic Bidding Team and later entered into the Organizing Committee. The changes of the entire urban fabric connected to Olympic Infrastructure based on what was already existing in Barcelona became a best practice in terms of mega-event related urban development. - Changes of Urban Development plans in favour of the event/bid. Potential changes of existing urban development plans can occur in the preparation phase of the event due to tight time constraints. To speed up land acquisition for Olympic Infrastructure some cities approve special legislative acts and give power to Organizing Committees. Special building permits are created in the area where Olympic Infrastructure has to be built and can contribute to long-lasting procedural changes in the city. A special law for the Athens 2004 Games recognized the strategic significance of the Olympic Games to the evolution of the metropolitan area. The location of Olympic Infrastructure was determined as to be in accordance with the regional, environmental and urban development guidelines of the master plan of Athens. Through this legislation and the installation of special agencies it was possible to accelerate permits of Olympic Works. - Modernization and Upgrading of existing facilities. In terms of existing infrastructure, the Olympics bring the opportunity to upgrade and modernize sports facilities. This may also decrease financial risk. The main Olympic Stadium as the centrepiece of Olympic Infrastructure relies traditionally on public funding. Some Olympic Cities have strived to use existing facilities or refurbished ones for this major infrastructure project. Naturally, development of sports facilities had to be faced by almost all Olympic cities. Moscow 1980 and Barcelona 1992 used mainly existing sports facilities and refurbished existing Stadiums to Main Olympic Stadiums. Los Angeles 1984 used existing facilities to a large extent. - Unused large-scale facilities. The history of the Olympic Games shows that many Olympic sports facilities received poor post-Games usage. International Olympic Sports Federations have often pushed host cities to provide over-ambitious state-of-the-art facilities which are not in line with the local popularity of the sport. Furthermore, local agendas have often pushed for grandiose landmark legacies to be built in order to showcase the local economy and engineering ability. These objects might be designed over-sized and turn in a post-event period to 'White elephants'. They may neither integrate a long-term urban planning policy nor relate to the population's need for leisure and culture facilities. It is sometimes difficult to convince leading teams in specific sports to move their home ground to new Olympic Infrastructures. Another problem in this respect is the difficulty to attract large crowds to newly developed parts of the city away from trying to opportunity the citizens habits. The Olympic stadium of Sydney 2000 generated continuing losses at A$38 million/year six years after the event. The competition for sports events with other stadia in Sydney caused limited booking and shows the lack of post-use planning. 'Sydney Jurassic Park' is a symbolic expression used by criticizers of the post-use of Sydney Olympic Park. - Increase of Housing stock through Olympic Village. The Olympic Village is often located close to the sports facilities and represents the accommodation for the Olympic Family. It is an essential part of Olympic Infrastructure and has to be addressed by every hosting city. In many cases, Olympic Villages become residential areas for local people or halls of residences for a local university or college after the Games. Thus, an Olympic Village is a chance to increase the city's housing stock and provide facilities for alternative uses in a post-event period. 'In Barcelona and Sydney the former Olympic Villages now provide a mixture of housing that contributes to the cities' housing stock and adds a valuable source of revenue to cover Games-related expenditure'. - Improvement of transport infrastructure. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Olympic Infrastructure induces also the upgrade of the city's transport infrastructure. For an effective transport of athletes, spectators and officials during the event many host cities tend to expand their transport system Investment of previous Olympic Cities is often focused especially on underground or light rail system. Recent Olympic Cities (Athens and Beijing) invest in tram and overhead urban rail system due to high costs and implementation difficulties of underground transport. This may contribute to a better infrastructure for citizens and decreases traffic pressure in inner city and congestion. Asian Olympic Cities have strongly linked the Games to transport infrastructure. Between 1957 and 1964 Tokyo established 73 km underground, 13.2 km monorail and 500 km Shinkansen connecting Tokyo, Kyoto and Osaka. Seoul added 157.1 km to the length of its underground network from 1978 to 1993 for the preparation of the Games. Finally, Beijing extended its light rail length by 87.1 km before 2008. A strong reliance to public transport can be observed in Seoul and Tokyo through this investment related to Olympic Infrastructure. - Development of other Infrastructure. Furthermore, development of Olympic Infrastructure can be a driver for additional infrastructural improvements in the city, affecting the entire urban fabric. A basic infrastructure is needed serving Olympic facilities. Many cities have used the event as a catalyst to induce such investment and bring other infrastructure to a higher level appropriate for international visitors. Such investments can enhance the Quality of life for citizens, tourists and attract inward investment. Tokyo included the improvement of water supply system, higher public health standards for refuse collection, street cleaning, public toilets and three sewage disposal plants. Barcelona, Atlanta and Sydney invested in telecommunication systems through the staging of the event. Cultural and research facilities (Olympic Studies Centre, Olympic Museum) close to Olympic Infrastructure supporting the Olympic Cultural Programme were realized in many Olympic Cities. - Destruction of cultural heritage. There is a potential risk that Olympic Infrastructure may affect the cultural heritage of a city negatively. The potential risk seems to be higher for Olympic Cities approaching development in the inner city. Consequently, disregarding the laws may lead to the destruction of culturally built environment and displacement of residents. Infrastructure development for the Games of Beijing 2008 negatively affected the cultural heritage of the city. Demolition in Beijing was an ongoing process in the whole city, especially threatening the old 'hutong' and 'siheyuan' areas. According to reports of COHRE the violation of Cultural Heritage Protection laws and regulations effected both irreparably damaged cultural heritage and also violated residents' rights to adequate housing.
Authors' introductionWe present an overview of research about racial residential segregation. The first part of the article reviews major debates and findings drawn primarily from the sociological literature. The second part of the article identifies new areas of research that in some cases cross into other disciplines such as geography and urban studies. We show the enduring persistence of racial residential segregation as well as its causes and consequences. We also highlight the ways in which residential segregation can be better understood by including discussions about the varied social and spatial expressions of, and responses to, segregation. The social scientific examination of the patterns and everyday experiences of racial residential segregation remains prolific.Authors recommendKrysan, Maria 2002. 'Community Undesirability in Black and White: Examining Racial Residential Preferences through Community Perceptions.'Social Problems 49: 521–43.The author presents an empirical critique of research which examines the role that residential preferences play in perpetuating racially segregated residential settlement patterns. The data are drawn from the Multi‐City Study of Urban Inequality. The author analyzes black and white participants' responses to open‐ended questions about community undesirability in 23 communities spread across four US metropolitan areas. Rather than examine residential preferences in relation to hypothetical communities of varying relative racial compositions, the author uses respondents' subjective perceptions of actual communities, and the reasons they give for their perceptions, as measures of residential preference. The major finding of the article is that preferences are mediated by class‐ and race‐based considerations, such as perceived community crime rates or a community's reputation as a hotbed of racial animosity and hostility.Logan, John R., Brian J. Stults, and Reynolds Farley 2004. 'Segregation of Minorities in the Metropolis: Two Decades of Change.'Demography 41: 1–22.The authors report on national‐ and metropolitan‐level residential segregation trends for white, black, Hispanic, and Asian groups using a cross‐sectional analysis of 2000 Census data. They also present findings from a longitudinal analysis of changing residential segregation trends for the period 1980 to 2000. During this time black–white segregation levels, measured by the Index of Dissimilarity, steadily declined nationally and in most major metropolitan areas. However, Hispanic–white and Asian–white segregation levels increased slightly at both the national and metropolitan levels since 1980. The authors estimate regression models to test prevailing hypotheses that seek to account for these changes. Notably, they conclude that black–white segregation remains high especially in older manufacturing centers in the Northeast and Midwest. Levels of Hispanic–white and Asian–white segregation meanwhile are increasing in regions where these minority groups are most heavily concentrated and where they continue to grow due to high levels of foreign‐born in‐migration.Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton 1993. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.This book is a seminal contribution to the scholarly debate about the causes and consequences of black urban poverty in the US. The authors argue that racial residential segregation is the key social process which explains the conditions under which a black urban underclass forms and is maintained. Segregation creates a 'structural niche' of concentrated black socioeconomic deprivation wherein, for instance, conditions of welfare dependency become normative and oppositional cultures emerge in reaction to the contradictory values of dominant groups. Massey and Denton claim that segregation is perpetuated by, but also compounds, the effects of institutional racism and white prejudice. To support their claim the authors point to historical trends in levels of racial residential segregation they attribute to public policy as well as private decision‐making. The book makes a methodological statement as well in relation to the conceptualization and measurement of residential segregation.Williams, Richard, Reynold Nesiba, and Eileen Diaz McConnell 2005. 'The Changing Face of Inequality in Home Mortgage Lending.'Social Problems 52: 181–208.The authors develop a theoretical framework to account for an emerging 'new inequality' in home mortgage lending and home‐ownership that has contributed to contemporary patterns of residential segregation. The 'old inequality', which was characterized by individual‐ and neighborhood‐level race‐ and class‐based discrimination, gave way in the early 1990s to a new form of inequality based on access to high‐cost loans and exposure to predatory lending practices. The authors rely on descriptive metropolitan‐level data on home mortgage lending to document rising rates of home‐ownership and loan origination among African American and low‐income borrowers, and within minority neighborhoods, since the early 1990s. Their interpretation of these data, however, leads them to conclude that despite these gains, the residential segregation generated by the old inequality creates the conditions for the emergence of the new inequality and similar patterns of residential segregation.Wyly, Elvin K., and Daniel J. Hammel 2004. 'Gentrification, Segregation, and Discrimination in the American Urban System.'Environment and Planning A 36: 1215–41.This article is a nice companion to the article by Williams et al. (2005) (see above). The authors examine racial and economic inequalities, such as residential segregation and racial discrimination, related to mortgage reinvestment and gentrification in major US central cities since the early 1990s. Using regression models to analyze home mortgage lending data and credit market characteristics across 30 US cities, the authors find that both early‐ ('peripheral') and late‐stage ('core') gentrification reproduce familiar patterns of race‐ and class‐based segregation, and are associated with more intensified forms of racial discrimination by property developers, realtors, and lenders.Online materials
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) –Home Mortgage Disclosure Act http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/ This website provides access to publicly reported loan data under the provisions of the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. The site allows users to view descriptive information on consumer lending institutions as well as borrower and loan characteristics that can be geocoded by census tract. The site is fairly user‐friendly yet provides access to powerful aggregate loan data. Researchers have used these publicly available data to compile profiles of consumer finance and investment trends across metropolitan areas or to begin to document patterns of disinvestment, redlining, and subprime lending. Racial Residential Segregation Measurement Project (Reynolds Farley, University of Michigan) http://enceladus.isr.umich.edu/race/racestart.aspQuoted from the website:This website provides you with indexes of racial residential segregation for all states, for all counties, for all metropolitan areas and for all cities of 100,000 or more using information from the Census of 2000. Indexes of dissimilarity, exposure indexes and interracial contact measures are available for five single races and for the three most frequently reported combinations of two races. Segregation measures are provided using three different levels of local area geography: census tracts, block groups, and blocks. The links on this page provide you with access to the calculation of measures, descriptions of their meaning, information about the census data and the measures as well as to a bibliography of major studies of the extent, causes, and consequences of racial residential segregation in the United States. Windows on Urban Poverty (Paul Jargowsky) http://www.urbanpoverty.net/ This website provides interactive features that examine the 'spatial context' of urban poverty; that is, the ways in which poor and segregated neighborhoods shape the life chances of impoverished individuals and families. The site has links to reports and policy briefs as well as a mapping tool which allows users to view the spatial expression of concentrated poverty neighborhoods and related demographic information. Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research (University at Albany, State University of New York) http://www.albany.edu/mumford/ The site allows users to access a wide range of social and economic indicators that document conditions of racial residential segregation across the US. The Mumford Center is a leader in reporting on national‐ and metropolitan‐level demographic trends compiled from publicly available US Census data. The U.S. Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/ This is the official US government website where users can access US Census data. The site includes a range of interactive mapping tools that can be used to generate profiles of key demographic, social, and economic indicators at varying geographic scales, such as the neighborhood and metropolitan levels. The site also links users to relevant census‐based government reports, news releases, and even multimedia content (e.g., video, radio, photography).
