This dissertation explores how to solve incentive problems in autocracies through institutional arrangements centered around political meritocracy. The question is fundamental, as merit-based rewards and promotion of politicians are the cornerstones of key authoritarian regimes such as China. Yet the grave dilemmas in bureaucratic governance are also well recognized. The three essays of the dissertation elaborate on the various solutions to these dilemmas, as well as problems associated with these solutions. Methodologically, the dissertation utilizes a combination of economic modeling, original data collection, and empirical analysis. The first chapter investigates the puzzle why entrepreneurs invest actively in many autocracies where unconstrained politicians may heavily expropriate the entrepreneurs. With a game-theoretical model, I investigate how to constrain politicians through rotation of local politicians and meritocratic evaluation of politicians based on economic growth. The key finding is that, although rotation or merit-based evaluation alone actually makes the holdup problem even worse, it is exactly their combination that can form a credible constraint on politicians to solve the hold-up problem and thus encourages private investment. An extension of the model also demonstrates that rotation and merit-based evaluation reduces politicians' entrenched interests in existing firms. This allows new firms to enter the market, which sustains Schumpeterian "creative destruction" and long-term growth. In other words, the combination of rotation and merit-based evaluation achieves both commitment and strong flexibility, a property rarely satisfied by other commitment devices. Firm-level panel data from China are further consistent with the main predictions from my model. The second chapter focuses on another critical dilemma in an autocracy, the loyalty-competence trade-off. An autocrat usually refuses to appoint a competent governor with a broad discretionary power because the governor can use his competence and discretion to challenge the autocrat. Through a game-theoretical model, I show that one-party state can potentially solve the dilemma by appointing both a party secretary and a governor to co-rule a province. The party secretary controls political power, while the governor commands the provision of the public good. The arrangement forestalls local attempts to challenge the autocrat and establishes the autocrat's confidence to promote meritocracy and decentralization. I also characterize the optimal party-government relationship: the secretary should sometimes dominate over the governor in public good provision but not always the case. This is very different from canonical theories on the separation of powers in a democracy. The model is motivated by the experience of China's party state, whose elements of meritocracy and dual leadership are modern incarnations of key institutions in Imperial China. From key historical records, I construct variables measuring political institutions over 1,300 years in Chinese history via textual analysis techniques. The statistical analysis uncovers a long-run correlation between meritocracy and dual leadership, showing the first order relevance of the theory.In the first chapter, I show how a meritocratic government with strong bureaucratic rules can contribute to a thriving market economy. In the third chapter, I also look at the other direction: when and how private economy contributes to bureaucratic capacity. This helps answer the question why some regimes maintain a persistent meritocracy, while aristocrats capture others. I show that in an environment with weak property rights, a meritocratic government and a thriving private economy reinforce each other. This matches important historical episodes such as the ``Tang-Song Transition'' in Medieval China. In an extension, I also show that legal property rights sufficiently strong can eliminate multiple equilibria, and that stronger property rights cause a more dynastic government. The extended model is employed to illustrate the difference between meritocracies in Imperial China and Ottoman Empire. It also implies a causal relationship between comparative law and state building.
This thesis consists of three empirical research papers on the political economy of China. The first chapter studies how conflict within an autocratic elite affects media content, while the second chapter shows how media content can in turn influence public opinion. The third chapter analyses the motivation and behaviour of individuals as they rise up the autocratic hierarchy.Chapter 1 offers an explanation for why media censorship varies within an autocratic country. I study how Chinese newspapers report about officials caught during Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign, by collecting close to 40,000 articles in print and the corresponding social media posts and comments. I show that individuals are significantly more likely to search for and comment on news about corrupt officials from their own province. Yet, despite greater reader interest, local newspapers underreport corruption scandals involving high-level officials from their own province. Underreporting is greater when a newspaper does not rely on advertising revenue and a corrupt official is well connected. When newspapers do report on high-level corruption at home, they deemphasise these stories, by making them shorter, less negative and less likely to explicitly mention corruption. Similarly, city-level newspapers report less about corruption in their own city relative to other cities in the same province, but