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Hegre (2005) offers an interesting example of cumulative science. By relaxing a restrictive assumption in Gartzke and Li (2003a), Hegre shows formally that the relationship between trade share and trade dependence need not be negative. Still, Hegre's assumptions are also in tension with his basic insight. We apply his logic in a more thorough manner to demonstrate that our original theoretical argument and empirical results are robust to the critique. Hegre (2005) also suggests that the pacifying effect of trade openness is likely an artifact of our failure to control for the size of the national economy. We re-estimate the effect of trade openness while controlling for the economic size of both states in the dyad and show that trade openness continues to reduce the likelihood of military conflict between countries.

Oneal and Barbieri & Peters offer divergent critiques of Gartzke & Li, who present a mathematical identity between competing operationalizations of dyadic interdependence, and show that the relationship one finds between conflict and commerce depends on how one constructs one's dyadic indicator of trade. Oneal seems to accept the identity, but not some of its implications. Barbieri & Peters challenge the identity and offer contrasting results. Here, we show that Barbieri & Peters's results are due to their model specification, which Gartzke & Li argue involves omitted variable bias.

While most quantitative studies find a negative relationship between economic interdependence and interstate disputes, research by Barbieri finds that interdependence precipitates conflict. Participants in the debate suggest several causes, but we show that alternative variable constructions are sufficient to account for the discrepant findings. A simple formal equivalence unites respective operationalizations of dyadic interdependence used by Oneal & Russett ( trade dependence, trade ij/GDP i) and Barbieri ( trade share, trade i/trade i) with the consensus construction of monadic trade openness (trade i/GDP i). We also show that Barbieri's trade share is negatively correlated with openness. Arguments in the article are verified through large-sample quantitative regression analyses of the two competing dyadic variable constructions and trade openness on MID onset. The results of these dyadic regression analyses show that trade share increases the probability of MID onset, trade dependence decreases the probability of MID onset and, correspondingly, that trade openness is negatively correlated with MID onset.

The proof for "War Is in the Error Term," a piece that appeared in the Summer 1999 issue of International Organization, contains a subtle error. Once the correction is made, there are broader implications for testing theories of war using quantitative studies. Large-n tests to verify the incomplete information explanation for war will be more difficult to perform than originally anticipated.

Deterrence theory emerged during the Cold War in response to the threats posed by nuclear weapons. Today, strategists must consider many other threats, such as cyber attacks, drones, space weapons, and subversion, all within a highly interdependent global economy. While many policymakers aspire to create integrated deterrence strategies, deterrence is not a panacea for complexity. Elements of Deterrence presents detailed arguments and empirical evidence demonstrating that the practice of deterrence involves complex trade-offs between multiple political goals and specialized military instruments. The result is a new synthesis of venerable themes in deterrence theory.

Global politics in the twenty-first century is complicated by dense economic interdependence, rapid technological innovation, and fierce security competition. How should governments formulate grand strategy in this complex environment? Many strategists look to deterrence as the answer, but how much can we expect of deterrence? Classical deterrence theory developed in response to the nuclear threats of the Cold War, but strategists since have applied it to a variety of threats in the land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains.