Suchergebnisse

von Hans-Jürgen Puhle ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Z 73.841-16

This paper identifies four primary drivers of proactive disclosure throughout history. The first is the need to inform the public about laws and decisions and the public's right to be informed, to know their rights and obligations. The second is the public's demand for the information needed to hold governments accountable both at and between elections. The third is the demand for information in order to participate actively in decision-making. The fourth is the provision to the public of information needed to access government services, which has expanded significantly in the past decade with growth of electronic access to services or 'e-government.' This paper attempts to advance the debate around that question by analyzing the multiple proactive disclosure provisions in national law and international treaties in order to identify the emerging global consensus on the classes of information which should be included in a proactive disclosure regime. The paper examines the practical challenges related to the implementation of proactive disclosure regimes and some of the lessons learned from which principles for making proactive disclosure work in practice can be derived. It concludes by identifying some future challenges and areas where additional research is needed.

[spa]Enmarcada en el estudio de la reacción internacional y la participación extranjera en la guerra civil española, esta Tesis analiza la respuesta al conflicto que se dio en Irlanda. Tal y como ocurrió en el resto de países democráticos, el contencioso español captó la atención de los habitantes de la isla de un modo significativo. El público se formuló su propia opinión al respecto, abriéndose un debate que se instaló en los principales resortes de la sociedad civil. Las formaciones políticas tomaron partido a favor de uno u otro bando y animaron a sus seguidores a secundar su postura. El Gobierno en funciones hubo de lidiar con una serie de imperativos que la conflagración impuso en su agenda, y los grupos de poder que ostentaban un peso relevante manifestaron su visión sin tapujos. Esto se advino en un momento en que la coyuntura interna de la isla atravesaba por un periodo delicado, puesto que el Free State pugnaba por consolidar el estatus que el Tratado de 1921 le había conferido, mientras que las élites dirigentes se disputaban el control del nuevo Estado. El carácter católico de la nación irlandesa jugó un papel crucial en la reacción que la guerra de España despertó entre sus ciudadanos. Pensemos que la defensa de este credo alimentaba una sangrienta disputa sectaria en el Norte, al tiempo que servía de factor diferencial para aislar la identidad gaélico-celta del resto de las Islas Británicas, de mayoría anglosajona y protestante. El tratamiento de las noticias sobre la Península que implementaron los rotativos del Sur, la postura adoptada por la Iglesia católica y la campaña a favor de los insurgentes que impulsó el conservadurismo irlandés, contribuyeron a decantar en un primer momento la opinión pública del lado rebelde. El conflicto fue interpretado como una pugna religiosa, condición que eclipsó otro tipo de lecturas posibles. La intensidad del clivaje vino acompañada, cuando no motivada, por una manipulación interesada de la información que se daba a la población. Las clases dominantes de la isla habían hecho un esfuerzo en los años precedentes por alejar a los sectores populares de las propuestas emancipadoras más radicales, alimentando para ello un temor rojo que terminó cuajando en el ánimo mayoritario. La corporación eclesiástica venía mostrando su cara más reaccionaria, enfrentándose sin complejos a cualquier atisbo de modernidad que pudiera cuestionar su poder. De hecho, muchos de sus adalides recibieron con gusto las formulaciones ideológicas que abogaban por reconquistar su preeminencia en todas las áreas de la vida comunitaria, es decir el corporativismo católico o, en su defecto, el vocacionalismo de Estado. La ultraderecha irlandesa adoptó una postura beligerante, volcando todas sus energías en la defensa de los facciosos. Los factores que motivaron esta actitud son complejos y variados, aunque en líneas generales respondieron a intereses propios, internos, antes que a una verdadera afección desinteresada. Por su parte, la izquierda radical no dudó en ofrecer toda su solidaridad a los republicanos españoles. Respuesta que le valió el acoso de muchos sectores sociales, políticos y religiosos. La insistencia de la contra-propaganda obrerista y la progresiva falta de legitimidad en la que cayó el discurso pro-franquista, terminaron por bascular el apoyo popular a la causa insurgente hacia una postura más templada. De este modo, las opiniones divergentes pudieron expresarse con un cierto margen de libertad. Aún así, la defensa de la causa lealista continuó chocando con la firme condena de la Iglesia y la oposición frontal de los estratos más acomodados. De Valera subscribió el plan de No-Intervención desde fechas tempranas, decisión que le valió la crítica de los contrincantes parlamentarios y de sus enemigos políticos. Dublín se esforzó en marcar un perfil de actuación diferenciado respecto a la Gran Bretaña, aunque no llegó a permitir que la cuestión española abriera ninguna brecha de disentimiento profundo entre ambos países. Salamanca encontró un aliado potencial en algunos grupos de presión irlandeses como el Irish Christian Front, la jerarquía católica y ciertos grupúsculos filo-fascistas como los blueshirts o el NCP. De hecho, a punto se estuvo de organizar una cruzada moderna en defensa de la cristiandad, que hubiera traído hasta España a millares de voluntarios dispuestos a combatir. Diversos intereses truncaron esta iniciativa y, finalmente, la propuesta se tradujo en una pírrica participación en la guerra de una pequeña compañía expedicionaria que no tardó en ser devuelta a su hogar. Por su parte, las formaciones que asumieron en la isla la salvaguarda del Gobierno de Madrid se vieron obligadas a aunar fuerzas y conglomerarse en un Frente Unido, a imagen y semejanza del Frente Popular español, para resistir el embate de la reacción. Contra viento y marea, esta plataforma convocó diversos actos de solidaridad en defensa de la legitimidad republicana, organizó comités de apoyo al pueblo español y trató de advertir a los trabajadores irlandeses del verdadero significado del conflicto. Aún más, algunos de sus mejores activos no dudaron en alistarse a las filas de las Brigadas Internacionales, haciéndose un lugar en la historia por su ardor en el combate y su sacrificio heroico. El objetivo de esta Tesis consiste, por un lado, en evocar el avance del estado de la cuestión que se ha alcanzado en Irlanda durante los últimos años, y por el otro, en aportar aquella información que las investigaciones que nos anteceden habían eludido. La justificación de todo ello, guarda relación con la escasa atención que la historiografía española ha prestado a esta temática hasta el momento, circunstancia que contrasta con la cantidad de trabajos que se han dedicado a analizar la respuesta que se dio en lugares como la Gran Bretaña, Francia, Italia o Alemania. Dicha carencia se presenta como un motivo de peso para tratar de llenar el vacío que existe en este campo. Para ello, hemos tratado de comprender los paradigmas que la historiografía irlandesa había establecido en torno al objeto de estudio, revisando las principales fuentes que habían consultado sus representantes y, en segundo lugar, hemos intentado descubrir y analizar otras fuentes novedosas que no habían sido trabajadas hasta la fecha. Los antecedentes de nuestra disertación se asientan en el trabajo desarrollado unas décadas atrás por algunos académicos irlandeses. Michael O'Riordan fue la primera persona que estudió con una cierta solidez la vivencia de los reclutas isleños en las Brigadas Internacionales. Su obra Connolly Column, se insería en la vertiente de publicaciones que analizaban el papel jugado por los distintos contingentes de voluntarios extranjeros que lucharon a favor del Gobierno de Madrid. Diletante antes que historiador de formación, su libro fue superado un tiempo después por la labor de los profesores Robert Stradling y Fearghal McGarry, quienes a finales de los años noventa editaron, respectivamente, el resultado de sus investigaciones centradas en la reacción irlandesa ante la guerra civil. Estos fueron los trabajos que nos pusieron en la pista del fenómeno que ocupa nuestra atención. La estructura de los temas abordados responde a un doble condicionante. Por un lado, resultaba complicado esquivar la división del contenido de sus obras que habían usado McGarry y Stradling. Por el otro, las propias fuentes que hemos consultado han impuesto, a tenor de las deducciones obtenidas, una determinada distribución de los resultados. El primero de estos imperativos guarda relación con el deseo de implementar una exposición holística del fenómeno. En este sentido, era menester acotar el marco histórico, construir una narración general de los hechos, y, profundizar en el relato de la experiencia vivida por los voluntarios que se trasladaron hasta la Península para combatir. Estas secciones de nuestro trabajo ocupan las Partes primera, segunda y tercera del mismo, y la estructura de sus capítulos guarda un parecido con los trabajos de McGarry y Stradling. La redacción de los apartados que los integran ha contado, aún así, con el auxilio de ciertas fuentes que estos autores no habían usado en su momento. Esto se hace patente en lo que concierne a la primera Parte. La segunda y tercera Parte incorporan algunos datos novedosos que derivan del análisis de periódicos y artículos que los susodichos investigadores pasaron por alto. El segundo condicionante al que nos habíamos referido guarda relación con la cuarta y quinta Parte de esta Tesis, donde se presenta la mayor dosis de originalidad que encierra nuestro ensayo. Son fruto de un estudio documental intensivo, que nos ha permitido recoger el testimonio aportado por una cantidad nada deleznable de material de archivo prácticamente inédito. La extensión de estos descubrimientos ha exigido ordenar los resultados de manera diferenciada según su contenido o procedencia. Así, la cuarta Parte aloja toda la información derivada de las cajas y legajos albergados por el National Archive of Ireland, vinculada eminentemente con la reacción de las autoridades irlandesas ante la guerra. Por el contrario, la quinta Parte expone los hallazgos encontrados en diversos archivos que se ubican en el Estado español, los más destacados de los cuales son el Archivo General Militar de Ávila y el Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica. La elección de las fuentes ha respondido a un criterio abierto, inclusivo, en cuyo origen subyacía el deseo de cotejar la mayor cantidad posible de inputs de información. Este trabajo se sitúa en el campo de la historia política, a lo que se suman algunas consideraciones de otra índole. A efectos de contenido temático, los centros a los que debíamos acceder en Irlanda eran, sin lugar a dudas, la National Library y el National Archive. La faena de biblioteca, en lo que a bibliografía y sección de hemeroteca se refiere, quedó satisfecha en el University College Cork, donde pude permanecer como investigador visitante. Por otro lado, la sanción de una aportación novedosa al estado de la cuestión debía resolverse a base de indagar con detenimiento en los archivos españoles. Era éste un campo de trabajo relativamente virgen en relación con los estudios que se habían impulsado en la isla, hecho que lo convertía por sí mismo en uno de los motivos que justificaban la elaboración de esta Tesis. Stradling y McGarry, tal y como habían hecho hasta entonces algunos especialistas extranjeros en materia de guerra civil, habían visitado, sin obtener grandes rendimientos, los centros de Ávila y Salamanca. En este sentido, mi primer cometido consistía en superar el alcance de la exploración que ambos habían llevado a cabo en estos archivos. La disponibilidad de tiempo, un mejor dominio del castellano y la voluntad de perseverar, permitían atisbar algunas expectativas de éxito en torno a este objetivo. Mi proyecto de investigación preveía extender las pesquisas a otros centros del Estado, meta que me condujo hasta las salas del Archivo General Militar de Segovia y el Archivo General Militar de Guadalajara. Anhelaba encontrar aquí más datos acerca de los voluntarios irlandeses que lucharon en la guerra y, aunque en poca cantidad, di con algo interesante. Las visitas al Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya, al Centro de Patrimonio Documental de Euskadi y al Archivo del Nacionalismo Vasco, tenían por objetivo la detección de relaciones y concomitancias entre el nacionalismo de estos lugares e Irlanda. De nuevo, estas diligencias concluyeron con un resultado favorable. Finalmente, requerí consultar los fondos de algunos equipamientos como la Biblioteca Foral de la Diputación de Bizkaia o los depósitos documentales y bibliográficos del Pavelló de la República (Universitat de Barcelona), para trabajar con algunas ediciones de prensa que podían enriquecer el trabajo. Las revistas y publicaciones periódicas que han sido citadas en esta Tesis fueron localizadas, de forma mayoritaria, en el archivo Special Collections y en la biblioteca de la universidad de Cork. Los fondos inter-universitarios a los que se puede acceder hoy en día a través de la Red, hicieron el resto. La prensa escrita que consulté en Irlanda ha representado un elemento de primer orden a la hora de obtener datos suculentos e información precisa con la que operar. Pude ocuparme de algunos portavoces radicales como el United Ireland o The Irish Democrat gracias a los microfilms que se guardan en la universidad de Cork. El análisis de otros periódicos de ámbito más general como el Irish Press o el Irish Independent, me vino facilitado por los servicios on-line de la Boole Library que ofrece la UCC, a los que logré tener acceso gracias a la condición de 'visiting researcher' con la que decidieron congraciarme. La inspección de rotativos como La Vanguardia y el ABC pudo solventarse sin problemas en España. Por el contrario, la depuración de algunos