Sample syllabusCourse outline and reading assignments Section 1: Segregation Trends and Patterns Residential Segregation in Black and White 'Census 2000 Basics' (http://www.census.gov/mso/www/c2000basics/00Basics.pdf)For an updated and extended discussion of measurement issues see: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/housing_patterns.htmlMassey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1993. American Apartheid: Chapter 1: 'The Missing Link'; Chapter 2: 'The Construction of the Ghetto'; Chapter 3: 'The Persistence of the Ghetto'Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1988. 'The Dimensions of Residential Segregation.'Social Forces 67: 281–315.Adelman, Robert M., and James Clarke Gocker. 2007. 'Racial Residential Segregation in Urban America.'Sociology Compass 1: 404–23. Moving Beyond the Black/White Dichotomy Logan, John R., Brian J. Stults, and Reynolds Farley. 2004. 'Segregation of Minorities in the Metropolis: Two Decades of Change.'Demography 41: 1–22.Fischer, Claude S., Gretchen Stockmayer, Jon Stiles, and Michael Hout. 2004. 'Distinguishing the Geographic Levels and Social Dimensions of U.S. Metropolitan Segregation, 1960–2000.'Demography 41: 37–59.White, Michael J., Eric Fong, and Qian Cai. 2003. 'The Segregation of Asian‐origin Groups in the United States and Canada.'Social Science Research 32: 148–67.Crowder, Kyle D. 1999. 'Residential Segregation of West Indians in the New York/New Jersey Metropolitan Area: The Roles of Race and Ethnicity.'International Migration Review 33: 79–113. Section 2: Causes of Residential Segregation Institutions and Actors Charles, Camille Zubrinsky. 2003. 'The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation.'Annual Review of Sociology 29: 167–207.Briggs, Xavier de Souza. 2005. Chapter 1 ('Introduction') and Chapter 2 ('More Pluribus, Less Unum? The Changing Geography of Race and Opportunity').Tegeler, Phillip. 2005. Chapter 9 (Briggs): 'The Persistence of Segregation in Government Housing Programs'.Jackson, Kenneth.1985. Crabgrass Frontier. Chapter 11: 'Federal Subsidy and the Suburban Dream: How Washington Changed the American Housing Market'. Group Differences in Socioeconomic Status and Neighborhood Preferences Logan, John R., Richard D. Alba, Thomas McNulty, and Brian Fischer. 1996. 'Making a Place in the Metropolis: Locational Attainment in Cities and Suburbs.'Demography 33: 443–53.Alba, Richard D., John R. Logan, Brian J. Stults, Gilbert Marzan, and Wenquan Zhang. 1999. 'Immigrant Groups in the Suburbs: A Reexamination of Suburbanization and Spatial Assimilation.'American Sociological Review 64: 446–60.Harris, David R. 2001. 'Why are Whites and Blacks Averse to Black Neighbors?'Social Science Research 30: 100–16.Krysan, Maria, and Reynolds Farley. 2002. 'The Residential Preferences of Blacks: Do they Explain Persistent Segregation?'Social Forces 80: 937–80.Emerson, Michael O., George Yancey, and Karen J. Chai. 2001. 'Does Race Matter in Residential Segregation? Exploring the Preferences of White Americans.'American Sociological Review 66: 922–35. Mortgage Lending Discrimination Yinger, John. 1995. Closed Doors, Opportunities Lost: The Continuing Costs of Housing Discrimination. Chapter 2 ('The Housing Discrimination Study'); Chapter 3 ('Discrimination in Housing'); Chapter 7 ('The Impact of Housing Discrimination on Housing Quality, Racial Segregation, and Neighborhood Change').Ross, Stephen L., and Margery Austin Turner. 2005. 'Housing Discrimination in Metropolitan America: Explaining Changes between 1989 and 2000.'Social Problems 52: 152–80.Williams, Richard, Reynold Nesiba, and Eileen Diaz McConnell. 2005. 'The Changing Face of Inequality in Home Mortgage Lending.'Social Problems 52: 181–208.Freidman, Samantha, and Gregory D. Squires. 2005. 'Does the Community Reinvestment Act Help Minorities Access Traditionally Inaccessible Neighborhoods?'Social Problems 52: 209–31. The Search for Housing Turner, Margery, and Stephen Ross. 2005. Chapter 4 (Briggs): 'How Racial Discrimination Affects the Search for Housing.'Farley, Reynolds. 1996. 'Racial Differences in the Search for Housing: Do Whites and Blacks Use the Same Techniques to Find Housing?'Housing Policy Debate 7: 367–85.Massey, Douglas S., and Garvey Lundy. 2001. 'Use of Black English and Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets: New Methods and Findings.'Urban Affairs Review 36: 452–69.Feagin, Joe. 1994. Living with Racism: The Black Middle‐Class Experience. Chapter 6: 'Seeking a Good Home and Neighborhood.' Section 3: Consequences of Residential Segregation Poverty Concentration and Hypersegregation Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1993. Chapter 5: 'The Creation of Underclass Communities'; Chapter 6: 'The Perpetuation of the Underclass'.Jargowsky, Paul A. 1997. Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City. Chapter 5: 'Theory and Evidence on Inner‐City Poverty.'Wilkes, Rima, and John Iceland. 2004. 'Hypersegregation in the Twenty‐First Century: An Update and Analysis.'Demography 41: 23–36.Roy, Kevin. 2004. 'Three‐Block Fathers: Spatial Perceptions and Kin‐Work in Low‐Income African American Neighborhoods.'Social Problems 51: 528–48. Neighborhood Effects Sampson, Robert J., Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Thomas Gannon‐Rowley. 2002. 'Assessing "Neighborhood Effects": Social Processes and New Directions in Research.'Annual Review of Sociology 28: 443–78.LaVeist, Thomas A. 1993. 'Segregation, Poverty, and Empowerment: Health Consequences for African Americans.'The Milbank Quarterly 71: 41–64.Rosenbaum, Emily, and Laura E. Harris. 2001. 'Low‐Income Families in Their New Neighborhoods: The Short‐Term Effects of Moving from Chicago's Public Housing.'Journal of Family Issues 22: 183–210.Wagmiller, Robert L. 2007. 'Race and the Spatial Segregation of Jobless Men in Urban America.'Demography 44: 539–62. Crime and Neighborhoods Anderson, Elijah. 1999. Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City. Preface, Introduction ('Down Germantown Avenue') and Chapter 1 ('Decent and Street Families').Pattillo‐McCoy, Mary. 1999. Black Picket Fences: Privilege and Peril among the Black Middle Class. Chapter 4: 'Neighborhood Networks and Crime'.Massey, Douglas S. 2001. 'Segregation and Violent Crime in Urban America.' Pp. 317–44 in Problem of the Century: Racial Stratification in the United States edited by Elijah Anderson and Douglas S. Massey.Logan, John R., and Brian J. Stults. 1999. 'Racial Differences in Exposure to Crime: The City and Suburbs of Cleveland in 1990.'Criminology 37: 251–76. Section 4: Mobility, Class, and Public Policy Residential Mobility Lee, Barrett A., R.S. Oropesa, and James W. Kanan. 1994. 'Neighborhood Context and Residential Mobility.'Demography 31: 249–70.South, Scott J., and Kyle D. Crowder. 1998. 'Leaving the 'Hood: Residential Mobility between Black, White, and Integrated Neighborhoods.'American Sociological Review 63: 17–26.Crowder, Kyle D., Scott J. South, and Erick Chavez. 2006. 'Wealth, Race, and Inter‐Neighborhood Migration.'American Sociological Review 71: 72–94.Pattillo‐McCoy, Mary. 2000. 'The Limits of Out‐Migration for the Black Middle Class.'Journal of Urban Affairs 22: 225–41. Intersection of Race and Class: The Black Middle Class Pattillo, Mary. 2005. 'Black Middle‐Class Neighborhoods.'Annual Review of Sociology 31: 305–29.Cashin, Sheryll D. 2001. 'Middle‐Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A Post‐Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America.'Cornell Law Review 86: 729–76.Adelman, Robert M. 2004. 'Neighborhood Opportunities, Race, and Class: The Black Middle Class and Residential Segregation.'City and Community 3: 43–63.Lacy, Karyn. 2004. 'Black Spaces, Black Places: Strategic Assimilation and Identity Construction in Middle‐Class Suburbia.'Ethnic and Racial Studies 27: 908–30. Public Policy and Politics Rubinowitz, Leonard S., and James E. Rosenbaum. 2000. Crossing the Class and Color Lines: From Public Housing to White Suburbia.Briggs, Xavier de Souza. 2005. Chapter 14: 'Politics and Policy: Changing the Geography of Opportunity'.Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1993. Chapter 8: 'The Future of the Ghetto'.Project ideas US Census Data Assignment (Adapted from an assignment developed by Nancy Denton, University at Albany, State University of New York)Your task for this assignment is to compare one US metropolitan area to another one. Your focus of the comparison should be on key sociodemographic variables including, but not limited to, the overall population size of the areas, the racial and ethnic composition of the areas, the socioeconomic standing of the areas, the housing quality, what types of occupational opportunities exist, the level of immigration in the areas, the level of residential segregation between groups in the areas, among others.You can choose any two metropolitan areas but they must be defined as such by the Census Bureau (i.e., make sure you obtain information at the metropolitan level). There should be some component of change; that is, identify how these variables have changed over time (an ideal strategy would be to focus on 1980 to 2000 changes, but there could be other strategies). In the end, you want a five‐page report comparing the two places. Which one would be better to live in? Why? From whose perspective?Potential data sources include:
The US Census: go to http://www.census.gov and click on 'American Factfinder' or another census tool The Lewis Mumford Center: go to http://www.albany.edu/mumford and click on 'Census 2000' and use one of the tools to obtain data
Urban Ethnography Assignment (Adapted from an assignment developed by Charles Gallagher, Georgia State University)Write a short ethnography about an urban, public space. Your task is to choose a public space (broadly defined) and examine who uses the space, how the space is used, and the interactions that occur between people in that space. Pay close attention to issues like (but others too) the racial and ethnic background of the people using the space, the socioeconomic reasons which explain the location of the site (e.g., exchange versus use values; urban development), and the extent to which the space is actually 'public' (i.e., are there restrictions to the space like bars separating benches in half?).You can observe any public space. For example, the extent to which a park is actually public is continually and consistently contested and negotiated. What about transportation nodes? Malls? Restaurants? Comparative Urban Assignment Your task for this assignment is to review three scholarly articles about a city outside of the US. Your focus can be on any aspect of the city but you should include some general information about the area including, but not limited to, the geographic and demographic size of the area, the socioeconomic standing of the area, the residential segregation of groups in the area, among other issues.You can choose any city or metropolitan area as long as it is outside of the US. In the end, you want a five‐page report reviewing the three articles with a brief introduction about the city (this information could be gleaned from one of the articles).The main international urban journal, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, will be very useful for this assignment, but you can obtain articles from any peer‐reviewed journal. Make sure to use only scholarly journals rather than popular magazines, newspaper articles, or the internet. Rely on the social science literature.
