AbstractGratification is synonymous with corruption. This is stated in the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 31 of 1999 concerning Corruption Crime and Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission. Many officials have been caught, because they have been proven to have accepted gratuities. Nevertheless, the interpretation of gratification must have clear truth and the content (substantially) must be able to explain legal events and legal issues regarding the interpretation of gratification. If you look at the Corruption Crime Law, it can be said that the interpretation of gratification is appropriate to provide certainty about the nature of knowledge about the broad interpretation of gratification such as Article 12 B, namely that gratification is used for one type of corruption, but if it is used in the Job Creation Law, Currently, the interpretation of gratification has become a legal debate in educating and providing legal knowledge related to the interpretation of gratification. For this reason, it was appointed as research in order to provide legal certainty and legal harmonization in an arrangement for the formation of legislation regarding a gratification system based on the principles in the discussion of the Omnibus Law. This type of research used in this research is normative legal research. By using primary and secondary legal materials, along with tertiary legal materials as supporting materials. Based on the results of this study, it is said that there are several interpretations of gratification that provide an inaccurate meaning because of the contextual and legal events, such as gratification used in the taxation aspect and examples can be given that perpetrators are corrupt, illegal logging perpetrators, illegal fishing actors, illegal mining actors , and traffickers are free without being taxed. When talking about a person or perpetrator in a criminal act, it must fulfill the elements in a criminal act such as intention, activity (legal life) in committing a crime and the fulfillment of a form of error or act against the law in a criminal act. When the proceeds of crime are in the form of objects of a criminal act to enrich oneself and one's own interests because they have committed acts of corruption, illegal logging, illegal fishing, illegal mining, and trafficking, it will become a different interpretation when it has permanent legal force, so it is necessary there is a proof and it is administrative in nature. Therefore there is a need for legal harmonization in providing an accurate interpretation of the gratuity system regulation in the Corruption Crime Act and the Job Creation Act in terms of the formation rules of legislation and the rules of the Omnibus Law.Keywords: gratification system; law harmonization; omnibus lawAbstrakGratifikasi identik dengan korupsi. Hal ini tercantum dalam Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 tentang Tindak Pidana Korupsi dan Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Sudah banyak pejabat terjerat, karena terbukti menerima gratifikasi. Meskipun demikian, penafsiran gratifikasi harus mempunyai kebenaran yang jelas dan konten (secara subtansial) harus dapat menjelaskan persitiwa hukum maupun isu hukum tentang penafsiran gratifikasi. Apabila melihat Undang-Undang Tindak Pidana Korupsi bisa dikatakan penafsiran gratifikasi itu tepat dipergunakan memberikan kepastian tentang hakikat ilmu pengetahuan tentang penafsiran gratifikasi secara luas seperti Pasal 12 B yakni gratifikasi dipergunakan untuk salah satu jenis korupsi, namun apabila dipergunakan dalam Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja, maka penafsiran gratifikasi saat ini menjadi perdebatan hukum dalam mengedukasi dan memberi ilmu pengetahuan hukum berkaitan dengan penafsiran gratifikasi. Untuk itulah diangkat sebagai penelitian dalam rangka untuk memberikan kepastian hukum dan harmonisasi hukum dalam suatu pengaturan pembentukan perundang-undangan tentang suatu sistem gratifikasi berdasarkan kaida-kaidah dalam pembahasan omnibus law. Jenis penelitian yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini ialah penelitian hukum normatif. Dengan menggunakan bahan hukum primer dan sekunder, beserta bahan hukum tersier sebagai bahan pendukung. Berdasarkan hasil penelitian ini, dikatakan bahwa ada beberapa penafsiran tentang gratifikasi memberikan pengertian yang tidak tepat karena melihat kontekstualnya maupun peristiwa hukumnya, seperti gratifikasi yang dipergunakan pada aspek perpajakan dan bisa diberikan contoh bahwa pelaku koruptor, pelaku pembalakan liar, pelaku illegal fishing, pelaku illegal mining, dan pelaku trafficking bebas tanpa dikenakan pajak. Apabila berbicara mengenai oknum atau pelaku dalam suatu tindak pidana, maka harus memenuhi unsur-unsur dalam suatu tindak pidana seperti niat, kegiatan (perstiwa hukum) dalam melakukan kejahatan dan terpenuhinya suatu bentuk kesalahan maupun perbuatan melawan hukum dalam suatu tindak pidana. Ketika terhadap hasil tindak pidana dalam bentuk objek suatu tindak pidana untuk memperkaya diri maupun kepentingan diri sendiri karena telah melakukan perbuatan korupsi, pembalakan liar, illegal fishing, illegal mining, dan trafficking akan menjadi suatu pnafsiran yang berbeda ketika sudah mempunyai kekuatan hukum tetap, sehingga perlu adanya suatu pembuktian dan sifatnya administratif. Oleh karena itu perlunya harmonisasi hukum dalam memberikan penafsiran yang tepat tentang pengaturan sistem gratifikasi dalam Undang-Undang Tindak Pidana Korupsi maupun Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja dalam kaidah-kaidah pembentukan peraturan perundang-undangan maupun kaidah-kaidah Omnibus Law.
This extraordinary and moving piece of original theatre tells the true stories of modern day slaves and their traffickers. Two hundred years since the abolition of the trans-Atlantic space trade, virtually every country in the world is affected by trafficking. 'Sold' is based on original interviews conducted this year and has been created by the company of actors and designers under the direction of Complicite Associate, Catherine Alexander, who created 'The Boy from Centreville' performed at Edinburgh Fringe in 2008. CAST - BA (HONS) ACTING COLLABORATIVE AND DEVISED THEATRE Fisayo Akinade - Gbenga Nadia Balfe - Gina/Mara Jordan Dawes - Danny/Luan Palkici Laura Dewey - Denise Marshall/Natalia Nicholas Hart - Jack Sara Hirsch - Claudia Schmidt Peter Hobday - Krisjãnis Magnus McCullagh - Iain/Alex Elizabeth Menabney - Anna Puzova/Police Officer John Montegrande - James/Andreas Peter Randall - Anthony Steen Cherrelle Skeete - Oliviette/Adjo Sarah Vevers - Christina Caine Paula Videniece - Aija Rhiannon Wallace - Carys Miles Yekinni - Tayo/Leo PRODUCTION TEAM - BA (HONS) THEATRE PRACTICE STUDENTS Sarah Beaton - Set and Costume Design Samantha Buckmaster - Costume Supervisor Gareth Wide - Lighting Design/Programmer Douglas Green - Video/Projection Design Peter Malkin - Sound Design James Nicholson - Sound Design Tal Landsman - Production Manager Elliot Bennet - Technical Manager Nikita Wolski - Stage Manager Sally Inch - Deputy Stage Manager Ellie Phillips - Assistant Stage Manager Sam Jeffs - Chief Electrician Kieran O'Brien - Media Production/Programmer CREATIVE TEAM Catherine Alexander - Director Andrew London - Assistant Director Max Mackintosh - Assistant Director Tara McAllister-Viel - Vocal Support Marina Tyndall - Accent Coach CHARACTER BIOGRAPHIES AND SOURCES Luan & Natalia Luan Plakici is an Albanian immigrant who was convicted of human trafficking in 2002. He was the first person to be tried under the new UK human trafficking laws and sentenced to 24 years in prison. Scenes are based on media reports about Luan and interviews with Denise Marshall. Danny & James In the north of England forced labour is a consistent underlying problem. These characters are based on original interviews with two Mancunians who have a connection with this issue. They have asked to remain anonymous. Tayo & Gbenga This storyline is based on accounts of boys and young men trafficked to the Ivory Coast to be used as forced labour. Taken from their homes in places such as Nigeria and Mali, these boys work on cocoa and sugar plantations. Much of the chocolate on sale in this country has links to slave about in Africa. The starting point for this storyline is the YouTube video: 'Chocolate, not so sweet after all'. (www.fairtrade.org.uk) Anthony Steen Anthony was a Conservative MP for Totnes. He is the chairman of The Human Trafficking Foundation and has been instrumental in raising UK governmental awareness of human trafficking. Character is based on original interviews with Anthony Steen. (www.allpartygrouphumantrafficking.org) Denise Marshall Denise is the director os Eaves and The Poppy Project: these organisations campaign for the freedom and rights of trafficked women. Character is based on original interviews with Denise Marshall. (www.eaves4women.co.uk) Jack & Carys One of the more sophisticated forms of coercion is the 'Loverboy'. A 'Loverboy' lures young girls into boyfriend/girlfriend relationships before cutting them off from family and friends and trafficking them from one town to another. (www.mydangerousloverboy.com) Aija & Krisjãnis These young Latvians came to the UK on legal passports with the promise of legitimate work and found themselves the victims of human trafficking. Storyline based on original interviews with sources who wish to remain anonymous. Oliviette Many people trafficked to the UK are enslaved as domestic servants in private homes. Some start as servants in their home countries, but when they are illegally transported to other countries to continue working they find themselves trapped. Storyline based on several sources which have been fictionalised. - 'Enslaved: The New British Slavery' by Ramila Gupta Anna Puzova Anna Puzova was the first woman in the UK to be convicted of child trafficking. As a mother with eight children named on her passport, she was easily able to traffic children from Italy to UK. Scenes are fictionalised based upon interviews with Superintendent Bernie Gravett, Metropolitan Police. Christine Caine Christine is a Christian leader from Sydney, Australia. She is actively involved in supporting victims of human trafficking through the A21 campaign. This character is created using verbatim text from Christine's YouTube videos. (www.thea21campaign.org) Andreas Andreas is a Greek immigrant who has integrated himself into the criminal underworld of Soho. The character is based on encounters with a source whose anonymity we wish to protect. Mara Mara is a Latvian masseuse whose career has been ruined following an accident. She awoke with amnesia and injuries which, she believes, resulted from being sold for sex whilst unconscious. Story based on original interviews with Mara Vaitkuse. Other Sources * UN Office on drugs and crime: www.undoc.org * US Trafficking in Persons' Report: www.state.gov * The Bible, Leviticus 25:44 * The Koran, The Believers 23:1 * London School of Hygiene and Medicine * Stop Trafficking Now: www.sctnow.org * 'Designing Trafficking Research From a Labour Market Perspective', by Beate Andrees and Mariska N. J. Van Der Linden * 'Stop the Traffic: People Shouldn't Be Bought and Sold', by Steve Chalke
Why do drug cartels fight states? Episodes of armed conflict between drug cartels and states in Colombia, Brazil and Mexico have demonstrated that `criminal wars' can be just as destructive as civil wars. Yet insurgents in civil wars stand a reasonable chance of winning formal concessions of territory or outright victory. Why fight the state if, like drug cartels, you seek neither to topple nor secede from it?Equally puzzling are the divergent effects of state crackdowns. Mexico's militarized crackdown in 2006 was intended to quickly break up the cartels and curtail incipient inter-cartel and anti-state violence; five years later, splintered cartels are an order of magnitude more violent, with over 16,000 homicides and 600 of attacks on army troops in 2011 alone. Conversely, in Rio de Janeiro, a massive November 2010 invasion by state forces of a key urban zone that had been under cartel dominion for a generation failed to produce the grisly bloodbath that even the government's defenders predicted. Instead, it heralded what appears to be a decisive shift by cartels away from confrontation. Why do some crackdowns lead to violent blowback, while others successfully curtail cartel-state conflict?The key to both puzzles lies in a fundamental difference between cartel-state conflict and civil war. Cartels turn to anti-state violence, not, as in civil war, in hopes of conquering mutually prized territory or resources, but to influence state policy. Like many interest groups, cartels expend resources to influence policy, usually acting at the level of policy enforcement, through corruption, but sometimes also at the level of policy formation, through lobbying. Yet licit interest groups are not targeted for destruction by the state, and generally possess no means of physical coercion. Cartels always face some level of state repression, but fighting back usually provokes even greater repression. Often, this leads them to `hide' rather than `fight', using anonymity and bribes to minimize confrontation; under certain conditions, though, violence may seem the best pathway to policy influence. The decision to turn to violent forms of policy influence is thus highly sensitive to what the state is doing ; shifts in state policy, especially crackdowns, can trigger sharp variation in cartel-state conflict.This study first distinguishes the logics of violent corruption and violent lobbying , as well as dynamics deriving from turf war among cartels, then identifies the conditions that make each logic operative. Violent corruption---epitomized by drug lord Pablo Escobar's infamous phrase " plata o plomo ?" (bribe or bullet?)---is central; it occurs, in all three cases, prior to and with greater consistency than violent lobbying or other mechanisms. States face a dilemma: they cannot crack down on traffickers without inadvertently giving corrupt enforcers (police, judges, etc.) additional leverage to extract bribes. A formal model of bribe negotiation illustrates the cartel's choice: simply pay the larger bribe, or use the threat of violence to intimidate enforcers and reduce the equilibrium bribe demand. The central finding is that blanket crackdowns in a context of widespread corruption can increase cartels' incentives to fight back, whereas more focused crackdowns that hinge on cartel behavior induce non-violent strategies. Conditionality of repression --the degree to which repressive force is applied in proportion to the amount of violence used by cartels--is thus a critical factor behind the divergent response of cartels to crackdowns across cases. A move toward conditional crackdowns occurred both in Colombia, after Escobar's demise and the fragmenting of the drug market, and in Rio de Janeiro, with its innovative `pacification' strategy. In both cases, cartels have shifted away from confrontation and toward non-violent `hiding' strategies. In Mexico, by contrast, the state has insisted on pursuing all cartels without distinction, leading to sharp increases in cartel-state violence.Other, less central logics help explain contrasting modalities of cartel violence. 'Violent lobbying', in the form of narco-terrorism and direct negotiation with state leaders, is dramatic and chilling, but only makes strategic sense when there is an open policy question that cartels can realistically hope to influence. Moreover, if the benefits of policy change are 'public' or non-excludable, violent lobbying is subject to the free-rider problem, and only likely to occur if cartels can cooperate. Thus violent lobbying has been intense in Colombia, where cartels were initially united and extradition remained an open policy question for a decade; occasional in Brazil where a dominant cartel uses it to influence carceral policy, and relatively rare in Mexico, where cartels are fragmented and the president's high-profile `ownership' of his crackdown creates overwhelming audience costs to policy change.Inter-cartel turf war is far more intense in Mexico than elsewhere, driving logics of reputation-building and false-flag attacks, and contributing to the prominence of `propagandistic' violence like mutilation and `narco-messages'. These turf-war dynamics are reinforced by the government's kingpin strategy and its splintering of the cartels. Moreover, fragmentation has a general-equilibrium effect on the maximum pressure the state can apply to any one cartel, given its unconditional approach. This further reduces the sanction cartels face for using violence, and drives the escalatory spiral presently gripping Mexico.The study concludes by asking why leaders do or do not adopt conditional strategies. Even when leaders would like to do so, they face both 'logistical constraints' arising from low capacity and fragmented security institutions, and 'acceptability constraints' deriving from the negative optics of `going easy' on less violent cartels (a necessary component of conditional repression). Case evidence helps identify political circumstances that minimize these constraints. Coalitions or partisan hegemony can mitigate institutional fragmentation, while the 'Nixon-Goes-to-China' effect allows leaders perceived as hardliners to overcome acceptability constraints, particularly if they present conditionality as a tactical, operational imperative.