noticiarios como el Our Fight o el Volunteer for Liberty exigió pasar algunas jornadas de trabajo en archivos especializados como el Centre d'Estudis Històrics Internacional. La mayor parte de la bibliografía utilizada en esta Tesis es de manufactura anglosajona, predominantemente irlandesa. La estancia de investigación que realicé en Irlanda me facilitó, en gran medida, su consulta. Años atrás, en motivo de mi primera visita a la isla, logré adquirir aquellos títulos más esenciales que habrían de sentar las bases de este ensayo. Desde Granada, mientras cursaba los estudios del DEA, continué alimentando esta actividad compilatoria. Posteriormente, cuando ya trabajaba en la Tesis, el CDMH y el CEHI me sirvieron para localizar algunas obras que podían ser de utilidad. A grandes rasgos, puede señalarse que nos hemos servido tanto de obras contemporáneas del estilo de The Book of the VX International Brigade o las memorias de O'Duffy, como de obras actuales redactadas por historiadores de nuestro tiempo. Lógicamente cada capítulo y apartado ha requerido una contextualización bibliográfica en particular. Algunos libros guardaban una utilidad transversal, por lo que han servido como herramientas generales. Otros fueron requeridos para atajar simples cuestiones puntuales, de modo que han ocupado una categoría secundaria. Finalmente, hemos usado algunas publicaciones a modo de instrumentos auxiliares. Eso sí, la mayor parte de los textos de los que nos hemos servido, ya fuesen recuerdos de veteranos, manuales escritos por historiadores, crónicas periodísticas de la guerra, artículos de prensa o revistas de corte académico, entre otros, estaban escritos en lengua inglesa. ; [eng]This project of investigation surveys Irish responses to the Spanish Civil War, recounting the participation of Irishmen on both sides of that conflict. Specially, it analyses the motives behind their involvement in Spain, their experiences there, and it attempts to place both in the context of comparative international responses to the war. It's correct to say that the Spanish Civil War aroused strong passions in Ireland, so this research examines various interest groups on the Irish front: supporters of the Spanish Republic, the pro-Franco Irish Christian Front, the Catholic Church, etc. It also considers the formation of diplomatic policy, and the party political responses. However, all those reactions help to illustrate the impact on Ireland of the rise of radical ideologies in 1930s Europe. So, this P.H.D. describes the political culture of interwar Ireland. The central part of this research studies the corps of 700 Irish volunteers, formed by Eoin O'Duffy (politician who had previously organised the banned quasi-fascist Bueshirts in Ireland), that fought on the Nationalist side of Franco. And by the other hand, explains the history about the group of IRA members and Irish Socialists who fought in support the cause of the Second Republic (around 250-300 men), organized by the Republican Congress and the Irish Communist Party with Frank Ryan as their leader; sometimes referred to as the "Connolly Column". Moreover, this work turns around different axes of research related with the connections between Ireland and Spain during the interwar period. This is, the foreign affairs among both countries, their diplomatic relations, the reception of Irish news and events in the Spanish medias of that time, etc. Specially, trying to put forward the Catalan and Basque particular ties with Ireland. By doing so, it analyzes several bonds that were established between various political parties, institutions, organizations and other bodies from those lands.

Summary of the Study Introduction Sudan is the third largest country on the African continent with a total area of 1,882,000 sq km. before the secession of South Sudan in 2011; Sudan was the largest country in Africa, covering I million square miles. Sudan is unique and complex in its climate, politics, environment, languages, cultures, religion and ethnicities. Demographically, Africans are the majority (52%), with Arab and Beja tribes constituting 38% and 6% of the population, respectively. Over 597 tribes live in Sudan that speak more than 400 dialects and practice different religions, live in Sudan. Muslims make up 70% of the total population of Sudan, followers of indigenous beliefs comprise 25% and Christians constitute 5% of the population. The complex mixture of the Sudanese social fabric renders it neither distinctly African nor Arab country. The Sudanese, however, have long disagreed about Sudan's identity. For some, Sudan should be Arab and Muslim. Other believe that the country should respect and accommodate all the cultures, religions and minorities within its territory. Most of Sudan constitutions stated that Islam and Arabic language should define the national identity. Politically, since the independence, Sudan has experienced a fluctuation between military rule and democratic rule. In fact, Sudan spent thirty years under the military rule, and only twelve years under democratically elected governments. The successive governments have frequently made use of emergency legislation to broaden the executive powers. These legislative measures have contributed to conflict and facilitated a range of human rights violations. In addition to the political instability, Sudan has the distinction in Africa in enduring a devastating civil war: that is: Sudan's north-south civil war. The conflict started just a year before the independence of Sudan, in 1956. The cumulative impact of that conflict has been massive. The conflict has caused horrendous loss of life in any interstate war, and has produced the largest internally displaced population (IDP) in the world. Sudan north-south conflict has long been perceived as ethnic or even religious conflict between the north and the south. Ethnicity has been used generously in the description of that conflict. Yet, a closer look at the history of the conflict reveals that the root-causes of that conflict are highly complex. But, this is by no means to say that conflict has had no ethnic, racial and religious overtones. The eruption of the north-south conflict was the result of a combination of factors. One could trace the root-causes of the conflict to the invasion of the south from the north by Turkiyya that expanded southwards, and the simultaneous development of slave trade. Thereafter, the British rule contributed in different ways to the crystallizing of the north-south dichotomy. After the independence of Sudan, successive governments, were unsuccessful in handling the growing southern problem, ranging from neglect to attempts to reverse the British isolation by enforced Arabisation and Islamization of the southern Sudan. The north-south conflict ended, in 1972, when Addis Ababa Agreement was signed by then President Nimeiry. But, the conflict broke out again, in 1983, when the Addis Ababa Agreement was abrogated by the then President Nimeiry. After a series of peace talks (which witnessed 'start and stop'), a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was concluded, in 9 January 2005, between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM/SPLA) to end the conflict. The CPA provides for a temporary solution for the conflict through, inter alia, the distribution of the power between the north and the south of Sudan by establishing a decentralised system of government with a significant devolution of powers within which the Southern Sudan is to enjoy a regional autonomy and share half of the resources with north Sudan for a period of six years. Furthermore, the CPA creates joint institutions, such as, the Government of the National Unity (GoNU) in which the Southern Sudan participate and share ministerial posts. The CPA also provides for the establishment of a number of commissions for implementing and monitoring the CPA, for instance, the Evaluation and Monitoring Commission, the National Human Rights Commission, etc. At the end of the interim period, a referendum on the self-determination is to be held, in 2011, in which the people of the Southern Sudan will decide whether to remain within a united Sudan or to secede and form an independent State. The Aim of the Study The significance of this study derives from the conclusion of the CPA and the adoption of the Interim National Constitution (INC) that called for democratic transformation so as to bring an end to Sudan north-south conflict. While the CPA ended Sudan's north-south conflict, a lasting peace and a democratic transformation, in Sudan, may prove elusive unless the CPA provisions are translated into reality, especially the implementation of constitutional, legislative and institutional reforms, including human rights protection and respect for the rule of law. The study aims to answer whether the CPA and INC can fulfil their roles in securing peace and establishing a framework in which the constitutional protection of human rights are recognised and effectively implemented through the availability of the various mechanisms. In this respect, the CPA provided for the adoption of a new constitution (INC), with a view to embedding constitutionalism, rule of law promotion, and protection of human rights. It is, therefore, this study is meant to analyze the constitutional, legislative and institutional reforms of the CPA and INC with a view to examining whether such constitutional reforms may be conducive for a lasting peace, in Sudan, that is based on human rights protection, constitutionalism and the rule of law. The CPA stipulated the need for institutional and legislative changes to reduce the risk of recurrence of human rights violations. To this end, the CPA mandated the adoption of a bill of right (for the promotion and protection of human rights) and provided for re-restructuring of the courts system. Such institutional reforms are aimed at embedding constitutionalism. That is to say: establishing a system in which the constitution provides an agreed upon framework for the exercise of powers and the protection of human rights. In this respect, the study examines whether the outcome of the constitutional reforms process (to recognise, implement, and protect human rights as provided for in the INC) have been reflected in institutional and legislative reforms to protect and prevent human rights violations and address past violations and systemic factors that have contributed to violations. To that end, the human right jurisprudence of the constitutional court will be examined. The Organization of the Study a) The Structure of the Political/Governance System in Sudan under the INC With the devolution of the powers and resources to the Southern Sudan level and other States, the governance system, under the INC, is structured with four levels of government: the national level at the apex, the Government of South Sudan level, the State level (25 States), the local level. Now, the government responsibilities are decentralized and the national government allocates a significant proportion of revenues to the States. It is, therefore, that the first question that this study poses is: What is the impact of the current governance in giving greater equity of representation and decision-making influence to communities across Sudan, thereby facilitating conflict management to achieve a lasting peace in Sudan? In Sudan, previously appropriate design of institutions to ensure political accommodations for all social groups has not been established in a way that would give them the chance to function properly. Now, the INC restructures the prevailing governance system by establishing a decentralized system of government that bears the characteristics of asymmetrical/symmetrical federalism - asymmetrical in the structure and responsibilities of subunits, with the level of South Sudan having more powers and resources than other States across Sudan. Establishment of a federal structure may constitute a mechanism for preventing a relapse into conflict through the devolution of the powers to the State level. For a federal to work effectively, it requires a functional court system to decide on the jurisdictional limits of the different levels of government. Nevertheless, the relevance of the court system in resolving the intractably political contentions in federal countries, especially in transition situations, is uncertain. Noticeably missing from the literature is the study and analysis of the impact of the role of court system in post conflict countries. That said, the role of the court system in preserving democracy has grown in importance with the increase recognition of the judicial review of the constitutionality of the acts of the government organs and the recognition and the protection of human rights provisions. It is, therefore, that the involvement of the courts is necessary to ensure the successful operation of the federalism and thus the failure or the success of federalism is contingent on the implementation of the federal system by the courts. According to some scholars, 'federalism means legalism – the predominance of the judiciary in the constitution- the prevalence of a spirit of legality among the people'. As '[the] courts …are actually telling a government how far it can go with its assigned constitutional rights'. This leads to the second question that this study addresses which relates to the analysis of the constitutional reform as provided for in the INC, in general, but with a special focus on the role of the court system, through the application of judicial review and protection of human rights, to resolve not only disputes in litigations between private parties, but also to prevent the arbitrary exercise of the government power. b) The Structure of the Legal System (Court System) in Sudan under the INC The available literature presents different views as to the role of the court system in new democracies. On one hand, one view assumes that the courts have a fairly wide discretion to decide the outcome of the controversial cases to the needs of the political moment. The other view, on the other hand, takes the position that political actors do not exert any kind of influence at all on the way judges make their decisions. A third source, and with which I agree, argues that legal rules do put