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Nur 41 von 143 Antragsskizzen für neue Exzellenzcluster haben es zum Vollantrag geschafft. Was bedeutet die Auswahl für den Fortgang der Exzellenzstrategie und für die deutsche Universitätslandschaft? Eine erste Analyse.
Foto: Pxhere, CCO.
SELBST WENN heute nicht Haushalts-Showdown in Bundesrat und Bundestag wäre und nicht das Finale im Poker ums Startchancen-Programm: Die Entscheidung des Expertengremiums der Exzellenzstrategie (ExStra) hätte auch sonst keine großen Schlagzeilen ausgelöst. Zumal die meisten Menschen außerhalb, vermutlich aber auch innerhalb der Universitäten gar nicht wissen, wer oder was eigentlich dieses Expertengremiums ist. Wenn überhaupt, so wurde die ExStra in jüngster Zeit vor allem unter der Fragestellung öffentlich diskutiert, ob sie mit ihrer Wettbewerbsorientierung und ihrem – 2022 nur leicht abgeschwächten – Fokus auf Grundlagenforschung noch in die Zeit passt.
Und doch: In den Chefetagen vieler Universitäten, in zahlreichen Fakultäten und Laboren wurde in den vergangenen Tagen ordentlich gezittert und gebangt. Denn auch wenn die 39 Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler, die dem ExStra-Expertengremium angehören, am Donnerstag nur eine Vorauswahl unter den 143 eingereichten sogenannten Antragsskizzen getroffen haben, nahmen sie damit eine der wichtigsten Weichenstellung in der Exzellenzförderung für die nächsten sieben Jahre vor.
Nicht für die Etablierten, die Inhaber der 57 bestehenden Exzellenzcluster. Die müssen sich erst in der jetzt beginnenden Hauptrunde dem Wettbewerb stellen. Doch all jene Forschenden, die hofften, künftig auch ein Stück vom Förderkuchen abzubekommen, erfuhren mit der Pressemitteilung von Deutscher Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) und Wissenschaftsrat am Freitagmorgen, ob sie weiter hoffen können. Und für etliche Hochschulen, die bislang nicht Exzellenzunis sind, ging es darum, ob sie im Rennen bleiben, um 2025 vielleicht eine zu werden.
Erfolgschance: 29 Prozent – bis jetzt
Genug auf die Folter gespannt. Hier sind die Ergebnisse, und das wichtigste lautet: Es war ein harter Schnitt. Das Expertengremium winkte nur 41 der 143 eingereichten Antragsskizzen durch, was einem Anteil von 29 Prozent entspricht. Und die Vollanträge kommen ja erst noch. Zum Vergleich: Bei der letzten vergleichbaren Cluster-Vorauswahl 2017 kamen 45 Prozent durch, insgesamt 88 Antragsskizzen. Warum jetzt so viel weniger? Weil, siehe oben diesmal die neuen Anträge mit den Platzhirschen konkurrieren, die nicht durch diese Vorrunde mussten. Hier zeigt sich eine Eigenart der ExStra, die für viele ihrer Kritiker zu ihren Hauptproblemen zählt: der potenziell geringe Grad ihrer Erneuerung. Welche Folgen das hat, dazu später mehr.
Schaut man in die Liste der 41 Erfolgsskizzen, fällt zunächst die Vielzahl der noch vertretenen Hochschulen auf. 37 Hochschulen aus 13 Bundesländern sind weiter dabei, was im Umkehrschluss aber auch bedeutet, dass 22 der 59 Hochschulen, die Skizzen eingereicht hatten, rausgefallen sind. Unter den 37 Erfolgreichen wiederum sind (nur?) zwölf Universitäten, die bislang keine Exzellenzcluster vorzuweisen haben. Sie dürfen jetzt Anträge schreiben oder sich daran beteiligen. Konkret sind das die Universität Siegen, die Technische Universität Darmstadt (gleich 3-mal), die Universität Duisburg-Essen, die Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, die Universität Halle-Wittenberg, die Universität Marburg (2-mal), die Universität Regensburg, die Technische Universität Hamburg, die Universität Leipzig (2-mal), die Universität Magdeburg, die Universität des Saarlandes und die Universität Hohenheim.
Während umgekehrt an 24 der 41 Skizzen, die jetzt zu Vollanträgen werden dürfen, aktuelle Exzellenuniversitäten beteiligt oder alleinige Träger sind: die RWTH Aachen (2-mal), die Freie Universität Berlin (3-mal), die Humboldt-Universität und die Charité (2-mal), die Technische Universität Berlin, die Universität Bonn (2-mal), die Technische Universität Dresden (3-mal), die Universität Hamburg, die Universität Heidelberg (2-mal), das Karlsruher Institut für Technologie, die Universität München (3-mal), die Technische Universität München (3-mal) und die Universität Tübingen, die unglaubliche sechsmal durchkam und jetzt inklusive ihrer drei bestehenden Exzellenzcluster mit neun Vollanträgen ins Rennen gehen kann. Das schafft nicht einmal der bisherige Cluster-Spitzenreiter Bonn, der mit sechs bestehenden und zwei Neuanträgen auf acht kommt. Der Berliner Verbund mit seinen sieben aktuellen Clustern hat insgesamt drei Neuanträge am Start. Insgesamt bleibt festzuhalten, dass zehn von elf Exzellenzuniversitäten (inklusive des Berliner Verbundes) mit neuen Skizzen dabei sind. Umso auffälliger, dass einer fehlt: Konstanz.
Die übrigen Universitäten, die bereits mindestens einen Exzellenzcluster haben und jetzt mindestens eine weitere erfolgreiche Skizze vorweisen können, sind: Bremen, die Technische Universität Dortmund, die Universität Frankfurt, die Universität Gießen, die Medizinische Hochschule Hannover, die Universität Jena, die Universität Ulm, die Universität Freiburg (2-mal), die Universität Stuttgart (2-mal), die Universität zu Köln (2-mal), die Universität Mainz, die Universität Würzburg und die Universität Oldenburg.
Hat sich durch die Anpassungen der Wettbewerbsregeln etwas getan?
Ja und nein. 2022 hatten Bund und Länder ihre Vereinbarung zur Exzellenzstrategie abgeändert. Seitdem können mehr als drei Universitäten an einem Cluster beteiligt sein, wodurch kleine und mittlere Standorte eine größere Chance auf einen Erfolg erhalten sollten. Nur hat diese Möglichkeit kein Konsortium genutzt. Gleichzeitig wurde Interdisziplinarität als Qualitätsmerkmal bei der Antragstellung stärker als bislang betont, auch sonst wurde eine größere Offenheit auch für überregionale und stärker transferorientierte Kooperationen signalisiert. Beides zeitigte jetzt gewisse Erfolge: Im Vorhaben "CARE: Klimaneutrales und ressourceneffizientes Bauen" wirken zum Beispiel die TU Dresden und die RWTH Aachen über große geografische Entfernungen zusammen und im "Zentrum für Chiräle Elektronik" die FU Berlin und die Universität Halle-Wittenberg mit der Universität Regensburg.
Insgesamt wurden sechs erfolgreiche Antragsskizzen von drei Hochschulen eingereicht, was erfreulich viel ist. Und es sind noch zahlreiche mittelgroße Universitäten im Wettbewerb, einige davon haben erstmals Aussicht auf einen Cluster. Die Mehrzahl der am Donnerstag erfolgreichen Konzepte werde von interdisziplinären Konsortien getragen, hat die DFG ausgewertet, dabei seien in zehn Skizzen die Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften am stärksten vertreten, in 15 Skizzen die Lebenswissenschaften, in acht Skizzen die Naturwissenschaften und in ebenfalls acht Skizzen die Ingenieurwissenschaften.
Nur etwas besser als zuvor in der Exzellenzstrategie steht der Osten der Republik da. Zu den gerade mal vier bestehenden Clustern außerhalb Berlins gesellen sich jetzt sieben erfolgreiche Antragsskizzen, erstmals hat Sachsen-Anhalt zwei darunter. Allerdings: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern und Brandenburg, wo es schon bislang keine Cluster gibt, gehen jetzt schon in der Vorrunde wieder leer aus. Die Wissenschaftsministerinnen beider Länder hatten sich für die ExStra-Reform stark gemacht. Im Westen ist allein Schleswig-Holstein ohne erfolgreiche Antragsskizze – allerdings hat die Universität Kiel zwei bestehende Cluster.
Ansonsten setzt sich das Muster der geografischen Exzellenz-Konzentration fort, besonders augenfällig wird das durch den Erfolg der baden-württembergischen Universitäten, aber auch der großen Wissenschaftsmetropolen Berlin, München, Hamburg und der Region Köln/Bonn. Der Verbund der Rhein-Main-Universitäten mit Mainz, Frankfurt und Darmstadt holt bei nur zwei bestehenden Clustern dank des Skizzenerfolgs deutlich auf. Aber all das ist natürlich nur eine Momentaufnahme, nach der Entscheidung zu den Vollanträgen sprechen wir uns wieder. Apropos...
Welche Chancen haben jetzt die Cluster, die durchgekommen sind?
Ziemlich gute. Würden alle 57 bisherigen Exzellenzcluster und alle 41 durchwundenen Skizzen tatsächlich Vollanträge einreichen, kämen 98 Vorhaben auf bis zu 70 zu vergebene Plätze. Auf diese Zahl hatten sich Bund und Länder 2022 nach langen Verhandlungen festgelegt, pro Cluster und Jahr soll es zwischen drei und zehn Millionen Euro Förderung geben. Die theoretische Erfolgschancen pro Antrag liegen jetzt also bei gut 70 Prozent. Wobei das nur gelten würde, wenn die neuen Projekte genauso behandelt würden wie die Verlängerungsanträge der bestehenden, obwohl die ja auf das Erreichte pochen können (allerdings auch an selbigem gemessen werden).
Wie stark das Neue gegenüber dem Bestehenden so oder so im Nachteil ist, wird deutlich, wenn man von den ursprünglich 143 neuen Antragsskizzen ausgeht. Dann stünde (bei angenommen gleichen Chancen ab jetzt) die gut 70-prozentige Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit bestehender Cluster rund 20,5 Prozent bei den Skizzen gegenüber. Tatsächlich wird aber intern damit gerechnet, dass etwa vier von fünf bestehenden Clustern verlängert werden könnten, womit die Erfolgschance der jetzt durchgegangen Skizzen bei knapp 60 Prozent läge. Und bezogen auf alle ursprünglich eingereichten 143 bei etwa 17 Prozent.
Was bedeutet das Ergebnis für den Wettbewerb in der Förderlinie "Exzellenzuniversitäten"?
Mindestens vier neue Exzellenzuniversitäten kann es 2026 geben, abhängig natürlich vom wissenschaftsgeleiteten Verfahren, darauf hatten sich Bund und Länder im Juni 2023 nach einem monatelangen Konflikt geeinigt. Es können aber auch mehr werden, denn die sogenannte Exzellenzkommission aus Wissenschaftlern und Politik bestätigte am Donnerstag offiziell per Beschluss: Schaffen es nicht alle elf Titelinhaber in die erneute Förderung, können auch ihre Plätze nachbesetzt und neu vergeben werden.
Woraus folgt: Zusätzlich zu den gegenwärtig elf Exzellenzuniversitäten können nach heute noch etliche weitere Universitäten davon träumen, sich um den Titel zu bewerben. Das sind zum einen diejenigen Hochschulen, die schon seit 2018 (mindestens) zwei Cluster haben (die zentrale Bewerbungsvoraussetzung), aber 2019 nicht zum Zug kamen: Kiel, Braunschweig, Freiburg, der Verbund von Uni und MHH Hannover, Köln, Bochum (das aber mit ihren Partnern bewerben will, siehe nächster Absatz), Münster, Stuttgart.