Programa de Doctorado en Migraciones Internacionales y Cooperación al Desarrollo ; Desde que ISIS declaró su califato de forma unilateral el 29 de junio de 2014, ha atraído a al menos 7,700 combatientes extranjeros de países occidentales y a otros 35,000 extremistas de otros 120 países. Esta migración de combatientes extranjeros, y la reciente ansiedad que supone su vuelta a los países de origen, se ha convertido en una de las principales preocupaciones en materia de seguridad en Occidente. Esta tesis doctoral se basa en los conocimientos en el ámbito de la trata de personas para proporcionar una alternativa a la securitización de la participación y la desvinculación de grupos políticamente violentos, como lSlS. Más concretamente, la estrategia de las 4P's utilizada en la lucha contra la trata de personas (prevención, protección, persecución y partenariados) ofrece un enfoque holístico apropiado para la prevención, la rehabilitación y la reintegración de extremistas violentos y combatientes extranjeros retornados, especialmente en el caso de las mujeres. Con el fin de confirmar la utilidad del ámbito la trata de personas como alternativa para los expertos en la lucha antiterrorista, este trabajo examina los paralelismos existentes entre los mecanismos de reclutamiento empleados por las redes yihadistas y aquellos empleados por las redes de trata. Una revisión bibliográfica preliminar revela que no hay estudios previos que destaquen estas similitudes y que, por tanto, no han explorado la aplicabilidad de la estrategia de las 4P's en el ámbito de la lucha contra el extremismo violento. Un análisis del discurso documenta que los medios de comunicación dominan la narrativa en tomo a ISIS. Esta realidad afecta tanto la investigación académica como la elaboración de políticas. A continuación, un estudio de caso sobre ISIS revela que los mecanismos de reclutamiento son muy similares a aquellos empleados por las redes de trata de personas, incluyendo la importancia dada a ideas como la 'mejora de los medios de vida' o la •idea de una utopía.' El 30% de los combatientes extranjeros que respondieron a la llamada a la migración (hijrah) han regresado a sus países de origen. Aunque la persecución siga siendo una opción, muchos de los combatientes extranjeros serán liberados. En el caso de las mujeres que no estuvieron involucradas en la lucha armada, lo más probable es que no se impongan penas de cárcel. El ámbito de trata de personas ofrece una serie de mecanismos de rehabilitacion y reintegracion que pueden ser adaptadas a las necesidades de aquellos que en su momento apoyaron el extremismo violento pero que nunca estuvieron directamente involucrados. Existen varias historias de éxito que reflejan que la cooperación entre las fuerzas de seguridad, activistas y antiguos extremistas pueden tener un efecto positivo en lo que respecta a la prevención y la reversión del proceso de radicalización. La estrategia de las 4P's pone de manifiesto que la solución ha de ir más allá de la represión. Los procesos de reintegración y rehabilitación efectivos suponen un elemento fundamental a la hora de abordar los principales elementos subyacentes del extremismo violento. Esta tesis doctoral plantea que no hemos de reinventar la rueda, y que mucho de lo que se ha aprendido a nivel internacional en la Guerra contra la Trata puede contribuir de forma positiva a la Guerra Contra el Terror. ; Since ISIS unilaterally declared it so-called Caliphate on June 29, 2014, it has attracted at least 7,700 Western foreign fighters plus another 35,000 extremists from another 120 countries. This flight offoreign fighters, and now anxiety associated with their potential return to their countries of origin, has become one ofthe main security concems in Westem countries This doctoral dissertation draws from what is known in the field of human trafficking to provide an altemative understanding to the securitization of engagement and disengagement from politically violent groups such as TSTS. The 4P strategy utilized to combat human trafficking (prevention, protection, prosecution and partnersbips) in particular offers a holistic approach that may prove appropriate for the prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders and retuming foreign fighters, particularly women. In order to confirm the utility of human trafficking as an altemative for counter-terrorism experts and those countering violent extremism, the parallels between the recruitment mechanisms employed by jihadist groups and those employed by human trafficking networks are explored. A preliminary literature review reveals that no prior studies have bighlighted these similarities and have therefore not examined the applicability of the 4P strategy when it comes to countering violent extremism. A discourse analysis then documents that media dominates the discourse surrounding ISIS. Tbis reality affects both academic research and policymaking. Thereafter, an in-depth case study of ISIS recruitment reveals that its mechanisms are very similar to those employed by human traffickers, including the importance given to ideas such as 'livelihood improvement,' or 'selling utopía.• Thirty percent of the foreign fighters that answered ISIS' call for hijra (migration) have now returned to their countries of origin. Although prosecution must be incorporated, most of these foreign :fighters will be released and, in the cases of women who have not taken up arms, there willlikely be no incarceration. The :field ofhuman tra:fficking offers a series of reintegration and rehabilitation mechanisms that could be tailored to meet the needs ofthose who once supported violent extremism but were never directly engaged in it Several success stories show how partnerships between law enforcement, activists and former extremists can have a positive impact regarding prevention and reversing the radicalization process. As the 4P's model makes apparent, ultimate solutions must be more than merely punitive. Effective rehabilitation and reintegration will prove a crucial component of addressing the core issues violent extremism protrudes from. Tbis dissertation hypothesizes and concludes that we need not rebuild the wheel, and that much of what has been learned internationally from the War on Trafficking can make a positive contribution to the War on Terror.
As host city of the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and Olympic Games in 2016, municipality of Rio de Janeiro seeks to respond to international expectations in terms of urban planning and security. Favelas, which have often been considered as an « urban problem », are at the heart of the public actions. Despite several eradication attempts during the military dictatorship, especially in wealthy areas of the city, the favelas have increased and are now subject of security and urbanization policies. For efficiency, public policies are rethought in a territorialised way, reinforcing public-private partnerships and the participation of the civil society. It pretends to remove the favelas of a situation of exception by introducing standards and urban amenities similar to formal neighborhoods (infrastructure, equipment, services, etc.). With very high crime rates, security is a challenge for the city. In 2008, the Public Security Secretariat of the State of Rio de Janeiro developed the so-called "pacification" policy, aiming at regaining control of the territories dominated by criminal groups, and at improving relations between the population and the police force, with the establishment of permanent Police Pacification Units (UPP). If the living conditions in the favelas are improving, these new public actions, however, show contrasted results : a new outbreak of confrontations in pacified favelas, between traffickers and police officers has contributed to reinforcing the feeling of insecurity of favelas residents. Moreover, valuation process and even gentrification, observed in some pacified favelas open up new opportunities to residents, but because of the price increase some of them are forced to move away. More generally, acceleration of urban transformations in the context of mega-events could modify the socio- spatial organization of the city (population displacements; transport infrastructure works, sports facilities construction, etc.). Focusing more specifically on two recently pacified favelas, Rocinha and Vidigal, located near wealthiest and most tourist areas of Rio de Janeiro, we seek to highlight the socio- spatial transformations and the effects of territorialised public actions. ; En tant que ville-hôte de la Coupe du Monde de Football en 2014 et des Jeux Olympiques en 2016, la municipalité de Rio de Janeiro tente de répondre aux attentes internationales concernant les enjeux de planification urbaine et de sécurité. Au cœur des actions publiques se trouvent des espaces longtemps considérés comme un « problème urbain » : les favelas. Malgré plusieurs tentatives d'éradication durant la dictature militaire, principalement dans les zones aisées de la ville, elles se sont multipliées et font aujourd'hui l'objet de politiques de sécurisation et d'urbanisation. Pour plus d'efficacité, les politiques publiques se territorialisent, favorisent les partenariats public-privé et la participation de la société civile. Il s'agit de faire sortir les favelas d'une situation d'exception en y introduisant les normes et les aménités urbaines similaires aux quartiers formels (infrastructures, équipements, services, etc.). Avec des taux de criminalité très élevés, la sécurité est un défi posé à la ville. Aussi, depuis 2008, une nouvelle politique de sécurité a été mise en place : la pacification, visant à reprendre le contrôle des territoires dominés par des groupes criminels et à améliorer les rapports entre la population et les policiers en mettant en place une occupation permanente par des Unités de Police de Pacification (UPP). Si les conditions de vie dans les favelas s'améliorent, ces nouvelles actions publiques affichent toutefois des résultats contrastés : la recrudescence de confrontations entre policiers et trafiquants dans certaines favelas pacifiées a contribué à renforcer le sentiment d'insécurité des habitants. De plus, le processus de valorisation, voire de gentrification, observé dans certaines favelas pacifiées offrirait à la fois de nouvelles opportunités aux habitants, mais, face à l'augmentation des prix, certains sont contraints à déménager. Plus généralement, l'accélération des transformations urbaines dans le contexte des méga-événements peut bouleverser l'organisation socio-spatiale de la ville (déplacements de population, travaux d'infrastructure de transport, construction d'équipements sportifs, etc.). En s'intéressant plus spécifiquement à deux favelas récemment pacifiées, Rocinha et Vidigal, situées à proximité des quartiers les plus aisés et touristiques de Rio de Janeiro, nous cherchons à mettre en lumière les transformations socio-spatiales et les effets des actions publiques territorialisées. ; Como cidade-sede da Copa do Mundo FIFA em 2014 e dos Jogos Olímpicos em 2016, a municipalidade do Rio de Janeiro procura atender as expectativas internacionais em termos de planejamento urbano e de segurança. No centro das ações publicas se encontram áreas que foram consideradas durante muito tempo como um " problema urbano " : as favelas. Apesar de várias tentativas de erradicação na época da ditadura, especialmente nas áreas mais ricas da cidade, elas multiplicaram-se e são agora objeto de políticas de segurança e urbanização. Para mais eficiência, as políticas públicas se territorializam, e promovem parcerias público-privadas e a participação da sociedade civil. Trata-se da saída das favelas duma situação de exceção através da introdução de normas e amenidades urbanas semelhantes aos bairros formais (infra-estruturas, equipamentos, serviços, etc.). Com índices de criminalidade muito altos, a segurança é um desafio para a cidade. Assim, desde 2008, uma nova política de segurança está sendo implantada : a pacificação, para tentar recuperar territórios dominados por grupos criminosos e melhorar as relações entre a população e a polícia através de uma ocupação permanente das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP). Se as condições de vida nas favelas estão melhorando, essas novas ações públicas, no entanto, mostram resultados contrastados : o aumento de confrontos entre a polícia e traficantes em algumas favelas pacificadas contribuiu para reforçar o sentimento de insegurança dos moradores. Além disso, o processo de valorização até mesmo de gentrificação, observado em algumas favelas pacificadas iria oferecer novas oportunidades para alguns moradores, mas por causa do aumento dos preços, algums deles têm que se remover. Dum modo mais geral, as accelerações das transformações urbanas no contexto dos mega-eventos pode modificar a organização sócio-espacial da cidade (remoções, obras de infra-estrutura de transporte, construção de instalações esportivas, etc.). Centrando-se mais especificamente em duas favelas recentemente pacificadas, Rocinha e Vidigal, localizadas perto das áreas mais ricas e turísticas do Rio de Janeiro, procuramos destacar as transformações sócio-espaciais e os efeitos das ações públicas territorializadas.