constrains over the exercise of the judicial discretion in controversial cases. A fourth view argues that in new fragile democracies constitutional courts/supreme courts should not be involved in judicial review, especially on adjudicating issues related to social and economic rights, which may profoundly affect the allocations of resources and violate the doctrine of separation of powers. In this respect, the study considers whether the court system, as restructured in the INC, and other constitutional guarantees introduced to the legal system as a whole, offer good prospects for constitutionalism that may control the power of the government so as not act arbitrarily. The role of court system in resolving disputes is highly contingent on the substantive law and the institutional structure within which the courts apply laws. Thus, this study examines to what extent the current structure of the legal system under the INC and the protection of human rights through the application of the Bill of Rights by the courts may signal the State's commitment to constitutionalism and respect to the rule of law. It is, therefore, that the role of the court system (in contributing to democratic transformation in Sudan) should be evaluated against the legal framework: that is the INC, with a focus on the independence of the judiciary, the application of the Bill of Rights and the rules governing the judicial review. c) The Legislative and Institutional Reforms under the INC The functions of the courts, in developing countries, have experienced increasingly transformative role as institutions that can hold the government organs accountable. The study aims to examine the practice of constitutionalism: that is, the implementation of the INC constitutional, institutional and legislative reforms, especially the compliance with the provisions of the INC and the CPA, in particular the role of the constitutional court as "a positive legislator". In this regard, the Sudanese Constitutional Court may play an important role in the law reform process given its power to annul laws found unconstitutional. This entails the non-applicability of such laws and, as a result, would compel the government institution/organ concerned to adopt new legislation that is in conformity with the INC. Thus far, the Sudanese constitutional court, under the INC, has received a number of human rights cases that involved issues related to violations of human rights or related to the constitutionality of key legislation, such as counter-terrorism laws, immunities for officials and statutes of limitation for torture. So what role the constitutional court has played in the law reform process under the INC? For the court system to play a role in the democratic reform, a comprehensive law reform process is seen as a prerequisite to bring the existing laws in line with the provisions of the INC and enacting new laws. Therefore, this study identifies what legislative and institutional reforms that have been undertaken by the parties to the CPA during the interim period to address human rights violations, root-causes of the conflict; inequality; marginalization, rule of law vacuum and weak democratic structures. Furthermore, this study offers empirical evidence for the judicial behavior of the Sudanese constitutional court through a systematic examination of selected human rights jurisprudence of the constitutional court to gauge its role in the law reform process in Sudan since the adoption of the INC. Overview of the Study and the Main Findings of the Study Introductory Chapter: Overview of the Study The Introductory Chapter provides an overview of the study, including, the key features of the State of Sudan, the aim of the study, the main objectives of the study, and a general overview of the study. Chapter One: A Historical Background of Sudan's North-South Conflict Chapter One gives a rich and deep account of Sudan north-south conflict. It looks at the root-causes of the conflict by elaborating on different factors that directly and indirectly contributed in making that conflict protracted. Chapter one moves on to consider the end of the first Sudan's north-south conflict which was ended when Addis Ababa Agreement was signed in 1972. Chapter one further elaborates on Sudan's second north-south conflict which broke out in 1983. Finally, Chapter one touches on the various peace initiatives that ended by the conclusion of the CPA. Chapter One concludes by analysing the CPA. In the final analysis, the CPA made significant changes the prevailing governance and legal systems in Sudan by establishing a federal system, introduced a dual legal system a bill of rights, provided for the right to self-determination for the south Sudan, established institutions for the protection of human rights by establishing mechanisms such as National Human rights Commission, and distributed the wealth equally between the north and the south. However, the CPA failed to include the Sudanese people in the talks leading to the conclusion of the CPA, as the CPA was bilateral reflecting the views of the north and the south. Chapter Two: The Structure of the Governance System under the INC The INC describes Sudan as a decentralized State with different levels of government: the national level, the Southern Sudan level, the State level and the local level. It further grants the Southern Sudan autonomy status. A careful analysis of the current governance arrangements reveals that the INC provides for asymmetric/symmetrical federalism system of governance. Chapter Two discusses the allocation of legislative powers between the national government, the Southern Sudan and the rest of the country and the nature of the constitutional design of the INC to manage diversity of Sudan (ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural diversity). At the outset of Chapter Three provides an overview the fundamental principles of federalism and provides a brief historical background of federalism in Sudan and how federalism arrangements can play a role as a tool for peace-building. In the final analysis, in contract with old constitutions of Sudan, the INC establishes a federal system, with four levels of government; national, south Sudan, State and local levels. The INC federal system guarantees the special characteristics of all ethnic and religious groups in Sudan through the creation of the Council of the States. However, all the States in Sudan are not treated equally, because (1) two States have special status (South Kordofan and Blue Nile States), and (2) between the ten States in the South and the national level, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) is inserted to exercise authority in respect of the ten States at South Sudan level. This means the INC creates asymmetrical/symmetrical federalism, as the South Sudan level enjoys significant autonomy and exclusive authority over ten States in South Sudan. All the States in Sudan are not treated equally, because (1) two States have special status (South Kordofan and Blue Nile States), and (2) between the ten States in the South and the national level, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) is inserted to exercise authority in respect of the ten States at South Sudan level. This means the INC creates asymmetrical/symmetrical federalism, as the South Sudan level enjoys significant autonomy and exclusive authority over ten States in South Sudan. The INC Schedules (A – C) distribute the exclusive and legislative powers to the national level (A), the GoSS level (B), and the state level (C). Schedule (D) lists the concurrent powers and Schedule (E) allocates the residual powers as per its nature. Schedule (F) is a provision to resolve conflict that might arise under Schedule (D). It should be noted that not all issues listed in the INC schedules are allocated to one level of government only. For example, several substantive issues are granted to the national level as an exclusive competence, to the South Sudan level as an exclusive competence and at the same time to all levels of government as a concurrent power, such as telecommunication. With regard to the legislative powers allocated to the tens states at the South level, the GoSS according to Schedule (B) has the competence to enact a kind of framework with regard to issues that fall under the exclusive South Sudan State competence, thereby limiting the legislative powers of the ten States in South Sudan. Finally, the INC has reinforced existing power relations and failed to provide structural changes for democratic transformation, as the INC asymmetrical federalism accommodates the demands of the South Sudan only. As the INC does not accommodate the demands of the different ethnic and cultural groups in the different regions of Sudan as demonstrated in Darfur Peace Agreement and East Sudan Agreement. Chapter Three: The Structure of the Legal System under the INC The INC altered the Sudanese legal system with a view to accommodating the competing views: Sharia law and secularism. For a proper understanding of the present Sudanese legal system and an assessment of the role of the court system in contributing to democratic governance, a glance at the Sudanese legal history is necessary. Firstly, Chapter Three reviews the constitutional developments in Sudan since the independence to the present day. Secondly, Chapter Three provides overview of the structure of the court system in a decentralized system and focuses on the contribution of the court system to democratic transformation through limiting the acts of the government. Chapter Three further discusses issues that may impact of the role of the court system in contributing to democratic transformation. Yet, the role of the court system in promoting democratic transformation is contingent on the constitution, the substantive law, etc. For instance, instituting the principles of constitutionalism is contingent on the independence of the judiciary, as an independent judiciary is required for the protection of constitutional rights and to restrain the actions of the government. Thus, it is important to understand under what conditions the court system develops such accountability functions: that is, what conditions favor the ability of the court system to exercise an effective accountability functions. It is, therefore, Chapter Three examines (a) how the INC re-structures the court system in the north and the south of Sudan so as to give effect to the principles of the federalism and legal pluralism; (b) the rules regulating the judicial review, and (c) the protection of human rights through the implementation of the bill of rights by the court, all of which signal the commitment of the State to establish democratic governance. Finally, Chapter Three attempts to evaluate the independence of the judiciary and the rules that govern the judicial review before and after the adoption of the INC with a view to assessing the fidelity of the government to the principles of constitutionalism, and whether the limitations observed in the actual conduct of the government. In the final analysis, the INC constitution making process was bilateral reflecting the views of the parties to the CPA and lacked inclusiveness, but provides for a pluralism legal system by providing for a constitution for south Sudan and 25 State constitutions. The INC introduces State judiciary and South Sudan judiciary and opted for an integrated the court system. That is: the State courts apply the State laws, the national laws and the South Sudan laws. In the North, the State courts are still organized by the national level, although the NC provides for the establishment of the State judiciary. At the South Sudan level, all State courts are organized and financed at the level. Towards the South Sudan, the National Supreme Court is the final court of on matters arising under national laws The INC emphasizes the importance of protecting; respecting and promoting human rights through the inclusion a bill of right and incorporation via Art. 27(3) of the INC all human rights treaties that Sudan has ratified, thereby the human rights contained in the INC directly applicable before the Sudanese courts. Also, the implementation of some human rights requires revision of the existing statutory laws. To date there has been limited legislative reforms to address human rights violations. A few laws have been reformed but fall short of Sudan international obligations, such as Criminal Act, Security Laws, Immunity Laws, etc. The INC differentiates between the north and the south regarding the sources of legislation. Art. 5 of the INC lists Sharia as one of the sources of legislation along with the consensus of the people at the national level. Art. 5(2) of the INC names popular consensus and the values and the customs of the people of Sudan as the sources of legislation in South Sudan. The INC contains special rules for national legislation if its source is religion or custom. In that case, a state where the majority of residents do not practice such religion or customs may introduce different legislation allows practices or establishes institutions in that State that are consistent with its own religion or customs. The INC establishes human rights commission for the implementation of the bill of rights as well as a commission for the protection of non-Muslims in the Capital. The INC has chosen a concentrated system of judicial review and a hybrid system of judicial review with respect to the South Sudan as the Supreme Court of South Sudan acts as a constitutional court and a high court of Appeal with respect to South Sudan. The newly enacted Judicial and Administrative of 2005 does not provide for concrete judicial review of law and bars the court from question the constitutionality of law by way of making referral to the constitutional court, thereby renders the judiciary unable to deal with crucial constitutional issues. Chapter Four: Institutional and Legislative Reform: Practice of Constitutionalism In order to understand whether the adoption of the INC has brought any changes may enhance the role of the court system in contributing to democratic transformation; Chapter Four scrutinizes the compliance of the statutory law with the provisions of the INC, the law reform process in Sudan