are more likely to report corruption within their provincial government than corresponding provincial newspapers. These results illustrate how intergovernmental conflict within an autocracy can lead to diverging media censorship strategies by different levels of government. I present suggestive evidence that this type of localised censorship can reduce the accountability of local governments.Chapter 2 investigates whether stereotypes in entertainment media promote negative sentiment against foreigners. Despite close economic ties, anti-Japanese sentiment is high in China. I assemble detailed information on Chinese TV broadcasts during 2012 and document that around 20 percent of all TV shows aired during prime time were historical TV dramas set during the Japanese occupation of China during World War II. To identify the causal effect of media on sentiment, I exploit high-frequency data and exogenous variation in the likelihood of viewing Sino-Japanese war dramas due to channel positions and substitution between similar programmes. I show that exposure to these TV shows lead to a significant increase in anti-Japanese protests and anti-Japanese hate speech on social media across China. These effects are driven by privately rather than state-produced TV shows.Chapter 3, co-authored with Paul Dutronc-Postel, illustrates how career incentives can affect bureaucrats' policy choices. We collect data on the career histories of the top bureaucrats of all Chinese prefectures between 1996 and 2014 and identify the causal effect of career incentives by exploiting variation in the ex ante competitiveness of promotions. Bureaucrats with a smaller starting cohort have a greater likelihood of promotion. This incentivises them to adopt a strategy that relies on real estate investment and rural land expropriation, resulting in faster growth in construction and GDP. We present suggestive evidence that the same incentives result in lower investment in education, public transport and health. We corroborate our findings using survey and remote sensing data, and show that land expropriations are associated with adverse outcomes for expropriated individuals, with subsequent arrests of local officials, and with the emergence of "ghost cities". ; Cette thèse se compose de trois articles de recherche empirique sur l'économie politique de la Chine. Le premier chapitre explique pourquoi la censure des médias varie au sein d'un pays autocratique. J'étudie la façon dont les journaux chinois rendent compte des fonctionnaires arrêtés lors de la campagne anti-corruption de Xi Jinping, en rassemblant près de 40,000 articles imprimés et les publications et commentaires correspondants dans les médias sociaux. Je montre que des individus sont plus enclins à rechercher et à commenter sur des fonctionnaires corrompus de leur propre province. Pourtant, malgré un plus grand intérêt des lecteurs, les journaux locaux sous-rapportent les scandales de corruption impliquant des hauts fonctionnaires de leur propre province. Lorsque les journaux rapportent sur la corruption dans leur propre province, ils minimisent ces scandales, en les rendant plus courtes, moins négatives et moins susceptibles de mentionner explicitement la corruption. De même, les journaux municipaux rapportent moins sur la corruption dans leur propre ville que dans d'autres villes de la même province, mais sont plus susceptibles de signaler la corruption au sein de leur gouvernement provincial. Ces résultats illustrent comment les conflits intergouvernementaux peuvent conduire à des stratégies de censure des médias divergentes par différents niveaux de gouvernement. Ce type de censure localisée peut réduire la responsabilité et imputabilité des gouvernements locaux.Le deuxième chapitre examine si les stéréotypes dans les médias de divertissement provoquent un sentiment négatif à l'égard des étrangers. Malgré des liens économiques étroits, le sentiment anti-japonais est élevé en Chine. Je rassemble des informations détaillées sur les émissions de télévision chinoises en 2012 et je documente qu'environ 20 pour cent de toutes les émissions diffusées aux heures de grande écoute étaient des dramatiques historiques qui se sont déroulées pendant l'occupation japonaise de la Chine. Pour identifier l'effet causal des médias, j'exploite les données à haute fréquence et la variation exogène de la probabilité de regarder des series de guerre sino-japonaises en raison des positions des chaînes et de la substitution entre des programmes similaires. Je montre que l'exposition à ces émissions de télévision conduit à une augmentation significative des manifestations antijaponaises et des discours de haine anti-japonais sur les médias sociaux en Chine. Ces effets sont attribuables à des émissions télévisées produites par des entreprises privées plutôt qu'à des émissions produites par l'État.Le troisième chapitre, co-écrit avec Paul Dutronc-Postel, illustre comment les incitations peuvent affecter les choix politiques des bureaucrates. Nous collectons les historiques de carrière des fonctionnaires de toutes les préfectures chinoises entre 1996 et 2014 et nous identifions l'effet causal des incitations en exploitant la variation ex ante du nombre de concurrents. Les cadres avec une cohorte initiale plus petite ont une plus grande probabilité de promotion. Cela les pousse à adopter une stratégie qui repose sur l'investissement immobilier et l'expropriation des terres rurales, et ce qui se traduit par une croissance plus rapide de la construction et du PIB. Nous présentons des preuves suggestives que les mêmes incitations entraînent une baisse des investissements dans des biens publics. Nous montrons que les expropriations de terres sont associées à des résultats négatifs pour les personnes expropriées, à des arrestations ultérieures de fonctionnaires locaux et à l'émergence de villes fantômes.
