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What is accepted as a near-truism, people will parrot that appointed counsel is for criminal matters but not civil ones. But the language in the Sixth Amendment does not explicitly draw the line between who does and does not get an appointed counsel. If there is a right of counsel to prevent wrongful incarceration for those charged with felonies, it is difficult to parse out criminal trials from all other forums that result in the same, if not greater, risk of innocent people wrongfully convicted and confined. How is it possible to provide appointed counsel for criminal felony trials, and not criminal appeals, misdemeanors, parole and probation hearings, or habeas petitions? This question is particularly pressing given that we know that, in furtherance of the mass incarceration policy, misdemeanors and violations of parole and probation were the front door and back door to ensure most people got caught up in and stayed in the criminal justice system. Moreover, habeas petitions are the best means to present evidence of actual innocence underlying any and all conviction. If courts continue to condition the right to appointed counsel on only the threat of mandatory incarceration, why are the most effective tools to prevent incarceration—either through the entry point of misdemeanor or the offered exit of parole— excluded from this right? In Gideon, the gravamen of the right to counsel is not predicated in criminal trials but is a remedy to level the playing field for all of us who are facing the well-oiled machine of the federal government. This asymmetry is not abstract. For any person who is in immigration court, that person is facing off against a professional government attorney, trained in an exceedingly complex area of law that the said trained government attorneys are experts in. For many, the person is representing themselves, and often, did not even begin with English as their first language. Although scholars have been calling for legal representation for lawful permanent residents (their home is here), asylum seekers (death is different), immigrants with criminal convictions (Padilla v. Kentucky practically created the "Fifth and a half Amendment" right for non-citizens in criminal court), detained immigrants (it is fundamentally unfair for someone to present their defense while locked up), or uniquely vulnerable immigrants (children or the mentally disabled), it becomes pretty clear that the divides between these groups pale in the common theme that there is no fair fight—for anyone in immigration court. Immigration court is set up to the full and complete advantage of one party—the same party that is the prosecutor, judge, and executioner. What this article seeks then ask is, if Gideon can be intellectually expanded to provide for a right to counsel in immigration courts does that right end there? On the one hand, the analogy between incarceration and deportation is apt. The simple answer is no. It is a mistake to condition the right of counsel only on the severity on the outcome of a process. For starters, those who experience the specific adverse outcome arising from civil law are not particularly assuaged by someone else who may be worse off. For instance, for someone who loses custody of their child or loses income from a disability check, the result is life altering to them. But more import, the safeguard must be available to offset an unfair process, regardless of whatever the outcome is, so that the process does not lose its legitimacy. Whenever there is a courtroom, with procedures and rules created by the government, applying laws passed by the government, and populated by professional lawyers hired to advance the interests of the government, there is simply no fair fight without a lawyer representing the private David on the other side. Indeed, the lawyer might be the metaphorical slingshot, for which there is no chance of success without one. Stated more clearly, the right to appointed counsel should not be available just for criminal trials. The more intellectually honest and constitutionally-sound dividing line between which forums receive appointed attorneys from those who do not is between public law and private law. Every court proceeding that involves the state or federal government—misdemeanors, habeas, immigration, family law, public housing, disability, public education—must expand their understanding of Gideon and provide appointed counsel to face off against the government. This remedy is the only means to both offset the baked-in asymmetry and ensure reliable outcomes is the appointment of counsel.

This translation of an original Chinese language work by Xiao Yongzhen discusses the legal authority Chinese courts rely on in addressing economic disputes arising from foreign investment and joint-venture agreements in the People's Republic of China. The translation details specific legal mechanisms used in China, as well as distinct Chinese legislation and practices relied upon to amicably resolve contractual disputes between private parties involving foreign interests in China. Translators' Introductory Note: The style of Chinese law review articles differs somewhat from that of American law reviews; therefore this translation should be read with those differences in mind. Chinese law review articles tend to be more expository rather than analytical as compared to American law reviews. Writing in the context of a civil law system, Chinese legal scholars rarely cite case law as authority. Constitutional and statutory authorities are commonly cited within the text of the article rather than through footnotes. The original text of this article does not contain any footnotes. Footnotes have been added by the translators to clarify or explain certain ambiguities in the text, provide specific citations, and to offer further information.