and the implementation of law in practice. Chapter Four further presents an analysis of more pertinent provisions of civil and political rights in the light of the laws and practices prevailing in the country to assess the extent to which the principles laid down in the INC are complied with. It further assesses the involvement of the Sudan constitutional court in the law reform process by reviewing a selected human rights jurisprudence of the constitutional court. Finally, Chapter Four makes a reference to the jurisprudence of other constitutional courts (the German constitutional court, the Indian Supreme Court and the South African constitutional court) by way of comparison. In the final analysis, a) the INC does not set out procedure for concrete review and access to the court is not free; b) The court has a broad power to consider and adjudge and annual any law in contravention with the constitution and restitute the right to the aggrieved person and compensate for the harm. The court may also order interim measures to avoid any harm. As such, the court can abolish laws and compel the government to enact new law; c) the constitutional court has reviewed a number of cases that alleged the violation of human rights. The court has demonstrated reluctance to declare legislation unconstitutional. Interpretation of the bill of rights and reference to international human rights lacked consistency and the court has taken deference to the executive; d) the constitutional, legislative and institutional changes did not acknowledge past human rights violations through mechanisms that would question the way of governance and persisting inequalities and injustices; e) the constitutional court has institutional weaknesses and its jurisprudence has largely upheld existing laws such as immunities laws and the constitutional court made limited reference to international human rights law; f) the constitutional, legal and institutional reforms failed to generate the sense of constitutionalism and the fundamental change that were to remove the causes for human rights violations and provide effective remedies. A number of laws contravening the human rights are still in force, such as, Public Order Act, Immunity of police, security and army officers, inadequate laws for the protection of women's rights; and finally, the implementation of CPA as a means of democratic transformation left an unreformed government virtually intact Chapter Five: Post- Referendum Sudan Chapter Five looks at the constitutional developments after the secession of South Sudan, with a focus on constitution making process in Sudan. The Southern Sudan Referendum for self-determination, held in July 2011, clearly indicated that the absolute majority of those who participated in the referendum for the Southern Sudan favour separation of the Southern Sudan from Sudan. The secession of the South Sudan on July 9, 2011, as a result of the referendum on self-determination provided by the CPA has created a new reality in Sudan with far reaching economic, political and social implications. Economic and financial losses related to the secession are substantial and have affected all sectors of the economy. Sudan has lost three-quarters of its largest source of foreign exchange (oil), half of its fiscal revenues and about two-thirds of its international payment capacity. In general, the secession of South Sudan resulted in a 36.5% structural decrease in overall government revenues. The unresolved issue of Abyei constitutes a trigger for potential violent tension in the future between Sudan and South Susan. Abyei status is yet to be decided, as both Sudan and South Sudan claiming it as part of its territory. Its final status will be decided by a Referendum for which implementation mechanisms have not yet been agreed upon by the two countries. The end of the CPA necessitated a constitutional review process to decide on the new constitution to replace the INC. However, for a constitution to be able to win the affections of the citizens of the State, it will be necessary to involve those citizens in the constitution-making process that establishes such a constitution, so as to ensure that the process is inclusive and reflects the aspirations of the Sudanese people at large. It is, therefore, important to increase public involvement in the constitution-making process by inviting public participation. In order for the design of a constitution and its constitution-making process to play an important role in the governance system, the design of the constitution has to be responsive to the aspirations of the ordinary people. A constitutional review process is currently under way but has not resulted in any clear proposals. That said, since 2011, a constitutional review has been underway in Sudan. The constitutional review process has not been participatory or inclusive. Lively debates on the new constitution in general, and the Bill of Rights and human rights protection in particular, have nevertheless ensued. These debates have been driven by a keen awareness of the importance of constitutional rights. These debates reflect both traditional concerns over the protection of civil and political rights, particularly in the administration of justice, and other issues that have also become a cause of acute concern. These include the desire for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, and the rights of members of groups who suffer discrimination, particular women, religious and ethnic minorities and persons with disabilities. Currently, public debate over the new constitution is proceeding, although the Government has not yet announced a timeframe for the constitution making process, amid a polarization of views on diverse issues such as the decentralization of power and wealth sharing between the different regions of Sudan. Since 2011, the Government of Sudan, in collaboration with the UNDP and other UN agencies, initiated the forum on public participation in constitution making to facilitate open and public dialogue. This approach has been based on the need to pursue the constitutional process/review inclusively, transparently and participatory to ensure all sectors of society including civil society organizations and opposition political groups participate fully in the process.

The Biden administration is wrestling for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — or so it claims. President Joe Biden has insisted that the war in Gaza must end with a pathway to Palestinian independence, a proposal Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has loudly rejected. Arab governments have tried to sweeten the deal, by offering to normalize relations with Israel in exchange for "irreversible" steps towards a Palestinian state.There's one irreversible step Biden could take with or without a deal: granting the Palestinian Authority diplomatic recognition. Experts say that the U.S. president has the power to recognize the State of Palestine, with immediate legal effects, and would most likely be able to push the United Nations to recognize Palestine as well. The president would not need permission from Congress or Israel, despite the fact that Israeli troops remain in control of most Palestinian territory."Even if the exact borders haven't been defined, Israel was recognized as a state without defined borders, so it's not an insurmountable obstacle," said Khaled Elgindy, former adviser to Palestinian negotiators and current head of the Program on Palestine and Israeli-Palestinian Affairs at the Middle East Institute in Washington.Biden is unlikely to make such a drastic move. His administration has opposed steps as basic as a ceasefire in Gaza, while running past Congress to flood Israel with generous military assistance, including ammunition refills and targeting support. Although Biden administration officials have portrayed themselves as helpless bystanders to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, trying their best to create the conditions for a solution, experts and former officials say that the administration has a variety of tools it has so far chosen not to use — both diplomatic recognition and other moves short of it."On the ground in Palestine," recognition of a Palestinian state "would not change too much," argued human rights lawyer Zaha Hassan, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "It would likely change how third states deal with the issues following on the U.S. lead, however."U.S. State Department official Josh Paul had resigned from his post last October over concerns that the "expanded and expedited provision of lethal arms to Israel...would only lead to more and deeper suffering for both the Israeli and the Palestinian people." In an essay published by the Los Angeles Times last month, Paul called on the Biden administration to recognize Palestine and endorse Palestinian statehood at the UN Security Council as the "first step" to a new peace process.The United States previously blocked the Palestinian Authority's bid for full UN membership in 2014. (It currently has a non-voting, observer seat.) Paul told Responsible Statecraft that no permanent member of the Security Council "would veto a U.S.-supported candidacy for Palestine."Everything from water rights to the use of radio waves and airspace over Israel and Palestine "would become negotiations between two equal parties rather than concessions from the occupier to the occupied," Paul said. "For many of these there are international arbitration fora that exist that would suddenly apply."Making Palestine a full member of the United Nations would render Israel "a state engaged in aggression against another member state" under the UN Charter, said Hassan, the lawyer. That could have immediate effects under American law. The Arms Export Control Act, which regulates American weapons sales and military aid, requires foreign buyers to use American-made weapons for "legitimate self-defense" in line with the UN Charter.After the Israeli air force bombed an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, the Reagan administration temporarily suspended fighter jet shipments to Israel on the grounds that Israel had exceeded the limits of self-defense. If Palestine were recognized as a separate country from Israel, similar calculations may come into play.However, it "really depends on the parameters of that recognition decision and what Israeli action we're talking about," said former State Department lawyer Brian Finucane, now a Crisis Group adviser. The United States could interpret Palestine's borders and Israel's right to self-defense in a way that continues to allow for broad Israeli military action.Another immediate impact of recognition would be allowing Palestine to open an embassy in America. Previously, Palestinian diplomats were based in the Palestine Liberation Organization offices in Washington, which the Trump administration shut down in 2018. If Palestine were a state, it could open an embassy protected by international law."However, Palestine might not want to do that unless the president also stops treating the PLO/PA officials as terrorists," said Hassan. The administration could waive immigration restrictions on Palestinian officials, but those officials may still be on the hook for civil lawsuits over violence against Israelis, due to the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act, passed by Congress in 2018.On top of the terrorism sanctions, any future U.S. administration could de-recognize the Palestinian government, warned Finucane, so "you need some kind of political consensus supporting" Palestinian independence to make it last. From the 1990s onwards, U.S. policy has been to support a Palestinian state as the end result of negotiations, not beforehand."It would almost certainly create a crisis in the bilateral relationship with Israel, which is the fundamental reason why it wouldn't happen," said Elgindy, the former adviser.However, Elgindy insisted that there are measures short of recognition that the Biden administration could take. Biden has so far imposed visa bans on Israeli settler vigilantes who commit violence against Palestinian civilians. He could push more serious economic sanctions against the settlements. Elgindy pointed out that several American charities funnel money to the settlements, and Biden could easily revoke their tax-exempt status. Several New York state legislators are pushing for that measure.Biden has also declined to reverse some of the Trump administration's moves entrenching Israeli legal control over the Palestinian territories. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had issued a memo declaring that Israeli settlements are not "per se inconsistent with international law," and ordered U.S. customs authorities to label settlement products "made in Israel." Biden's State Department has not reversed either decision.U.S. military aid to Israel is often cited by critics as another point of leverage that the United States refuses to use. Congress currently budgets around $3 billion a year in aid to Israel and is considering $14.5 billion in additional aid this year. There are signs Biden would have a willing partner in Congress if he decided to restrict that aid. Almost every single Democrat in the Senate has signed on to an amendment that would add endorsement of a two-state solution to the military aid package."Step One is the realization that there isn't a military solution to this, and that only addressing the political dimension is going to resolve that. Right now, they're doing both. They're saying there is a military solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, but we also want to have a diplomatic solution. You can't really do both. It doesn't make any sense," Elgindy said. "Maybe they think that they mean it, but in reality, they are creating the conditions that make a diplomatic settlement almost impossible."Faced with the tradeoff between military and diplomatic measures, Biden is committed to continuing the Israeli war."You cannot say there's no Palestinian state at all in the future. And that's going to be the hard part," Biden said at a December campaign event. "But in the meantime, we're not going to do a damn thing other than protect Israel in the process. Not a single thing."