This thesis consists of three empirical research papers on the political economy of China. The first chapter studies how conflict within an autocratic elite affects media content, while the second chapter shows how media content can in turn influence public opinion. The third chapter analyses the motivation and behaviour of individuals as they rise up the autocratic hierarchy.Chapter 1 offers an explanation for why media censorship varies within an autocratic country. I study how Chinese newspapers report about officials caught during Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign, by collecting close to 40,000 articles in print and the corresponding social media posts and comments. I show that individuals are significantly more likely to search for and comment on news about corrupt officials from their own province. Yet, despite greater reader interest, local newspapers underreport corruption scandals involving high-level officials from their own province. Underreporting is greater when a newspaper does not rely on advertising revenue and a corrupt official is well connected. When newspapers do report on high-level corruption at home, they deemphasise these stories, by making them shorter, less negative and less likely to explicitly mention corruption. Similarly, city-level newspapers report less about corruption in their own city relative to other cities in the same province, but are more likely to report corruption within their provincial government than corresponding provincial newspapers. These results illustrate how intergovernmental conflict within an autocracy can lead to diverging media censorship strategies by different levels of government. I present suggestive evidence that this type of localised censorship can reduce the accountability of local governments.Chapter 2 investigates whether stereotypes in entertainment media promote negative sentiment against foreigners. Despite close economic ties, anti-Japanese sentiment is high in China. I assemble detailed information on Chinese TV broadcasts during 2012 and document that around 20 percent of all TV shows aired during prime time were historical TV dramas set during the Japanese occupation of China during World War II. To identify the causal effect of media on sentiment, I exploit high-frequency data and exogenous variation in the likelihood of viewing Sino-Japanese war dramas due to channel positions and substitution between similar programmes. I show that exposure to these TV shows lead to a significant increase in anti-Japanese protests and anti-Japanese hate speech on social media across China. These effects are driven by privately rather than state-produced TV shows.Chapter 3, co-authored with Paul Dutronc-Postel, illustrates how career incentives can affect bureaucrats' policy choices. We collect data on the career histories of the top bureaucrats of all Chinese prefectures between 1996 and 2014 and identify the causal effect of career incentives by exploiting variation in the ex ante competitiveness of promotions. Bureaucrats with a smaller starting cohort have a greater likelihood of promotion. This incentivises them to adopt a strategy that relies on real estate investment and rural land expropriation, resulting in faster growth in construction and GDP. We present suggestive evidence that the same incentives result in lower investment in education, public transport and health. We corroborate our findings using survey and remote sensing data, and show that land expropriations are associated with adverse outcomes for expropriated individuals, with subsequent arrests of local officials, and with the emergence of "ghost cities". ; Cette thèse se compose de trois articles de recherche empirique sur l'économie politique de la Chine. Le premier chapitre explique pourquoi la censure des médias varie au sein d'un pays autocratique. J'étudie la façon dont les journaux chinois rendent compte des fonctionnaires arrêtés lors de la campagne anti-corruption de Xi Jinping, en rassemblant près de 40,000 articles imprimés et les publications et commentaires correspondants dans les médias sociaux. Je montre que des individus sont plus enclins à rechercher et à commenter sur des fonctionnaires corrompus de leur propre province. Pourtant, malgré un plus grand intérêt des lecteurs, les journaux locaux sous-rapportent les scandales de corruption impliquant des hauts fonctionnaires de leur propre province. Lorsque les journaux rapportent sur la corruption dans leur propre province, ils minimisent ces scandales, en les rendant plus courtes, moins négatives et moins susceptibles de mentionner explicitement la corruption. De même, les journaux municipaux rapportent moins sur la corruption dans leur propre ville que dans d'autres villes de la même province, mais sont plus susceptibles de signaler la corruption au sein de leur gouvernement provincial. Ces résultats illustrent comment les conflits intergouvernementaux peuvent conduire à des stratégies de censure des médias divergentes par différents niveaux de gouvernement. Ce type de censure localisée peut réduire la responsabilité et imputabilité des gouvernements locaux.Le deuxième chapitre examine si les stéréotypes dans les médias de divertissement provoquent un sentiment négatif à l'égard des étrangers. Malgré des liens économiques étroits, le sentiment anti-japonais est élevé en Chine. Je rassemble des informations