Suchergebnisse

Status-seeking behavior, the pursuit of a higher position on an international social hierarchy as perceived and defined by members of a community, has received considerable attention in recent years. Yet, much of what this recent literature calls status-seeking is difficult to distinguish from something else: the pursuit of fairness. We disentangle status-seeking from fairness-seeking by identifying where a pure status-seeking and a fairness-seeking argument diverge—in the degree to which state actors demand exclusive rights and privileges. Survey experiments of the Russian public concerning the country's membership in the G8 as well as a case study of Germany's behavior in the first Moroccan crisis provide strong support for our "biased fairness" account. Derived from the behavioral economics and psychology literature, it maintains that leaders demand entitlements that match their status and find any such denial as less fair than an equivalent discrepancy for other countries. However, once assured of what they deserve, they do not demonstrate any tendency to exclude others, the hallmark of the status motivation. Convergent evidence at multiple levels of analysis, country contexts, and widely different time periods gives strong indications that fairness concerns are driving much of what is attributed to status-seeking.

The recent Eurozone crisis and negotiations over bailout packages to Greece are more than a simple controversy about financial resources. They have a decidedly moralistic overtone. Giving more funds is thought by some to be unfair to hard‐working taxpayers and does not teach Greece an important moral lesson. Yet much international political economy scholarship neglects such considerations. We build on moral psychology to understand the ethical drivers of both German support and opposition to the 2015 Greek government bailout package. We analyze original survey data to show how morality is an essential factor in Germany's hard‐line approach. Our results show that caring and European attachment are associated with bailout support, while authority, national attachment, and retributive fairness drive opposition. Some morals also have boundaries: National attachment attenuates the effect of harm/care on support for foreign financial assistance but strengthens the effect of fairness on bailout opposition. Moral psychology helps us understand foreign policy but must be adapted to account for multiple potential ingroups.

Why are democratic publics reluctant to use force against fellow democracies? We hypothesize that the democratic peace in public opinion owes, in large part, to racialized assumptions about democracy. Rather than regime type per se doing the causal work, the term "democracy" inadvertently primes the presumption that target countries are predominantly white. This implicit racialization, in turn, explains the reluctance of the American public to support aggression against fellow democracies, most notably among respondents higher in ethnocentrism who disproportionately drive the democratic peace treatment effect. Two original survey experiments, a large-scale word embedding analysis of English texts, and reanalyses of published studies support this expectation. Our results suggest that the democratic peace in public opinion is, largely, an ethnocentric and racialized peace. The findings hold implications for the role of racism and racialization in foreign policy opinion research generally.

AbstractPsychology is traditionally used in political science to explain deviations from rationality. Lost in the debate between rationalists and their critics, however, is a sense of whether the kinds of strategic self-interested behavior predicted by these models has psychological microfoundations: what wouldhomo economicuslook like in the real world? We argue that strategic rationality varies across individuals and is characterized by a pro-self social-value orientation and a high level of epistemic motivation. Testing our argument in the context of international relations, we employ a laboratory bargaining game and integrate it with archival research on German foreign policy-making in the 1920s. We find in both contexts that even among those interested in maximizing only their own egoistic gains, those with greater epistemic motivation are better able to adapt to the strategic situation, particularly the distribution of power. Our results build a bridge between two approaches often considered to be antithetical to one another.

AbstractCanonical models of costly signaling in international relations (IR) tend to assume costly signals speak for themselves: a signal's costliness is typically understood to be a function of the signal, not the perceptions of the recipient. Integrating the study of signaling in IR with research on motivated skepticism and asymmetric updating from political psychology, we show that individuals' tendencies to embrace information consistent with their overarching belief systems (and dismiss information inconsistent with it) has important implications for how signals are interpreted. We test our theory in the context of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran, combining two survey experiments fielded on members of the American mass public. We find patterns consistent with motivated skepticism: the individuals most likely to update their beliefs are those who need reassurance the least, such that costly signals cause polarization rather than convergence. Successful signaling therefore requires knowing something about the orientations of the signal's recipient.

Previous research has shown that on issues of foreign policy, individuals have "general stances," "postures," "dispositions" or "orientations" that inform their beliefs toward more discrete issues in international relations. While these approaches delineate the proximate sources of public opinion in the foreign policy domain, they evade an even more important question: what gives rise to these foreign policy orientations in the first place? Combining an original survey on a nationally representative sample of Americans with Schwartz's theory of values from political psychology, we show that people take foreign policy personally: the same basic values we know people use to guide choices in their daily lives also travel to the domain of foreign affairs, offering one potential explanation why people who are otherwise uninformed about world politics nonetheless express coherent foreign policy beliefs.