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AbstractUrban popular movements that organize illegal land invasion communities present an intriguing puzzle. When most invasion organizations acquire land titles, their participation levels plummet and their agendas stagnate; yet some neighborhoods achieve land titles, sustain high participation, and acquire other services, such as piped-in water. Why do these organizations achieve movement resilience? The more typical trajectory of movement collapse is explained by the disappearance of the key selective incentive, property security. Some organizations, however, evade this "security trap" through mixed motives: their basic material agenda is supplemented by a nonmaterial and often altruistic agenda, which sustains participation in the face of reduced selective incentives. Examining three neighborhood case studies in Lima and Quito, this article argues that a new, "innovator" type of invasion organization is more likely to exhibit sustained participation and movement resilience due to tactical innovation, democratic governance, and mixed motives.

This paper provides a systematic analysis of fiscal decentralization on the quality of government by studying jointly its effects on electoral discipline and selection, in a setting where, realistically, voters only have limited information about fiscal policy in other jurisdictions, ruling out yardstick competition. Fiscal centralization reduces the extent of electoral discipline, as a corrupt (rent-seeking) incumbent can target good behavior only at a "minimum winning coalition" of regions (selective rent- diversion) in order to retain office, but thus makes it more profitable for bad incumbents to pool with good ones, thus increasing the probability of electoral discipline occurring at all. Voters tend to prefer centralization when politicians are low quality i.e. more likely to be corruptible. Centralization with uniform taxes can dominate both unconstrained centralization and decentralization, explaining why uniform taxes are so widely observed. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

While the presence of a strong civil society is recognized as desirable for democracies, an important question is what motivates citizens to join organizations. This article presents novel experimental evidence on the conditions under which citizens join interest organizations. We presented 1,400 citizens in two Mexican states with fliers promoting a new local interest organization. These fliers contain one of four randomly selected recruitment appeals. We find evidence that both brokerage of state patronage and demand-making for local public goods are effective recruitment appeals. The effect for patronage brokerage is especially pronounced among respondents with prior organizational contact, supporting our hypothesis of a "particularistic socialization" effect wherein organizational experience is associated with greater response to selective material benefits. Our findings suggest that under some conditions, rather than generating norms of other-regarding, interest organizations can reinforce members' individualistic tendencies.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Figures -- Preface -- 1 Introduction: Why 'Behavioral' Public Economics? -- 1.1 Public Economics and Policy -- 1.2 Behavioral Economics and Policy -- 1.3 Why Social Preferences Matter? -- 1.4 From Economic Incentives to Social Incentives -- Notes -- 2 Preferences, Utility, and Welfare -- 2.1 Preferences and Choices -- 2.1.1 Revealed Preference Theory -- 2.1.2 Critique of Revealed Preference Theory -- 2.1.3 Behavioral Economics and Revealed Preference Theory -- 2.2 Utility -- 2.2.1 What Is Utility? -- 2.2.2 Expected Utility Theory -- 2.3 Welfare: Personal and Social -- 2.4 Well-Being and Happiness -- Notes -- 3 Economic Incentives in Public Economics -- 3.1 Taxation -- 3.2 Sin Taxes -- 3.3 Imperfect Information and Contracts -- 3.4 Tax Compliance -- 3.5 The Environment -- Notes -- 4 Behavioral Economics and Public Policy -- 4.1 Bounded Rationality -- 4.1.1 Herbert Simon and Bounded Rationality -- 4.1.2 Routine -- 4.1.3 Selective Rationality and X-Efficiency -- 4.1.4 Ecological Rationality -- 4.2 Perception and Entrepreneurship -- 4.2.1 Uncertainty -- 4.2.2 Schumpeterian Entrepreneurship -- 4.2.3 Kirznerian Entrepreneurship -- 4.3 Errors and Biases -- 4.4 Gains and Losses -- 4.5 Nudges -- 4.6 Addiction and Self-Control -- Notes -- 5 Social Preferences and Moral Economy -- 5.1 Social Incentives and Social Preferences -- 5.2 Social Preferences and Fairness -- 5.3 Altruism and Envy -- 5.4 Public Goods and Charitable Giving -- 5.5 Philanthropy and Corporate Social Responsibility -- Notes -- 6 Social Incentives and Interaction -- 6.1 Society and Coordination Problems -- 6.2 Social Norms -- 6.3 Norm Compliance -- 6.4 Identity and Culture -- 6.5 Social Preferences and Internal Moral Constraints -- Notes -- 7 Governing the Commons With Social Incentives.

