Suchergebnisse

International aid projects in post-communist countries were meant to support the existing systems of environmental protection during the transition period and also to introduce new standards of environmental governance. This paper looks at the role project evaluations can play in fulfilling these goals. While the outcomes of the World Bank project in the Belavezhskaya Pushcha national park in Belarus were evaluated positively after its (delayed) completion, an evaluation using the same criteria 10 years later challenges the long-term effectiveness of the project. Evaluating the implementation process, we see three interlinked reasons for this failure which can be generalized with regard to environmental governance in many post-communist countries even now: the predominance of the natural sciences, an unbalanced representation of the actors, and little knowledge regarding participatory methods. In order to introduce new standards for environmental governance, international aid projects should use ongoing project and, in particular, process evaluation as a tool to support communication between the donor organizations and the implementing agencies on the one hand and between the different actors in the receiving countries on the other.

With the beginning of economic reform in the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), open unemployment rapidly reached comparable levels to those in Western economies. Governments in the region reacted to this rise by adopting active labor market policies (ALMP) as an important tool in the fight against unemployment. Before reviewing the evidence on the efficacy of such policies we look at the scope and the rationale of ALMP measures in a transitional context. Since government budgets are very tight in these countries it is important to evaluate ALMP in a rigorous fashion. The paper analyzes macroeconometric and microeconometric methods of program evaluation, as they were applied in transition economies. Both these approaches have a raison d'être and should be understood as complementing. Providing a selective review of the literature, some of the strengths and the pitfalls of the two approaches are highlighted. We also point to the lessons one can draw from the surveyed studies for a better understanding of how active measures affect labor market outcomes in this set of countries.

For FDI to help stimulate economic growth and alleviate poverty in developing countries, two conditions have to be met. The first requirement is to improve developing countries' attractiveness to foreign investors. Second, the host-country environment in which foreign investors operate must be conducive to favorable FDI effects with regard to overall investment, economic spillovers and income growth. To a certain extent, these two requirements involve similar policy challenges for developing countries. The development of local markets and institutions, an investment-friendly policy and administrative framework, as well as the availability of local complementary factors of production can be considered major driving forces of FDI. Hence, better access to FDI depends on policy actions on all these fronts. At the same time, empirical studies strongly suggest that favorable effects of FDI in the host countries would be more likely if these factors figured high on the policy agenda. Nevertheless, policymakers should be aware that meeting the first condition, i.e., attracting FDI, is no guarantee for reaping benefits from FDI. For all we can tell, it appears much more difficult to benefit from FDI than to attract FDI. Resource-based countries with low per-capita income frequently exemplify this dilemma. Many of these countries report fairly high FDI inflows, but the enclave character of FDI in commodity-related activities renders it unlikely that FDI contributes significantly to economic growth and poverty alleviation.

Although the WTO Agreement contained many provisions for 'special and differential' treatment, it is now generally accepted that developing countries have yet received rather few real benefits from the Uruguay Round. The hunt is on to find ways to better address the needs of these countries in the new Round; some suggest the credibility and viability of the WTO itself is at stake. Several suggestions already exist about what further might be done. This paper proposes an additional step which might be taken in the agricultural field. Developing and transitional country governments have a need to protect their farmers (and, often, consumers) against external shocks, particular arising from world market price swings. Typically lacking fiscal resources, their only feasible approach to do this may be through the use of border measures to moderate price transmission to the domestic market. With non-tariff barriers and export subsidies now effectively removed from the choice set for most, what remains are variable tariffs, variable import subsidies and variable export taxes (and, to a limited extent, controls on export quantities). Many developing countries emerged from the Uruguay Round with bound tariffs quite high relative to applied tariffs. This gives them considerable 'room' to vary the applied tariff as a domestic price stabilising measure. Some have formal policies in place to do so systematically. Others have done it on a more ad hoc basis. However, questions have been raised about the WTO-legality of such practices because the Agreement on Agriculture explicitly bans some types of variable tariffs ('variable import levies' and 'minimum import prices'). The reality is that such 'banned' schemes are still in operation in the EU and Japan, and some other existing forms of variable tariffs (e.g., 'seasonal' tariffs) have not been challenged, and appear to be widely acceptable. It is concluded that clarification is needed about which types of variable tariff practices are to be allowed and which are not. Rather than opposing developing countries' use of 'sliding scale' tariff schemes and lamenting their high levels of tariff bindings, the OECD group could recognise these countries needs, not exaggerate the costs to themselves, and endorse the practice of varying the applied tariff as a stabilising measure for importcompeting agricultural producers and for consumers of the same commodities. As a 'special and differential' concession, developing and transition countries could be allowed to retain tariff bindings at a level high enough to provide a capacity for using variable tariffs as a safety net measure. Conditions and incentives could be attached to ensure transparency, predictability, and a principally stabilising (not permanently protective) tariff use. Any new disciplines on export taxes or controls should take into consideration the logical linkage and be made consistent with such a concession.

Russland ist bis heute ein klassischer Transformationsstaat. Grundsatzentscheidungen harren der Lösung. Doch das Regime ist handlungsunfähig. Die politische Ordnung ist gespalten, ein Doppelstaat entstanden. Der Verfassungsstaat mit seinen formalen Institutionen und Verfahren wird blockiert durch einen Verwaltungsstaat, in dem Gruppen ihre Interessen mit informellen Praktiken verfolgen und dadurch den Verfassungsstaat unterminieren. Liberale und traditionalistische Schichten blockieren sich gegenseitig. Die wirtschaftliche Modernisierung kommt nicht voran. Russland ist in einer Sackgasse. Ein Ausweg ist ohne die Herausbildung eines gesellschaftlichen Konsens und die Rückkehr zum Verfassungsstaat nicht möglich - mit oder ohne Putin. (Osteuropa (Berlin) / SWP)

"Die Staaten Nordafrikas stehen gegenwärtig vor der Aufgabe, ein Bündel an Sicherheitsproblemen mit Destabilisierungspotenzial zu lösen. Die ungelösten 'alten' Probleme mit ihren negativen Folgen für die menschliche und ökonomische Sicherheit führten 2011 in Ägypten, Libyen und Tunesien zu Massenprotesten und politischen Machtwechseln. Die mit den Machtwechseln in diesen drei Staaten einhergehenden institutionellen Auflösungsprozesse beeinträchtigen die Stabilität und Sicherheit der gesamten Region. Höchste Priorität müssen deswegen die Wiederherstellung der Sicherheit und die Institutionenbildung in den Transformationsstaaten haben. Die externen Möglichkeiten, einen Beitrag zur Stabilisierung der Staaten zu leisten, sind allerdings begrenzt." (Autorenreferat)