Suchergebnisse

"Institutions stimulate deliberative decision-making if they hinder stakeholders from
introducing bargaining power into the decision process. This article explores the
conditions for, and limits of, the creation of deliberative legitimacy in single market
regulation. An assessment of the standardization procedure demonstrates that legitimacy
arises only from the combination of political and technical deliberation." (author's abstract)

"The European Medicines Agency (EMEA) represents a new type of
supranational regulation. Formally, it merely advises the Commission and a member
state committee on the authorization of pharmaceuticals. In practice, however, it
dominates decision-making and operates much like an independent agency. Based
upon a brief discussion of the merits of independent regulation and the necessity
to control regulatory activities, the article explores the institutional arrangement in
which the EMEA is embedded and seeks to explain how tight oversight is compatible
with quasi-independent action. It argues that the multi-tiered oversight mechanism
restricts the non-scientific actors involved in the authorization of pharmaceuticals
more than the agency – as long as the agency adheres to its mandate of producing
scientifically convincing decisions." (author's abstract)

"Der Beitrag untersucht, ob das Verfahren der Weltbank zur Projektvergabe zu sachgerechten Entscheidungen führt. Auf der Grundlage einer geeigneten normativen Konzeption wird dazu ein idealtypisches Verfahrensarrangement identifiziert, das durch die Trennung unterschiedlicher Entscheidungsfunktionen und die Bindung von Entscheidungen an inhaltliche Kriterien auch widerstrebende Akteure systematisch zu sachgerechten Entscheidungen anhält. Es erlaubt den Akteuren nicht mehr, ihre Interessen genau zu kalkulieren und den Entscheidungsprozess durch machtbasiertes Verhandeln (bargaining) wirksam zu beeinflussen. Wir finden dieses Arrangement in einem Teilbereich der Projektvergabe der Weltbank. Die Bank hat verbindliche Umwelt- und Sozialstandards für die Projektbewertung erlassen und ein Inspektionsverfahren eingerichtet, in dessen Rahmen die Einhaltung dieser Richtlinien überprüft werden kann. Allerdings sind andere Gegenstandsbereiche der Projektvergabe bislang ungeregelt. Die Untersuchung von fünf Konflikten um die Finanzierung großer Projekte aus der jüngeren Zeit zeigt, dass das Verfahren machtbasierte Interessen dort zuverlässig aussondert, wo fallübergreifende Entscheidungskriterien existieren, während in den ungeregelten Bereichen Verhandlungs- und Abstimmungsmacht dominieren." (Autorenreferat)

The competitive quest of the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO for authority to regulate international trade in genetically modified organisms (GMOs) exemplifies a typical interaction between international institutions with diverging objectives. This article first develops a conceptual framework for the analysis of institutional interaction that emphasizes disaggregation of complex interaction situations into separate cases of clearly directed inter-institutional influence. These cases can follow different causal mechanisms. Second, applying this framework to the interaction between the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO reveals that existing commitments have driven parties toward a step-wise delimitation of the institutions' jurisdictions. Although the WTO acquired a firstmover advantage by structuring the regulatory field, the Cartagena Protocol showed surprising strength in exploiting the remaining room for maneuver. The structure of international governance thus steers institutions with differing objectives toward a jurisdictional balance that, while reflecting existing power relations, limits the potential for conflict and frames available policy choices.

The competitive quest of the Cartagena Protocol & the WTO for authority to regulate international trade in genetically modified organisms (GMOs) exemplifies a typical interaction between international institutions with diverging objectives. This article first develops a conceptual framework for the analysis of institutional interaction that emphasizes disaggregation of complex interaction situations into separate cases of clearly directed inter-institutional influence. These cases can follow different causal mechanisms. Second, applying this framework to the interaction between the Cartagena Protocol & the WTO reveals that existing commitments have driven parties toward a step-wise delimitation of the institutions' jurisdictions. Although the WTO acquired a firstmover advantage by structuring the regulatory field, the Cartagena Protocol showed surprising strength in exploiting the remaining room for maneuver. The structure of international governance thus steers institutions with differing objectives toward a jurisdictional balance that, while reflecting existing power relations, limits the potential for conflict & frames available policy choices. Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

"The competitive quest of the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO for authority to regulate international trade in genetically modified organisms (GMOs) exemplifies a typical interaction between international institutions with diverging objectives. This article first develops a conceptual framework for the analysis of institutional interaction that emphasizes disaggregation of complex interaction situations into separate cases of clearly directed inter-institutional influence. These cases can follow different causal mechanisms. Second, applying this framework to the interaction between the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO reveals that existing commitments have driven parties toward a step-wise delimitation of the institutions' jurisdictions. Although the WTO acquired a first-mover advantage by structuring the regulatory field, the Cartagena Protocol showed surprising strength in exploiting the remaining room for maneuver. The structure of international governance thus steers institutions with differing objectives toward a jurisdictional balance that, while reflecting existing power relations, limits the potential for conflict and frames available policy choices." (author's abstract)

This article argues that a World Environment Organization (WEO) does not promise to enhance international environmental governance. First, we claim that the establishment of an international organization alone in a policy field currently populated by regimes cannot be expected to significantly improve environmental governance because there is no qualitative difference between these two forms of governance institutions. Second, we submit that significant improvement of international environmental governance through institutional re-arrangement must rely on a modification of decision-making procedures &/or a change of institutional boundaries. Third, we develop three principal models of a possible WEO. A WEO formally providing an umbrella for existing regimes without modifying issue-areas & decision-making procedures would be largely irrelevant. A WEO integrating decision-making processes of existing regimes so as to form comprehensive "world environment round" of intergovernmental bargaining would be largely dysfunctional & prone to a host of negative side-effects. A 'supranational' WEO including large-scale use of majority decision-making & far-reaching enforcement mechanisms across a range of environmental issues might considerably enhance international environmental governance, but it appears to be grossly utopian. In conclusion, a WEO cannot be at the same time realistic, significant & beneficial for international environmental governance. Available political resources should be invested in advancing existing & emerging sectoral environmental regimes rather than in establishing a WEO. 67 References. Adapted from the source document.

Der Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit die von der WTO institutionell vorangetriebene fortschreitende Weltmarktintegration den Erlass nationaler oder internationaler Schutzstandards erschwert und wie darauf institutionell reagiert wird. Hier lassen sich innerhalb der WTO überraschende Entwicklungen beobachten. Durch den "Import" bestehender Standards aus anderen internationalen Institutionen gewinnt die Welthandelsordnung Sensibilität für marktkorrigierende Schutzregulierung, ohne in unmittelbare Regulierungskonkurrenz mit den standardsetzenden Institutionen zu geraten. Zunächst werden zentrale Merkmale der Welthandelsordnung daraufhin untersucht, in welcher Weise sie die Regulierungsfähigkeit der Staaten einschränken. Sodann wird herausgearbeitet, dass insbesondere im Bereich der Verfahrensstandards Regulierungsdefizite verbleiben, obwohl auf diesem Gebiet zahllose standardsetzende internationale Regime errichtet worden sind. Im dritten Schritt wird untersucht, inwieweit die WTO aufgrund neuerer Rechtsprechung zur Triebfeder für die internationale Verfahrensregulierung werden kann. Schließlich wird den Folgen nachgegangen, die der Import internationaler Produktstandards in die Welthandelsordnung nach sich zieht. Der Beitrag kommt zum Schluss, dass ein Netzwerk miteinander verknüpfter internationaler Institutionen mit der Welthandelsorganisation als Zentrum entsteht. (ICA2)