détaillées sur les émissions de télévision chinoises en 2012 et je documente qu'environ 20 pour cent de toutes les émissions diffusées aux heures de grande écoute étaient des dramatiques historiques qui se sont déroulées pendant l'occupation japonaise de la Chine. Pour identifier l'effet causal des médias, j'exploite les données à haute fréquence et la variation exogène de la probabilité de regarder des series de guerre sino-japonaises en raison des positions des chaînes et de la substitution entre des programmes similaires. Je montre que l'exposition à ces émissions de télévision conduit à une augmentation significative des manifestations antijaponaises et des discours de haine anti-japonais sur les médias sociaux en Chine. Ces effets sont attribuables à des émissions télévisées produites par des entreprises privées plutôt qu'à des émissions produites par l'État.Le troisième chapitre, co-écrit avec Paul Dutronc-Postel, illustre comment les incitations peuvent affecter les choix politiques des bureaucrates. Nous collectons les historiques de carrière des fonctionnaires de toutes les préfectures chinoises entre 1996 et 2014 et nous identifions l'effet causal des incitations en exploitant la variation ex ante du nombre de concurrents. Les cadres avec une cohorte initiale plus petite ont une plus grande probabilité de promotion. Cela les pousse à adopter une stratégie qui repose sur l'investissement immobilier et l'expropriation des terres rurales, et ce qui se traduit par une croissance plus rapide de la construction et du PIB. Nous présentons des preuves suggestives que les mêmes incitations entraînent une baisse des investissements dans des biens publics. Nous montrons que les expropriations de terres sont associées à des résultats négatifs pour les personnes expropriées, à des arrestations ultérieures de fonctionnaires locaux et à l'émergence de villes fantômes.
This thesis consists of three empirical research papers on the political economy of China. The first chapter studies how conflict within an autocratic elite affects media content, while the second chapter shows how media content can in turn influence public opinion. The third chapter analyses the motivation and behaviour of individuals as they rise up the autocratic hierarchy.Chapter 1 offers an explanation for why media censorship varies within an autocratic country. I study how Chinese newspapers report about officials caught during Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign, by collecting close to 40,000 articles in print and the corresponding social media posts and comments. I show that individuals are significantly more likely to search for and comment on news about corrupt officials from their own province. Yet, despite greater reader interest, local newspapers underreport corruption scandals involving high-level officials from their own province. Underreporting is greater when a newspaper does not rely on advertising revenue and a corrupt official is well connected. When newspapers do report on high-level corruption at home, they deemphasise these stories, by making them shorter, less negative and less likely to explicitly mention corruption. Similarly, city-level newspapers report less about corruption in their own city relative to other cities in the same province, but are more likely to report corruption within their provincial government than corresponding provincial newspapers. These results illustrate how intergovernmental conflict within an autocracy can lead to diverging media censorship strategies by different levels of government. I present suggestive evidence that this type of localised censorship can reduce the accountability of local governments.Chapter 2 investigates whether stereotypes in entertainment media promote negative sentiment against foreigners. Despite close economic ties, anti-Japanese sentiment is high in China. I assemble detailed information on Chinese TV broadcasts during 2012 and document that around 20 percent of all TV shows aired during prime time were historical TV dramas set during the Japanese occupation of China during World War II. To identify the causal effect of media on sentiment, I exploit high-frequency data and exogenous variation in the likelihood of viewing Sino-Japanese war dramas due to channel positions and substitution between similar programmes. I show that exposure to these TV shows lead to a significant increase in anti-Japanese protests and anti-Japanese hate speech on social media across China. These effects are driven by privately rather than state-produced TV shows.Chapter 3, co-authored with Paul Dutronc-Postel, illustrates how career incentives can affect bureaucrats' policy choices. We collect data on the career histories of the top bureaucrats of all Chinese prefectures between 1996 and 2014 and identify the causal effect of career incentives by exploiting variation in the ex ante competitiveness of promotions. Bureaucrats with a smaller starting cohort have a greater likelihood of promotion. This incentivises them to adopt a strategy that relies on real estate investment and rural land expropriation, resulting in faster growth in construction and GDP. We present suggestive evidence that the same incentives result in lower investment in education, public transport and health. We corroborate our findings using survey and remote sensing data, and show that land expropriations are associated with adverse outcomes for expropriated individuals, with subsequent arrests of local officials, and with the emergence of "ghost cities". ; Cette thèse se compose de trois articles de recherche empirique sur l'économie politique de la