As host city of the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and Olympic Games in 2016, municipality of Rio de Janeiro seeks to respond to international expectations in terms of urban planning and security. Favelas, which have often been considered as an « urban problem », are at the heart of the public actions. Despite several eradication attempts during the military dictatorship, especially in wealthy areas of the city, the favelas have increased and are now subject of security and urbanization policies. For efficiency, public policies are rethought in a territorialised way, reinforcing public-private partnerships and the participation of the civil society. It pretends to remove the favelas of a situation of exception by introducing standards and urban amenities similar to formal neighborhoods (infrastructure, equipment, services, etc.). With very high crime rates, security is a challenge for the city. In 2008, the Public Security Secretariat of the State of Rio de Janeiro developed the so-called "pacification" policy, aiming at regaining control of the territories dominated by criminal groups, and at improving relations between the population and the police force, with the establishment of permanent Police Pacification Units (UPP). If the living conditions in the favelas are improving, these new public actions, however, show contrasted results : a new outbreak of confrontations in pacified favelas, between traffickers and police officers has contributed to reinforcing the feeling of insecurity of favelas residents. Moreover, valuation process and even gentrification, observed in some pacified favelas open up new opportunities to residents, but because of the price increase some of them are forced to move away. More generally, acceleration of urban transformations in the context of mega-events could modify the socio- spatial organization of the city (population displacements; transport infrastructure works, sports facilities construction, etc.). Focusing more specifically on two recently pacified favelas, Rocinha and Vidigal, located near wealthiest and most tourist areas of Rio de Janeiro, we seek to highlight the socio- spatial transformations and the effects of territorialised public actions. ; En tant que ville-hôte de la Coupe du Monde de Football en 2014 et des Jeux Olympiques en 2016, la municipalité de Rio de Janeiro tente de répondre aux attentes internationales concernant les enjeux de planification urbaine et de sécurité. Au cœur des actions publiques se trouvent des espaces longtemps considérés comme un « problème urbain » : les favelas. Malgré plusieurs tentatives d'éradication durant la dictature militaire, principalement dans les zones aisées de la ville, elles se sont multipliées et font aujourd'hui l'objet de politiques de sécurisation et d'urbanisation. Pour plus d'efficacité, les politiques publiques se territorialisent, favorisent les partenariats public-privé et la participation de la société civile. Il s'agit de faire sortir les favelas d'une situation d'exception en y introduisant les normes et les aménités urbaines similaires aux quartiers formels (infrastructures, équipements, services, etc.). Avec des taux de criminalité très élevés, la sécurité est un défi posé à la ville. Aussi, depuis 2008, une nouvelle politique de sécurité a été mise en place : la pacification, visant à reprendre le contrôle des territoires dominés par des groupes criminels et à améliorer les rapports entre la population et les policiers en mettant en place une occupation permanente par des Unités de Police de Pacification (UPP). Si les conditions de vie dans les favelas s'améliorent, ces nouvelles actions publiques affichent toutefois des résultats contrastés : la recrudescence de confrontations entre policiers et trafiquants dans certaines favelas pacifiées a contribué à renforcer le sentiment d'insécurité des habitants. De plus, le processus de valorisation, voire de gentrification, observé dans certaines favelas pacifiées offrirait à la fois de nouvelles opportunités aux habitants, mais, face à l'augmentation des prix, certains sont contraints à déménager. Plus généralement, l'accélération des transformations urbaines dans le contexte des méga-événements peut bouleverser l'organisation socio-spatiale de la ville (déplacements de population, travaux d'infrastructure de transport, construction d'équipements sportifs, etc.). En s'intéressant plus spécifiquement à deux favelas récemment pacifiées, Rocinha et Vidigal, situées à proximité des quartiers les plus aisés et touristiques de Rio de Janeiro, nous cherchons à mettre en lumière les transformations socio-spatiales et les effets des actions publiques territorialisées. ; Como cidade-sede da Copa do Mundo FIFA em 2014 e dos Jogos Olímpicos em 2016, a municipalidade do Rio de Janeiro procura atender as expectativas internacionais em termos de planejamento urbano e de segurança. No centro das ações publicas se encontram áreas que foram consideradas durante muito tempo como um " problema urbano " : as favelas. Apesar de várias tentativas de erradicação na época da ditadura, especialmente nas áreas mais ricas da cidade, elas multiplicaram-se e são agora objeto de políticas de segurança e urbanização. Para mais eficiência, as políticas públicas se territorializam, e promovem parcerias público-privadas e a participação da sociedade civil. Trata-se da saída das favelas duma situação de exceção através da introdução de normas e amenidades urbanas semelhantes aos bairros formais (infra-estruturas, equipamentos, serviços, etc.). Com índices de criminalidade muito altos, a segurança é um desafio para a cidade. Assim, desde 2008, uma nova política de segurança está sendo implantada : a pacificação, para tentar recuperar territórios dominados por grupos criminosos e melhorar as relações entre a população e a polícia através de uma ocupação permanente das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP). Se as condições de vida nas favelas estão melhorando, essas novas ações públicas, no entanto, mostram resultados contrastados : o aumento de confrontos entre a polícia e traficantes em algumas favelas pacificadas contribuiu para reforçar o sentimento de insegurança dos moradores. Além disso, o processo de valorização até mesmo de gentrificação, observado em algumas favelas pacificadas iria oferecer novas oportunidades para alguns moradores, mas por causa do aumento dos preços, algums deles têm que se remover. Dum modo mais geral, as accelerações das transformações urbanas no contexto dos mega-eventos pode modificar a organização sócio-espacial da cidade (remoções, obras de infra-estrutura de transporte, construção de instalações esportivas, etc.). Centrando-se mais especificamente em duas favelas recentemente pacificadas, Rocinha e Vidigal, localizadas perto das áreas mais ricas e turísticas do Rio de Janeiro, procuramos destacar as transformações sócio-espaciais e os efeitos das ações públicas territorializadas.
As host city of the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and Olympic Games in 2016, municipality of Rio de Janeiro seeks to respond to international expectations in terms of urban planning and security. Favelas, which have often been considered as an « urban problem », are at the heart of the public actions. Despite several eradication attempts during the military dictatorship, especially in wealthy areas of the city, the favelas have increased and are now subject of security and urbanization policies. For efficiency, public policies are rethought in a territorialised way, reinforcing public-private partnerships and the participation of the civil society. It pretends to remove the favelas of a situation of exception by introducing standards and urban amenities similar to formal neighborhoods (infrastructure, equipment, services, etc.). With very high crime rates, security is a challenge for the city. In 2008, the Public Security Secretariat of the State of Rio de Janeiro developed the so-called "pacification" policy, aiming at regaining control of the territories dominated by criminal groups, and at improving relations between the population and the police force, with the establishment of permanent Police Pacification Units (UPP). If the living conditions in the favelas are improving, these new public actions, however, show contrasted results : a new outbreak of confrontations in pacified favelas, between traffickers and police officers has contributed to reinforcing the feeling of insecurity of favelas residents. Moreover, valuation process and even gentrification, observed in some pacified favelas open up new opportunities to residents, but because of the price increase some of them are forced to move away. More generally, acceleration of urban transformations in the context of mega-events could modify the socio- spatial organization of the city (population displacements; transport infrastructure works, sports facilities construction, etc.). Focusing more specifically on two recently pacified favelas, Rocinha and Vidigal, located near wealthiest and most tourist areas of Rio de Janeiro, we seek to highlight the socio- spatial transformations and the effects of territorialised public actions. ; En tant que ville-hôte de la Coupe du Monde de Football en 2014 et des Jeux Olympiques en 2016, la municipalité de Rio de Janeiro tente de répondre aux attentes internationales concernant les enjeux de planification urbaine et de sécurité. Au cœur des actions publiques se trouvent des espaces longtemps considérés comme un « problème urbain » : les favelas. Malgré plusieurs tentatives d'éradication durant la dictature militaire, principalement dans les zones aisées de la ville, elles se sont multipliées et font aujourd'hui l'objet de politiques de sécurisation et d'urbanisation. Pour plus d'efficacité, les politiques publiques se territorialisent, favorisent les partenariats public-privé et la participation de la société civile. Il s'agit de faire sortir les favelas d'une situation d'exception en y introduisant les normes et les aménités urbaines similaires aux quartiers formels (infrastructures, équipements, services, etc.). Avec des taux de criminalité très élevés, la sécurité est un défi posé à la ville. Aussi, depuis 2008, une nouvelle politique de sécurité a été mise en place : la pacification, visant à reprendre le contrôle des territoires dominés par des groupes criminels et à améliorer les rapports entre la population et les policiers en mettant en place une occupation permanente par des Unités de Police de Pacification (UPP). Si les conditions de vie dans les favelas s'améliorent, ces nouvelles actions publiques affichent toutefois des résultats contrastés : la recrudescence de confrontations entre policiers et trafiquants dans certaines favelas pacifiées a contribué à renforcer le sentiment d'insécurité des habitants. De plus, le processus de valorisation, voire de gentrification, observé dans certaines favelas pacifiées offrirait à la fois de nouvelles opportunités aux habitants, mais, face à l'augmentation des prix, certains sont contraints à déménager. Plus généralement, l'accélération des transformations urbaines dans le contexte des méga-événements peut bouleverser l'organisation socio-spatiale de la ville (déplacements de population, travaux d'infrastructure de transport, construction d'équipements sportifs, etc.). En s'intéressant plus spécifiquement à deux favelas récemment pacifiées, Rocinha et Vidigal, situées à proximité des quartiers les plus aisés et touristiques de Rio de Janeiro, nous cherchons à mettre en lumière les transformations socio-spatiales et les effets des actions publiques territorialisées. ; Como cidade-sede da Copa do Mundo FIFA em 2014 e dos Jogos Olímpicos em 2016, a municipalidade do Rio de Janeiro procura atender as expectativas internacionais em termos de planejamento urbano e de segurança. No centro das ações publicas se encontram áreas que foram consideradas durante muito tempo como um " problema urbano " : as favelas. Apesar de várias tentativas de erradicação na época da ditadura, especialmente nas áreas mais ricas da cidade, elas multiplicaram-se e são agora objeto de políticas de segurança e urbanização. Para mais eficiência, as políticas públicas se territorializam, e promovem parcerias público-privadas e a participação da sociedade civil. Trata-se da saída das favelas duma situação de exceção através da introdução de normas e amenidades urbanas semelhantes aos bairros formais (infra-estruturas, equipamentos, serviços, etc.). Com índices de criminalidade muito altos, a segurança é um desafio para a cidade. Assim, desde 2008, uma nova política de segurança está sendo implantada : a pacificação, para tentar recuperar territórios dominados por grupos criminosos e melhorar as relações entre a população e a polícia através de uma ocupação permanente das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP). Se as condições de vida nas favelas estão melhorando, essas novas ações públicas, no entanto, mostram resultados contrastados : o aumento de confrontos entre a polícia e traficantes em algumas favelas pacificadas contribuiu para reforçar o sentimento de insegurança dos moradores. Além disso, o processo de valorização até mesmo de gentrificação, observado em algumas favelas pacificadas iria oferecer novas oportunidades para alguns moradores, mas por causa do aumento dos preços, algums deles têm que se remover. Dum modo mais geral, as accelerações das transformações urbanas no contexto dos mega-eventos pode modificar a organização sócio-espacial da cidade (remoções, obras de infra-estrutura de transporte, construção de instalações esportivas, etc.). Centrando-se mais especificamente em duas favelas recentemente pacificadas, Rocinha e Vidigal, localizadas perto das áreas mais ricas e turísticas do Rio de Janeiro, procuramos destacar as transformações sócio-espaciais e os efeitos das ações públicas territorializadas.
