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This article investigates how election information such as opinion polls can influence voting intention. The bandwagon effect claims that voters 'float along': a party experiencing increased support receives more support, and vice versa. Through a large national survey experiment, evidence is found of a bandwagon effect among Danish voters. When voters are exposed to a news story describing either an upwards or downwards movement for either a small or large party, they tend to move their voting intentions in the according direction. The effect is strongest in the positive direction – that is, when a party experiences increased support, more follows. Consistent effects are found across two different parties for a diverse national sample in a political context very different from earlier research on the bandwagon effects. Considering previous research and the fact that evidence is not found that suggests that the effect of polls vary across sociodemographic groups, the results imply that bandwagon behaviour is based not on social or political contingencies, such as media or political institution, but on fundamentals of political cognition.

Abstract
Similar to all other types of information, public opinion polls can influence public opinion. We present two hypotheses to understand how polls affect public opinion: the bandwagon and the underdog effect. The bandwagon effect claims that voters "jump on the bandwagon," which means that if a party is gaining in the polls, the party will gain additional support from the voters, and vice versa if the party is losing in the polls. The underdog effect suggests that if a party is losing in the polls, the party will gain some sympathy votes to offset this loss. We use a survey experiment to test the two hypotheses. We find evidence of the bandwagon effect, and the effect is strongest in the positive direction. When voters learn that a party is gaining in the polls, voters will be more likely to vote for it. There is also some evidence for the negative bandwagon effect. We find no evidence for the underdog effect. The effects head in the same direction regardless of the size of the party. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings with regards to a potential ban on publishing opinion polls.

Employing a comparative experimental design drawing on over 18,000 interviews across eleven countries on four continents, this article revisits the discussion about the economic and cultural drivers of attitudes towards immigrants in advanced democracies. Experiments manipulate the occupational status, skin tone and national origin of immigrants in short vignettes. The results are most consistent with a Sociotropic Economic Threat thesis: In all countries, higher-skilled immigrants are preferred to their lower-skilled counterparts at all levels of native socio-economic status (SES). There is little support for the Labor Market Competition hypothesis, since respondents are not more opposed to immigrants in their own SES stratum. While skin tone itself has little effect in any country, immigrants from Muslim-majority countries do elicit significantly lower levels of support, and racial animus remains a powerful force.

Employing a comparative experimental design drawing on over 18,000 interviews across eleven countries on four continents, this article revisits the discussion about the economic and cultural drivers of attitudes towards immigrants in advanced democracies. Experiments manipulate the occupational status, skin tone and national origin of immigrants in short vignettes. The results are most consistent with a Sociotropic Economic Threat thesis: In all countries, higher-skilled immigrants are preferred to their lower-skilled counterparts at all levels of native socio-economic status (SES). There is little support for the Labor Market Competition hypothesis, since respondents are not more opposed to immigrants in their own SES stratum. While skin tone itself has little effect in any country, immigrants from Muslim-majority countries do elicit significantly lower levels of support, and racial animus remains a powerful force.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Preface -- Introduction: The Complex and Contested History of Democracy -- Part I Pre-Classical Democracy -- Chapter 1 Prehistory -- Chapter 2 The Assyrians -- Chapter 3 Ancient India -- Chapter 4 Ancient China -- Chapter 5 Israel and Phoenicia -- Part II Classical Democracy -- Chapter 6 Early Greece -- Chapter 7 Athens -- Chapter 8 Rome -- Part III Medieval Democracy -- Chapter 9 Islam -- Chapter 10 Venice -- Chapter 11 The Nordic Countries -- Chapter 12 The Christian Church -- Part IV Early Modern Democracy -- Chapter 13 The English Parliament -- Chapter 14 The Levellers and Diggers -- Chapter 15 The Swiss Cantons -- Chapter 16 The American Revolution -- Chapter 17 The French Revolution -- Part V Colonialism and Democracy -- Chapter 18 Africa -- Chapter 19 Native Americans -- Chapter 20 Australasia -- Chapter 21 Singapore -- Part VI National Movements -- Chapter 22 1808: South American Liberation -- Chapter 23 1848: European Revolutions -- Chapter 24 1919: After Versailles -- Chapter 25 1945: Post-Second World War Japan -- Chapter 26 1989: Eastern Europe -- Part VII Peoples' Movements -- Chapter 27 Anti-Slavery -- Chapter 28 Women's Suffrage -- Chapter 29 Socialism, Communism, Anarchism -- Chapter 30 Civil Rights -- Part VIII Democracy Today -- Chapter 31 South Africa -- Chapter 32 Bolivia -- Chapter 33 Georgia -- Chapter 34 Iraq -- Chapter 35 Burma -- Chapter 36 China since Tiananmen Square -- Chapter 37 Islam since 9/11 -- Part IX Futures and Possibilities -- Chapter 38 Democracy Promotion -- Chapter 39 Transnational Democracy -- Chapter 40 Digital Democracy -- Chapter 41 Radical Democracy -- Chapter 42 Deliberative Democracy -- Chapter 43 New Thinking -- Conclusion: The Future History of Democracy -- Notes on the Contributors -- Index

Das CSES Module 5 (2016-2021) legt den Schwerpunkt auf "the politics of populism", also auf Populismus. Es erforscht länderübergreifend den Zusammenhang zwischen dem Aufstieg von populistischen Parteien und der Verteilung von "populistischen" Einstellungen innerhalb der Bevölkerung. Hauptziel des Moduls ist es, die Auffassungen der BürgerInnen von politischen Eliten, gesellschaftlichen "Out-Groups" und nationaler Identität sowie die sich hieraus ergebenden Implikationen für repräsentative Demokratien zu analysieren. Die Daten erlauben es Forschenden somit, die Variation im Wettbewerb politischer Eliten und "populistischer" Einstellungen über Demokratien hinweg mit einzubeziehen, und zu untersuchen, wie solche Wahrnehmungen das Wahlverhalten von BürgerInnen beeinflussen.