Zusätzlich hoffen, mindestens bis die Vollanträge bewilligt sind, können jetzt: Oldenburg, Bremen, Würzburg, Jena, Leipzig, Ulm, Würzburg, Gießen, Marburg und die Rhein-Main-Universitäten Mainz, Frankfurt und Darmstadt. Ebenso die Universitätsallianz Ruhr der Universitäten Bochum, Duisburg-Essen und der TU Dortmund, weil sie zusammen inklusive bestehender Cluster und Neuanträge auf deutlich mehr als die für einen Verbund nötigen drei Cluster kommt. Schon jetzt wieder raus ist eine frühere Exzellenzuniversität, die wiederholt in der Krise steckte: die Universität Göttingen, aktuell mit einem Cluster, aber ohne erfolgreiche Antragsskizze. Bitter.
Noch eine Ergänzung: Theoretisch könnten sich Universitäten, die am Ende eine erfolgreiche Clusterbewerbung (ob neu oder verlängert) haben, mit zwei weiteren in ihrer Umgebung zu einem Exzellenzverbund zusammenschließen und so in der Exzellenzuni-Förderlinie ins Rennen gehen. Dafür wären im Verbund wie gesagt drei Cluster nötig. Nur erscheint kaum vorstellbar, dass plötzlich entstehende Zweck-Neuverbünde ein so überzeugendes Bewerbungsnarrativ finden könnten, um das Wohlwollen der Gutachter zu erreichen.
Wie geht es jetzt weiter?
Den gesamten Zeitplan für diese Wettbewerbsrunde in beiden Förderlinien hat die DFG hier veröffentlicht. In den nächsten Monaten werden die Antragsteller jetzt zusätzlich zum gewohnten Zittern wieder neuen Stress haben. Bis zum 22. August 2024 sollen sie ihre Skizzen zum Voll-Förderantrag ausarbeiten und einreichen. Die gleiche Deadline gilt für die Fortsetzungsanträge für die 57 bereits geförderten Exzellenzcluster. Zwischen Oktober 2024 und 2025 folgen die Begutachtungen durch erneut international besetzte Panels, bevor am 22. Mai 2025 die Exzellenzkommission die finale Förderentscheidung trifft. Wieviel Erneuerung wird die Exzellenzlandschaft dann erleben, wieviel Bestätigung laufender Projekte? Wie wird es austariert, das Verhältnis zwischen Dynamik und Kontinuität? In der Kommission sitzen neben den Wissenschaftlern des Expertengremiums die Wissenschaftsminister von Bund und Ländern. Spätestens dann, das zeigt die Erfahrung vergangener Runden, werden die Entscheidungen in der Exzellenzstrategie auch politisch, das gilt umso mehr für die Auswahl in der Förderlinie Exzellenzuniversitäten, die im September 2026 ansteht und wiederum in der Exzellenzkommission fallen wird.
Hier ist die Liste mit allen erfolgreichen Antragsskizzen auf der DFG-Website zum Nachlesen. Hinweis: Ich habe diesen Artikel am 05. Februar 2024 um einen Absatz ergänzt.
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Better market linkages and higher farm benefits for smallholder farmers in emerging and developing economies have received remarkable attention worldwide (Minot and Roy, 2007; Kumar et al., 2011). In this regard, contract farming (CF) is proposed as a better solution to the fact that smallholders are otherwise potentially dropped out of the modern marketing channels because of small-scale production and farmers from emerging and developing countries are to earn more farm benefit by getting closely linked to modern, in many cases global food value chains markets (Bacon, 2005; Mangala and Chengappa, 2008; Minten et al., 2009; Rao et al., 2012; Jia and Bijman, 2013). Furthermore it is expected that the challenges of a sharply increasing world population, the overuse of natural resources, and the reduction of overall agricultural land size can be met by contracting smallholder farmers (Sartorius, 2013). However, the circumstances of farmers' decision in contracting and its influences on farm performances have remained uncertain so far for many specific countries and products (Rao et al., 2012). Among the major rice farming countries in Southeast Asia, i.e. Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, and Thailand, Vietnam is characterized by very favorable natural and social conditions for irrigated rice production in bulk. Irrigated rice production in the country is based on high soil quality, tropical monsoon weather, numerous water-flows and a large share of the population working in the agricultural sector (more than 66%) (Ya'kub et al., 2012). However, low quality and a lack of professionalism are dramatic problems of the Vietnamese rice export sector (Reardon et al., 2014). Vietnam is still known as a low-quality rice supplier; as a result the Vietnamese rice price is 20% to 30% lower than the Thai rice price (Kubo, 2013). The Vietnamese rice has also lately entered the world export market while the prices were already steadily declining (Nielsen, 2003; Dechachete, 2011; Ramberg, 2011). Currently, the Vietnamese rice sector is characterized by a lack of information with short technical assistances, and low input qualities. It is assumed that there is still a large potential to increase the ability of smallholders to improve production and increase rice yields, overcome existing market barriers, access export markets and increase farm benefits and improve the livelihood of farmers' families. By further promoting the CF scheme in 2002, the Vietnamese government proposed a better frame for the agricultural sector, especially, for the rice sector in the country (Kompas, 2002; Hoang and Yabe, 2012; Vu, 2012). By farmers' participation in the CF scheme, the production of high-quality products due to improved farmer training and better quality of input factors is a possible solution for Vietnamese rice to more successfully compete on the world market (Dawe, 2004). Furthermore, farmers can expect a price differential due to improved quality and competitiveness. Thus, this scheme is assumed to support smallholders to increase farm benefits. In addition, the CF scheme has been implemented to improve farmers' bargaining power and to create an official ground for smallholders to directly deal with private sectors in the Vietnamese economy. In terms of firm benefits, these decisions also clarify the government's efforts to support the private sector in supplying agricultural inputs to farmers such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, credit, and extension services (Ya'kub et al., 2012). Furthermore, this step is also an important procedure to secure national food demand, improve international competitiveness, and upgrade the position of export-oriented rice farmers (Goletti et al., 1997; ADB, 2005). However, in terms of empirical research, up to this date, there are only very few studies that explore the benefits of CF for exporters of rice farmers in Vietnam, especially with regard to the Mekong River Delta (MRD) where about 90% of the national export rice quantity is produced (Loc and Son, 2011). Therefore, there is a lack of in-depth quantitative studies analyzing the effects of CF participation with regard to farmers' marketing decisions, farm performance and technical efficiency, especially, in the export-oriented rice production segment. Against this background it is the objective of this dissertation to close this research gap by providing a better understanding of farmers' decision making with regard to the CF scheme and providing more in-depth insights into the effects of contract farming on efficiency and farm performance. The conceptual framework of this study is based on the New Institutional Economics perspective proposed by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975). The underlying ideas about the contract concept explained in the following basically refer back to the three major sub-strands, i.e. agency theory (Ross, 1973), transaction cost theory (Benjamin et al., 1978; Williamson, 1979), and property rights theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Grossman and Hart, 1986). Thereof, the transaction cost theory is particularly suitable for this study since it describes "uncertainty" as a main dimension (together with "asset specificity" and "frequency") influencing the appropriateness of governance mechanisms in (food) supply chains (Williamson, 1979). The market imperfections due to a lack of information, a limited accessibility of inputs, and a shortage of technical assistance all contribute to "uncertainty" and are related to the research topic and objective of this study. In spite of increasing pressure to deliver high quality export products at competitive prices to enter the up-market domestic and global value chains, the CF scheme still faces some constraints in emerging and developing economies. This can be explained by reference to the poor coordination among parties, unfavorable contracts, and specified socio-demographic characteristics (Da Silva, 2005; Simmons et al., 2005; Hongdong, 2007; Wang et al., 2014). Nonetheless, these aspects have only been poorly analyzed so far and are not well understood, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. This dissertation seeks to overcome this weakness by building up the conceptual framework and empirical methodology to capture these aspects of the export-oriented rice sector in the Mekong River Delta of Vietnam. We address these research objectives by using primary data collected in early 2016 in the Mekong River Delta (MRD) of Vietnam, where nearly 90% of the country's export rice is produced. The target population of 250.000 households lives in the three main export-oriented rice production regions namely Kien Giang, Can Tho, and An Giang provinces, in the MRD (USDA, 2015). Using a structured questionnaire, 250 households were randomly chosen from the aforementioned provinces. To thereby ensure the comparability of contract and non-contract farmers, we randomly selected 134 contract farmers from contractor lists and 116 non-contract farmers from village official lists of 12 villages. The surveyed households had to meet two criteria: Firstly, they had to be located in the same area as the contract participants, and secondly, they also had to produce export-oriented rice. These selected farmers cumulate rice under written contracts. The contracting company is in charge of specifying the production practices, including input supply (seeds, fertilizer, pesticides), extension services, and the commitment of buying the products (Simmons et al., 2005; Bijman, 2008). In this study, the export-oriented rice farmers were interviewed regarding the information about three types of export-oriented rice producing seasons between November 2014 and October 2015. In the first paper, we explore the factors that determine smallholder farmers' probability in developing and emerging economies to participate in CF scheme. We particularly focus on the accessibility of market information. A binary probit model is applied to examine the probability to participate in the CF scheme. We follow Heckman's (1979) method to compare the probit results with the maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) in order to control any sample selection bias (Wynand and Bernard, 1981). Results reveal that farmers' contracting decisions are strongly affected by farm characteristics, market information access, and household characteristics. Remarkably, the accessibility of world market price information significantly increases smallholders' likelihood to participate in CF. Moreover, the extension service offered by the contractors is considered to be an important motivator for rice smallholders to participate in CF. The availability of price information should be taken into account by the government to motivate the active participation of smallholders in contractual arrangements. The second paper provides the evidence about how the CF scheme influences household income and rice profit within the export-oriented rice sector in Vietnam. We employ the Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) estimation in combination with propensity score matching (PSM) procedure to control any sampling bias. The result confirms a positive effect of contract participation status on farming households' performance. Particularly, together with "farming size" and "the accessibility of extension services", "the accessibility of world price information" is found as a positive determinant. Moreover, CF participation is considered to be an important influencer for rice smallholders to increase their income and rice profit. In addition, it becomes evident that not only larger-scale farmers but also small-scale farmers can benefit from contract participation. In this connection, the OLS regression in combination with PSM gives noticeable evidence for the role of CF in improving household income of smallholders by 20.87% and rice profit by 30.54% in Vietnam. In the third paper, we investigate how CF improves the technical efficiency of farming and the technical inefficiency determinants of export-oriented rice production in the country. The Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is applied to measure the production frontier and the farming technical inefficiency determinants, and PSM is again applied to control for self-selection bias. The results show that the average technical efficiency is of 87.33% with a range between 56.48% and 96.47%. The results suggest convincible opportunities for farmers to increase the productivity of export-oriented rice production in the country by nearly 13% without raising the current resource levels. Land, seed, fertilizer, machine, and labor are identified as the major inputs of the production frontier. Moreover, the socio-demographic characteristics of the sample also slightly influence the TE of rice farming, however their influence is non-significant. Based on the findings, "educational level", "rice farming experience" and "off-farm income" are found as determinants positively influencing rice farming TE. In contrast, there is a low negative effect of credit accessibility. In addition, CF participation is considered to have an influence (even though not a significant one) for rice smallholders to increase their farm TE. In this connection, contract participation could support not only larger-scale farmers but also small-scale farmers from developing and emerging economies in improving their production patterns.
