Psychological Differentiation in Heroin Addicts
In: International journal of the addictions, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 151-159
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In: International journal of the addictions, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 151-159
In: Introduction to modern society series
In: 14(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 151-171 (2013)
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This paper analyses price competition between two firms producing horizontally and vertically differentiated goods. These are assumed to be credence goods, as consumers can hardly ascertain the quality of the commodities. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique price equilibrium and we characterize it. To illustrate the model, we adapt it to represent a newspapers' industry with two outlets, when the population of readers have preferences both on the political stance of the newspapers and on the accuracy of news they dispatch.
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This paper analyses price competition between two firms producing horizontally and vertically differentiated goods. These are assumed to be credence goods, as consumers can hardly ascertain the quality of the commodities. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique price equilibrium and we characterize it. To illustrate the model, we adapt it to represent a newspapers' industry with two outlets, when the population of readers have preferences both on the political stance of the newspapers and on the accuracy of news they dispatch.
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In: Routledge research in education Volume 181
1. The politics of differentiation -- 2. A politics of differentiation and pedagogy -- 3. A politics of differentiation and teacher expectations -- 4. A politics of differentiation and care -- 5. A politics of differentiation and curriculum -- 6. A politics of differentiation and culture -- 7. A politics of differentiation towards social justice.
In: Economics Letters, Band 174
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In: Policy research : the trends project series
By paying special attention to political processes, norms, and representations, and by indicating how social policies shape economic functioning and relate to normative definitions, this book will interest policy-oriented researchers and decision-makers
In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 1611-1619
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
In this paper, we study how input prices affect product differentiation in network industries. In particular, we study whether the principle of vertical differentiation (Choi and Shin 1992, "A Comment on a Model of Vertical Product Differentiation." The Journal of Industrial Economics 40 (2):229–31; Wauthy 1996, "Quality Choice in Models of Vertical Differentiation." The Journal of Industrial Economics 44 (3):345–53) remains valid when an entrant purchases an essential input from an incumbent at a regulated price. We find that the higher quality firm always chooses the best available quality, whereas the lower quality firm chooses an intermediate quality, which increases with the input price. If the higher quality firm is the incumbent, a cost-oriented input price maximizes welfare, but comes at the cost of a lower average quality, a higher degree of product differentiation, and therefore stronger downstream market power.
This paper proposes a taxonomy of the Stackelberg equilibria emerging from a standard game of horizontal differentiation à la Hotelling in which the strategy set of the sellers in the location stage is the real axis. Repeated leadership appears the most advantageous position. Furthermore, this endogenously yields vertical differentiation between products at equilibrium.
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In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 84, Heft 3, S. 691-701
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Working paper
In: Moscow University Economics Bulletin, Band 2019, Heft 1, S. 50-70
In this paper we present the results of the analysis of firm behavior in two-sided market with product differentiation. Based on the developed model, we study the conditions when it is profitably for a firm to launch two versions of a product: full and test platform models. In our analysis we draw on the methods of microeconomics, industrial economics, game theory and contract theory. The main conclusions confirm the benefit from versioning strategy in a firm in case of strong indirect network effects in the market between the two groups of agents. Product versioning allows the firm to separate agents more effectively: the first group with high product and connection value and the second group that generates high network effects. We noted that product differentiation is preferable for agents from the second group.
In: Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 540-549