Klimaforandring er et enormt problem for styring, koordinering og incitamentskabelse. For at nå vores klimamål kræver det et langvarigt samarbejde mellem mennesker. Dette omfatter en lang række styringsniveauer, der spænder fra ikke-statslige, subnationale, nationale og internationale aktører. Parisaftalen, den første multilaterale miljøaftale, bygger på en bottom-up og decentral koordinering mellem alle disse aktører. Denne decentraliserede styringstilgang muliggjorde gennembruddet i klimaforhandlingerne men udgør også en enorm ledelses- og styringsudfordring. Tidligere klimastyringssystemer, såsom Kyoto-protokollens mekanismer, var alle centralt koordineret og førte til fragmenterede og ensartede systemdesigns. For at muliggøre en effektiv koordinering af klimaindsatsen på tværs af styringsniveauerne skal disse systemer bindes sammen for at eliminere informationsasymmetri samt skabe gennemsigtighed og tillid. I denne sammenhæng nævnes blockchain ofte som en lovende teknologi. Dog er blockchain stadig en ny og ofte misforstået teknologi der skaber både hype og antagonisme. Denne afhandling har til formål at analysere denne teknologi baseret på en systematisk tilgang til at forstå hvad den kunne bruges til og hvor den ikke bør anvendes. Afhandlingen fokuserer på anvendelsesmuligheder inden for rammerne af Parisaftalen, navnligt CO2-markedsmekanismer og energieffektivitet. En detaljeret forståelse af de specifikke anvendelsesbetingelser er bydende nødvendigt, da blockchain med rette kritiseres for at være en teknologi på jagt efter efter anvendelse. Derfor skal betingelserne for at anvende en blockchain-løsning være stærkt begrundede, da teknologien medfører betydelige afvejninger sammenlignet med konventionelle databasesystemer. Teknologien bør kun anvendes hvis blockchain er den eneste løsning til at udvikle nye økonomiske- eller styringsmodeller, eller som minimum føre til en betydelig forbedring i forbindelse med automatisering og transaktionseffektivitet. For at foretage denne systematiske vurdering fremfører denne afhandling nogle kriterier og en beslutningsramme for at evaluere om det er gavnligt at anvende blockchain-teknologien, og i så fald, hvilken type blockchain er mest nyttig. Dernæst trækker afhandlingen denne beslutningsramme ud over de forskellige anvendelser inden for kulstofmarkeder og energieffektivitet. På baggrund af denne evaluering fastslås det at anvendelse af blockchain-teknologien på disse brugstilfælde er nyttig. Analysen viser også at valget af blockchain-design, eksempelvis i forhold til de gavnlige teknologiske egenskaber og styringstyper, varierer væsentligt. Der er således ikke tale om en ensartet blockchain der "passer til alt", men derimod at den pågældende anvendelse i hvert enkelt tilfælde resulterer i et særskilt blockchain-design. Efter at have bekræftet brugsrelevansen for blockchain ved brugstilfælde inden for rammerne af Parisaftalen, kom spørgsmålet om "hvordan denne teknologi kan bruges til at skabe reel forandring og fremskynde koordineringen af klimahandlinger?" Parisaftalen består af et betydeligt antal aktører med vidt forskelligartede kapaciteter og interesser. Disse kapaciter spænder fra aktører med et stort fravær af teknologisk eller organisatorisk parathed til at kunne gennemføre klimaregnskaber samt inddrage blockchain-teknologi, over til aktører med meget avancerede handlemuligheder. Som følge deraf udviser aktører også forskellighed i deres åbenhed over for forandring, alt fra en parathed til at tage tigerspring ind i nye teknologier, og i den anden ende en teknologisk fastlåshed og stiafhængighed. På samme måde varierer interesserne og de økonomiske incitamenter blandt aktørerne meget. Denne heterogenitet blandt aktørerne er allerede evident på den politiske forhandlingsscene, hvor nationale parter hidtil ikke har kunnet nå til enighed omkring regelbogen for de nye mekanismer for kulstofmarkedet (Artikel 6). I dette heterogene og politiske miljø ville anvendelse af en blockchain-applikation være gavnlig, men vedtagelsen og innovationen kompliceres af de mange forskellige aktørers kapacitet og interesser. Blockchain er en teknologi der formes af det miljø, hvor det anvendes, og derefter fungerer som en platform der muliggør ledelse af det pågældende miljø. Disse indbyrdes afhængigheder mellem blockchainen og dets adoptionsmiljø afføder nye teoretiske overvejelser for adoption og innovation af blockchain-teknologien. På trods af disse kompleksiteter og usikkerheder er det nødvendigt at indtænke blockchain-teknologien til at fremskynde og muliggøre en accelereret klimahandling. Vi befinder os i en afgørende tid hvor de nuværende konventionelle systemer og teknologier ikke er i stand til at levere den nødvendige koordinering til at opnå vores klimamål. Vi er i gang med at skabe fremtidens systemer og arkitekturer; post-2020-systemerne. Dette giver os mulighed for at overgå fra manuelle og analoge processer til automatiserede og digitale designs, aktiveret af nye teknologier, såsom blockchain-teknologien. ; Climate change is an enormous governance, coordination and incentive challenge. To achieve our climate goals, a multitude of governance levels, ranging from non-state, to sub-national, to national and to international actors need to collaborate over a long-time period. The Paris Agreement, as the first multilateral environmental agreement, is built on bottom-up and decentralized coordination among all of these actors. This decentralized governance approach enabled the breakthrough in climate negotiations but also posed an immense governance challenge. Previous climate governance systems, such as the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, were all centrally coordinated and led to the establishment of fragmented and heterogeneous system designs. To enable the effective coordination of climate action through governance, these systems need to be connected to eliminate information asymmetry and create transparency and trust. In this context, blockchain is frequently mentioned as a promising technology. However, blockchain is still a new and often misunderstood technology, causing both hype and antagonism. This thesis analyses this technology based on a systematic approach to understanding what it could and what it shouldn't be used for. The thesis focuses on use cases inside the Paris Agreement, namely carbon market mechanisms and energy efficiency. A detailed understanding of the specific case requirements is critical as blockchain is rightfully criticised as a technology in search of use cases. Accordingly, the case requirements need to provide a strong justification for a blockchain application as the technology comes with significant trade-offs compared to conventional database systems. Only if blockchain is the sole technological solution to develop novel economic or governance models or significantly improves automation and transaction efficiency should it be applied. For this systematic assessment, the thesis develops criteria and a decision framework to evaluate if a blockchain application is beneficial and, if so, what type of blockchain is most feasible. As a next step, the thesis applies this framework to the different carbon market and energy cases. This evaluation establishes that a blockchain application towards these cases is suitable. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that the blockchain design, e.g. in terms of beneficial technological features and governance type, vary substantially. Hence, there is no uniform blockchain that "suits all", but each case requirement results in a distinct blockchain design. After confirming the relevance of blockchain for cases inside the Paris Agreement, the question became, "how can this technology be used to have an actual impact and accelerate climate action coordination?" The Paris Agreement consists of a vast number of actors with very different capacities and interests. Such capacities range from almost no technological or organisational capacities to conduct climate accounting and adopt blockchain technology to very advanced actors. Consequently, actors also show diverse attitudes manifesting in openness to leapfrog into new technologies or technology lock-in and path-dependence. Similarly, the interests and economic incentives among actors vary widely. This actor heterogeneity was already expressed at the political and negotiation stage, where national Parties could thus far not agree on the rulebook for the new carbon market mechanisms (Article 6). A blockchain application would be beneficial in this heterogeneous and political environment, but its adoption and innovation is complicated by the diverse range of actors' capacities and interests. Blockchain is a technology that is shaped by its application environment and then acts as a platform to enable governance of that environment — these blockchain inherent interdependencies with its adoption environment present novel theoretical considerations for blockchain adoption and innovation. Despite these complexities and uncertainties, blockchain needs to be considered to enable and accelerate climate action. We are at a crucial time where the established legacy systems and technologies are insufficient to provide the coordination needed to achieve our climate goals. We are currently designing the systems and architectures of the future, the post-2020 systems. This allows the transition from manual and analogue processes into automated and digital designs, enabled by emerging technologies, such as blockchain.

"Aryanization" is the Nazi term for the cheap purchase of Jewish firms during the Third Reich with the ultimate goal of eliminating Jews from the German economy. Eleven of the largest such companies in Germany are examined in this dissertation and a noticeable pattern becomes evident. In an atmosphere of anti-Semitism, conservative non-Nazi businessmen approached Germany's three largest banks to request that they withdraw existing loans from the Hermann Tietz department store chain. Although this study focuses on the large Hermann Tietz and Leonhard Tietz retailers, it presents a new paradigm of Aryanization through analyses of the patterns of acquisition of massive publishing houses, as well as an enormous private bank, brewery, and gun manufacturer. The financial institutions participated because they earned fees, appointed bank executives to the formerly Jewish firms' Supervisory Boards and became the house bank conducting all future transactions. Courts were unwilling to intervene in the coerced acquisitions, because they shared the same conservative mindset as the businessmen and financial institutions. By focusing on the Jewish enterprises, it appears that the largest enterprises were frequently purchased in 1933-1935, whereas the tiny "Mom-and-Pop-shops" usually went out-of-business in 1938. This insight has not been noticed by the traditional model, since it does not differentiate between large and small companies. The cheap purchase of Jewish-owned companies occurred throughout the 1933 through 1938 timeframe. Saul Friedländer keenly observed a radical break in its implementation during these six pre-war years, with the pre-1936 period being a time of "relative moderation." He discerned a "new phase on the internal German scene" in 1936 in its manner of actualization, which had profound consequences. The 1936 break in the style of execution occurred due to Germany's economic growth and return to full employment as well as Göring's appointment to the Four Year Plan to prepare the nation for war. With regard to the Jewish citizens, the resulting "internal radicalization" in 1936 necessitated that in the opinion of the Reich "their assets [be] impounded for the benefit of German rearmament." Furthermore, Schacht's dismissal in 1938 also contributed to the Government replacing private opportunists as the key player in Aryanization. There were two periods of Aryanization. The 1933-1935 period, discussed in this dissertation, was characterized by an ad-hoc private initiative perpetrated by non-Nazi businessmen. In contrast, the 1936-1938 period was an organized state activity leading to the exclusion of Jewish businessmen from the German economy.Many historians have successfully elucidated the later 1936 through 1938 period of Aryanization directed from Berlin for the benefit of the state or private parties. By observing that the largest of Jewish-owned companies were taken during the earlier 1933 through 1935 period, this dissertation would like to make a contribution to scholarship. The responsibility for the 1933-1935 Aryanizations is placed firmly on the private sector, rather than on either the Nazi political party or on the central government in Berlin as has been characterized for the 1936-1938 timeframe. Another comprehensive break in the Aryanization process was the later focus on tens of thousands of mid-sized and small businesses as contrasted with the earlier conglomerates. The later timeframe additionally also concentrated on houses, apartments, acreage and even synagogues. This coincides with Friedländer's far-reaching break between the two periods of Aryanization. Although the following quotation concerns the difference between the prices paid for large versus small firms, perhaps Friedländer could accept my interpretative inclusions, which coincide with my perspective: "As noted in chapter 1 , recent research indicates that the considerable scope of [later] Aryanization at the medium- and small-business level was not indicative of the [earlier] situation at the higher level of the economy." The interpretive adaptation of Friedländer illustrates that although this dissertation is indebted to him for an Aryanization paradigm, with a thoroughgoing differentiation before and after 1936, there are some significant contributions in this research. Another such example concerns the role of Conservatives in the process of expropriating Jewish companies. Friedländer viewed Conservatives, such as Schacht, as a protection for the continuation of Jewish ownership or at least that fair market value would be offered. However, research uncovered in this dissertation indicated that in the earlier 1933-1935 period, Conservative businessmen without any capital were extended loans by Conservative bankers to coerce a sale in which Conservative judges were unwilling to ensure that justice was achieved. For the most part, one does not find documentation in the archives concerning the earlier 1933-1935 intervention by Adolf Hitler, Hermann Goering, or Rudolf Hess in the seizure of large Jewish-owned department stores, publishing houses, banks, and breweries. Instead, the key participants in the acquisition of such non-Gentile firms are non-NSDAP Party members, such as Joachim Tiburtius, Georg Karg, Max Winkler, Walther Frisch and Herbert Hoffmann. In Chapter III Section B4, this Dissertation has discovered and extrapolated on the venomous feature articles and lampoons beginning in December 1927 by Propaganda Minister Goebbels. However, my research process actually began by means of a different approach. In 2010, Business Historian Jeff Fear recommended that I begin my Aryanization research by reading microfilm on Hermann Göring's Four Year Plan. Two significant differences immediately emerged between my 1933-1935 bottom-up approach in the investigation of seizing Jewish firms and a later top-down procedure. First, I discovered that in building his financial colossus, Göring had not depended upon acquiring firms from the consumer sector as the private Aryanizers did. Göring's NSDAP-inspired technique involved acquiring control over firms in the Autobahn construction, car manufacturing and synthetic fuel and fiber replacement industries. Second, following Friedländer's observation, Göring's Four Year Plan commenced in 1936, which was after the timeframe from 1933 to 1935 in which the major Jewish companies had been "purchased." Private "purchases" of Jewish-owned businesses for personal benefit occurred years before Göring's acquisition of war-related industries for the state's benefit. The Dissertation does not seek to answer the question of whether comparatively smaller private sector Aryanizations influenced the later NSDAP's public infrastructure acquisitions. In addition, neither Friedländer nor I attempt to address the quantitative issues of what percentage of rearmament funding originated with Hjalmar Schacht's Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft promissory notes (also known as Mefo bills) as opposed to the requisition of Jewish assets. The hesitancy to be more quantitatively precise in both Aryanization and the funding of German rearmament is indirectly acknowledged by Friedländer's admission: "It is difficult to assess what was paid. to the tens of thousands of Jewish owners." This dissertation merely seeks to contribute to the understanding of early Aryanization. Neither the Aryanization by the state or by private individuals in the later 1936-1938 period are addressed. Numerous other economic issues remain for future research, including other private to public transitions such as the private pre-1933 building of the Autobahn to the later Organisation Todt construction of the roads. One of the three largest financial organizations was the Dresdner Bank. Its executive Karl Rasche was made a scapegoat by his firm in the subsequent war-crimes trials at Nuremberg. In contrast, little is known about other Dresdner Bank executives, not to mention the numerous local bank managers who organized lists of local businessmen seeking a quick profit. Similarly, little is known about German businessmen, who were not Nazi Party members, but who nevertheless took advantage of the political circumstances to enrich themselves. Germans viewed post-war de-Nazification proceedings as "victor justice," and thus these post-war processes are replete with whitewashed assessments of how German businessmen acquired Jewish firms. Since the original Jewish proprietors were usually unaware of the confidential negotiations between the three banks and the new Gentile owners, the restitution trials are often unhelpful to the historian. Nevertheless the common perspective of a "perpetrator" as one carrying a weapon, is expanded to include "ordinary" non-Nazi businessmen who enriched themselves at Jewish expense.