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE: Polymorphisms in coagulation genes have been associated with early-onset ischemic stroke. Here we pursue an a priori hypothesis that genetic variation in the endothelial-based receptors of the thrombomodulin-protein C system (THBD and PROCR) may similarly be associated with early-onset ischemic stroke. We explored this hypothesis utilizing a multi-stage design of discovery and replication. METHODS: Discovery was performed in the Genetics-of-Early-Onset Stroke (GEOS) Study, a biracial population-based case-control study of ischemic stroke among men and women aged 15-49 including 829 cases of first ischemic stroke (42.2% African-American) and 850 age-comparable stroke-free controls (38.1% African-American). Twenty-four single-nucleotide-polymorphisms (SNPs) in THBD and 22 SNPs in PROCR were evaluated. Following LD pruning (r2≥0.8), we advanced uncorrelated SNPs forward for association analyses. Associated SNPs were evaluated for replication in an early-onset ischemic stroke population (onset-age<60 years) consisting of 3676 cases and 21118 non-stroke controls from 6 case-control studies. Lastly, we determined if the replicated SNPs also associated with older-onset ischemic stroke in the METASTROKE data-base. RESULTS: Among GEOS Caucasians, PROCR rs9574, which was in strong LD with 8 other SNPs, and one additional independent SNP rs2069951, were significantly associated with ischemic stroke (rs9574, OR = 1.33, p = 0.003; rs2069951, OR = 1.80, p = 0.006) using an additive-model adjusting for age, gender and population-structure. Adjusting for risk factors did not change the associations; however, associations were strengthened among those without risk factors. PROCR rs9574 also associated with early-onset ischemic stroke in the replication sample (OR = 1.08, p = 0.015), but not older-onset stroke. There were no PROCR associations in African-Americans, nor were there any THBD associations in either ethnicity. CONCLUSION: PROCR polymorphisms are associated with early-onset ischemic stroke in Caucasians. ; This study was supported in part by NIH grants U01 NS069208, R01 NS100178, and R01 NS105150; an Epidemiology of Aging Training Program Grant, NIH/NIA T32 AG000262; the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and the American Heart Association Cardiovascular Genome-Phenome Study (grant# 15GPSPG23770000), and an American Heart Association Discovery Grant supported by Bayer Group (grant# 17IBDG33700328). Further details regarding the data collection, organization, funding and relationships between METASTROKE and the other studies involved can be found below. Genetics of Early Onset Stroke (GEOS) Study (Baltimore, USA): GWAS data for the GEOS Study was supported by the National Institutes of Health Genes, Environment and Health Initiative (GEI) grant U01 HG004436, as part of the GENEVA consortium under GEI, with additional support provided by the Mid-Atlantic Nutrition and Obesity Research Center (P30 DK072488); and the Office of Research and Development, Medical Research Service, and the Baltimore Geriatrics Research, Education, and Clinical Center of the Department of Veterans Affairs. Genotyping services were provided by the Johns Hopkins University Center for Inherited Disease Research (CIDR), which is fully funded through a federal contract from the National Institutes of Health to the Johns Hopkins University (contract number HHSN268200782096C). Assistance with data cleaning was provided by the GENEVA Coordinating Center (U01 HG 004446; PI Bruce S Weir). Study recruitment and collection of datasets were supported by a cooperative agreement with the Division of Adult and Community Health, Centers for Disease Control and by grants from the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) and the NIH Office of Research on Women's Health (R01 NS45012, U01 NS069208-01). METASTROKE: METASTROKE is a collaboration of numerous international studies with the aim of validating associations from previous GWAS and identifying novel genetic associations through meta-analysis of GWAS datasets for ischemic stroke and its subtypes. Included studies are as follows: ASGC: Australian population control data were derived from the Hunter Community Study. We also thank the University of Newcastle for funding and the men and women of the Hunter region who participated in this study. This research was funded by grants from the Australian National and Medical Health Research Council (NHMRC Project Grant ID: 569257), the Australian National Heart Foundation (NHF Project Grant ID: G 04S 1623), the University of Newcastle, the Gladys M Brawn Fellowship scheme, and the Vincent Fairfax Family Foundation in Australia. Elizabeth G Holliday was supported by a Fellowship from the National Heart Foundation and National Stroke Foundation of Australia (ID: 100071). BRAINS: Bio-Repository of DNA in Stroke (BRAINS) is partly funded by a Senior Fellowship from the Department of Health (UK) to P Sharma, the Henry Smith Charity and the UK-India Education Research Institutive (UKIERI) from the British Council. HPS: Heart Protection Study (HPS) (ISRCTN48489393) was supported by the UK Medical Research Council (MRC), British Heart Foundation, Merck and Co (manufacturers of simvastatin), and Roche Vitamins Ltd (manufacturers of vitamins). Genotyping was supported by a grant to Oxford University and CNG from Merck and Co. Jemma C Hopewell acknowledges support from the British Heart Foundation (FS/14/55/30806). ISGS: Ischemic Stroke Genetics Study (ISGS)/Siblings With Ischemic Stroke Study (SWISS) was supported in part by the Intramural Research Program of the NIA, NIH project Z01 AG-000954-06. ISGS/SWISS used samples and clinical data from the NIH-NINDS Human Genetics Resource Center DNA and Cell Line Repository (http://ccr.coriell.org/ninds), human subjects protocol numbers 2003-081 and 2004-147. ISGS/SWISS used stroke-free participants from the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging (BLSA) as controls. The inclusion of BLSA samples was supported in part by the Intramural Research Program of the NIA, NIH project Z01 AG-000015-50, human subjects protocol number 2003-078. The ISGS study was funded by NIH-NINDS grant R01 NS-42733 (JF Meschia). The SWISS study was funded by NIH-NINDS grant R01 NS-39987 (J F Meschia). This study used the high-performance computational capabilities of the Biowulf Linux cluster at the NIH (http://biowulf.nih.gov). MGH-GASROS: MGH Genes Affecting Stroke Risk and Outcome Study (MGH-GASROS) was supported by NINDS (U01 NS069208), the American Heart Association/Bugher Foundation Centers for Stroke Prevention Research 0775010N, the NIH and NHLBI's STAMPEED genomics research program (R01 HL087676), and a grant from the National Center for Research Resources. The Broad Institute Center for Genotyping and Analysis is supported by grant U54 RR020278 from the National Center for Research resources. MILANO: Milano - Besta Stroke Register Collection and genotyping of the Milan cases within CEDIR were supported by the Italian Ministry of Health (grant numbers: RC 2007/LR6, RC 2008/LR6; RC 2009/LR8; RC 2010/LR8; GR-2011-02347041). FP6 LSHM-CT-2007-037273 for the PROCARDIS control samples. WTCCC2: Wellcome Trust Case-Control Consortium 2 (WTCCC2) was principally funded by the Wellcome Trust, as part of the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium 2 project (085475/B/08/Z and 085475/Z/08/Z and WT084724MA). The Stroke Association provided additional support for collection of some of the St George's, London cases. The Oxford cases were collected as part of the Oxford Vascular Study which is funded by the MRC, Stroke Association, Dunhill Medical Trust, National Institute of Health Research (NIHR) and the NIHR Biomedical Research Centre, Oxford. The Edinburgh Stroke Study was supported by the Wellcome Trust (clinician scientist award to C Sudlow), and the Binks Trust. Sample processing occurred in the Genetics Core Laboratory of the Wellcome Trust Clinical Research Facility, Western General Hospital, Edinburgh. Much of the neuroimaging occurred in the Scottish Funding Council Brain Imaging Research Centre (www.sbirc.ed.ac.uk), Division of Clinical Neurosciences, University of Edinburgh, a core area of the Wellcome Trust Clinical Research Facility and part of the SINAPSE (Scottish Imaging Network—A Platform for Scientific Excellence) collaboration (www.sinapse.ac.uk), funded by the Scottish Funding Council and the Chief Scientist Office. Collection of the Munich cases and data analysis was supported by the Vascular Dementia Research Foundation. M Farrall and A Helgadottir acknowledge support from the BHF Centre of Research Excellence in Oxford and the Wellcome Trust core award (090532/Z/09/Z). VISP: The GWAS component of the Vitamin Intervention for Stroke Prevention (VISP) study was supported by the United States National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), grant U01 HG005160 (PI Michèle Sale & Bradford Worrall), as part of the Genomics and Randomized Trials Network (GARNET). Genotyping services were provided by the Johns Hopkins University Center for Inherited Disease Research (CIDR), which is fully funded through a federal contract from the NIH to the Johns Hopkins University. Assistance with data cleaning was provided by the GARNET Coordinating Center (U01 HG005157; PI Bruce S Weir). Study recruitment and collection of datasets for the VISP clinical trial were supported by an investigator-initiated research grant (R01 NS34447; PI James Toole) from the United States Public Health Service, NINDS, Bethesda, Maryland. Control data obtained through the database of genotypes and phenotypes (dbGAP) maintained and supported by the United States National Center for Biotechnology Information, US National Library of Medicine. WHI: Funding support for WHI-GARNET was provided through the NHGRI GARNET (Grant Number U01 HG005152). Assistance with phenotype harmonisation and genotype cleaning, as well as with general study coordination, was provided by the GARNET Coordinating Center (U01 HG005157). Funding support for genotyping, which was performed at the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard, was provided by the NIH Genes, Environment, and Health Initiative (GEI; U01 HG004424). SiGN: The Stroke Genetics Network (SiGN) study was funded by a cooperative agreement grant from the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) U01 NS069208. Genotyping services were provided by the Johns Hopkins University Center for Inherited Disease Research (CIDR), which is fully funded through a federal contract from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to the Johns Hopkins University (contract no. HHSN268200782096C). The Biostatistics Department Genetics Coordinating Center at the University of Washington (Seattle) provided more extensive quality control of the genotype data through a subcontract with CIDR. Additional support to the Administrative Core of SiGN was provided by the Dean's Office, University of Maryland School of Medicine. This work was supported by grants received from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) in the context of the e:Med program (e:AtheroSysMed), the FP7 European Union project CVgenes@target (261123), the DFG as part of the CRC 1123 (B3), the Corona Foundation and the Fondation Leducq (Transatlantic Network of Excellence on the Pathogenesis of Small Vessel Disease of the Brain).
