Suchergebnisse

Among the many issues raised by James Lebovic's perceptive review are two that strike me as crucial: the relationships between intelligence and social science and those between intelligence and policymaking. The first itself has two parts, one being how scholars can study intelligence. Both access and methods are difficult. For years, diplomatic historians referred to intelligence as the "hidden dimension" of their subject. Now it is much more open, and Great Britain, generally more secretive than the United States, has just issued the authorized history of MI5 (see Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5, 2009). Since the end of the Cold War, the CIA has released extensive, if incomplete, records, and the bright side (for us) of intelligence failures is that they lead to the release of treasure troves of documents, which can often be supplemented by memoirs and interviews. But even more than in other aspects of foreign policy analysis, we are stuck with evidence that is fragmentary. In this way, we resemble scholars of ancient societies, who forever lament the loss of most of the material they want to study.

Foreign policy difficulties usually produce extensive scholarship. Vietnam led to numerous appraisals and reappraisals, many of which paralleled the protests in being heartfelt and radical. Perhaps because of the lack of a draft, Iraq's protests have been cooler and more muted, and the scholarship has tended to be more analytical and mainstream. James Lebovic's excellent study looks at both cases to drive home the argument that was part of the Vietnam critique: Even if the United States is the most powerful state in the international system, there are sharp limits to what it can accomplish, and its very power creates some of those limits (see William J. Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power, 1966)

In analyzing the current unipolar system, it is useful to begin with structure. No other state or plausible coalition can challenge the unipole's core security, but this does not mean that all its values are safe or that it can get everything that it wants. Contrary to what is often claimed, standard balance of power arguments do not imply that a coalition will form to challenge the unipole. Realism also indicates that rather than seeking to maintain the system, the unipole may seek further expansion. To understand the current system requires combining structural analysis with an appreciation of the particular characteristics of the current era, the United States, and its leaders. Doing so shows further incentives to change the system and highlights the role of nuclear proliferation in modifying existing arrangements. Adapted from the source document.