Suchergebnisse

Scholars and observers of the U.S. Senate have noted an appreciable rise in the use of the filibuster over the course of the 20th century. Although numerous explanations have been offered, alternative accounts have never been pitted against each other in a multivariate fashion. In this article, we survey and test these multiple accounts, using data on filibusters launched between 1917 and 1996. Our findings suggest that the incentive to filibuster is predictably shaped by both partisan preferences and institutional opportunity, findings that hold even before the marked rise in partisanship evident at late century.

Congress and the constitutional system / Charles Stewart III -- Institutional development of congress / Eric Schickler -- Actions in the public sphere / David R. Mayhew -- Modern campaigns and representation / Gary C. Jacobson -- Elections, parties, and governance / Sarah A. Binder -- Representing racial and ethnic minorities / David T. Canon -- Committees and policy formulation / David W. Rohde -- Parties and leadership in the house / Barbara Sinclair -- Parties and leadership in the Senate / Steven S. Smith -- Interests, constituencies, and policy making / Frances E. Lee -- Deliberation and decision making / Paul J. Quirk -- Foreign affairs and war / Christopher J. Deering -- Budgets and fiscal policy / Eric Patashnik -- Advice and consent : cooperation and conflict in the appointment of federal judges / Forrest Maltzman -- Congress and the bureaucracy / Charles R. Shipan -- Images of congress / John R. Hibbing -- Politics of congressional reform / C. Lawrence Evans -- Institutional politics, performance, and reform / Paul J. Quirk and Sarah Binder.

Some recent scholarship affords political parties little role in explaining patterns of legislative outcomes. Policy preferences, rather than partisanship, are said to provide the superior account of legislative behavior. In this paper, we challenge one recent such account of legislative outcomes. We show that the likelihood of finding a party effect depends on where we look for it & with what measures we use to test for it. Party effects, we find, are amply visible in the 1994 "A to Z" discharge petition campaign in the US House of Representatives, a case where party has been termed inconsequential. 45 References. Adapted from the source document.