Chine. Le premier chapitre explique pourquoi la censure des médias varie au sein d'un pays autocratique. J'étudie la façon dont les journaux chinois rendent compte des fonctionnaires arrêtés lors de la campagne anti-corruption de Xi Jinping, en rassemblant près de 40,000 articles imprimés et les publications et commentaires correspondants dans les médias sociaux. Je montre que des individus sont plus enclins à rechercher et à commenter sur des fonctionnaires corrompus de leur propre province. Pourtant, malgré un plus grand intérêt des lecteurs, les journaux locaux sous-rapportent les scandales de corruption impliquant des hauts fonctionnaires de leur propre province. Lorsque les journaux rapportent sur la corruption dans leur propre province, ils minimisent ces scandales, en les rendant plus courtes, moins négatives et moins susceptibles de mentionner explicitement la corruption. De même, les journaux municipaux rapportent moins sur la corruption dans leur propre ville que dans d'autres villes de la même province, mais sont plus susceptibles de signaler la corruption au sein de leur gouvernement provincial. Ces résultats illustrent comment les conflits intergouvernementaux peuvent conduire à des stratégies de censure des médias divergentes par différents niveaux de gouvernement. Ce type de censure localisée peut réduire la responsabilité et imputabilité des gouvernements locaux.Le deuxième chapitre examine si les stéréotypes dans les médias de divertissement provoquent un sentiment négatif à l'égard des étrangers. Malgré des liens économiques étroits, le sentiment anti-japonais est élevé en Chine. Je rassemble des informations détaillées sur les émissions de télévision chinoises en 2012 et je documente qu'environ 20 pour cent de toutes les émissions diffusées aux heures de grande écoute étaient des dramatiques historiques qui se sont déroulées pendant l'occupation japonaise de la Chine. Pour identifier l'effet causal des médias, j'exploite les données à haute fréquence et la variation exogène de la probabilité de regarder des series de guerre sino-japonaises en raison des positions des chaînes et de la substitution entre des programmes similaires. Je montre que l'exposition à ces émissions de télévision conduit à une augmentation significative des manifestations antijaponaises et des discours de haine anti-japonais sur les médias sociaux en Chine. Ces effets sont attribuables à des émissions télévisées produites par des entreprises privées plutôt qu'à des émissions produites par l'État.Le troisième chapitre, co-écrit avec Paul Dutronc-Postel, illustre comment les incitations peuvent affecter les choix politiques des bureaucrates. Nous collectons les historiques de carrière des fonctionnaires de toutes les préfectures chinoises entre 1996 et 2014 et nous identifions l'effet causal des incitations en exploitant la variation ex ante du nombre de concurrents. Les cadres avec une cohorte initiale plus petite ont une plus grande probabilité de promotion. Cela les pousse à adopter une stratégie qui repose sur l'investissement immobilier et l'expropriation des terres rurales, et ce qui se traduit par une croissance plus rapide de la construction et du PIB. Nous présentons des preuves suggestives que les mêmes incitations entraînent une baisse des investissements dans des biens publics. Nous montrons que les expropriations de terres sont associées à des résultats négatifs pour les personnes expropriées, à des arrestations ultérieures de fonctionnaires locaux et à l'émergence de villes fantômes.
Das Jahr 1989 markiert nicht nur den Beginn entscheidender geopolitischer Veränderungen, sondern gleichzeitig den Ursprung eines bedeutsamen Wandels in der internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Mit der viel beachteten Studie 'Sub-Saharan Africa – From Crisis to Sustainable Growth' initiierte die Weltbank eine Debatte über die Relevanz institutioneller Faktoren für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, die in den folgenden Jahren unter dem Titel 'Good Governance' erhebliche Bedeutung erlangte. Nahezu alle zentralen Akteure begannen, entsprechende Aspekte in ihrer praktischen Arbeit zu berücksichtigen, und entwickelten eigene Konzepte zu dieser Thematik. Wenn auch mit der Konzentration auf Institutionen als Entwicklungsdeterminanten eine grundlegende Gemeinsamkeit der Ansätze festzustellen ist, unterscheiden sie sich jedoch erheblich im Hinblick auf die Einbeziehung politischer Faktoren, so dass von einem einheitlichen Verständnis von 'Good Governance' nicht gesprochen werden kann. Während die meisten bilateralen Akteure sowie DAC und UNDP Demokratie und Menschenrechte explizit als zentrale Bestandteile betrachten, identifiziert die Weltbank einen Kern von Good Governance, der unabhängig von der Herrschaftsform, also sowohl in Demokratien wie auch in Autokratien, verwirklicht werden kann. Die Implikationen dieser Feststellung sind weit reichend. Zunächst erlaubt erst diese Sichtweise der Bank überhaupt, entsprechende Aspekte aufzugreifen, da ihr eine Berücksichtigung politischer Faktoren durch ihre Statuten verboten ist. Bedeutsamer ist allerdings, dass die Behauptung der Trennbarkeit von Good Governance und der Form politischer Herrschaft die Möglichkeit eröffnet, Entwicklung zu erreichen ohne eine demokratische Ordnung zu etablieren, da folglich autokratische Systeme in gleicher Weise wie Demokratien in der Lage sind, die institutionellen Voraussetzungen zu verwirklichen, welche als zentrale Determinanten für wirtschaftlichen Fortschritt identifiziert wurden. Damit entfällt nicht nur ein bedeutsamer Rechtfertigungsgrund für demokratische Herrschaft