AbstractThe Point of a Politeia: Changing Conceptions of Regimen and Regime from 450 to 350 BCEbyDerin Bennet McLeodDoctor of Philosophy in ClassicsUniversity of California, BerkeleyProfessor G.R.F. (John) Ferrari, Chair This dissertation provides a conceptual history of politeia from its origins in the second half of the fifth century BCE down through the middle of the fourth century BCE. In the period under consideration, politeia shows a wide range of meanings. It can describe the function or condition of a politēs ('citizenship') or his activities ('daily life of a citizen') but also the 'government or administration' of a city or the 'constitution' or 'form of government' of a city. In order to explain this pattern of usage, building on the methodological insights Reinhart Koselleck, Quentin Skinner, and R.G. Collingwood as discussed in the introduction, I explain why and to what ends people began and continued to talk about politeia. In chapter one, I suggest that people first began talking about politeia in the context of descriptions of the supposedly unusual features of the Spartan way of life, which they said were part of the Spartan politeia. Building on tropes of sympotic literature that discussed sympotic practices as a mode of ethical orientation, they sought to intervene in ubiquitous debates about the merits of nomos as opposed to physis. Politeia, and more particularly Lacedaimoniōn Politeia—the "title" for such works—provided a third banner in such debates and a way of responding to the individualist concern with control and independence associated with praise of physis. They did so by pointing out the importance of things outside a person's control, especially his breeding and education, in forming that person and making him and all those like him best and strongest in the way those praising physis claimed to want to be. In chapter two, I argue that precisely such controversies lie behind Herodotus' unexpected use of the term politeia in his stories of the seers Teisamenos and Hegesistratus (Hdt. 9.33-37). The stories, read alongside other passages in the History, reflect Herodotus' skepticism about both the unmitigated drive for control and independence associated with physis and the notion that a person could only be shaped by an extended, arduous process outside his control. Furthermore, details in the story of Teisamenos direct our attention to the similarity between the promises of the Lacedaimoniōn Politeiai and the position of the dual Spartan kings, each of whom would be superlative. I argue that the Spartan kings help us see a problem with the promises of the Lacedaimoniōn Politeiai: for one person to be the best or the strongest he must be better than others. I finally argue that the Constitutional Debate (Hdt. 3.80-82), though decidedly not conceived as being about politeiai, suggests the importance of having a ruling entity that is at once both unified and plural. In chapter three, I consider how politeia as a heading for descriptions of all the features of Spartan life came also to center more particularly on who ruled in a city. I suggest that in the Old Oligarch we can see a plausible explanation: when the question at the heart of the Lacedaimoniōn Politeiai—how did these people become so powerful—was asked about the people of Athens, the answer couldn't be in virtue of their breeding or education because aristocratic audiences assumed that the Athenian dēmos lacked any sort of breeding or education. The answer therefore had to be that they were powerful just in virtue of their position in the city; from that position they could shape all the elements of civic life at issue in the Lacedaimoniōn Politeiai but would not be shaped by them. By contrast, the funeral oration that Thucydides puts in Pericles' mouth (Th. 2.35-46) encourages the people of Athens to focus on their power but to conceive their power not in terms of ruling or setting the terms of civic life but rather in realizing their interests. It further tries to help them see those interests not just as material advantage but as realized by becoming better versions of themselves through conscious love for the city and its empire rather than unconscious subjection to civic norms as in the Lacedaimoniōn Politeiai. In the remainder of the history, and especially in book eight, Thucydides suggests that by 411 the Periclean vision had been supplanted by the promise of one group ruling over others to its own advantage. This matches what we can see of thinking about politeia in oratory from around 411. In chapter four, I argue that Aristophanes' Acharnians, Knights, and Wasps take up the appeal of ruling for members of a group such as the Athenian dēmos and humorously exploitation of the tension between the appeal of the dēmos as a group ruling and of the members of the dēmos severally doing so. While only the dēmos as a collective could rule, these plays stage fantasies of each member of the dēmos himself ruling, either by identifying with the corporate person of the dēmos or, more preposterously, by imagining himself taking on that role in his own person. In chapter five, I explore the continuation into the fourth century of the focus on the ruling group in talking about politeia. I first argue that fourth-century Attic oratory continues the pattern, identified in book eight of Thucydides and in late fifth-century oratory, of talking about politeia as the power of ruling, the fact of a particular group wielding that power, or the group of individuals wielding that power. I also argue that this focus makes sense in the context of the orators' concern, described especially by Josh Ober, to create an ideology that levels on the political field the imbalance between speakers and jurymen or members of the assembly on the social field. I also demonstrate that there is a similar pattern of use in treaties from the first half of the fourth century and suggest that the importance of treating the contracting parties as much like natural people as possible explains the tendency to talk of politeia as just the group in charge of a city. I finally discuss the use of politeia to describe the honorary status conferred on foreigners, which, while it falls outside the dissertation's main narrative of political reflection and activity would be prominent down through the Hellenistic and Roman times. Finally, in chapter six, I take up Plato's response, in his Republic (Politeia) to these earlier traditions. I argue that the motivating challenges of the Republic—above all Thrasymachus' statements about civic structure and how people should behave within that structure as well as their restatement in Glaucon's challenge—represent for the reader the danger of the focus on the ruling group and its connection to the selfish individualism of those who praised physis as a guide for action. I further suggest that the response to these challenges—the politeia described in the central books—is best understood as elaborating or repurposing elements of thinking about politeia already in the air. The focus on the musical education of the guards helps us further see the importance of forces working on people unawares. And the description of the creation and civic situation of the philosopher-rulers amounts to a recommitment to the importance of who rules but with an entirely new sense of what should make someone a ruler and of what the activity of ruling properly consists. I finally argue Isocrates' later epideictic speeches explicitly argue against Plato's new vision of rulers and for something like the popular conception of politeia.

