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We examine the roles of democratic politics and political institutions in shaping social welfare spending in 18 contemporary capitalist democracies. We explore the social spending consequences of government partisanship, electoral competition and turnout, and the self-interested behaviors of politicians and bureaucrats, as well as such relatively durable facets of political institutions as neocorporatism, state centralization, and traditionalist policy legacies. Pooled time series analyses of welfare effort in 18 nations during the 1960–82 period show that electoral turnout, as well as left and center governments increase welfare effort; that the welfare efforts of governments led by particular types of parties show significant differences and vary notably with the strength of oppositional (and junior coalitional) parties; and that relatively neocorporatist, centralized, and traditionalistic polities are high on welfare effort. Overall, our findings suggest that contrary to many claims, both partisan and nonpartisan facets of democratic politics and political institutions shape contemporary social welfare effort.

Empirical analysis of the role of democratic politics and political institutions in shaping social welfare policy in 18 capitalist democracies.

Abstract. Post‐war welfare effort (i.e., welfare spending as a share of national income) in advanced capitalist political democracies is proposed to result from policy routines emphasized in the traditional academic literatures complemented and mediated by class‐linked factors stressed in the 'new political economy' literature. Both sets of factors are integrated into a single conception of state policy‐making. In this, self‐interested elite and administrative state personnel respond to their environments by means of relatively discretionary and relatively automatic policy routines, respectively. Left and non‐Left governments mediate these routines and do so differently in different long‐term institutional (strong‐union versus weak‐union) and macroeconomic (expansionary versus crisis) contexts. Welfare expansion is found to be amply explained by the proposed processes, differentiated by context. Left parties and militants are found to matter primarily in contexts marked by 'Left corporatism'(or strong unions) and/or by relatively 'expansionary economic climates'. Ironically, Left‐party governments in Left corporatist contexts are found to be particularly sensitive to inflation where transfer spending is concerned. Where unions are strong, policy making is generally less incremental and more flexible. After 1973, policy sensitivity to real economic growth or decline looms large, and working‐class‐linked politics are muted where unions are weak, most especially where they are decentralized.

A conception of the process of state policy making in postwar welfare efforts in 16 nations is presented that integrates both the "industrial society" or "developmental" literature & the "new political economy" literature. Self-interested elite & administrative state personnel respond to their environments by means of relatively discretionary & automatic policy routines, respectively. Left & non-Left governments mediate these routines differently in different long-term institutional & macroeconomic contexts. Welfare expansion is explained by the proposed processes, differentiated by context. Left parties & militants matter primarily in contexts marked by strong unions &/or by relatively expansionary economic climates. Left-party governments in Left corporatist contexts are particularly sensitive to inflation where transfer spending is concerned. Where unions are strong, policy making is generally less incremental & more flexible. After 1973, policy sensitivity to real economic growth or decline looms large, & working-class-linked politics are muted where unions are weak, especially where they are decentralized. 6 Tables, 1 Figure, 69 References. Modified HA