Third World vulnerabilities and global negotiations
In: Review of international studies: RIS, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 235-249
ISSN: 0260-2105
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In: Review of international studies: RIS, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 235-249
ISSN: 0260-2105
World Affairs Online
In: Third world quarterly, Band 4, Heft 3, S. 503-508
ISSN: 1360-2241
In: International organization, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 497-510
ISSN: 1531-5088
Two distinct traditions have developed from structural realist perspectives. The first, the billiard ball version, focuses purely on interaction among states. The second, the tectonic plates version, focuses on the relationship between the distribution of power and various international environments. It is the latter tradition that suggests why regimes may be important for a realist orientation. However, it also opens the possibility for viewing regimes as autonomous, not just as intervening, variables. There may be lags between changes in basic causal variables and regime change. There may be feedback from regimes to basic causal variables. Both lags and feedback suggest an importance for regimes that would be rejected by conventional structural arguments.
In: International organization, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 185-205
ISSN: 1531-5088
International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area. As a starting point, regimes have been conceptualized as intervening variables, standing between basic causal factors and related outcomes and behavior. There are three views about the importance of regimes: conventional structural orientations dismiss regimes as being at best ineffectual; Grotian orientations view regimes as an intimate component of the international system; and modified structural perspectives see regimes as significant only under certain constrained conditions. For Grotian and modified structuralist arguments, which endorse the view that regimes can influence outcomes and behavior, regime development is seen as a function of five basic causal variables: egoistic self-interest, political power, diffuse norms and principles, custom and usage, and knowledge.
In: International organization, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 185-510
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 185-205
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 497-510
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 36, S. 185-510
ISSN: 0020-8183
Based on papers presented at conferences in Los Angeles, California, Oct., 1980, and Palm Springs, California, Feb., 1981.
In: International Studies Quarterly, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 119
In: International organization, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 303-328
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 303-328
ISSN: 1531-5088
This paper examines the experience of developing countries in the three major regional financial institutions, the Inter-American, Asian, and African Development Banks. In the Inter-American Development Bank, members from developing countries have secured both influence and resources; in the Asian Development Bank they have secured resources but little influence; in the African Development Bank they have influence but limited resources. This variation can be explained by the different issue area power structures within which the banks function. The Inter-American Development Bank has functioned within a hegemonic structure. The dominant power, the United States, pursued long-term political objectives and accepted considerable autonomy for developing countries within the Bank. The Asian Development Bank has functioned within a bipolar structure with Japan playing an increasingly important role. As a normal power, Japan has pursued tangible economic interests and has constrained the behavior of the Asian Development Bank. Until the late 1970s the African Development Bank functioned in a multipolar structure that largely excluded nonregional countries. This exclusion made it impossible to generate substantial resources. Experience in the regional development banks suggests that a hegemonic structure can offer weaker states both resources and influence provided that the milieu goals of the dominant power are not violated.
In: International organization, Band 35, S. 303-328
ISSN: 0020-8183
In: International Studies Quarterly, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 491
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 94, Heft 1, S. 77-96
ISSN: 1538-165X
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 94, Heft 1, S. 77-96
ISSN: 0032-3195
World Affairs Online