als solche, sondern rekurrierend auf bestimmte, dieser zu attestierende, entwicklungshemmende Charakteristika können Autokratien nun möglicherweise als überlegene Herrschaftsform verstanden werden, da sie durch jene nicht gekennzeichnet sind. Die Schlussfolgerungen der Weltbank unterstützen somit auch die vor allem im Zusammenhang mit der Erfolgsgeschichte der ostasiatischen Tigerstaaten vertretene Idee der Entwicklungsdiktatur, die heute mit dem Aufstieg der Volksrepublik China eine Renaissance erlebt. Der wirtschaftliche Erfolg dieser Staaten ist danach auf die überlegene Handlungsfähigkeit autokratischer Systeme zurückzuführen, während Demokratien aufgrund der Verantwortlichkeitsbeziehungen zwischen Regierenden und Regierten nicht in der Lage sind, die notwendigen Entscheidungen zu treffen und durchzusetzen. Die dargestellte Sichtweise der Weltbank ist allerdings von verschiedenen Autoren in Zweifel gezogen worden, die auch für ein im Wesentlichen auf technische Elemente beschränktes Good Governance-Konzept einen Zusammenhang mit der Form politischer Herrschaft erkennen. So wird beispielsweise vertreten, das Konzept der Bank bewege sich ausdrücklich nicht in einem systemneutralen Vakuum, sondern propagiere zumindest implizit die Etablierung demokratischer Regierungsformen. Im Übrigen steht die aus den Annahmen der Weltbank neuerlich abgeleitete Idee der Entwicklungsdiktatur in einem erheblichen Widerspruch zu der von multilateralen wie bilateralen Akteuren verstärkt verfolgten Förderung demokratischer Herrschaft als Mittel für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung sowie der fortschreitenden Verbreitung der Demokratie. Besteht nun doch ein Einfluss der Herrschaftsform auf die Verwirklichung von Good Governance als zentraler Entwicklungsdeterminante und kann zudem davon ausgegangen werden, dass Demokratien diesbezüglich Vorteile besitzen, dann ist eine Entwicklungsdiktatur keine denkbare Möglichkeit, sondern im Gegenteil demokratische Herrschaft der gebotene Weg zu wirtschaftlichem Wachstum bzw. einer Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse. Aufgrund der mit den Schlussfolgerungen der Weltbank verbundenen bedeutsamen Implikationen und der bisher weitestgehend fehlenden ausführlichen Thematisierung dieses Gegenstands in der Literatur ist eine detaillierte theoretische Betrachtung der Zusammenhänge zwischen den zentralen Elementen von Good Governance und demokratischer Herrschaft notwendig. Darüber hinaus sollen die angesprochenen Beziehungen auch einer empirischen Analyse unterzogen werden. Gegenstand dieser Arbeit ist deshalb die Fragestellung, ob Good Governance eine von demokratischer Herrschaft theoretisch und empirisch unabhängige Entwicklungsstrategie darstellt. ; The year 1989 has not only brought the beginning of crucial geopolitical transformations after a period of confrontation that lasted for more than four decades but simultaneously the rise of a significant change in the international development cooperation. With the famous study 'Sub-Saharan Africa – From Crisis to Sustainable Growth', the World Bank initiated a debate on the relevance of institutional factors for economic development which obtained remarkable importance in the subsequent years under the title 'good governance'. Virtually all central actors started to consider such aspects and heed them in their practical work, among them the Bretton-Woods-organizations World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD and a multitude of bilateral players. But although there was an essential consensus about the concentration on institutions as determinants for development, the concepts differ considerably regarding the inclusion of political factors. Therefore it is not possible to assume that there is an undivided understanding of 'good governance'. Whereas most of the bilateral actors as well as DAC and UNDP explicitly regard democracy and human rights as central elements, the World Bank defines a core of good governance that is independent from the form of political rule and therefore possible to achieve in both democracies and autocracies. The implications of this ascertainment are far reaching. First of all, this perception actually permits the bank to include institutional aspects in its work since their articles of agreement prohibit political factors to be taken into account. But more relevant is that the idea that good governance can be separated from the form of political rule provides the opportunity to achieve development without the establishment of a democratic order, since autocratic regimes are in the same way as democracies able to realize the necessary preconditions which have been identified as central determinants for economic progress. As a consequence, not only does an important justification for democracy itself vanish, but referring to certain characteristics of democratic regimes that are seen to repress development, autocracies can perhaps be identified as the superior form of rule. The World Bank's conclusions therefore also support the idea of an undemocratic developmentalist state which evolved in the context of the East Asian tigers' success stories and is of relevance today because of China's economic rise. Accordingly, the prosperity of these countries can be traced back to the predominant capacity to act while democracies are not able to reach the necessary decisions and to implement inevitable policies because of the accountability relations between the branches of government and the people. In addition, to assume that certain factors relevant for development are independent from the form of political regime has