As host city of the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and Olympic Games in 2016, municipality of Rio de Janeiro seeks to respond to international expectations in terms of urban planning and security. Favelas, which have often been considered as an « urban problem », are at the heart of the public actions. Despite several eradication attempts during the military dictatorship, especially in wealthy areas of the city, the favelas have increased and are now subject of security and urbanization policies. For efficiency, public policies are rethought in a territorialised way, reinforcing public-private partnerships and the participation of the civil society. It pretends to remove the favelas of a situation of exception by introducing standards and urban amenities similar to formal neighborhoods (infrastructure, equipment, services, etc.). With very high crime rates, security is a challenge for the city. In 2008, the Public Security Secretariat of the State of Rio de Janeiro developed the so-called "pacification" policy, aiming at regaining control of the territories dominated by criminal groups, and at improving relations between the population and the police force, with the establishment of permanent Police Pacification Units (UPP). If the living conditions in the favelas are improving, these new public actions, however, show contrasted results : a new outbreak of confrontations in pacified favelas, between traffickers and police officers has contributed to reinforcing the feeling of insecurity of favelas residents. Moreover, valuation process and even gentrification, observed in some pacified favelas open up new opportunities to residents, but because of the price increase some of them are forced to move away. More generally, acceleration of urban transformations in the context of mega-events could modify the socio- spatial organization of the city (population displacements; transport infrastructure works, sports facilities construction, etc.). Focusing more specifically on two recently pacified favelas, Rocinha and Vidigal, located near wealthiest and most tourist areas of Rio de Janeiro, we seek to highlight the socio- spatial transformations and the effects of territorialised public actions. ; En tant que ville-hôte de la Coupe du Monde de Football en 2014 et des Jeux Olympiques en 2016, la municipalité de Rio de Janeiro tente de répondre aux attentes internationales concernant les enjeux de planification urbaine et de sécurité. Au cœur des actions publiques se trouvent des espaces longtemps considérés comme un « problème urbain » : les favelas. Malgré plusieurs tentatives d'éradication durant la dictature militaire, principalement dans les zones aisées de la ville, elles se sont multipliées et font aujourd'hui l'objet de politiques de sécurisation et d'urbanisation. Pour plus d'efficacité, les politiques publiques se territorialisent, favorisent les partenariats public-privé et la participation de la société civile. Il s'agit de faire sortir les favelas d'une situation d'exception en y introduisant les normes et les aménités urbaines similaires aux quartiers formels (infrastructures, équipements, services, etc.). Avec des taux de criminalité très élevés, la sécurité est un défi posé à la ville. Aussi, depuis 2008, une nouvelle politique de sécurité a été mise en place : la pacification, visant à reprendre le contrôle des territoires dominés par des groupes criminels et à améliorer les rapports entre la population et les policiers en mettant en place une occupation permanente par des Unités de Police de Pacification (UPP). Si les conditions de vie dans les favelas s'améliorent, ces nouvelles actions publiques affichent toutefois des résultats contrastés : la recrudescence de confrontations entre policiers et trafiquants dans certaines favelas pacifiées a contribué à renforcer le sentiment d'insécurité des habitants. De plus, le processus de valorisation, voire de gentrification, observé dans certaines favelas pacifiées offrirait à la fois de nouvelles opportunités aux habitants, mais, face à l'augmentation des prix, certains sont contraints à déménager. Plus généralement, l'accélération des transformations urbaines dans le contexte des méga-événements peut bouleverser l'organisation socio-spatiale de la ville (déplacements de population, travaux d'infrastructure de transport, construction d'équipements sportifs, etc.). En s'intéressant plus spécifiquement à deux favelas récemment pacifiées, Rocinha et Vidigal, situées à proximité des quartiers les plus aisés et touristiques de Rio de Janeiro, nous cherchons à mettre en lumière les transformations socio-spatiales et les effets des actions publiques territorialisées. ; Como cidade-sede da Copa do Mundo FIFA em 2014 e dos Jogos Olímpicos em 2016, a municipalidade do Rio de Janeiro procura atender as expectativas internacionais em termos de planejamento urbano e de segurança. No centro das ações publicas se encontram áreas que foram consideradas durante muito tempo como um " problema urbano " : as favelas. Apesar de várias tentativas de erradicação na época da ditadura, especialmente nas áreas mais ricas da cidade, elas multiplicaram-se e são agora objeto de políticas de segurança e urbanização. Para mais eficiência, as políticas públicas se territorializam, e promovem parcerias público-privadas e a participação da sociedade civil. Trata-se da saída das favelas duma situação de exceção através da introdução de normas e amenidades urbanas semelhantes aos bairros formais (infra-estruturas, equipamentos, serviços, etc.). Com índices de criminalidade muito altos, a segurança é um desafio para a cidade. Assim, desde 2008, uma nova política de segurança está sendo implantada : a pacificação, para tentar recuperar territórios dominados por grupos criminosos e melhorar as relações entre a população e a polícia através de uma ocupação permanente das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP). Se as condições de vida nas favelas estão melhorando, essas novas ações públicas, no entanto, mostram resultados contrastados : o aumento de confrontos entre a polícia e traficantes em algumas favelas pacificadas contribuiu para reforçar o sentimento de insegurança dos moradores. Além disso, o processo de valorização até mesmo de gentrificação, observado em algumas favelas pacificadas iria oferecer novas oportunidades para alguns moradores, mas por causa do aumento dos preços, algums deles têm que se remover. Dum modo mais geral, as accelerações das transformações urbanas no contexto dos mega-eventos pode modificar a organização sócio-espacial da cidade (remoções, obras de infra-estrutura de transporte, construção de instalações esportivas, etc.). Centrando-se mais especificamente em duas favelas recentemente pacificadas, Rocinha e Vidigal, localizadas perto das áreas mais ricas e turísticas do Rio de Janeiro, procuramos destacar as transformações sócio-espaciais e os efeitos das ações públicas territorializadas.
As a general rule, criminal defendants whose cases made it to the Supreme Court between 1967 and 1991 must have thought that, as long as Justice Thurgood Marshall occupied one of the nine seats, they had one vote for sure. And Justice Marshall rarely disappointed them – certainly not in cases of any broad constitutional significance. From his votes and opinions, particularly his dissents, many were quick to conclude that the Justice was another of those "bleeding heart liberals," hostile to the mission of law enforcement officers and ready to overlook the gravity of the crimes of which the defendants before him had been convicted. A short conversation with the man would have put any such assumptions to rest. One needed only to sense his pride in his son John's work as a Virginia State Trooper,' his respect for clever but honest prosecutors, or his hostility and contempt for drug traffickers ("dopers" he would call them), to be sure that Justice Marshall had little sympathy for outlaws, and much for those trying to enforce the law. Furthermore, there was no disjunction between the Justice's privately expressed sentiments and public utterances. It is true that many of his criminal procedure opinions, had they become law, might have made it more difficult to convict criminal defendants. His legal positions, however, seem to have been rooted, not in any overarching ideology of limited government, but in an intense awareness, based upon long experience, that those who wield the authority of the state are but human actors. Just as he respected those who exercised this authority with decency and integrity, he sought to ensure that those who did not would not prevail. He was also keenly aware of the humanity of those against whom the forces of the state were arrayed, and he recognized that illegitimate coercion can arise as easily from a suspect's fear of official misconduct as it can from actual misconduct. Justice Marshall's jurisprudence in criminal cases was not merely a product of his own experiences, but what he had learned about the realities of the criminal justice system before taking his seat at the Supreme Court surely informed the approach he took to criminal cases. This was not someone prone to speak in abstract terms about finetuning the scales of justice. While a student at Howard Law School, he participated in one of the earliest clinical programs in criminal law and worked as an assistant to Charles Houston on death penalty cases. When he began a private practice in Baltimore, he took on many criminal cases, and his first appearance before the Supreme Court was in a capital case." The NAACP had, since its inception, waged a campaign against racial inequities in the administration of criminal justice, and Thurgood Marshall played a leading role in this campaign, first at the NAACP and then at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. No one would call him a desk-bound general. Travelling around the country, and especially the deep South, he learned about local law enforcement practices from clients, sheriffs, prosecutors, and judges." While, on at least one occasion, he may narrowly have escaped violence at the hands of police officers, he was also the beneficiary of police work. Later, he often spoke with affection about the Texas Rangers who protected him on some of his trips, and would tell of mobs that sometimes pursued him. Marshall's tenure as Solicitor General may have given him an even greater appreciation of law enforcement interests in criminal cases. Indeed, in one of his few unsuccessful appearances before the Supreme Court, he argued the government's position in Westover v. United States, a companion case to Miranda v. Arizona. lthough Justice Marshall's experiences offered him a unique perspective on the criminal process, the Warren Court's progress before Marshall took the bench somewhat limited his impact as a Justice on this area of the law. By 1967, when Thurgood Marshall became an Associate Justice, the Warren Court had rendered many of the landmark decisions that transformed the constitutional landscape in the area of criminal procedure. Over the previous half dozen years, the Court had decided Mapp v. Ohio, holding that state courts must exclude evidence obtained by unreasonable searches and seizures; Gideon v. Wainwright, establishing the right of indigent defendants to appointed counsel in state criminal proceedings; Massiah v. United States, extending the right to counsel to defendants' encounters with police and police informants after criminal proceedings commence; and Miranda v. Arizona, holding that the police must advise individuals taken into custody, even prior to the commencement of formal proceedings, of their right to remain silent and their right to counsel, and that the police may not interrogate suspects unless they knowingly and voluntarily waive those rights. While the outcome of some of these cases might be traced, directly or indirectly, to the work of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund under Thurgood Marshall's leadership, he played no role as a Justice in deciding them. During the twenty-four years of Thurgood Marshall's tenure, the task of the Court in the area of criminal procedure largely was to fill in a picture whose broad outlines already had been painted. Justice Marshall may have seen his mission as essentially a conservative one: ensuring that the constitutional safeguards that the Court had already announced had meaning in the world he had seen before becoming a Justice – the world where poor and unsophisticated defendants, often victims of societal discrimination, found their fates, and sometimes their lives, placed in the hands of police officers, prosecutors, judges, juries, and even defense lawyers who had yet to heed the Court's ringing calls for equality, fairness, and individual treatment. We aspire to a government of "laws not men," but Marshall understood how bias or misunderstanding could infect a criminal justice system of laws and men. And he understood how individuals would implement, be affected by, or react to the Court's decisions interpreting and applying constitutional provisions. Repeatedly, and, as the years went on, often in dissent, Justice Marshall reminded his brethren of the human interactions at the heart of the criminal process and argued, often unsuccessfully, for a jurisprudence that wo uld limit the ability of human actors to corrupt that process.