There are numerous examples from across Europe where collaborative science-industry initiatives, which provide a bottom-up approach to trawl gear development, have been successful in developing selective gears. For fishers, the collaborative approach creates a sense of ownership and control over the gears developed and often a greater desire for them to achieve their objectives. Despite the many benefits of collaborative initiatives, a lack of clarity and transparency, incorrect incentives, unclear communication, and distrust or diverging perceptions can inhibit their performance. The present review examines the different collaborative approaches to fishing gear development that have been established within Europe, highlighting their salient features, comparing their objectives, and discussing the types and effectiveness of the incentives offered. Also examined is how the reform of the European Union's (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), together with the proposed reform of the technical measures framework, can potentially improve the flexibility in the technical regulations and allow for such initiatives to be a central part in improving the state of fish stocks throughout the EU. Finally, a framework is proposed on how initiatives pertaining to industry-led fishing gear development might look like under the reformed CFP.

The authors develop an institutional choice framework to examine and interpret change in local boundaries and provide a single explanation for the use of varied instruments to create new boundaries or expand old ones. Boundary decisions are viewed as the product of actors' seeking particular outcomes within a context of existing governments and established rules governing boundary change. Selective costs and benefits, rather than collective costs and benefits, are most likely to provide incentives for institutional entrepreneurship and collective action. Such a framework is valuable because it integrates the fragmented literatures on local boundaries, provides a linkage between boundary choices and policy outcomes at the local level, and can guide empirical research into the causes and consequences of boundary change. This framework can provide the foundation of a more general model of institutional choice and institutional entrepreneurship.

Majority Party leaders are hypothesized, through their control of the legislative schedule in the House of Representatives, to use legislative success as a selective incentive to encourage majority party members to contribute to the collective goals of the party. Members can demonstrate party loyalty through floor voting and financial contributions to the party's re-election efforts. This article examines legislative success from the 103rd through 107th Congresses. The evidence shows that both demonstrations of party loyalty have a significant effect on legislative success.

Abstract
Economic sanctions remain one of the most widely used foreign policy tools. At the same time, their enforcement is often incomplete and selective. If sender states are concerned about sanctions effectiveness, variation in enforcement is counterproductive. We argue that sender states face a trade-off between effective coercion in the present and the ability to use coercion in the future. We develop a formal model to explore the mixed incentives of senders such as the United States in enforcing their financial sanctions against banks. Using data on US enforcement actions taken in support of the Iranian sanctions regime from 2003 to 2014 and three illustrative case examples, we evaluate the hypothesis that sanctions enforcement should be greater when the position of the US dollar is strong relative to alternative settlement mechanisms. Our findings support this contention.

PurposeThis paper seeks to examine the critical role fiscal incentives have played in urban regeneration in Ireland since 1986, focusing on the role of such incentives, their impact on development and implications for the market of their termination.Design/methodology/approachThe paper is structured as a periodised chronology where real time is divided into analytically defined phases linked to policy shifts. In this way features of urban regeneration policy can be discussed within the economic context and policy constraints within which their decisions were shaped. Policies have evolved from blanket subsidisation of development in designated areas towards a more selective approach. The paper reflects the results of structured interviews of policymaking, planning and development interests on the operation and effectiveness of the schemes. Quantitative analysis of the costs and benefits of a selected number of property developments in Dublin is included and can be compared with similar schemes internationally.FindingsThe findings of this paper are that urban regeneration policies as operated over the period have had a significant role in the physical rejuvenation of previously derelict areas and that the role of incentive based policies requires continual monitoring to avoid market distortion effects and to achieve wider regeneration objectives in terms of social and economic aims.Originality/valueDespite the importance of the subject there has been a noticeable lack of evidence‐based research in the area and this paper provides quantitative and qualitative evidence based material upon which further research on the costs and effectiveness of the schemes can be based.