Tese apresentada à Universidade Fernando Pessoa como parte dos requisitos para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Ciências Sociais, especialidade em Serviço Social ; Apesar da visibilidade crescente da Nova Administração Pública (NAP) e das agências reguladoras, permanecem por responder algumas interrogações cruciais sobre como respeitar os padrões adequados de ―Value for Money‖ (VFM) na utilização de recursos públicos. Esta tese pretende explorar o impacto das agências reguladoras na problemática da ―accountability‖ e da gestão de recursos públicos através de uma análise critica das instituições de auditoria na prossecução de VFM de acordo com a teoria da NAP. A tese envereda, ainda, por uma análise crítica da posição dos cidadãos no contexto da atividade desempenhada pelas agências reguladoras. O contexto tanzaniano foi abordado através de uma estratégia de investigação qualitativa, comênfase nas entrevistas, questionários e análise documental, com o propósito de testar a validade das perguntas de partida. Os resultados revelaram que a Tanzânia adotou o modelo de NPA e criou, nessa conformidade, várias agências reguladoras. Todavia, tratou-se da adoção parcial do modelo de NAP. Apesar das reformas empreendidas, tem-se notado o crescimento de fraude, de irregularidades várias, de corrupção e uma utilização ineficiente de recursos públicos. Constatou-se que a adoção da NAP e a criação de agências reguladoras não contribuíram para o aumento do poder das entidades de supervisão financeira do setor público nem para o aumento dos padrões de ―accountability‖. Um fator com peso que diminui o alcance de VFM é o elevado nível de dependência política das entidades responsáveis pela provisão de serviços públicos. Os resultados revelaram ainda que as entidades de supervisão financeira do setor público têm muita utilidade para assegurar VFM na utilização de recursos públicos. No entanto, as instituições de auditoria tanzanianas confrontam-se com vários desafios que dificultam a execução cabal dos seus deveres profissionais. Estas entidades encontram-se divididas entre acautelar interesses políticos e interesses dos cidadãos. Por exemplo, os dirigentes das instituições de supervisão financeira na Tanzânia são nomeados pelo governo e dele dependem em larga medida,o que coloca em risco a sua independência política. O modelo das agências reguladoras tanzanianas inclui consultores financeiros com ligações ao governo e não verdadeiras instituições de supervisão financeira do setor público. Apesar do Controllerand Auditor Generaldispor de um mandato constitucional para auditar o setor público, não dispõe de poderes de verificação das suas recomendações. A tese considera, por conseguinte, que as entidades de supervisão financeira do setor público tanzaniano têm poderes limitados. Não obstante a Constituição exigir que o governo seja ―accountable‖ junto dos cidadãos e que haja abertura à intervenção dos cidadãos na gestão dos assuntos públicos, o modelo das agências reguladoras da Tanzânia, assim como o seu enquadramento legal e o sistema de ―accountability‖, ignoram a intervenção dos cidadãos. ; Despite the increased visibility of the adoption of New Public Management (NPM) and agencification, the key questions regarding the achievement of Value for Money (VFM) in the utilization of public resources remain unanswered. This dissertation intended to produce evidence on the impact of agencification on accountability and management of public resources. It critically analyzes the usefulness of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) in assuring VFM in the utilization of public resources according to the NPM doctrine. It also provides a critical analysis of the position of the public in the agencification framework. Qualitative research strategy was used to analyze the Tanzanian framework, and in particular in-depth interviews, questionnaires, and documentary analysis, to confirm the initial research assumptions. Findings revealed that Tanzania has embraced NPM and agencification. However, the country has partially implemented the NPM doctrine. Despite the reforms, fraud, irregularities, corruption, and inefficient use of resources are growing. NPM and agencification have not largely improved public watchdogs' power in addressing accountability issues. One major factor that hinders the achievement of VFM is that the service delivery machinery has been highly politicized and becomes part of the political system. Findings reveal that public financial watchdogs are exceptionally useful in assuring VFM in the utilization of public resources. However, Tanzania's SAI is facing a number of challenges that resulted in the unsuccessful execution of professional duties. Watchdog institutions are facing the risk of balancing political interests and the interests of the public. For instance, the heads of Tanzania's public financial watchdog institutions are appointed and largely obey to the government and not to the public. This puts in jeopardy their expected independence status. Thus, Tanzania's agencification and accountability framework comprises ―government financial consultants‖ and not ―public financial watchdog institutions‖. Although the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) is constitutionally mandated to audit the public sector, it is not mandated to follow-up and to enforce audit recommendations. This dissertation considers Tanzania's public watchdog institutions as toothless public financial watchdog institutions. Regardless that the Constitution requires the government to be accountable to the people and to be open to the people's participation in public affairs, Tanzania's agencification, legal and accountability frameworks ignore the involvement of the public. ; Malgré l'augmentation de la visibilité de l'adoption de la Nouvelle Gestion Publique (NGP) et des agences de régulations, les questions clés concernant le respect des standards de « Value for Money » (VFM) dans l'utilisation des ressources publiques restent sans réponse. L'objectif de cette thèse est d'analyser l'impact des agences de régulation sur la problématique de l'«accountability» et de la gestion des ressources publiques à travers une analyse critique de l'utilité des Institutions de Surveillance pour assurer une VFM dans l'utilisation des ressources publiques en suivant la doctrine de la NGP. La thèse présente aussi une analyse critique de la position du public face aux activités effectuées par les agences de régulation. La recherche qualitative a été utilisée comme stratégie pour analyser le contexte de la Tanzanie, et en particulier les interviews approfondies, les questionnaires et l'analyse documentaire, pour confirmer les hypothèses initiales de recherche. Les résultats ont révélé que la Tanzanie a adopté la NGP et l'agencement. Cependant, il ne s'agit que d'une mise en oeuvre partielle du modèle de NGP. Malgré les réformes, la fraude, les irrégularités, la corruption, et l'utilisation inefficace des ressources augmentent de plus en plus. L'adoption de la NGP et la création des agences de régulation n'ont pas amélioré le pouvoir des institutions publiques de surveillance ni traité les problématiques liées à l'«accountability». Un facteur important qui entrave la réalisation de NGP est le fait que le mécanisme de prestation de services a été très politisé et devient partie intégrante du système politique. Les résultats révèlent que des garde-fous dans la gestion des finances publiques sont particulièrement utiles pour assurer une NGP dans l'utilisation des ressources publiques. Cependant, les institutions tanzaniennes de surveillance sont confrontées à des défis qui ont abouti à une exécution sans succès de ses devoirs professionnels. Elles sont partagées entre les intérêts politiques et les intérêts publics. A titre d'exemple, en Tanzanie, les chefs des institutions financières publiques de surveillance n'obéissent pas aux intérêts publics mais plutôt au gouvernement qui les nomme. Ceci met en péril leur statut d'indépendance présumée. Ainsi, le modèle tanzanien des agences de régulations et de «accountability» inclut les «consultants financiers du gouvernement» mais pas les «institutions de contrôle des finances publiques ». Bien que la Constitution donne mandat à la «Cours des Comptes» pour auditer le secteur public, cette dernière ne dispose pas de pouvoir pour suivre et appliquer les recommandations des audits. Cette thèse considère les institutions publiques de vigilance de la Tanzanie disposent des pouvoirs assez limités. En dépit du fait que la Constitution oblige le gouvernement à rendre compte à la population et lui ouvrir une participation à la gestion des affaires publiques, le cadre juridique des agences de régulation et de l'«accountability» en Tanzanie ignore complétement la participation des citoyens.

This research is based on a simple puzzle. France is supposed to be a very State-centred society with a sharp divide between the private and the public and an early rationalized bureaucracy (which is supposed to include law and justice). In addition, the 19th century could be seen as the paroxysm of this tendency, as guilds, trade unions, and all sorts of " medium bodies " based on a common occupation were theoretically forbidden from 1791 to 1884. And yet France has had commercial courts since the 16th century, i.e. special courts with lay judges elected by fellow " merchants "; and the century that I study is arguably the moment when they were the less criticized, when they dealt with the most cases and when they were considered as a model in many if not all foreign countries. What I wish to understand is therefore both the very long-term persistence of this institution and its special situation at this moment in time. What I study is not commercial courts per se, but a French model of peer judgement, as it was something that was considered as a model to be followed by many actors, and as what was to be followed was an ideal-type, not a specific, precise institution. The model consists in the simultaneous presence of four characteristics: there were only lay judges; they were, in principle, elected by peers on the basis of a common economic activity; they used a procedure that was specific and supposedly simpler than that of normal courts; but the special courts were an integral part of the official justice system. What I want to understand is how this model worked, especially in relationship to French political and economic peculiarities (how it relied on them/how it contributed in shaping them), and particularly how it could survive the important political and economic changes of my period. My puzzle is all the more relevant because of the weaknesses of parts of the literature addressing the resolution of commercial disputes, namely the " legal traditions " school (that neglects the existence of commercial courts in the " civil law " context) and most of the discussions of " lex mercatoria " (that describes the emergence of a " private " law and of " private " but organized forms of justice or arbitration as a natural process). More generally, I question the representation of the public and the private as a simple dichotomy or a continuous scale, and I emphasize the need for a study of different forms of " co-regulation " that all mix " private " and " public " elements, but in different ways. I argue that the French model of peer judgement is part of a specific form of relationships that I call " putting the private in the State ": putting people that are legitimized as experts of economic activities because they are themselves merchants/bankers/even workers, etc. in official positions, as experts of these activities. This is different from other ways to articulate the private and the public, for example from sanction by the State of privately organized regulations (e.g. professional rules, arbitration awards). I establish this by studying the practices of French courts at a macro scale, linking them to discourses about the institution, and comparing them to practices in England and the State of New York and to discussions about the introduction of commercial courts on the French model that took place there in the 1850s-1870s. ; Les principaux résultats de cette recherche portent, d'une part, sur les mécanismes qui permettent l'adaptation et la reproduction, à très long terme, de ce que j'ai appelé un modèle français de jugement des pairs, d'autre part sur les relations entre droit et économie que fait apparaître l'étude des pratiques liées à ce modèle. Par " modèle français de jugement des pairs ", je désigne l'association de quatre traits : il s'agit de juridictions insérées dans le système judiciaire officiel, mais dont les juges sont élus, considérés comme pairs des parties parce qu'ils mènent le même type d'activités économiques, et dont les procédures sont simplifiées. Ces traits se retrouvent, au moins en principe, dans les tribunaux de commerce français ; ils sont considérés, à l'époque, comme un modèle possible (parmi d'autres) à l'étranger. Ils constituent aussi un modèle, en France même, pour de nouvelles institutions, notamment les conseils de prud'hommes, qui en viennent à fonctionner en système avec les tribunaux de commerce. La forte légitimité de ce modèle dans la France du 19e siècle est énigmatique à plus d'un titre, puisqu'il présente une hybridation entre des traits associés en général aux justices " publiques " ou " privées ", rationalisées ou d'Ancien régime. De plus, alors que de nos jours, nombre d'économistes affirment que la common law est intrinsèquement plus adaptée aux besoins de l'économie, l'adoption de tribunaux de pairs à la française était alors sérieusement discutée dans des régions très dynamiques économiquement comme l'Angleterre ou l'État de New York. Cette recherche souligne qu'il est pour le moins exagéré de parler, pour la période actuelle, d'une toute nouvelle " imbrication de l'économique et du judiciaire ", qui aurait remplacé une " méfiance traditionnelle du monde économique envers les juridictions ". Les situations en la matière, lorsque la révolution industrielle battait son plain, étaient radicalement différentes non seulement entre niveaux du commerce, mais aussi entre pays. Les marchands français étaient parmi ceux qui avaient le plus tôt " découvert le chemin des tribunaux ", comme ceux de New York (en tout cas les grands négociants parmi eux), mais à la différence - bien malgré eux - de ceux des grandes villes industrielles et portuaires anglaises. Mais l'essentiel n'était pas l'existence, en soi, de tribunaux à part pour le commerce, ou encore de tribunaux où des marchands étaient les juges. Ce qui fonde le modèle français de jugement des pairs, c'est, d'une part, le caractère généraliste de ces tribunaux, qui se veulent ceux de tout le " commerce ", malgré toutes les tensions qui existent en permanence entre la notion unitaire de commerce et celle plus fragmentée de " métiers ". C'est aussi, d'autre part, la notion de " fonctions gratuites ", un bénévolat de service public qui fait entrer de plain pied des pairs élus dans l'Etat, avec des conséquences tant pour la trajectoire ultérieure de ces pairs que pour l'Etat lui-même. Le modèle français de jugement des pairs, issu du monde des corporations, a dû s'adapter à leur disparition, ce qui a finalement placé les tribunaux de commerce, à leur tour, dans une position de pivot, tout en redéfinissant leur légitimité d'une manière compatible avec la nouvelle conception de l'Etat. En pratique, loin de rendre une justice toujours conciliatrice, experte et fondée en équité, comme on le pense souvent, ces tribunaux fondent leur légitimité sur l'existence en leur sein de plusieurs filières, plusieurs types de procédures bien distincts, que leurs juges considèrent comme adaptés aux différents types d'affaires dont ils ont à traiter et qui leur permettent en particulier de gérer la masse du contentieux des impayés. Quant aux justices " plus privées " que j'ai rencontrées au cours de cette recherche, notamment les instances d'arbitrage des associations de branches ou des chambres de commerce d'Angleterre et des Etats-Unis, leur création et leur maintien n'ont rien d'évident. En France, ces instances se sont même retrouvées associées aux tribunaux de commerce dans un rôle d'auxiliaires plutôt que concurrentes. Les faire vivre demande un travail institutionnel qui est resté hors de portée de la plupart de ceux qui l'ont entrepris au 19e siècle : elles ne sont pas le produit naturel de l'existence de " communautés " qui auraient intérêt à créer une " justice privée ".