In: Raboteg-Šarić, Zora and Bouillet, Dejana and Marinović, Lovorka (2007) Trafficking in the eyes of the youth in Croatia : understanding the problem and prevention possibilities. International Organization for Migration, Zagreb. ISBN 978-953-99721-8-7
Trafficking in human beings includes recruitment, transport, organisation of border-crossing, hiding or receiving persons, by use of threats, force, other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, lies, by abuse of authority or vulnerable position or by giving and receiving money or services in order to obtain consent of the person who has control over another person. Trafficking in human beings exists on all continents and in a great number of states. The lack of knowledge and data about human trafficking among the children and young people as well as among the wider public leads to the prevailing opinion that such things happen somewhere else, outside our country, which is, in fact of benefit to persons involved in the human trafficking chain and their criminal activities. Even though Croatia was until recently just a transit country in the human trafficking chain, today it has been documented that it is also a destination country, as well as a country where the human trafficking victims are being recruited. Children and young people belong to a group which is especially exposed to the risk of victimisation in the human trafficking chain. High school students are a vulnerable group because they will soon face the decision whether to enter the labour market or continue their education, and in the process many will start living independently outside their permanent place of residence. Therefore, the publication entitled " Human Trafficking in the Eyes of the Youth in Croatia – Understanding the Problem and Prevention Possibilities" is dedicated to the trafficking in children and young people as a special segment of trafficking in human beings. It includes the presentation of the problem from the professional and scientific point of view. The introductory part presents definitions and main features of the human trafficking problem with special emphasis on more important international documents related to the subject. It also includes an overview and explanation of forms, methods and causes of human trafficking as well as possible risks. It further deals with the perception of the problem of trafficking in human beings in Croatia. A larger part of the publication includes an overview and explanation of forms, methods and causes of trafficking in children as well as an analysis of results of a research conducted by the International Organization for Migration in cooperation with the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports in 2004. The goals of the mentioned research were to learn what level of information Croatian high school students have about the problem of trafficking in human beings, to get information about their experience and views on human trafficking and to assess their awareness of the risk to become human trafficking victims themselves. The research was conducted with the purpose of contributing to preparations for systematic youth education about possible risks and manners of protection from trafficking in human beings as anticipated by the National Plan for the Supression of Trafficking in Persons in the Republic of Croatia. The study consisted of a survey on the subject and the organisation of focus groups. The survey was based on a questionnaire put together in a special way, with 35 questions, many of which included additional questions, the Likert-type rating scales or a series of proposed answers. Questions were related to the respondents' socio-demographic characteristics, high school students' plans for their professional future, value systems, their attitudes about the roles of men and women in the society, their reactions in hypothetic violent situations in relationships, their general level of information on trafficking in human beings, their sources of information on human trafficking and their attitudes towards human trafficking and the victims of trafficking. The qualitative part of the study was conducted by organising 14 focus groups which included students from 10 high schools, two students' homes and one youth club. The participants in focus groups answered the following questions: How would you define human trafficking? Give an example or describe an occasion when you heard about human trafficking! What are, in your opinion, basic ways in which someone becomes a trafficking victim? What rights are human trafficking victims deprived of most? Do you think that you personally could become a victim of trafficking in human beings and why? What ways and means do you propose for the fight against human trafficking? Altogether 950 high school students of both genders from 25 municipalities/towns in Croatia took part in the survey. The average age of participants in the survey was 16, 6 years. The total of 275 high school students participated in focus groups. Most focus groups participants were 17 years old. The sample had approximately the same number of high school students of each gender. The survey was conducted on a representative sample and qualitative part of the study on an occasional sample. The survey produced numerous interesting results, and the results obtained in focus groups have been largely confirmed by the survey. The results show that a majority of the young have heard of the problem of trafficking in human beings with the purpose of their exploitation. Students attending high schools in Zagreb and surroundings and Dalmatia have above-average knowledge about the problem of trafficking in people. In the regions of Slavonia and Istria, North Coast and Gorski kotar, students' knowledge about the problem is close to the average, and in the Northern Croatia, the Lika, Kordun and Banovina regions, their knowledge is bellow-average. The young from bigger towns are somewhat better informed about the problem of trafficking in human beings than the young from smaller towns. Students of three-year vocational schools are considerably less informed about the problem than students attending four-year college-preparatory schools (gymnasiums) and four-year vocational schools. A little bit more than half of the respondents believe that trafficking in human beings in Croatia is not very prominent. Girls and older students see the problem as being more serious than boys and younger students do. Asked whether there have been any cases of human trafficking in the community where they live, 6, 7 percent of participants in the survey answered affirmatively ; the young from bigger towns have more often heard of such cases. Most students were informed about the problem of trafficking in human beings through television programmes and newspaper articles. A considerably smaller number of young people have learned about it thorough posters, brochures and various promotion materials. Approximately every fifth participant in the survey learned about human trafficking trough Internet, from friends, acquaintances, parents or at school. The level of information on human trafficking possessed by students attending gymnasiums and four-year vocational schools is above-average, whereas it is bellow-average among students of three-year vocational school. The respondents whose information about human trafficking comes from several sources (the media, school, parents or other family members) have a more complete understanding of the problem. The largest number of high school students that have been surveyed holds the traffickers and their desire for profit, as well as the lack of knowledge and information about real risks of human trafficking responsible for this phenomenon. High school students see causes for trafficking in human beings in inadequate legislation and poor moral values. Girls and students attending gymnasiums agree more often than boys and students attending vocational schools with the claim that ignorance and the lack of information about real risks should be blamed for the trafficking in women with the purpose of sexual exploitation. A special risk of youth victimisation results from their wish to become independent and find employment. Our survey has shown that as many as two thirds of high school students agree with the opinion that a lot of money can be easily earned in other states, and just as many of them would feel quite safe if they would be offered a job abroad by someone they know well. At the same time, more than a fourth of students demonstrated unrealistic expectations related to the possibility of legitimate employment abroad, and expressed their belief that they would easily get work permit once they have already arrived in other country. Young people have most faith in information about certain job offers coming from their close relatives and information received through legitimate employment agencies. It is, however, significant that as many as 15, 7 percent of students would accept any job under the condition that it is well paid, and 16 percent of students would accept a job even when they are not well informed about employment conditions and the employer. At the same time, approximately two fifths of the participants would like to move to some other state for a longer period of time. Students who give more importance to entertainment, money and career success have a stronger wish to migrate. Generally, the results show that males, students attending vocational schools and students of lower grades are more inclined to underestimate the risk of becoming victims of trafficking in human beings. They also more often have views and convictions due to which they may be inclined to high-risk behaviour and they have smaller capacity to face negative influences and manipulation attempts of human traffickers. The fact that the knowledge about the risks of trafficking in people is very uneven can be also seen from the data showing that not a single respondent was aware of all aspects of human trafficking ; they had knowledge just of some of its aspects. As possible ways of victimisation, the respondents (mainly participants in focus groups) recognised abduction, poverty, the search for employment, allurement (with false job offers predominating), risky behaviour of potential victims, the trade in children, but also wider social conditions in the states from which victims originate (like poverty, unemployment, lack of respect for human rights etc.). The possibility of victimisation through offered marriage proposals and intimate relationship has been recognised by a disturbingly small number of respondents. The results have also shown that many respondents place the problem of trafficking in human beings in the " third world" countries, whereas they see the possibility of victimisation in Croatia as negligible and unlikely. Majority of the young believe that they could never become victims of human trafficking (because the trafficking is not present in Croatia, because they are cautious, because they keep in good company etc.), yet there is a considerable number of those who think that the possibility exists. Among them, most think that they could become victims because they have not been sufficiently informed about possible difficulties and risks related to the search for employment abroad. Therefore, the fact that about approximately half of the young wish to learn more about human trafficking through some form of school education is not surprising. The requirement for information about concrete examples is especially marked, as well as information about the real extent of trafficking in human beings in our society. There is also a need for effective models of protection against trafficking in human beings. Another requirement is for providing potential victims with information of better quality about legal possibilities of employment abroad. A special group of answers comprises answers which propose that more attention be paid to trafficking in people by the media, including promotional videos, advertisements and thematic leaflets. The respondents have also recognised the need for introducing different security measures into the society (stricter punishments for perpetrators of this criminal act, stricter border control, greater police presence in the streets, higher-quality work of security services, fight against corruption etc.). It is interesting that almost half of the students propose that customers seeking prostitutes be punished as they see them as the cause of the problem. Some of the respondents spoke of the need for a wider social action, including greater respect for human rights, work towards the change of views such as the conviction that the money and wealth are the only paths towards satisfaction and happiness, encouragement of citizens' activism, renovation of the youth gathering places (sports grounds) and schools. They also spoke of the need that basic causes of human trafficking be removed. In the final part of the publication the authors propose different models of education of young people on trafficking in human beings aimed at reducing the risks of their victimisation. The proposed models include, at the girst level, special informative lectures for school classes, according to pre-designed protocol, as well as wide distribution of educational material in high schools. At the second level, additional education of some of the professors is also proposed, together with a further development of preventive programs focused on the development of identity and competence of young people, including providing support for their development which implies cooperation between system of education and other youth-oriented support systems in local communities. The third level of education aimed at preventing the trafficking in human beings includes a wide education on human rights, the encouragement of young people to actively participate in the development of their own social context and, in particular, the development of such an educational and wider social framework in which human rights in general will be promoted and protected to the greatest extent possible.