Work by Axelrod, Hardin, and Taylor indicates that problems of repeated collective action may lessen if people use decentralized strategies of reciprocity to induce mutual cooperation. Hobbes's centralized solution may thus be overrated. We investigate these issues by representing ongoing collective action as an n-person repeated prisoner's dilemma. The results show that decentralized conditional cooperation can ease iterated collective action dilemmas—if all playersperfectlymonitor the relation between individual choices and group payoffs. Once monitoring uncertainty is introduced, such strategies degrade rapidly in value, and centrally administered selective incentives become relatively more valuable. Most importantly, we build on a suggestion of Herbert Simon by showing that a hierarchical structure, with reciprocity used in subunits and selective incentives centrally administered, combines the advantages of the decentralized and centralized solutions. This hierarchical form is more stable than the decentralized structure and often secures more cooperation than the centralized structure. Generally, the model shows that the logic of repeated decision making has significant implications for the institutional forms of collective action.

Abstract
State capacity is seen as one of the central elements determining whether countries have "strong" or "weak" systems of immigration and asylum. An underlying assumption of the global refugee regime is that countries of the Global South—thought to have less state capacity—do not have the ability to respond and host asylum seekers and refugees and must be financially supported by countries of the Global North in order to do so. But how can we understand "strong" migration responses from an otherwise "weak" state, as well as responses that change over time without corresponding alterations to underlying state capacity? This paper analyzes the case of Egypt, which, over the course of a decade, alternated between three types of migration policies requiring a range of state resources. Drawing on more than 70 in-person interviews and an analysis of public documents, this paper presents a theory of selective state capacity and argues that infrastructural weakness does not imply a lack of strategic decision-making in the field of migration, or an unwillingness to expend state resources, when the political incentives are in place.

Objetivo/contexto: la deserción, o salida no autorizada de un grupo armado, tiene importantes implicaciones para la contrainsurgencia, la terminación de una guerra y la dinámica de reclutamiento. Si bien la investigación existente enfatiza la importancia de motivaciones individuales para la deserción, el declive organizacional, en forma de adversidad militar y financiera, también puede condicionar la deserción. El declive organizacional socava los instrumentos de un grupo para canalizar las preferencias individuales hacia la acción colectiva. Estos instrumentos incluyen los incentivos selectivos, el atractivo ideológico y la coerción. Cuando el poder vinculante de estos instrumentos disminuye, los deseos individuales comienzan a dominar el comportamiento, lo que aumenta la probabilidad de deserción. Metodología: se utiliza la insurgencia de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) para examinar este argumento con un enfoque multimétodo. Primero, se realiza un análisis cuantitativo para explorar datos únicos sobre más de 19.000 desertores de las FARC reportados entre 2002 y 2017, proporcionados por el Ministerio de Defensa de Colombia. Al protegerse contra amenazas a la inferencia causal, el análisis estadístico indica que el declive organizacional impulsa la deserción. En segundo lugar, se lleva a cabo un análisis cualitativo utilizando una gran cantidad de informes detallados sobre entrevistas con desertores realizadas por personal militar colombiano. Conclusiones: los informes demuestran que el declive organizacional debilita los incentivos selectivos, la ideología del grupo y un régimen coercitivo creíble, y fomenta la deserción mediante estos mecanismos. Originalidad: estos hallazgos brindan información clave para los formuladores de políticas, dado que la deserción puede contribuir tanto a poner fin a un conflicto como a acelerar el reclutamiento de nuevos combatientes. ; Objective/Context: Desertion, or the unauthorized exit from an armed group, has major implications for counterinsurgency, ...