Free trade agreement of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) immediately will be implementedin the region. The four pillars of the AEC concept is a reference in the enforcement process. All memberstates have made preparations including Indonesia. Small and Medium-sized Enterprises also makepreparations. The preparation of the Indonesian government in the deal and how the measures taken toprotect Small and Medium-sized Enterprises is a discussion in the review of this article. Policies madeby the government, including the measures taken for businesses Small and Medium-sized Enterprises,still found some difficulties in implementation.Because entirely not going well then the nomination acceleration trade policies comprehensivelyneeds to be activated immediately so that the various policy papers that the government made will be ableto work together with entreperenurs. 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The direct estimation of heritability from genome-wide common variant data as implemented in the program Genome-wide Complex Trait Analysis (GCTA) has provided a means to quantify heritability attributable to all interrogated variants. We have quantified the variance in liability to disease explained by all SNPs for two phenotypically-related neurobehavioral disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and Tourette Syndrome (TS), using GCTA. Our analysis yielded a heritability point estimate of 0.58 (se = 0.09, p = 5.64e-12) for TS, and 0.37 (se = 0.07, p = 1.5e-07) for OCD. in addition, we conducted multiple genomic partitioning analyses to identify genomic elements that concentrate this heritability. We examined genomic architectures of TS and OCD by chromosome, MAF bin, and functional annotations. in addition, we assessed heritability for early onset and adult onset OCD. Among other notable results, we found that SNPs with a minor allele frequency of less than 5% accounted for 21% of the TS heritability and 0% of the OCD heritability. Additionally, we identified a significant contribution to TS and OCD heritability by variants significantly associated with gene expression in two regions of the brain (parietal cortex and cerebellum) for which we had available expression quantitative trait loci (eQTLs). Finally we analyzed the genetic correlation between TS and OCD, revealing a genetic correlation of 0.41 (se = 0.15, p = 0.002). These results are very close to previous heritability estimates for TS and OCD based on twin and family studies, suggesting that very little, if any, heritability is truly missing (i.e., unassayed) from TS and OCD GWAS studies of common variation. the results also indicate that there is some genetic overlap between these two phenotypically-related neuropsychiatric disorders, but suggest that the two disorders have distinct genetic architectures. ; Judah Foundation ; NIH ; Tourette Syndrome Association International Consortium for Genetics (TSAICG) ; New Jersey Center for Tourette Syndrome and Associated Disorders ; NIMH ; Obsessive Compulsive Foundation ; Ontario Mental Health Foundation ; Tourette Syndrome Association ; American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (AACAP) ; Anxiety Disorders Association of America (ADAA) ; University of British Columbia ; Michael Smith Foundation ; American Recovery and Re-investment Act (ARRA) ; Australian Research Council ; Australian National Health and Medical Research Council ; German Research Foundation ; NIH Genes, Environment and Health Initiative [GEI] ; Gene Environment Association Studies (GENEVA) under GEI ; NIH GEI ; National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism ; National Institute on Drug Abuse ; Univ Chicago, Dept Med, Med Genet Sect, Chicago, IL 60637 USA ; Harvard Univ, Massachusetts Gen Hosp, Dept Psychiat,Sch Med, Psychiat & Neurodev Genet Unit,Ctr Human Genet Re, Boston, MA USA ; Broad Inst Harvard & MIT, Stanley Ctr Psychiat Res, Cambridge, MA USA ; Univ Chicago, Dept Med, Chicago, IL 60637 USA ; Univ Chicago, Dept Human Genet, Chicago, IL 60637 USA ; Univ Amsterdam, Acad Med Ctr, Dept Psychiat, NL-1105 AZ Amsterdam, Netherlands ; Massachusetts Gen Hosp, Analyt & Translat Genet Unit, Boston, MA 02114 USA ; Univ Queensland, Diamantina Inst, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia ; Univ Queensland, Queensland Brain Inst, Brisbane, Qld 4072, Australia ; Univ Hlth Network, Toronto Western Res Inst, Toronto, ON, Canada ; Hosp Sick Children, Toronto, ON M5G 1X8, Canada ; Univ Vita Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy ; Hadassah Hebrew Univ Med Ctr, Herman Dana Div Child & Adolescent Psychiat, Jerusalem, Israel ; Univ Pontificia Bolivariana, Univ Antioquia, Medellin, Colombia ; Johns Hopkins Univ, Sch Med, Dept Psychiat & Behav Sci, Baltimore, MD 21205 USA ; Yale Univ, Dept Psychiat, New Haven, CT 06520 USA ; Yale Univ, Sch Med, Ctr Child Study, New Haven, CT 06510 USA ; North Shore Long Isl Jewish Med Ctr, Manhasset, NY USA ; NYU Med Ctr, New York, NY 10016 USA ; North Shore Long Isl Jewish Hlth Syst, Manhasset, NY USA ; Hofstra Univ, Sch Med, Hempstead, NY 11550 USA ; Inst Nacl Psiquiatria Ramon de la Fuente Muniz, Mexico City, DF, Mexico ; UCL, London, England ; Univ Hong Kong, Dept Psychiat, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China ; Univ São Paulo, Sch Med, Dept Psychiat, São Paulo, Brazil ; Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Med Ctr, Dept Psychiat, Amsterdam, Netherlands ; Univ Utrecht, Dept Clin & Hlth Psychol, Utrecht, Netherlands ; Altrecht Acad Anxiety Ctr, Utrecht, Netherlands ; Univ Milan, Osped San Raffaele, I-20127 Milan, Italy ; Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Psychol, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA ; Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Psychiat, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA ; Univ Montreal, Montreal, PQ, Canada ; Univ Calif Los Angeles, Keck Sch Med, Div Biostat, Dept Preventat Med, Los Angeles, CA USA ; Univ Illinois, Dept Psychiat, Inst Juvenile Res, Chicago, IL 60612 USA ; Univ Ghent, Lab Pharmaceut Biotechnol, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium ; Inst Pasteur, Paris, France ; French Natl Sci Fdn, Fondat Fondamental, Creteil, France ; Hop Robert Debre, AP HP, Dept Child & Adolescent Psychiat, F-75019 Paris, France ; Univ Montreal, Dept Psychiat, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada ; Univ Wurzburg, Dept Child & Adolescent Psychiat Psychosomat & Ps, D-97070 Wurzburg, Germany ; Univ Munich, Dept Psychiat & Psychotherapy, Munich, Germany ; Yale Univ, Sch Med, Dept Psychiat, New Haven, CT USA ; Harvard Univ, Sch Med, Dept Psychiat, Massachusetts Gen Hosp,OCD Program, Boston, MA 02115 USA ; Univ Med Greifswald, Helios Hosp Stralsund, Dept Psychiat & Psychotherapy, Greifswald, Germany ; Butler Hosp, Brown Med Sch, Dept Psychiat & Human Behav, Providence, RI 02906 USA ; Shaare Zedek Med Ctr, Neuropediatr Unit, Jerusalem, Israel ; Rutgers State Univ, Dept Genet, Human Genet Inst New Jersey, Piscataway, NJ USA ; Univ Stellenbosch, Dept Psychiat, ZA-7600 Stellenbosch, South Africa ; Univ São Paulo, Fac Med, Dept Psychiat, BR-05508 São Paulo, Brazil ; Baylor Coll Med, Dept Neurol, Parkinsons Dis Ctr, Houston, TX 77030 USA ; Baylor Coll Med, Dept Neurol, Movement Disorders Clin, Houston, TX 77030 USA ; Massachusetts Gen Hosp, Dept Psychiat, Boston, MA 02114 USA ; Ctr Addict & Mental Hlth, Neurogenet Sect, Toronto, ON, Canada ; Univ Toronto, Dept Psychiat, Toronto, ON, Canada ; Yale Univ, Sch Med, Dept Genet, Yale Child Study Ctr, New Haven, CT 06510 USA ; Overlook Hosp, Atlantic Neurosci Inst, Summit, NJ USA ; Carracci Med Grp, Mexico City, DF, Mexico ; Inst Mondor Rech Biomed, Creteil, France ; Yale Univ, Ctr Child Study, New Haven, CT 06520 USA ; Univ Bonn, Dept Psychiat & Psychotherapy, Bonn, Germany ; Univ Illinois, Dept Psychiat, Inst Human Genet, Chicago, IL 60612 USA ; Univ Stellenbosch, Dept Psychiat, MRC Unit Anxiety & Stress Disorders, ZA-7600 Stellenbosch, South Africa ; Univ Calif San Francisco, Dept Psychiat, San Francisco, CA USA ; UCI, Sch Med, Dept Psychiat & Human Behav, Irvine, CA USA ; Univ Utah, Salt Lake City, UT USA ; NIMH Intramural Res Program, Clin Sci Lab, Bethesda, MD USA ; Med City Dallas Hosp, Dept Clin Res, Dallas, TX USA ; Univ Med Ctr, Rudolf Magnus Inst Neurosci, Dept Psychiat, Utrecht, Netherlands ; Univ Calif Los Angeles, Semel Inst Neurosci & Human Behav, Ctr Neurobehav Genet, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA ; Yale Univ, Sch Med, Dept Genet, New Haven, CT 06510 USA ; Univ So Calif, Keck Sch Med, Zilkha Neurogenet Inst, Dept Psychiat & Behav Sci, Los Angeles, CA 90033 USA ; Univ Calif Los Angeles, David Geffen Sch Med, Dept Psychiat & Biobehav Sci, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA ; Yale Univ, Dept Psychol, New Haven, CT 06520 USA ; Partners Psychiat & McLean Hosp, Boston, MA USA ; Sunnybrook Hlth Sci Ctr, Frederick W Thompson Anxiety Disorders Ctr, Toronto, ON M4N 3M5, Canada ; St George Hosp, London, England ; Sch Med, London, England ; Hosp Nacl Ninos Dr Carlos Saenz Herrera, San Jose, Costa Rica ; Universidade Federal de São Paulo, Dept Psychiat, Child & Adolescent Psychiat Unit UPIA, São Paulo, Brazil ; Wayne State Univ, Dept Psychiat & Behav Neurosci, Detroit, MI 48207 USA ; Detroit Med Ctr, Detroit, MI USA ; McGill Univ, Montreal Neurol Inst, Montreal, PQ, Canada ; Univ Cologne, Dept Psychiat & Psychotherapy, D-50931 Cologne, Germany ; Univ Fed Bahia, Univ Hlth Care Serv SMURB, Salvador, BA, Brazil ; Youthdale Treatment Ctr, Toronto, ON, Canada ; Johns Hopkins Univ Sch Med, Baltimore, MD USA ; Univ Cape Town, ZA-7925 Cape Town, South Africa ; Univ Med Ctr Utrecht, Dept Med Genet, Utrecht, Netherlands ; Vanderbilt Univ, Kennedy Ctr Res Human Dev, Dept Psychiat, Nashville, TN 37235 USA ; Vanderbilt Univ, Kennedy Ctr Res Human Dev, Dept Pediat & Pharmacol, Nashville, TN 37235 USA ; Vanderbilt Univ, Inst Brain, Nashville, TN 37235 USA ; Univ Zurich, Dept Child & Adolescent Psychiat, Zurich, Switzerland ; Univ Wurzburg, Dept Child & Adolescent Psychiat, D-97070 Wurzburg, Germany ; Univ Amsterdam, Acad Med Ctr, Ctr Psychiat, NL-1105 BC Amsterdam, Netherlands ; Inst Royal Netherlands Acad Arts & Sci NIN KNAW, Netherlands Inst Neurosci, Amsterdam, Netherlands ; NIMH Intramural Res Program, Unit Stat Genom, Bethesda, MD USA ; Univ Utah, Dept Psychiat, Salt Lake City, UT USA ; Natl Inst Genom Med SAP, Carracci Med Grp, Mexico City, DF, Mexico ; Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Ctr Neurogen & Cognit Res, Dept Funct Genom, Amsterdam, Netherlands ; Vrije Univ Amsterdam Med Ctr, Dept Clin Genet, Amsterdam, Netherlands ; Erasmus Univ, Med Ctr, Dept Child & Adolescent Psychiat, Rotterdam, Netherlands ; Univ Michigan, Dept Psychiat, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA ; Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Med Ctr, Dept Clin Genet, Sect Med Genom, Amsterdam, Netherlands ; German Ctr Neurodegenerat Dis, Tubingen, Germany ; Hosp Sick Children, Program Genet & Genome Biol, Toronto, ON M5G 1X8, Canada ; Erasmus MC, Dept Clin Genet, Rotterdam, Netherlands ; Univ British Columbia, British Columbia Mental Hlth & Addict Res Inst, Vancouver, BC V5Z 1M9, Canada ; Brigham & Womens Hosp, Div Cognit & Behav Neurol, Boston, MA 02115 USA ; Massachusetts Gen Hosp, Dept Neurol, Boston, MA 02114 USA ; Universidade Federal de São Paulo, Dept Psychiat, Child & Adolescent Psychiat Unit UPIA, São Paulo, Brazil ; NIH: NS40024 ; NIH: NS16648 ; NIH: MH079489 ; NIH: MH073250 ; NIH: NS037484 ; NIH: 1R01MH079487-01A1 ; NIH: K20 MH01065 ; NIH: R01 MH58376 ; NIH: MH085057 ; NIH: MH079494 ; NIH: HHSN268200782096C ; NIMH: R01MH092293 ; American Recovery and Re-investment Act (ARRA): NS40024-07S1 ; American Recovery and Re-investment Act (ARRA): NS16648-29S1 ; Australian Research Council: FT0991360 ; Australian Research Council: DE130100614 ; Australian National Health and Medical Research Council: 1047956 ; Australian National Health and Medical Research Council: 1052684 ; German Research Foundation: DFG GR 1912/1-1 ; NIH Genes, Environment and Health Initiative [GEI]: U01 HG004422 ; NIH GEI: U01HG004438 ; : R01 MH090937 ; : P50MH094267 ; Web of Science