La trata de personas frente a la política migratoria y de atención a víctimas en Colombia, como factor de afectación del principio de la dignidad humana, no resulta ser un tema sencillo de analizar, pues desde el punto de vista jurídico, son muchas las apreciaciones y derivaciones que pueden llegar a identificarse pero donde son los derechos humanos lo que mayor vulneración presentan, dada la incapacidad de reconocer por parte de las autoridades, las redes de tratantes que operan dentro y fuera del país. De conformidad con el artículo 188a del Código Penal colombiano, la trata de personas se define como: "la captación, traslado, acogida o recibimiento de una persona, dentro del territorio nacional o hacia el exterior, con fines de explotación", una situación de gran complejidad que compromete los derechos de mujeres, niños, niñas y adolescentes que por su misma situación de vulnerabilidad, se convierten en blanco fácil para las redes, sometiéndolas a ejercer trabajo forzados y denigrantes a razón de un pago irrisorio por los servicios ofrecidos. Adicionalmente, el artículo 3 de la Ley 985 de 2005 hace mención de la explotación como: "la obtención de algún provecho económico o cualquier otro beneficio para sí o para otra persona, mediante la explotación de la prostitución ajena u otras formas de explotación sexual, los trabajos o servicios forzados, la esclavitud o las prácticas análogas a la esclavitud, la servidumbre, la explotación de la mendicidad ajena, el matrimonio servil, la extracción de órganos u otras formas de explotación". Cada uno de estos lineamientos se constipen en la base jurídica de la cual deben partir todas las investigaciones en torno al tema de la trata de personas en Colombia, pero donde tristemente las víctimas la perciben en muchas de las ocasiones, como una oportunidad laboral que les permite percibir un ingreso y por lo tanto atender diligentemente las necesidades de sus familias y las propias. Se trata en este caso de personas que no solamente han sido desprotegidas por el Estado, sino que involucra a grupos de migrantes dentro de un movimiento social que viene caracterizando a muchas regiones y territorios, marcados por la situación social de sus países, las escasas oportunidades laborales, sociales y económicas, la situación política y formas de gobierno, así como la búsqueda de mejores ingresos. Esta misma necesidad, ha llevado a grupos de migrantes provenientes de Venezuela, de África, Haití, e incluso de Cuba, a refugiarse en el país bien sea con el ánimo de mejorar su seguridad y atención, o como simplemente para hacer tránsito hacia países como los Estados Unidos donde confían alcanzar un asilo, tener un empleo digno y mejorar económicamente dado que en sus países de origen la situación social, económica y de seguridad no les ofrece mayores garantías. No obstante, esta condición de vulnerabilidad de los migrantes se convierte en una oportunidad para aquellas redes de trata de personas que se han establecido dentro y fuera del país con el ánimo de aprovechar la vulnerabilidad de las personas, persuadiéndolas para hacer parte de ellas, bajo engaños y falsas promesas económicas que les genera mayor estabilidad, pero que posteriormente se convierten en amenazas cuando las víctimas se niegan a continuar, lo que se constituye en una clara afectación de los derechos y de principios como la dignidad humana. Hay que tener en cuenta que en muchas de las ocasiones, las víctimas terminan aceptando las condiciones porque no se les cohíbe o limita y porque además los pagos de los líderes de estas redes, resultan ser acordes con sus aspiraciones, pero lo triste en este caso, es que pueden ser los niños, niñas y adolescentes los más perjudicados por cuanto se les imprime temor, se les tortura y amenaza de manera directa, llevándolos a aceptar las condiciones de explotación sexual, laboral y servidumbre, propias de este tipo de delitos. El desconocimiento general que existe frente al tema, permite de alguna manera, la profundización temática, vista desde le análisis de la normatividad existente, cuyo punto de partida se da desde la Constitución Política del año 1991 en el caso colombiano, pero que no desconoce las normas internacionales dispuestas en el marco de la protección y defensa de los derechos humanos y donde el derecho penal tiene injerencia por tratarse de delitos que vulneran e irrespetan la dignidad humana. De esta manera, se analiza el delito de la trata de personas frente a la política migratoria y de atención a víctimas en Colombia como factor de afectación del principio de la dignidad humana, reflejando la realidad actual de las migraciones en Colombia y del delito de la trata de persona en Colombia, señalando la regulación constitucional, jurisprudencial y doctrinal en torno a política migratoria y de atención a víctimas de trata de personas en Colombia, fundamentados en la teoría aplicable al delito analizado. ; Trafficking in persons in the face of migratory policy and care for victims in Colombia, as a factor that affects the principle of human dignity, is not an easy topic to analyze, since from the legal point of view, there are many assessments and referrals that can be identified but where human rights are the ones that present the greatest violation, given the inability of the authorities to recognize the networks of traffickers that operate inside and outside the country. In accordance with article 188a of the Colombian Penal Code, human trafficking is defined as: "the recruitment, transfer, harboring or reception of a person, within the national territory or abroad, for the purpose of exploitation", a situation of great complexity that compromises the rights of women, children and adolescents who, due to their very situation of vulnerability, become an easy target for the networks, subjecting them to forced and demeaning labor at the rate of a derisory payment for the services offered. Additionally, article 3 of Law 985 of 2005 mentions exploitation as: "obtaining some economic advantage or any other benefit for oneself or for another person, through the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices analogous to slavery, servitude, exploitation of the begging of others, servile marriage, the removal of organs or other forms of exploitation. Each of these guidelines are established in the legal basis from which all investigations on the subject of human trafficking in Colombia must start, but where sadly the victims perceive it on many occasions, as a job opportunity that they It allows them to receive an income and therefore diligently attend to the needs of their families and their own. In this case, it is about people who have not only been unprotected by the State, but also involves groups of migrants within a social movement that has been characterizing many regions and territories, marked by the social situation of their countries, the scarce opportunities labor, social and economic, the political situation and forms of government, as well as the search for better income. ; Magister en Derecho Penal y Procesal Penal ; Maestría
In the armed conflicts of Guatemala, Peru and Colombia, paramilitary groups were created to fight the guerrillas and also to prevent the mobilization of the social sectors interested in transforming the established social order. In these countries, different circumstances led to the official deactivation of paramilitary structures.Guatemala's paramilitary groups (PAC) were established by the state in the early 1980s and were formally demobilized in 1996 after the signing of peace agreements between the government and the guerrilla group URNG. In Peru, the peasant rounds were created in the south-central cordillera during the 1980s. In 2003, after the fall of President Fujimori, the Peruvian state ceases to motivate the organization of these armed groups. In Colombia, paramilitary groups were promoted during the 1980s by various actors, including regional elites, militaries and drug traffickers. In 2003, these armed groups signed a peace agreement with the government of President Uribe, in which they pledge to surrender arms and begin a gradual process of demobilization.Despite the aforementioned processes to disable paramilitaries, those groups continue to exist. Thus, it is relevant to ask whether these structures are still a form of paramilitarism and to identify the reasons why they are still present. In order to answer these questions, the main research objective is to analyze, from a comparative perspective, the transformation processes of PAC, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitaries from the moment when the respective States took the official decision to disable these groups. This work is developed in three chapters.The first chapter compares the emergence of the paramilitary groups studied. From this comparative perspective and using certain elements of the systemic and the structuralist functionalist approaches, I propose a theoretical conceptualization of the paramilitary phenomenon. According to this conceptualization, the main function of paramilitarism in the three study cases is the protection of the threatened social order.The second chapter examines the processes that led to the official deactivation of paramilitarism in the three countries. To this end, we compare the conditions under which the respective armed conflicts ended, the context in which each State took the decision to disable the paramilitary and the different Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes.The third chapter compares the transformation of PACs, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitaries after their official deactivation.The research is based on the comparative method. For each chapter, comparison variables are constructed. The main sources of information are, first, a bibliographic review on the theoretical conceptualization of paramilitarism, the armed conflicts of the respective countries and the origin and evolution of the studied groups. Secondly, a study of the online press about the recent activities of the PACs, peasant rounds and Colombian paramilitary groups to analyze the current characteristics these groups.Finally, the comparative analysis of the emergence of paramilitarism in Guatemala, Peru and Colombia leads to the conclusion that the existence of a social order perceived as threatened is the core element to explain the creation of those armed structures. The main objective is not to fight guerrilla, but to protect the social order. As a result, the persistence of a situation in which the social order or the status quo is still considered "in danger" explains the persistence of paramilitarism. Thus, the structures that currently exist in Guatemala and Colombia are, indeed, a form of paramilitarism, unlike Peru. ; Dans les conflits armés du Guatemala, du Pérou et de Colombie, des groupes paramilitaires ont été créés afin de lutter contre les guérillas et aussi d'empêcher la mobilisation des secteurs sociaux intéressés à transformer l'ordre social établi. Dans ces pays, différentes circonstances ont mené à la désactivation officielle des structures paramilitaires.Les groupes paramilitaires du Guatemala (PAC) ont été créés par l'État au début des années 80 et ont été officiellement démobilisés en 1996, après la signature des accords de paix entre le gouvernement et la guérilla URNG. Au Pérou, les rondes paysannes ont été créées dans la cordillère sud-centrale au cours des années 1980. En 2003, après la chute du Fujimori, l'État péruvien cesse de motiver l'organisation de ces groupes. En Colombie, les groupes paramilitaires ont été promus pendant les années 80 par différents acteurs, parmi lesquels figuraient les élites régionales, l'armée et les narcotrafiquants. En 2003, ces groupes armés ont signé un accord de paix avec le gouvernement du président Uribe, dans lequel ils s'engagent à remettre les armes et à commencer un processus progressif de démobilisation.Même si au Guatemala, au Pérou et en Colombie, des processus pour désactiver les groupes paramilitaires ont été mis en place, ceux-ci continuent d'exister. Ainsi, il est pertinent de se demander si ces structures sont encore une forme de paramilitarisme et d'identifier les raisons pour lesquelles elles sont toujours présentes. En vue de répondre à cette question, l'objectif principal de recherche est d'analyser depuis une perspective comparative les processus de transformation des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens à partir du moment où les États respectifs prennent la décision officielle de désactiver ces groupes. Ce travail est développé en trois chapitres.Le premier chapitre compare l'émergence des groupes paramilitaires étudiés. A partir de cette perspective comparative et en utilisant certains éléments des approches systémique et structurelle fonctionnaliste, nous élaborons une conceptualisation théorique du phénomène paramilitaire. Selon cette conceptualisation, la fonction principale du paramilitarisme dans les trois cas d'étude est la protection de l'ordre social menacé.Le deuxième chapitre étudie les processus qui ont conduit à la désactivation officielle du paramilitarisme dans les trois pays analysés. À cette fin, nous comparons les conditions dans lesquelles se sont terminés les conflits armés respectifs, le contexte où chaque État a pris la décision de désactiver le paramilitarisme et les processus de Désarmement, de Démobilisation et de Réintégration (DDR).Le troisième chapitre compare la transformation des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens après leur désactivation officielle.La recherche se base sur la méthode comparative. Pour chaque chapitre, des variables de comparaison sont construites. Les sources d'information principales sont, premièrement, une révision bibliographique sur la conceptualisation théorique du paramilitarisme, les conflits armés et l'origine et l'évolution des PAC, des rondes paysannes et des paramilitaires colombiens. Deuxièmement, l'analyse des caractéristiques actuelles des groupes étudiés se base principalement sur une étude de presse on line.L'analyse comparative de l'émergence du paramilitarisme au Guatemala, au Pérou et en Colombie permet de conclure que l'existence d'un ordre social perçu comme menacé est à l'origine de la création de structures armées dont la fonction principale n'est pas de lutter contre la guérilla, mais la protection de cet ordre social. En conséquence, la persistance d'un contexte dans lequel l'ordre social ou le statu quo sont toujours considérés en danger est l'élément qui explique la poursuite du paramilitarisme. Ainsi, les structures qui existent actuellement au Guatemala et en Colombie sont, en effet, une forme de paramilitarisme, à la différence du Pérou.