In the past twenty years, international criminal law has become one of the main areas of international legal scholarship and practice. Most textbooks in the field describe the evolution of international criminal tribunals, the elements of the core international crimes, the applicable modes of liability and defences, and the role of states in prosecuting international crimes. The Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law, however, takes a theoretically informed and refreshingly critical look at the most controversial issues in international criminal law, challenging prevailing practices, orthodoxies, and received wisdoms. Some of the contributions to the Handbook come from scholars within the field, but many come from outside of international criminal law, or indeed from outside law itself. The chapters are grounded in history, geography, philosophy, and international relations. The result is a Handbook that expands the discipline and should fundamentally alter how international criminal law is understood.

Considerable scholarly attention has been paid to a range of criminal behaviours that are perpetrated with the aid of digital technologies. Much of this focus, however, has been on high-tech computer crimes, such as hacking, online fraud and identity theft, or child exploitation material and cyberbullying. Less attention has been paid to 'technology-facilitated sexual violence', where new technologies are used as tools to perpetrate or extend the harm of a sexual assault, extend control and abuse in a domestic violence situation, or distribute sexual or intimate images of another without their consent. In this article, we focus on the scope and limitations of criminal legislation for responding to these varied but interconnected gendered harms. We argue that although there have been some developments in a range of international jurisdictions, particularly relating to the phenomenon of 'revenge pornography', much more needs to be done both within and beyond the law. Whilst we support the intervention of the criminal law, we argue that equal attention must be given to policies and practices of educators, law enforcement agencies, service providers, online communities and social media networks to fulfil the promise of equal and ethical digital citizenship.

Argues that the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), which incorporated the concept of the illegal enemy combatant into the law, resulted in the legalization of a new legal & political order in the US. Further, the idea of the illegal enemy combatant concerns the relation between the US state & its residents & the US & other countries, with the concept of the illegal enemy combatant situated at the intersections of military & criminal law & US & international law. It is contended that looking at the concept sheds light on various incarnations of US sovereignty & of the US state's international & domestic relations, allowing for a definition of the new for of the US state. The conceptual history of enemy combatant or illegal combatant is traced to the Bush administration's 13 November 2001 executive order; it first applied to foreigners, but was quickly applied to US citizens as well. It is asserted that while the (2004) Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision seemed a victory for civil liberties, it offered the government the opportunity to ask Congress to custom build a new legal order & that such authority is reflected in the MCA, which provides a political character to the crime(s) of an illegal enemy combatant & legalizes special military tribunals established by the 2001 executive order. These tribunals are supposed to be reserved only for foreign enemy combatants, but the MCA is explicit in applying them to the whole population. Thus, the MCA is seen to transform the state organization via the ending of the formal separation of powers & creating a subjective law placed in the executive's hands, one that no longer respects international law while war becomes an ordinary police operation; US criminal law establishes a new definition of hostility that is globally applied, placing all populations at the mercy of US executive power. D. Edelman

The number of premeditated murders in the world is constantly growing. Influential factors in this process are the following phenomena: economic crisis, unemployment, low level of legal awareness and legal culture, legal nihilism, contradictions in society, contradictions of normative legal acts, gaps in legislation, insufficiently effective activity of law enforcement agencies. Each country in its public policy is trying to resolve the issue under study, creating rules of law that correspond to today's reality. Section 71.2 contains an article providing for liability for "Murder of a member of the United Nations or a person associated with it". It states that "A person commits a crime if: a) his conduct results in the death of another person; b) if the other person is a member of the United Nations or a related person; (c) If the person is a member of a United Nations or a related person, participates in a United Nations operation; (d) The first-mentioned person intends to cause or recklessly causes the death of a member of the United Nations or a related person or any other person by such conduct. " Another article, which provides for liability for premeditated murder, is contained in section 115.1 and is entitled "Murder of an Australian citizen or resident". It states that; "(1) A person commits an offense if: (a) The person commits an act outside Australia (before or after 1 October 2002 or the date of entry into force of this Code); and b) the conduct results in the death of another person; and (c) the other person is an Australian citizen or resident of Australia; and (d) the first-mentioned person intends to cause or negligently causes the death of an Australian citizen or resident of Australia or any other person by such conduct. " Another provision related to the death of another person is contained in section 268.8, which deals with "Crime against humanity - murder". It states that "A person (offender) commits a crime if: a) the perpetrator causes the death of one or more persons; and (b) the ...