further consequences. It is now possible for extern players and for affected countries, to boost economic development without being confronted with the difficulties of a change in the system, explicitly the redemption of an autocratic regime and the institutionalization and consolidation of a democracy. Furthermore, autocratic rulers cannot stabilize their leadership by satisfying the needs of the population without starting a political change. nBut the World Bank's view is far from being undisputed. A multitude of authors recognize multifaceted connections between the form of political rule and good governance, even though the latter is limited to technical aspects. For example, the bank's concept is regarded as not neutral relative to the form of rule and implicitly propagating a democratic regime. For the rest, the idea of an undemocratic developmentalist state stands in clear contradiction to the spread of democracy in the 1990s as a part of the third wave of democratization and to the promotion of democracy by multilateral and bilateral players as a means for economic development. If there is actually an influence of the form of political rule on those institutional factors identified as central determinants for development and if an advantage of democracies can be found, then a developmentalist autocracy is no viable possibility. Far from it, democracy could then be seen as the appropriate path to economic growth and an improved living standard. Because of the meaningful implications of the World Bank's conclusions and since there is no detailed study of this subject in scientific literature, a detailed theoretical as well as empirical analysis of the relationship between democracy and good governance is necessary. The question if good governance is a development strategy that is theoretically and empirically independent from democratic rule therefore is discussed in this paper.
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To many observers, the leadership of President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has marked an emerging shift in the Indo-American relationship, pointing towards a new era of mutual alignment. A plethora of bilateral summits proclaiming a "high-level of engagement" to craft "an enduring India-U.S. partnership," expanded joint-defense collaboration, the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues, deepening technological linkages, and shared security interests regarding the rise of China indicate there may have been a substantial shift in Indian strategy.While relations are undeniably strong, policymakers should remain skeptical that this stems from an underlying geopolitical alignment. Despite moving closer to the Western camp, India maintains a strategy of multi-alignment and will likely continue to do so in the coming decades.We Have Been Here BeforeThis is not the first time that there has been an apparent Indo-American rapprochement. India's doctrine of nonalignment, combined with their linkages to the Soviet Union and American diplomatic relations with Pakistan, caused distrust throughout the Cold War. Yet, the partnership blossomed after the turn of the millennium under the Bush administration, with significant cooperation in counter-terrorism, advanced technological development, democracy promotion, and environmental protection.Despite India's nuclear program and subsequent nuclear tests violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), George W. Bush lifted economic and military sanctions in 2001. In 2006, India and the United States signed the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which allowed access to civilian nuclear reactor technology.Much like today, there were several joint agreements. If you file off the dates, many mirror Biden and Modi's pledges, with commitments to expand joint exercises, defend democracy, and create cooperative groups such as the Defense Policy Group (DPG), which resulted in new American arms sales to India.There was considerable optimism at the start of the Obama administration that India would officially pivot into the Western camp. However, this hope was illusory. New elections in India brought in elites who favored strategic autonomy. Obama inflamed fears around American credibility by improving relations with China and discussing a potential G-2, a core Indian concern. Despite inching closer towards alignment for the past decade, India rapidly flipped away from the United States by joining China-led initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Furthermore, India continued to maintain its reliance on Russian arms, which limited the potential for joint military planning.Obama tried to mend the rift, but it was too little, too late, and the alliance has maintained a distinctly transactional feel until the present day. A lesson should be learned: seemingly strong Indo-American bonds can crack when security interests shift.Flashpoints for TensionsMuch like in the Obama administration, a confluence of factors could easily reverse recent gains. India and Russia remain partners despite the invasion of Ukraine. In line with much of the Global South, they have consistently abstained from condemning Russian actions and refused to sanction Russian oil (although allegedly this may have been in line with Washington's desire to stabilize oil prices). Perhaps most importantly, India's military remains reliant on Russian arms. Recently, they started to somewhat distance themselves from the Russian defense industry, but India still calculates that a strong relationship with Moscow is necessary to prevent isolationism that would push them further