Tropische Entwaldung ist eines der dringendsten Umweltprobleme unserer Zeit. Sie ist einer der wichtigsten Treiber des Klimawandels und führt zu hohen Verlusten von Biodiversität und Ökosystemdienstleistungen. Bolivien ist eines der Länder mit den höchsten Entwaldungsraten weltweit. Im Rahmen der weltweiten Bemühungen zur Lösung dieses Problems unter dem REDD- Mechanismus ist es wichtig, konkrete und länderspezifische Handlungsoptionen für eine effektive und effiziente Entwaldungsreduktion zu identifizieren. Eine wichtige Voraussetzung dafür ist ein tiefgehendes Verständnis der komplexen Prozesse, die zu Entwaldung führen. Räumliche Modelle können hierfür wertvolle Informationen liefern, indem sie mögliche Einflussfaktoren in der Vergangenheit auswerten und Szenarien über künftige Entwicklungen generieren. In dieser Arbeit wird die logistische Regression als Schlüsselinstrument für eine systematische Identifikation von Handlungsoptionen angewendet, um die Ausbreitung der wichtigsten waldersetzenden Landnutzungsaktivitäten einzudämmen. Die gesamte Arbeit untersucht das bolivianische Tiefland als Modellregion. In einer Fallstudie wird zunächst die Expansion der mechanisierten Landwirtschaft im Department Santa Cruz untersucht. Der großflächige Soja-Anbau macht diese Region zu einem der Brennpunkte der Entwaldung in Südamerika. Ein logistisches Regressionsmodell über fünf Beobachtungszeitpunkte (1976, 1986, 1992, 2001 und 2005) identifiziert die wichtigsten Einflussfaktoren für die Ausbreitung der mechanisierten Landwirtschaft und analysiert ihre Wirkung über die Zeit. Es zeigt sich, dass die übergeordnete Entwaldungsdynamik über die Zeit stabil blieb, wobei es jedoch eine Tendenz zum Vordringen in die amazonischen, feuchteren Wälder im Norden von Santa Cruz gibt; eine analoge Entwicklung ist auch aus Brasilien bekannt. Die Modellierungsergebnisse werden genau validiert; dafür werden projizierte mit tatsächlichen Entwaldungsmustern verglichen und versteckte Korrelationen zwischen unabhängigen Variablen aufgedeckt. Die Fallstudie zeigt, dass die logistische Regression ein geeignetes Werkzeug für die weitergehenden Studien ist, unter der Voraussetzung, dass sie von sorgfältigen Evaluierungen und Plausibilitätschecks begleitet wird. In einer Folgeanalyse werden die drei wichtigsten direkten Ursachen für Entwaldung im gesamten bolivianischen Tiefland identifiziert: Mechanisierte Landwirtschaft war für 54% der Entwaldung zwischen 1992 und 2004 verantwortlich, gefolgt von Rinderzucht mit 27% und kleinbäuerlicher Landwirtschaft mit 19%. Mithilfe eines multinomialen Logitmodells werden die Einflussfaktoren dieser drei Landnutzungsformen analysiert. Die Resultate zeigen, dass die Expansion der mechanisierten Landwirtschaft hauptsächlich mit einem guten Zugang zu den Exportmärkten, fruchtbaren Böden und moderaten Niederschlagsbedingungen im Zusammenhang steht. Die Ausbreitung der kleinbäuerlichen Landwirtschaft ist mit einem eher feuchten Klima assoziiert, außerdem mit fruchtbaren Böden und einem guten Zugang zu lokalen Märkten. Die Umwandlung von Wald in Weideland zeigt nur geringe Korrelationen mit Umweltfaktoren und lässt sich am besten mit dem Zugang zu lokalen Märkten erklären. Landnutzungsrestriktionen, etwa Schutzgebiete, scheinen die Expansion von mechanisierter Landwirtschaft zu verhindern, zeigen aber wenig Wirkung in Bezug auf kleinbäuerliche Landwirtschaft und Viehzucht. Eine Analyse von zukünftigen Entwaldungstendenzen zeigt die wahrscheinliche künftige Ausbreitung jeder der drei Landnutzungsformen und identifiziert insbesondere zwei mögliche neue Expansionsgebiete der mechanisierten Landwirtschaft bei Puerto Suarez und San Buenaventura. Die quantitativen Modellierungsergebnisse werden ergänzt durch eine qualitative Analyse historischer Prozesse, die die Landnutzungsmuster in verschiedenen Teilen des bolivianischen Tieflands geformt haben. Während die quantitative Analyse die neueren räumlichen Entwaldungsdynamiken gut erklären kann, scheinen die Zeitpunkte von Entwaldungsereignissen vor allem durch historische Faktoren und politische Interventionen bestimmt zu werden. In einer dritten Analyse wird – wieder am Beispiel Boliviens – ein systematischer Ansatz zur Identifikation von Handlungsoptionen entwickelt, wobei die Modellierungsergebnisse ein wichtiges Element bilden. Die Ableitung von Handlungsoptionen basiert auf dem räumlichen und ökonomischen Potenzial landwirtschaftlicher Expansion, auf den erwarteten Kosten einer Entwaldungsreduktion sowie auf den aktuellen rechtlichen und politischen Rahmenbedingungen in Bolivien. Alle Analysen beziehen sich auf die drei direkten Ursachen von Entwaldung; für diese Landnutzungsformen werden spezifische Handlungsoptionen diskutiert. Die Eindämmung der Viehwirtschaft zeigt sich trotz des höheren Entwaldungsanteils der mechanisierten Landwirtschaft als Priorität, da die Umwandlung in Weideland für nahezu alle zugänglichen Wälder eine Bedrohung darstellt und da eine Reduktion zu relativ geringen Kosten möglich sein sollte. Eine schärfere gesetzliche Kontrolle sowie die Stärkung von zuständigen Institutionen auf nationaler und lokaler Ebene sind von höchster Bedeutung für die Reduktion aller drei Entwaldungstypen. Spezifische Maßnahmen sollten eine effizientere Produktion auf bereits genutzten Flächen gegenüber dem Vordringen in bewaldete Gebiete attraktiver machen. In diesem Zusammenhang könnten höhere Gebühren für legale Entwaldung die Ausbreitung von mechanisierter Landwirtschaft und Viehwirtschaft eindämmen. Auch eine Rückführung der Diesel-Subventionen dürfte die Expansion der mechanisierten Landwirtschaft bremsen. Solche Maßnahmen sollten durch die Förderung einer höheren räumlichen Produktionseffizienz ergänzt werden, etwa durch verbesserten Zugang zu Dünger oder technische Beratung und Unterstützung für höhere Bestockungsdichten. Die Ausbreitung der kleinbäuerlichen Landwirtschaft scheint aufgrund der hohen Zahl von Akteuren schwerer kontrollierbar zu sein; wichtig wäre es aber, das Eindringen in Schutzgebiete zu verhindern und effizientere und nachhaltigere Anbauformen sowie auch Arbeitsplätze außerhalb der Landwirtschaft zu fördern. Die Entwaldungsmodellierung zeigt sich als wichtiges analytisches Werkzeug zum Verständnis der zugrunde liegenden Prozesse; sie kann wichtige Informationen zur Ableitung von Handlungsoptionen liefern. Zukünftige Forschung könnte die Möglichkeiten von komplexeren Szenarien durch die Integration dynamischer Elemente ausloten; entsprechende Möglichkeiten sind in bestehenden Modellierungsprogrammen angelegt. Im Ausblick dieser Arbeit wird außerdem die Technik des Kartierens von Opportunitätskosten des Waldschutzes vorgestellt: Sie ermöglicht Szenarien auf der Basis von nicht-räumlichen Faktoren, etwa von Preisen landwirtschaftlicher Produkte. Für die praktische Anwendung von Modellen scheint es allerdings wichtig zu sein, eine hohe Transparenz zu wahren, um regelmäßige Plausibilitätschecks zu ermöglichen. Es besteht weiterer Forschungsbedarf zur Identifikation geeigneter Handlungsoptionen für eine effektive und effiziente Entwaldungsreduktion. In der Diskussion um REDD scheint die Bekämpfung der Entwaldung durch industrielle Landwirtschaft und große Rinderfarmen nur eine untergeordnete Rolle zu spielen. Dies könnte im Vorherrschen traditioneller Naturschutzkonzepte begründet sein sowie in einem ungerechtfertigten Fokus auf Kleinbauern. Auch der Schwerpunkt auf marktbasierten Lösungsansätzen scheint fragwürdig; nach den Ergebnissen dieser Arbeit könnte die direkte Unterstützung der Regierungen von tropischen Ländern bei der Umsetzung der erfolgsversprechendsten Maßnahmen zielführender sein. Des Weiteren scheint es wichtig, bei existierenden entwaldungsrelevanten globalen Märkten anzusetzen, etwa beim Handel mit Agrarrohstoffen wie Soja, Rindfleisch, Palmöl oder Tropenholz aus Kahlschlägen. ; Tropical deforestation represents one of the most urgent environmental problems of our time; it contributes heavily to climate change, causes immense losses of biodiversity and endangers important environmental services. Bolivia is among the countries with the highest deforestation rates in the world. In light of the current international efforts to reduce deforestation within the framework of REDD, effective and efficient country-specific policy options need to be identified to make progress on the ground. A prerequisite for the prioritization of such policy options is a detailed understanding of the complex processes driving deforestation. Spatial models can contribute valuable information to this end. They can provide quantitative evaluations of hypothesized drivers of deforestation in the past and also generate scenarios that represent probable developments in the future. This study applies spatially explicit regression models as a key instrument for the systematic identification of specific policy options suitable for mitigating the expansion of the main forest-depleting land uses. The entire study is based on Bolivia as a model country. The expansion of mechanized agriculture in the department of Santa Cruz is analyzed as a first case study. Soybean production has converted this area into one of the hotspots of deforestation in the entire Amazon. A logistic regression model covering five time steps (1976, 1986, 1992, 2001 and 2005) identifies the main determinants of the expansion of mechanized agriculture and explores the development of their effects over time. It shows that – while deforestation dynamics have been generally stable over time – there is a tendency of increased penetration into the more humid Amazonian forests in northern Santa Cruz, a development that is also known from Brazil. The model's results are thoroughly validated, including a comparison between projected and observed deforestation patterns and the investigation of hidden correlations between independent variables. The case study shows that logistic regression is a suitable tool for the purposes of the entire study, provided that careful evaluations and plausibility checks of the model outputs are conducted. In a subsequent analysis covering the entire Bolivian lowlands, three main proximate causes of deforestation are identified: mechanized agriculture was responsible for 54% of deforestation between 1992 and 2004, followed by cattle ranching with 27 %, and small-scale agriculture with 19%. A multinomial logit model is applied to analyze the determinants of each of these proximate causes of deforestation. The results suggest that the expansion of mechanized agriculture occurs mainly in response to good access to export markets, fertile soil and intermediate rainfall conditions. Increases in small-scale agriculture are mainly associated with a humid climate, fertile soil and proximity to local markets. Forest conversion into pastures for cattle ranching occurs mostly irrespective of environmental determinants and can mainly be explained by access to local markets. Land use restrictions, such as protected areas, seem to prevent the expansion of mechanized agriculture but have little impact on the expansion of small-scale agriculture and cattle ranching. An analysis of future deforestation trends reveals possible hotspots of future expansion for each proximate cause and specifically highlights the possible opening of new frontiers of deforestation due to mechanized agriculture in the areas of Puerto Suarez and San Buenaventura. The quantitative insights of the model are substantiated with a qualitative analysis of historical processes that have shaped land use patterns in different zones of the Bolivian lowlands to date. Whereas the quantitative analysis effectively elucidates the spatial patterns of recent agricultural expansion, the interpretation of long-term historic drivers reveals that the timing and quantity of forest conversion are often triggered by political interventions and historical legacies. In a third analysis, a systematic approach is developed in order to prioritize policy options for effective and efficient deforestation reduction, making use of the model outputs, among other things. Again, Bolivia is taken as a model country. The derivation of policy options is based on analyses of the spatial and economic potential of agricultural expansion, the expected costs of deforestation reduction, and the current legal and political framework in Bolivia. All analyses focus on the three proximate causes of deforestation; and specific policy options are discussed for these types of land use. It is concluded that, although mechanized agriculture caused more than half of all past deforestation in lowland Bolivia, cattle ranching activities should be targeted as a priority since their expansion threatens forests in many different locations and improvements could be achieved at relatively low costs. Enforcing legislation while strengthening institutions on both national and local levels is of utmost importance for the reduction of the expansion of all three land use categories. Specific measures should aim at giving an advantage to more efficient production on existing farms over the expansion into forested areas. In this context, a higher legal fee for deforestation has potential to mitigate forest conversion due to mechanized agriculture and cattle ranching farms, while a removal of subsidies for agro-diesel may specifically reduce the expansion of mechanized agriculture. Such measures could be complemented by a support for higher production efficiency, such as better access to fertilizer and techniques allowing increased cattle stocking densities. The expansion of small-scale agriculture seems to be difficult to control, due to the large number of agents; measures should focus on mitigating the encroachment into areas with land use restrictions, fostering more sustainable and space-efficient agricultural practices, as well as off-farm employment. Models of deforestation are found to be important analytical tools for a better understanding of the processes leading to deforestation; they can render important information for the development of policy options to combat deforestation. Further investigations may explore the possibilities of building more complex scenarios by adding dynamic elements that are contained in some existing land use modeling frameworks. In the outlook of this study, the mapping of opportunity costs of forest conservation is shortly introduced as a promising possibility of generating scenarios based non-spatial factors such as prices of agricultural goods. It is however concluded that, for practical applications, it seems reasonable to keep the transparency of models as high as possible in order to allow for constant plausibility checks of the model outputs. The study concludes that more research is needed to identify and evaluate suitable policy options to reduce deforestation on the ground. In the discussion on REDD, only little attention seems to be given to the development of mitigation strategies for large forest clearings driven by corporate agents and large cattle farms. This may be due to a certain prevalence of traditional approaches to biodiversity conservation within selected conservation areas and an unjustified focus on smallholders. Also the strong focus on market-based solutions may be questionable; according to this study it would be more appropriate to directly support the governments of tropical countries to implement the most promising measures. It may also be important to target existing markets that drive deforestation, i.e., global markets for beef, soybean, palm oil and tropical timber stemming from clear-cuts.