In: Population and development review, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 188-189
ISSN: 1728-4457
In his September 2002 report to the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary‐General Kofi Annan identified migration as a priority issue for the international community. Subsequent initiatives prompted by the UN resulted, in December 2003, in the formation of a Global Commission on International Migration. This independent body has three mandates: to bring international migration issues to the top of the global agenda, to analyze shortcomings in approaches to international migration and examine inter‐linkages with other issue‐areas, and to make practical recommendations for how to manage international migration more effectively. Remarks made by Kofi Annan at the launching of the Commission in Geneva were amplified in an address he gave to the European Parliament in Brussels on 29 January 2004 upon receiving the Andrei Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Simultaneously a brief article covering the themes in that address, signed by Kofi Annan, was released by the Secretary‐General's office for publication in leading newspapers throughout Europe. The full text of this article (http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/sg‐29jan2004.htm) is reproduced below.The article presents a number of propositions about international migration, with special reference to Europe, that tend to be taken for granted in discussions of the subject in international forums. Perhaps because of the article's brevity, the propositions are stated in strikingly unqualified form. Europe needs migrants. Immigration will enrich and strengthen European countries; the alternative is accepting declining living standards and social division‐‐a meaner, weaker, older Europe. In the absence of migration, jobs would go unfilled and services undelivered. Immigration cannot be controlled: closing the door would not only harm Europe's long‐term economic and social prospects, it would drive more and more people to come in through the back door. Such propositions, far from being axiomatic, are of course highly controversial. A fuller examination of them is presumably part of the Global Commission's remit.One of the biggest tests for the enlarged European Union, in the years and decades to come, will be how it manages the challenge of immigration. If European societies rise to this challenge, immigration will enrich and strengthen them. If they fail to do so, the result may be declining living standards and social division. There can be no doubt that European societies need immigrants. Europeans are living longer and having fewer children. Without immigration, the population of the soon‐to‐be twenty‐five Member States of the EU will drop, from about 450 million now to under 400 million in 2050. The EU is not alone in this. Japan, the Russian Federation and South Korea, among others, face similar possible futures‐where jobs would go unfilled and services undelivered, as economies shrink and societies stagnate. Immigration alone will not solve these problems, but it is an essential part of any solution.We can be sure that people from other continents will go on wanting to come and live in Europe. In today's unequal world, vast numbers of Asians and Africans lack the opportunities for self improvement that most Europeans take for granted. It is not surprising that many of them see Europe as a land of opportunity, in which they long to begin a new life‐just as the potential of the new world once attracted tens of millions of impoverished but enterprising Europeans. All countries have the right to decide whether to admit voluntary migrants (as op‐posed to bona fide refugees, who have a right to protection under international law). But Europeans would be unwise to close their doors. That would not only harm their long‐term economic and social prospects. It would also drive more and more people to try and come in through the back door‐by asking for political asylum (thus overloading a system designed to protect refugees who have fled in fear of persecution), or by seeking the help of smugglers, often risking death or in‐jury in clandestine acts of desperation on boats, trucks, trains and planes. Illegal immigration is a real problem, and States need to cooperate in their efforts to stop it‐especially in cracking down on smugglers and traffickers whose organized crime networks exploit the vulnerable and subvert the rule of law. But combating illegal immigration should be part of a much broader strategy. Countries should provide real channels for legal immigration, and seek to harness its benefits, while safeguarding the basic human rights of migrants. Poor countries can also benefit from migration. Migrants sent at least $88 billion to developing countries in remittances during 2002‐54% more than the $57 billion those countries received in development aid.Migration is therefore an issue in which all countries have a stake‐and which demands greater international cooperation. The recently established Global Commission on International Migration, co‐chaired by distinguished public figures from Sweden and South Africa, can help to establish international norms and better policies to manage migration in the interest of all. I am confident that it will come up with good ideas, and I hope they will win support, from countries that "send" migrants as well as those that receive them. Managing migration is not only a matter of opening doors and joining hands internationally. It also requires each country to do more to integrate new arrivals. Immigrants must adjust to their new societies and societies need to adjust too. Only with an imaginative strategy for integrating immigrants can countries ensure that they enrich the host society more than they unsettle it. While each country will approach this is‐sue according to its own character and culture, no one should lose sight of the tremendous contribution that millions of immigrants have already made to modern European societies. Many have become leaders in government, science, academia, sports and the arts. Others are less famous but play an equally vital role. Without them, many health systems would be short‐staffed, many parents would not have the home help they need to pursue careers, and many jobs that provide services and generate revenue would go unfilled. Immigrants are part of the solution, not part of the problem. All who are committed to Europe's future, and to human dignity, should therefore take a stand against the tendency to make immigrants the scapegoats for social problems. The vast majority of immigrants are industrious, courageous, and determined. They don't want a free ride. They want a fair opportunity for themselves and their families. They are not criminals or terrorists. They are law‐abiding. They don't want to live apart. They want to integrate, while retaining their identity. In this twenty‐first century, migrants need Europe. But Europe also needs migrants. A closed Europe would be a meaner, poorer, weaker, older Europe. An open Europe will be a fairer, richer, stronger, younger Europe‐provided Europe manages immigration well.
This paper examines the relationship between narcotics trafficking and violence in Central America. The first part of the paper addresses particular questions posed for the 2011 World Development Report and examines several competing hypothesis on the drivers of crime in Central America. A key finding is that areas exposed to intense narcotics trafficking in Central America suffer from higher homicide rates. Drug trafficking has corrupted state institutions, which have been overwhelmed by the resources deployed by trafficking organizations. The second part of the paper reviews the reasons drug trafficking and anti trafficking enforcement are associated with violence in general and consider policy options.
THE USE OF NATURALLY OCCURRING MOOD- altering substances is deeply rooted in the traditions and cultures of many communities worldwide. As documented in other societies and historical records,1,2 various compounds have been employed for altering consciousness and for their curative effects.3 Two substances traditionally used in the Middle East include hashish and khat.4 Hashish, as cannabis, has been known in the region since ancient times.5 Khat, also known as chat, derived from the leaves and young shoots of the khat plant (Catha edulis), is used for its stimulant effect.6 Technological advances that enable high purification of drugs and transporting them fast, and increasing urbanisation, have caused these mood altering substances to be taken out of their traditional role in societies and have come to pose new, complex and challenging threats.7 These threats have been manifested in two important ways: () wider use of drugs, and (2) a shift from natural drugs to the more potent purer forms. Globally, illegal money derived from illicit drug transactions amounts to 400 billion dollars annually, and is second only to the arms trade.8,9 The countries of the Arabian Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) offers an interesting study area because their diverse cultures have experienced rapid acculturation, a phenomenon often equated with a rise in psychosocial stress.10 Psychosocial stress has often been associated with vulnerability to self poisoning11 and substance abuse.12 Although there are no adequate statistical studies to indicate the incidence of substance dependency in the GCC, it is clear that substance abuse is not a minor problem considering the number of reported drug seizures by the authorities.13 In real terms, the drugs seized by law enforcement authorities constitute only 5–0 percent of the actual quantity.14 Comprehensive data on the pattern of substance dependency is hampered by the criminal and moral stigma associated with substance dependency. Whatever the real number of people afflicted with addiction, substance dependency is a severe problem when considered in terms of personal distress, family disruption and interference with productivity and economic growth. Efforts have been undertaken in GCC countries to reduce the demand for drugs and to prevent drug abuse before it occurs. These efforts are coordinated through the Demand Reduction Committee, created in 200 with members from all countries of the GCC. The committee provides leadership in coordinating and facilitating strategies in this area including law enforcement, rehabilitation and leading and assisting the community in the task of education and prevention of substance abuse. Some studies have suggested that substance dependency occurs in adolescents in all strata of the society.14–16 However, these studies are limited to self-report questionnaires based on secondary school students. Although peer pressure is likely to play a significant part in the initiation of substance abuse,16 the subsequent heavy abuse is often associated with various psychosocial factors. It has been suggested that of all the social factors that predispose individuals to substance abuse, boredom is the most significant.14,17 The recent affluence and modernisation of the GCC societies have led many people to have a lot of spare time, as household chores are carried out by expatriate servants.14 The detrimental effects of such a lifestyle, including substance dependency, have been speculated in the literature.13,18–21 In a study cited by Al-Harthi14 of personality profiles and descriptive analyses of typical substance users enrolled in a treatment centre in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the most frequently stated reason for indulging in drugs was to escape boredom. This view, though substantiated by other studies in the region,22,23 has not taken into account the relationship of individual temperament to substance abuse. Recent studies have suggested that phenotypical "risk takers" or "sensation seekers" are often not inhibited from yielding to various illicit practices including substance abuse.24 Future studies in the region should examine the association between personality types, risk taking behaviour and boredom. The premise that the rise in substance dependency might be precipitated by erosion of traditional family networks and skewed social expectations might be relevant to GCC countries. Al-Hashmi18 has suggested that modernisation has resulted in the Omani family becoming nuclear at the cost of the traditional extended family. Concurrently, domestic servants brought from overseas, often illiterate in the dominant language, are providing much of the socialisation to children. Reinforced by frequent international travelling, satellite televisions and the Internet, acculturation appears to have occurred too quickly in GCC societies. Smith has remarked that these changes have brought these communities development that took a thousand years in Europe in less than 20 years.25 Studies from other parts of the world that have experienced similar rapid pace of modernisation have shown disintegration of native culture and identity as well as dissolution of the social network, to which individuals had previously turned for help when in trouble.26 In addition, the spread of education have resulted in higher levels of expectations. In the new social order, individuals in the region tend to regard employment opportunities, guaranteed higher levels of income, and especially, higher social standing, as acquired rights. Frustration of the desire to climb the social ladder leads to social insecurity.14 The present situation of society in transition fits with the classical sociological observations of Ibn Khaldun and Emile Durkheim: rapid transformation leads to breakdown of traditional social cohesion.14As a result, the sense of belonging becomes a luxury, leading to social drift, alienation, and the proliferation of social misfits. The society itself may become anomic. The relationship between acculturation, anomie and drug taking has received empirical support.27 The present tendency is to view substance abuse in its psychosocial context rather than on moral terms. While more studies that are comprehensive are needed to examine the pattern of use and misuse of drugs in the GCC countries, there are various reasons to assume that substance dependency is likely to continue to pose a problem in the region. First, the geography helps both trafficking and consumption. GCC countries are located close to the "Golden Triangle" or "Drug Belt", a part of Asia where underdevelopment and political instability have fuelled drug driven economies. Second, being on a major route for international airlines and sea routes by virtue of being in the middle of the world, GCC countries are at constant risk of being used as trans-shipment points for drug trafficking. The Arabian Peninsula has a vast coastline with its horizon overlooking major sea routes to different continents. Even if vigilance to guard its borders is heightened, such a long coastline would remain porous. Moreover, effective surveillance would require more allocation of resources and work force, drawing vital resources away from establishing essential remedial and rehabilitation services for the victims of substance abuse. Thirdly, the increasing number of visitors and the presence of foreign labour in the GCC also help make the "Gulf route" a crossroad for trans-world drug supplies. Some individuals may fall prey to the fallouts from these passing illegal shipments even though they may be destined elsewhere. It is also possible that an increase in consumption of illicit substances among the local population has in itself escalated the demand. In support of the latter view are the rising statistics on the mortality related to drug abuse and the number of clients seeking treatment in rehabilitation centres in the GCC states.15,28 Dispensing accurate information on issues related to substance abuse is a key component to fighting drug abuse. Studies are needed to illuminate the effect of substance dependency in the GGC countries as the mass media often tends to downplay the risks of drug use, or sometimes even glamorises it. Evidence is emerging on the personal consequences of substance dependency. Okasha, in the context of Egypt, has demonstrated that substance dependency is likely to lead to underachievement at school or work and exacerbate family stress, financial burdens and exposure to criminal activity.29 However, literature does not discern whether these social problems are the cause or the effect of the substance