into China's strategic orbit.This limits India's commitment to one of the main American security architectures in the Indo-Pacific, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). Russian arms are not interoperable with the rest of the QUAD's forces, which could dampen air and sea superiority in a crisis. But even if India tried to fully transition away from Russian arms, Russia has sold them the largest share of weapons for decades. The limited interoperability of Russian and American arms complicates any large-scale shift by magnifying costs and risking Indian defenses in the meantime. Regardless of how the American relationship develops, Russia will continue to be a fixture in Indian security interests for the foreseeable future. India has new concerns about American reliability, especially after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Already, there are concerns that the weapons left behind are arming Kashmir separatists trying to split from India in favor of Pakistan. While relations under the Trump administration were not hostile, a return to an 'America First' foreign policy could make India calculate they need to hedge their bets away from the United States if they don't trust Trump's willingness to assist in a crisis.Perhaps the most recent flash point in the relationship was the attempted assassination against Sikh activist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, an American citizen, on American soil. All signs point to Indian officials being directly involved with the plot, which could be unacceptable to the United States.This points to a broader divergence between New Delhi and Washington: Indian democratic backsliding. It seems increasingly doubtful that Indo-American relations, as some have argued, can be grounded by shared ideological values. The rise of Hindu nationalism has tarnished Indian democracy, leading to discriminatory legislation against Muslim Indians and a substantial increase in hate crimes. Modi himself recently implied Muslims were "infiltrators," a common Islamophobic trope in Hindu nationalist hate speech. Outside extra-judicial killings, Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has increasingly escalated assaults against India's democratic principles. Political opponents, from politicians to activists to journalists, have been jailed under the pretense of anti-corruption measures, with peaceful protests violently stamped out. Most measurements of democratization have downgraded democratic India's status to "partly free" or even an "electoral autocracy."None of this is to gloss over the United States' electoral flaws, but India's trajectory is directly contradictory to the "shared values" expressed in the joint summits and implies that should security interests diverge, there won't be much tethering Indo-American coordination.Indian Multi-Alignment and Great Power AmbitionsIt is undeniable that Modi's foreign policy choices are motivated by great power desires. India is the world's most populous country and in a position to surge economically. A consumer boom and wage growth are likely incoming, with plenty of room for industries to meet the needs of the growing consumer class. Its population size will create a powerhouse working class to power growing markets for emerging technologies, clean energy, and businesses seeking new supply chains outside of China. Additionally, India is increasingly trying to position itself as the voice of the Global South, which often puts it in opposition to American and European interests. India has one of the strongest militaries in Asia and the ability to project power regionally. The Indian Ocean's name is no coincidence. India will not give up regional hegemony without a fight. To achieve these goals, India cannot play second fiddle to America forever. It is increasingly clear that India's strategic approach is to keep its options open so it can take advantage of whatever side best suits its interests. This is not to imply that there will be an imminent breakup. For the time being, there is a growing bipartisan understanding in Washington that China is the largest long-term threat to American security, which makes for a natural partnership with India, which fears Chinese territorial encroachment. India's threat perceptions seem to be locked in after military crises in 2014, 2017, 2020, and 2022.As of now, the BJP is positioned to maintain power after the 2024 election, making it unlikely to impact the trajectory of the relationship barring an unforeseen anti-American faction gaining footing. Should the party expand its hold over Parliament, the surface of the relationship may remain the same, but centralizing Modi's power would only exacerbate his authoritarian and hawkish leanings.Still, India's growing illiberalism shouldn't be a barrier for the moment. The United States has a long history of working with dictatorships that have questionable human rights records. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pinochet-controlled Chile immediately come to mind. Security interests frequently trump moral qualms. But should the security situation change — as a result of U.S.-China rapprochement, a surprise change in Indian or American leadership, or a crisis of credibility — policymakers may find that there is not much at the core of the relationship. India may be useful to American strategists who want to balance China for now, but make no mistake, India will not sacrifice its core interests to appease the United States. Security relationships can seem momentarily strong, but they are a house of cards vulnerable to shifting geopolitical winds.