In: Hoekman , J 2012 , ' Science in an age of globalisation : the geography of research collaboration and its effect on scientific publishing ' , Doctor of Philosophy , Industrial Engineering and Innovation Sciences , Eindhoven . https://doi.org/10.6100/IR735405
Although scientific knowledge is considered by many a universal and context-free product, its producers are often embedded in geographically bounded networks of research collaboration. However, in an age of globalisation these local networks of knowledge production are challenged by pressures to make science more efficient and to align its priorities with problems of global relevance such as climate change and worldwide epidemics. Against this background, the dissertation sets out to examine changes in the contemporary geography of research collaboration and explores how these changes affect the publication of research findings in scientific journals. The dissertation starts with introducing a framework to understand how geographical space structures research collaboration among researchers. The two structuring principles in this framework are a logic of proximity that provides solutions for coordination problems in research practice, and a logic of stratification that provides researchers with differential means to engage in collaborations. The logic of proximity mainly follows from the importance of physical co-presence both for carrying out the complex tasks associated with scientific research and for establishing trust in research results. The logic of stratification is an outcome of the reward system in science which provides differential credit to researchers on the base of their past productivity. Globalisation affects these logics through technological advancements in ICTs and mobility, and through the harmonisation of research policies and practices across territories. It is hypothesised in this dissertation that these changes have implications for geographical patterns of research collaboration, and also for the way research findings are communicated in scientific publications. The empirical validation of this framework centers around two main themes that very much bear the imprint of globalisation in science. The first theme concerns the research policies of the European Union that are focused on the harmonisation of regional and national institutions in Europe in order to create an integrated 'European Research Area' (ERA) which should make the European research system more efficient and competitive. The Framework Programmes are explicitly designed to facilitate this integration process and in doing so they fund thousands of transnational research projects making it the largest transnational funding scheme in the world. Against this background, Chapter 2 evaluates the extent to which European research collaboration networks are already spatially integrated based on publication and patent data with multiple addresses. The results indicate that research collaborations in Europe are structured by geographical proximities as the choice for collaboration partners is impeded both by the kilometric distance between researchers and by national borders separating them. The chapter also presents some evidence that research collaboration networks are stratified on the base of similarity in productivity and access to resources. This logic of stratification operates irrespective of the location of researchers vis-à-vis each other. The main conclusion that follows from this analysis is that the present efforts towards the creation of ERA are well justified. The empirical study in Chapter 3 develops a dynamic approach to the geography of research collaboration by studying whether the logic of proximity is changing over time. The main argument of this chapter holds that one should make a conceptual distinction between a possible changing effect of geographical distance and a possible changing effect of territorial borders when studying proximity dynamics in research collaboration networks. When making such a distinction in the context of the European research system, the chapter shows that it is primarily the importance of regional and national borders that is decreasing over time, but that the role of geographical proximity in structuring research collaborations is remarkably stable. The findings indicate that globalisation in science is mainly realised through the harmonisation of territorial institutions, but that physical co-presence remains an important coordination device for exchanging complex forms of knowledge that cannot be easily communicated over large distances. The objective of Chapter 4 is to study to what extent the Framework Programmes (FPs), as the main funding instrument of the European Commission, are affecting the geography of European research collaboration. It is hypothesised that, in case the FPs indeed render territorial borders less important, they are likely to create (new) stratified networks of research collaboration that disproportionally consists of high-performance researchers located in Europe's core regions. Contrary to the expectation no evidence for this hypothesis is found. The presented analysis indicates that the FPs indeed have a substantial effect on promoting international scientific collaboration networks which are still relatively uncommon in comparison to national collaboration networks. However, it is also shown that acquisition of FP funding is rather equally distributed over Europe and that the FPs are more effective in establishing ties between poorly connected researchers than in further strengthening existing ones. When stimulating already existing networks the FPs run the risk of being a substitute for other funding sources. This implies that current EU research policy is in line with the cohesion objective of the European Union. The second theme of this dissertation concerns the global standardization of medical experiments on human subjects. In recent years, proponents of an evidence-based medicine have pushed for standards concerning the conduct of clinical trials and subsequent publication of research findings in clinical trial registers and scientific publications. This standardization process is closely linked to an increase in the number and size of clinical trials that involve scientific researchers and patients from across the globe. The empirical chapters address whether this standardization process has an effect on several aspects of scientific publishing including the constitution of authorship on publications, the communication of evidence after study completion, and the presence of error in scientific publications. In order to analyse these questions, a database is created that links information on registered clinical trial projects (www.clinicaltrials.gov) to scientific publications of the main findings after study completion. Chapter 5 focuses in this respect on the standardization of good clinical practice (ICH-GCP) which has made the exchange of clinical data between geographically dispersed research sites less complicated. This has resulted in a process of global outsourcing with increasing enrolment of patients from emerging economies, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia. The chapter describes this globalisation tendency and studies whether worldwide patient involvement in clinical trials is reflected in the geographical composition of scientific management teams in those trials. The chapter develops an empirical strategy to determine the geographical distribution of management teams by using authorship data from publications reporting on primary outcomes. On the basis of this data it is shown that, given patient involvement, authorships are disproportionally granted to researchers in a few leading countries. The chapter discusses possible adverse consequences of this situation especially concerning the monitoring of clinical trial quality and (the lack of) interactions between researchers that are in immediate contact with patients and researchers that design trials and interpret their results. Chapter 6 concentrates on the publication behaviour of pharmaceutical companies who are well known for their strategy to withhold negative research findings from the scientific literature. To remedy this situation several authorities have recently mandated both registration of clinical trials before study onset and publication of major research findings after study completion. The main question holds under what conditions pharmaceutical companies decide to publish their clinical trial findings either in scientific journals or on the web. The main hypothesis is that under the new institutional context pharmaceutical companies will continue to highlight positive results in the scientific literature as it provides them with certification that their research findings are scientifically sound, methodologically rigourous and thus credible. Negative results, by contrast, are expected to be published on the web. This hypothesis is tested against a sample of clinical trials that assess the efficacy of glucose lowering agents in diabetes patients. The results indicate that firms continue to highlight positive results in scientific journals which results in an ongoing and persistent bias of evidence in the literature. Finally, Chapter 7 studies the production and detection of error in scientific publications on the basis of published errata and retractions. It is derived from earlier chapters that geographical proximity remains an important coordination device in research practice. This begs the question whether researchers operating in geographically dispersed research projects are also more likely to produce error because effective peer-control may be lacking and the establishment of mutual understanding hindered. The chapter addresses this question by making a conceptual distinction between modes of coordination that influence error production, and the prestige of research findings that influences error detection. With respect to prestige of research the chapter shows that editorial policies of scientific journals may actively steer the process of error detection by organising impact around particular findings and by enforcing strict publication guidelines. After controlling for these factors the analysis finds that geographically distributed research results in less accurate scientific publication. Globalisation tendencies thus put increasing responsibility on the publication system to correct errors in publications. Based on the findings of the empirical chapters, the overall conclusion of the dissertation is three-fold. The first conclusion holds that changes in the contemporary geography of research collaboration are mainly visible in institutional harmonisation across territories, rather than in a tendency towards a 'death of distance' per se. This paradoxical process provides new prospects for worldwide research collaborations, but limits at the same time the possibilities to make these prospects work in actual research practice. Second, the presented analysis indicates that in an age of globalisation, science does not become a global level playing field where chances of success level off. Rather, stratified structures are reproduced at different spatial scales via the creation of new reward systems and global research collaboration network that exhibit high entry barriers. Third, globalised science reveals new publication practices that concern authorship norms, the prevalence and correction of error in scientific publications and the conditions under which disclosure of research findings takes place. In this respect, new global contexts have often been cited as contributors to the quality, impact and practical application of research findings. The results presented here do not support the argument and at least point to some potential side-effects of geographically distributed research. These effects require a rethinking of science's institutions in light of globalisation.