dependency. Substance dependency is often associated with psychiatric morbidity30 but it is not clear whether this is cause or effect. Karam et al in their report from Lebanon suggest a strong relationship between addiction to substances of abuse and psychiatric diagnoses.31 These authors further suggest that certain personality types often abuse specific substances. However, such a simplistic view appears to be merely reiterating the chicken-or-the-egg argument. Some authors have suggested that substance dependency is a form of self-medication, which implies that individuals with substance dependency have high levels of psychosocial distress and use illicit drugs in an attempt to alleviate their distress. This is relevant to the suggestion that some psychiatric symptoms may mimic withdrawal effects of chronic substance dependency and withdrawal symptomatology co-varies with cognitive and psychological functioning.32 In addition to psychiatric illness, substance dependency has been seen to increase the risk of adverse drug reactions. A well-known complication of substance dependency is the risk of transmission of human immunodeficiency virus and other infections.33 VISIBLE PATTERNS IN THE GCC The discovery of oil in the GCC has brought rapid modernisation as well as unprecedented material progress and economic security.34 Although GCC nationals, like other cultural groups in developing countries, are thought to have beliefs that protect them against developing substance dependency, such beliefs appear to be eroding with the rising tide of acculturation and economic restructuring. Demographic factors such as the preponderance of adolescents in the population will continue to elude those advocating demand reduction policies even if harsher penalties are decreed for traffickers and users. Approximately 60% of the population in the region are less than 20 years old.35 As reported elsewhere, 36 adolescents are prone to risk taking behaviour, a temperament that has been associated with developmental milestones including the underdevelopment of the orbital-frontal cortex.34 In GCC countries, the rate of juvenile delinquency has, in a span of 0 years, increased approximately by 400%. Unless the needs of such a large and important segment of society as its young people are addressed, this may present a demographic time-bomb with unpredictable social consequences. With a fast growing population, competitions for social and occupational roles are likely to be more intense, leaving many failed individuals behind. With such a demographic trend, it is likely that many individuals carry a greater risk of developing various adjustment difficulties including substance dependency.37 Data emanating from other developing countries suggest that drug peddlers tend to target the poor and the unemployed. Whereas substance dependency in other parts of the world is often associated with economic and social breakdown,38 no study has examined whether substance dependency in the GCC countries follows the same pattern.39 Preliminary observations in Oman suggest that there is relationship between unemployment and propensity for substance abuse.14 Interestingly, the study suggests that addiction to illicit drugs is likely to interfere with employment, often rendering some individuals to lose their jobs. In the midst of such conflicting views, further studies are needed to ascertain the conditions that trigger drug dependency in the community.40 While more information is needed in order to make an informed policy on substance dependency, there is some evidence pointing to which substances are widely abused in GCC countries. First, clinical reports suggest that solvent misuse is extensive although no formal studies have been conducted. Hafeiz41 has suggested that abuse of solvents often occurs in order to overcome the boredom of modern living. There is also increasing evidence to suggest that some of these agents cause mental disorders42 as well as neurological complications.43 The chemicals in question include glues, liquid shoe polish, deodoriser, petrol, cologne and insecticides.44,45 A special pattern of substance dependency associated with social deviancy and delinquency also involves a home-made mixture of dates and ointments as well as inhalation of intoxicating fumes derived from burning the wings of cockroaches and ants with volatile substances. Habitual inhaling of these substances is often associated with a failure to thrive.42 Secondly, inhaling smoke derived from nicotine based substances is now common in many GCC countries.46,47 Tobacco is often chewed, snuffed or smoked either in cigarettes or in sheesha. The latter (also known as hookah) is a smoking device, widely used in some communities of the Arabian Peninsula, to smoke jurak, a cooked tobacco-fruit mixture, and burnt by an electrical device or by charcoal. The produced smoke passes through the water at the base of the sheesha and then a long-tube before it is inhaled. Though most smokers consider sheesha less harmful to health than cigarette smoking,48 this has not been substantiated in regional studies.48,49 Experimental and clinical studies have found that nicotine, an active ingredient of both sheesha and cigarettes, not only triggers cardiovascular diseases, but also predisposes frequent users to various neuropsychiatric disorders.50 The question remains whether smoking triggers mental illness or people with mental illness are more likely to smoke.51 Pharmacological studies have unequivocally shown that nicotine is as addictive as other well-known psychoactive drugs such as cocaine and amphetamines.52 However, GCC countries have given a low priority to this a public health issue. Demand for nicotine has been falling in industrialised nations, 53 but a similar picture is not emerging from middle and low income countries. Cigarette companies are now targeting the developing world.53 Moreover, cigarette companies are manufacturing products of differing quality for sale in different markets. It has been shown that cigarettes of the same brand sold in developing countries have higher tar content than in the country of origin.54 Some studies have suggested that certain cigarettes are made from more potent, hence, more addictive, nicotine.53,55 As there is no known effective program to educate people about the dangers of smoking, prevention and smoking cessation appear to an unattainable goals. To compound the problem, some proponents of the "gateway phenomenon" suggest that smoking is a springboard to hard drugs such as cocaine and heroin, 56 though there is also evidence to contradict this view.57 The social problems precipitated by alcoholism have not yet been reported in the GCC countries though some reports suggest that drinking problems are proliferating.13,44,58 The World Health Organisation59 estimates that more then 5 million people are disabled because of alcohol use, making it the fourth leading cause of worldwide disability. Theobald has suggested that approximately 0% of alcohol consumers will at some time experience serious health problems related to their drinking habit.60 As many individuals are now facing the daily challenges of modern living and the pressures of modern life, alcohol abuse is thought to be one of the elusive antidotes to modern insecurity.17 Some recent findings suggest that individuals who have a high subjective level of insecurity in their lives are likely to abuse alcohol to ward of their psychosocial stress. Interestingly, people with such attributes have been seen to have refractory types of alcoholism.61 Alcohol syndromes such as delirium tremens and Korsakoff's psychosis are known to occur among people who consume it regularly.50 Persons at risk of drinking problems cannot be reliably identified in the population; therefore the pattern of drinking and its psychosocial correlates are indicated for the GCC countries. The bulk of the studies21,45,58 have focused solely on exploring the validity of research instruments on cross-cultural application of drinking attitude and behaviour. Little is known on the effect of alcohol repackaged as "cologne" available in some GCC countries.62,63 Colognes or ethyl alcohol-containing perfume and after-shave are sometimes ingested as an alcohol substitute.64 Relevant to this, it would be important to determine whether the availability of alcohol and other soft drugs deters people from going into narcotics that are more dangerous. One suggestion is that in those societies of GCC where there is a relaxed attitude towards alcohol, there are fewer propensities towards heroin and other dangerous drugs.14 It also not clear how such information would be helpful in planning intervention programs in GCC countries, as the experiences from other societies suggest a complex relationship between alcohol and substance abuse. The "gateway theory" would suggest that using alcohol leads people to use harder drugs like cocaine and heroin.65 There is also scant information on the pattern and psychosocial correlates of over-the-counter medications in the GCC countries. Though generally viewed as harmless, many of them have the potential for abuse, particular those that are considered to be amphetamine-like stimulants.66 These includes nasal decongestants, bronchodilators, appetite suppressants and energy pills and drinks. While there is no evidence to suggest that cocaine and hallucinogens are widely consumed in the GCC countries, 13 the story of opiate use is somewhat different. Historical documents suggest that opium was considered as a medicinal substance in the Middle East. It was recommended by various towering Arab figures such as Ibn Sina.1 More recently, however, its semi-synthetic counterpart, heroin, far removed from its cultural context, is becoming the drug of choice for addicts in the GCC countries. Being close to heroin producing regions of the world, GCC appears to be the trafficker's place of choice. Being capable of causing compulsive dependency within a short time, heroin has a devastating effect on the user and society in general. To those who are addicted to heroin, it appears the habit leaves them little time for meaningful life. To compound the problem, as 90% of GCC heroin addicts use it intravenously, sharing of contaminated needles causes infections of human immune deficiency virus and a high incidence of other infections.33 Similarly, the number of cases of heroin addiction is often directly related to the number of crimes.27 Despite stringent regulations to reduce the supply and demand, the habit proliferates. Judging from the quantities of drugs seized by the authorities, the last decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of cases of heroin addiction, the number of addicts seeking rehabilitation, and death due to heroin overdose.PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE Rehabilitation for addiction is often in the hands of psychiatric or penitentiary services though some specialised centres have emerged in some GCC countries.16 Culturally sensitive interventions seem to be often relegated to fringe importance. Medical interventions are likely to grow considering the many claims about new pharmacological tools that take advantage of the chemical properties of alcohol and other drugs. However, drug treatment for substance dependency should not hold up the search for psychosocial predisposing factors, which, in turn, could be a springboard for educational strategies to reduce demand. Indeed, blind adherence to pharmacological intervention not only seems similar to drug peddling, but also may be counterproductive in the long term. A biomedical explanatory model of substance dependency may lead to stigma, and lessen the individual and societal accountability in tackling compulsive dependency. Stressing personal responsibility, on the other hand, motivates one to change, as well as help one understand the challenges ahead and evolve coping mechanisms.67 As distress and stress are experienced in a socio-cultural context, rehabilitation services should avoid committing what Kleinman has called a "category fallacy", where a view of human nature developed for one cultural group is uncritically applied to members of another group for whom its validity has not been established.68 According to Kleinman, this results in a "distortion of pathology" rather than a critical understanding of the ways in which the members of a different cultural group perceive, experience and communicates beliefs and distress. One of the essential grounds for formulating enlightened policies toward drug dependency is to consider the society's outlook towards mood altering substances. Despite the documented frequency of substance abuse in GCC countries, a review of the literature reveals no objective studies on knowledge, attitude and perception. Opinion towards substance dependency among citizens of GCC countries is likely to have a wide-ranging influence, affecting issues as diverse as personal consequences of substance dependency, prevention, care and management of people with substance abuse. Historical and cross-cultural studies have suggested that individuals with substance dependence are likely to encounter active discrimination and harassment which, in turn, exacerbates their psychosocial predicament and perpetuates their relapse into drug taking.37 Similarly, it has been suggested that social attitudes can be more devastating than the addiction itself, and the addict's family suffers as well.69 Although many victims of substance dependency could benefit from treatment, attitudes of society towards them is likely to hamper their seeking rehabilitation. As a result, many are likely to stay underground until addiction has reached an advanced stage of irreversible pathology. This not only increases pessimism of the victims and those around them but also shatters the prospect of recovery. Therefore, more research in GCC countries should be conducted in order to shed light on socio-cultural factors that precipitate individuals to succumb to substance abuse. This would open the door for contemplating strategies to achieve a reasonable level of prevention as well as to prioritise which aspects of services are pertinent to the region. Grinspoon and Bakalar have suggested that of all the mistakes repeated, the most serious is trying to free society of drugs via legislation and regulation.70 Indeed, many studies1 suggest that no punitive measure deters availability and abuse of drugs.14 It appears that financial gain is one of the strongest determining factors. Globally, though consensus from the experts in the field suggests that substance dependency is a disease, public opinion often considers it a form of moral degeneracy that can destroy social values. As a result, victims of substance dependency are sent to the prison. Many countries have pursued the idea of creating a national consensus towards zero tolerance for substance abuse and death penalty for drug traffickers. The policies fluctuate between curbing trafficking, reducing demand and decriminalisation of certain classes of drugs.71 Some countries have considered decriminalizing soft drugs and the debate continues on the rationale of dispensing heroin to heroin-addicts.72 Although more time is needed to assess the long-term outcome of these new programs, history has shown that none of the previous campaigns to curb the spread of substance misuse has worked. Instead, the situation appears to be summed up in Bob Marley's lyric, "So you think you have found the solution; But it's just another illusion". CONCLUSION The problem of drug abuse in the GCC is a multi-dimensional one without easy solutions. This paper has touched upon several of these issues. Even though for zero tolerance to substance dependency is advocated, no program has been found to be universally successful in reducing drug dependence. Historically, many societies have tried both criminalisation and decriminalisation but to no avail. Despite all the technologies to monitor and legal authority to bring the drug traffickers to justice,including the threat of death penalty, dealing with substances that cause addiction is becoming a global challenge of ever increasing magnitude. More discouraging, the problem has even affected societies where one would expect cultural factors to protect them from the attraction of drugs. The purpose of this paper, thus, is to "point a finger to the moon", the moon symbolising the complexity of substance dependency. One should not confuse the moon with the finger that points to it.