The original justification for Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (the Directive) was to promote the growth of the European life science sector by harmonizing and clarifying European biotechnology patent laws. As early as 1985, the European Commission had identified the fragmentation of European patent laws as a potential problem. The Directive thus aimed to address obstacles to the unity of the internal market, which would arise if national Member States adopted divergent and uncoordinated policies and legislation in a field of economic activity that had been earmarked as poised for spectacular growth. The Commission further identified the lack of guidance within the European Patent Convention 1973 (EPC) on how its provisions were to be applied to biotechnological inventions meant that researchers were unsure if their work could be legally protected within Europe. The Commissions concerns were lent greater political urgency by three significant events that combined to establish the dominance of the United States (U.S.) biotechnology industry. First, biology researchers in the U.S. were increasingly developing new techniques that had substantial commercial application. Second, the U.S. Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to promote greater uniformity in the application of patent law and to reduce the possibility of forum shopping by parties seeking favorable courts. Thirdly, the landmark Supreme Court ruling in Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v Chakrabarty, took an important step towards patent liberalization by stating that living matter was not excluded as a 'product of nature' and that patents shall be available for 'anything under the sun made by man'. It was not long after the Chakrabarty decision that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) began issuing patents on gene fragments, transgenic bacteria, and cell lines expressing DNA sequences producing therapeutically useful proteins. A trend had been for European companies to move their biotechnology research from the European Union (EU) to the U.S. because they regarded the commercial and legal climate there as more encouraging. The Commission concluded that European biotechnology patent laws should be clarified and harmonized in order to provide the incentives and legal certainty required for the biotechnology industry to flourish. Given the nature of the objectives pursued, one might have expected that the drafting of the Directive would be a relatively straightforward administrative exercise in harmonizing the legal criteria of novelty, inventive step, and industrial application in the context of biotechnological inventions. Indeed, the first draft of the Directive framed the problem solely in these terms with the legal standards proposed largely reflecting the more permissive approach of the USPTO. The project soon ran into difficulties. The Directive differs in a key way from the approach of the U.S., as it establishes a prominent role for 'morality' as an evaluative criterion within European patent law. This unique stance emerged during extensive discussions between the Parliament, the Commission, and the Council, and was a political concession to the view expressed by the Parliament that the patenting of biological materials, in particular those of human origin, raises important ethical and social concerns. Attempts to address these anxieties resulted, inter alia, in the inclusion of a 'morality clause' in article 6 of the Directive. article 6(1) provides that inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality. article 6(2), intended to clarify how the general morality exclusion in article 6(1) should be applied, contains a list of specific examples of biotechnology inventions that are excluded from patentability on moral grounds. Ironically, it has been article 6(2) that has been the source of great uncertainties in the years since the Directive was enacted. In particular, questions regarding how article 6(2)(c), which excludes 'uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes' from patentability, should be applied in relation to patent applications for inventions concerning human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) have given rise to long-running legal, ethical, and policy debates. The debate revolves around the fact that article 6(2)(c) is silent with regard to hESCs. This is because the first ever isolation of hESCs from an embryo was reported four months after the adoption of the Directive. Although the Directive was 'addressed' only to EU Member States, the European Patent Office (EPO), which is independent of the EU, voluntarily incorporated the Directive's rules within the EPC. Thus moral exclusions are now a fixture of European patent law. Most patents in Europe are granted via the EPO; however, European patents must still be enforced in individual Member States who may interpret the Directive differently. Whereas the EPO has not granted any patents on hESC claims, an overview of EU Member States interpretation of article 6(2)(c) reveals a patchwork of permissive and restrictive regulatory policies towards the patentability of hESCs. In contrast to Europe, U.S. patent law contains no statutory basis for the USPTO or a court to deny patent protection to morally controversial biotech subject matter. The U.S. has adopted probably the most liberal patenting policies on stem cell research, with the USPTO granting in excess of forty-one patents that claim hESCs in their title and front pages. The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the inconsistent application of the EU Biotechnology Directive's moral exclusion clause could undermine investor confidence in Europe, providing a competitive advantage to the U.S. Understanding the science is essential for engaging in knowledgeable debate about the ethical issues surrounding hESCs. Part II provides an analysis of the biology that underpins the human embryo setting out the crucial distinction between totipotent and pluripotent hESCs. In Part III our attention turns to pre Directive jurisprudence under article 53(a) EPC, where the EPO showed a willingness to interpret the moral exclusion clause in a narrow manner that afforded patent protection to controversial biotechnology inventions. It was against the EPC framework and the jurisprudence emerging from the EPO that the Commission conceived the need for European biotechnology patent laws to be clarified and harmonized. Part IV charts the troublesome enactment and transposition of the Biotechnology Directive that exposed inherent European conflicts regarding patent protection for biotechnological inventions concerning 'living matter' of human origin. In Part V our focus turns to the subsequent emergence of hESC technology, providing an analysis of the post Directive EPO decision in Edinburgh Patent which set a precedent for the recent decision in Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) where the EPO moved away from its pre Directive narrow approach embracing a broad interpretation of the moral exclusion clause setting out a restrictive policy on the patentability of hESCs. Part VI analyses the patentability of hESCs at the national level, comparing the relatively permissive United Kingdom (UK) and Swedish regulatory approaches to the more restrictive German regime, a comparison that raises interesting questions as to the legal certainty of biotechnology inventions claiming hESCs within Europe. In Part VII our attention turns to the patentability of hESCs in the U.S. This section of the paper begins with an analysis of the Constitutional basis of U.S. patent law prior to setting out the link between 'utility' and 'morality' in U.S. patent law. Part VII then considers the liberation of U.S. patent law, the application of the Thirteenth Amendment to biotechnological inventions, along with the rejection of the doctrine of moral utility before finally examining the recent full frontal attack on biotechnology patents in the U.S. and the reinstatement of federal funding for hESC research.

The Situation In The Middle East Report Of The Secretary-General On The Implementation Of Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) And 2393 (2017) ; United Nations S/PV.8209 Security Council Seventy-third year 8209th meeting Monday, 19 March 2018, 3.20 p.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Van Oosterom . (Netherlands) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Shen Bo Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Tumysh Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Kuzmin Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie Provisional agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-07515 (E) *1807515* S/PV.8209 The situation in the Middle East 19/03/2018 2/3 18-07515 The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The President: The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor. Mr. Kuzmin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): As far as I know, today's meeting was not scheduled in the Security Council's agreed programme of work for this month. Our delegation would be extremely grateful to you, Mr. President, if you could explain what exactly we are supposed to discuss at today's meeting and whom the Council plans to invite as briefers. The President: The representative of France has asked for the floor. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): France and six other Council members asked for this briefing to be held for both functional and substantive reasons. With regard to the functional reasons, in order to act, the Council should have at its disposal all the information it needs to understand the crises it considers, including information on human rights. That is particularly the case with Syria, where, as we all know, the human rights dimension has been inextricably linked to the dynamics of the conflict from the outset. There have been other briefings by the High Commissioner for Human Rights on situations on the Council's agenda. Syria should not and cannot be an exception. That brings me to the basic reason for our collective request. Our last such briefing on Syria, by then-High Commissioner Navi Pillay, was in 2014. Human rights are a fundamental aspect of the crisis that the Council has not dealt with since then, even though violations of human rights are at the heart of the conflict and its intensification, to the detriment of international peace and security. The briefing we decided to call for will therefore complement those that have been devoted to the humanitarian, chemical and political situations in Syria. If we do not have an understanding of the human rights dimension of the conflict in Syria and the potential solution to it, we are simply being unrealistic and in denial. Who could understand it? The regime, along with other parties, especially Da'esh, has violated people's rights not just as a consequence of the fighting but by using such violations as a chosen, deliberate weapon and instrument of control over territories and populations. Lastly, human rights are inseparable from a political settlement of the conflict. If the Council wishes to commit in good faith to ensuring that the same atrocities are not repeated, it must contribute to a political solution based on a Syrian society that offers inclusion for all its sectors, as well as institutions that respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all Syrians. For all those reasons and others, France has called for this meeting and urges all members of the Council to express their willingness for it to be held. The President: The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor to make a further statement. Mr. Kuzmin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation is opposed to holding today's meeting, as we immediately informed our colleagues on Friday, 16 March. We see no justification for such a meeting, since human rights is not a subject on the Security Council's agenda. That is what the Human Rights Council deals with in its work in Geneva. The mere presence of Mr. Ra'ad Hussein in New York is not a convincing reason for him to brief the Security Council. However, as I understand it, the French delegation, along with a number of others, has already explained the real reasons behind today's meeting. They want to hear about how the Syrian regime, as they refer to it, is violating the rights of its own people. I note once again that their subject is that infamous regime, rather than the extremists whom they openly support and who have been terrorizing the people of Syria for eight years now. That only confirms our fears about the deeply politicized nature of this initiative, which has nothing to do with concern for the Syrians. We would also like to ask the Secretariat to explain the reason for circulating to delegations a note on human rights in Syria from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, despite the fact that we did not request that information. The United Nations system is not organized so that any United Nations body can send the Security Council any information it feels like. We believe that the Secretariat blindly obeyed the delegations that decided to hold this briefing, in violation of the division of labour among the main organs of our Organization, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. In the circumstances, we believe it essential to cancel the meeting and we are 19/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8209 18-07515 3/3 therefore obliged to ask the President to put the issue to a procedural vote. The President: In view of the request of the Russian Federation and the comments made by members of the Council, I intend to put the provisional agenda to the vote. I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Kuzmin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I would just like to explain that the item on our agenda, "The situation in the Middle East", is an existing agenda item and that of course we are not against it per se. What we are against is holding today's meeting in the format that has been proposed. Therefore, I would ask the President to formulate the question to reflect the fact this is a procedural vote. Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): The United States strongly supports the holding of today's meeting and urges all Council members to support the procedural vote in favour of proceeding as planned today. The Russian Federation's continued efforts to obstruct the Council's work and its attention to grave and systemic human rights violations by the Russian Federation's allies are appalling, and the Council should not allow them to stand. Mr. Shen Bo (China) (spoke in Chinese): The Charter of the United Nations clearly outlines the functions of and divisions of labour among all the main organs of the United Nations. The primary role of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security, not to consider human rights issues. Pushing the Security Council into discussing human rights issues erodes the functions of other United Nations organs and will not help us to find an effective solution to the issue. China opposes holding deliberations in the Security Council on such issues, and in particular on questions of human rights in Syria. The President: I would like to ask the representative of the Russian Federation to clarify what he wants to be put to a vote, if he wants a procedural vote. Mr. Kuzmin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We propose voting on whether the meeting should be held today or not. Obviously, we assume that the issue that should be put to the vote is whether today's meeting should be held in principle. We have not yet adopted the agenda for today's meeting. If we had, the meeting would take place. But that has not happened. The President: The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the provisional agenda for today's meeting. I shall put the provisional agenda to the vote now. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Against: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation Abstaining: Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia The President: The provisional agenda received 8 votes in favour, 4 votes against and 3 abstentions. The provisional agenda has not been adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. The meeting rose at 3.35 p.m.