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This monograph offers a theoretical foundation of the executive branch in Western democracies and argues that the tension between dominance and submission is maintained by the adoption of various forms of fuzziness, under which a guise of legality masks the absence of the substantive limitation of power.

The Virginia Tech Student Government Association (SGA) held an inauguration for incoming executive branch officers on Wednesday, April 14 on the steps of Burruss Hall. The officers were welcomed into their new positions after a campaign that began March 16 and ended March 29, with voting taking place March 30 and 31.

This article deals with the problems of regulating executive branch advertising and publicity programs. Over the years, these programs have been the object of several laws intended to restrict their growth. However, the volume of these activities, along with specific examples of agency circumvention of limitations, shows that the general legal restrictions have not been effective. The Reagan Administration has developed a model control system to deal with executive branch publicity activities. It, too, is found wanting by the authors. They suggest that a number of persistent unresolved problems will have to be addressed in developing laws and regulations in this area.

Suggests that failure of President Carter's attempts to reform the federal bureaucracy illustrates how institutional decision-making processes can hinder even determined presidential efforts to implement cabinet-level reorganization; US.

Adjudications are an important, though understudied, means through which administrative agencies create policies that have a lasting impact. We argue that executive branch agency heads utilize their oversight of agency adjudications to advance agency goals. Relying on an original data set of adjudications appealed to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's agency head's adjudication delegee, our empirical results indicate a substantial positive effect on the probability that the agency head will reverse an administrative law judge (ALJ) when he receives the appeal of an antiagency ALJ decision. However, the agency's adjudication oversight is conditional on political constraints, including partisanship differences between an agency and the litigated law and whether the case is being heard during a time of presidential transition. These results have clear implications for the use and effectiveness of agency adjudications as a political tool.

Adjudications are an important, though understudied, means through which administrative agencies create policies that have a lasting impact. We argue that executive branch agency heads utilize their oversight of agency adjudications to advance agency goals. Relying on an original data set of adjudications appealed to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's agency head's adjudication delegee, our empirical results indicate a substantial positive effect on the probability that the agency head will reverse an administrative law judge (ALJ) when he receives the appeal of an antiagency ALJ decision. However, the agency's adjudication oversight is conditional on political constraints, including partisanship differences between an agency and the litigated law and whether the case is being heard during a time of presidential transition. These results have clear implications for the use and effectiveness of agency adjudications as a political tool. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

How the elements of the United States' government work together is a question that can betraced back to the the vigorous debates at the Republic's founding. This dissertation movesthe research forward by bringing to bear new data, in particular databases of governmentactions including: executive orders, Senate committee assignments, and the CongressionalRecord; as well as non-governmental information including: polling, and media coverage.The analysis is divided into three papers. Chapter 2 focuses on the link between Congressand the Executive through presidents' use of executive orders. I find that since 1936 thenumber of significant orders issued per year has remained basically level. I estimate thatover 75% or significant executive orders have shifted policy outcomes closer to the congressional majority's preference. From this I conclude that executive orders generally serve as a steady, shared policymaking tool between Congress and the president. Chapter 3 focuseson the link between Congress and the public. I use a new dataset of over 3,000 surveyquestions to measure the public's perceptions -- perceived issue ownership -- and comparethat to measures of each party's Senate committee preferences -- legislative issue ownership. On average, there is little to no relationship between the two. Chapter 4 focuses on senators' committee preferences in response to declining media coverage of Congress, examining the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees from 1947 to 2006. The research relies on new, continuous measures of committee desirability and a unique dataset of congressional press coverage. Although both committees' visibility and attractiveness have declined dramatically over 60 years, statistical analyses indicate that change in internal rules and external events are relatively more important than the media as predictors for senators' investment in committee careers.

Although their leaders and staff are not elected, bureaucratic agencies have the power to make policy decisions that carry the full force of the law. In this groundbreaking book, Sean Gailmard and John W. Patty explore an issue central to political science and public administration: How do Congress and the president ensure that bureaucratic agencies implement their preferred policies? The assumption has long been that bureaucrats bring to their positions expertise, which must then be marshaled to serve the interests of a particular policy. In Learning While Gov.